

THE FUTURES
OF
IRAN'S NUCLEAR STRATEGY:
OPTIONS FOR A NUCLEAR AGE

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Today, the Cold War has disappeared but thousands of those weapons have not. In a strange turn of history, the threat of global nuclear war has gone down, but the risk of nuclear attack has gone up. More nations have acquired these weapons. Testing has continued. Black market trade in nuclear secrets and nuclear materials abound. The technology to build a bomb has spread. Terrorists are determined to buy, build or steal one. Our efforts to contain these dangers are centered on a global non-proliferation regime, but as more people and nations break the rules, we could reach the point where the center cannot hold.

President Barack Obama

Prague, April 2009

“Any use of nuclear weapons by accident or design risks human casualties and economic dislocation on a catastrophic scale. Stopping the proliferation of such weapons and their potential use, by either state or non-state actors must remain an urgent priority for collective security.” (Report on the Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 2004)

Since the discovery of fissile material, nuclear technology and weaponry, the international community has worked to find the balance between fostering the peaceful use of nuclear power, while simultaneously safeguarding against continued global proliferation and development of nuclear weapons. Until 1953, U.S. policy supported the concepts outlined in the Baruch Plan, which proposed the establishment of an international agency that would own and control all nuclear capable weapons. This organization would also immediately administer sanctions to any country that attempted to build or acquire nuclear weapons or fissile material. This plan was never adopted by the global community, but shortly after WWII, in 1957, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established to apply oversight and monitor world nuclear ambitions. An actual formal international agreement to limit the spread of nuclear weapons was put into force more than a decade later, in March 1970, under the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. For the most part, the treaty has helped to shape a framework to limit the spread of nuclear arms, while the IAEA, reporting to the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council, monitors participating countries to insure compliance with the statutes set forth in the agreement.

Under the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, for non-nuclear states seeking a peaceful nuclear program, the agency has provided standards and oversight, requiring transparency in regards to any fissionable material required by the states to complete their program. For both weapon states and non-nuclear states, The IAEA also requires an accounting system to track materials. Over time, additional provisions have been amended to the structure of the IAEA as to provide the agency increased access to information, physical locations, and to increase the overall efficiency of the program.

Despite increased oversight, some states have abused the guidelines set forth in the IAEA regulations. North Korea is one example, but more recently, in September 2009 evidence was provided indicating that Iran has been creating a secret uranium enrichment facility at Qom, and it became apparent that for years Iran has not been in compliance to the NPT and IAEA regulations. Iran has been assuring the world and the IAEA that over the years they have acting in good faith; that their nuclear pursuits were and are peaceful. This new discovery casts doubt on these intentions and increases tension to an already strained Middle East and based on Iran's response could escalate toward military confrontation.

As the result of the potential threat a nuclear armed Iran poses to countries such as Israel and the United States as well as future implications in regards to nuclear proliferation, it is essential to look at the possible futures and to determine what next steps may be best for various state actors to insure stability, world security, to protect the interests and safety of each participant as well as to promote the legal framework of the Security Council, the IAEA and the NPT.

This paper seeks to explore the possible next steps/responses to Iran's nuclear pursuits as well as how Iran's nuclear program will then affect relations and policy in the Middle East and among other world participants, most notably the United States, Israel and the P 5 + 1, (This represents five permanent UN Security Council Members and Germany). *The Security Council will be treated as one unit for this particular study, with particular attention paid to Russia and China.*

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LITERATURE REVIEW

There is significant literature concerning Iran's pursuit of nuclear power, theories of nuclear non-proliferation and approaches to contain those threats. Events surrounding questions of Iran's non-compliance and internal unrest continue to unfold every day. As a result, much information for this particular study comes from open source articles, websites, agency reports, press releases, State Department and White House updates and interviews. Though there is always the danger of bias, in this particular case it helped to illuminate the perspectives from each country as well as their views of each other. In regards to the history of relationships, policy, nuclear development and strategy, there is a plethora of good material.

To provide a foundation for comprehending U.S. policy and the international perspective concerning the nuclear issue and Iran, one can turn to various intelligence reports, congressional testimonies or binding treaties. Some of the texts that were explored for this study include the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate, a Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and other CRS reports for Congress from experts such as Katzman and Kerr. Also significant were the IAEA Implementations of Safeguards Agreement and a response dated December 2009 from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the IAEA.

One significant aspect of the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate was its dual approach in regards to Iran's nuclear pursuits and intentions. It recanted information from 2005 in which it was reported that Iran was indeed a threat and stated with 'high confidence' that Iran was developing a nuclear weapons program. In a complete flip, the 2007 report claimed that in 2003, Iran halted its nuclear program, possibly not restarted until mid 2007 and would have the capability of producing nuclear weapons between the years 2010 and 2015.

According to Paul Kerr, in a November 2009 CRS report, the NIE was amended as a result of updated intelligence information made available. He shares the perspective that

Iran stopped its nuclear weapons program, but is keeping options open. He lists several reasons for this view including the following: there has been no proof, it would undermine a fatwa issued by Khamenei, and Iran has demonstrated changes that reflect great openness (Kerr, 2009, 16).

Nicholas Burns, the Under Secretary for Political affairs had a different perspective. On March 29, 2007 in a Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he presented this view:

“The greatest immediate threat posed by the Iranian regime is its pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability....For nearly three decades, dealing with Tehran’s confrontational ideology and strident anti-Americanism has been a persistent dilemma for our country. But never have the concerns regarding Iran’s intentions been more serious, the intricacies of Iranian politics more significant or the policy imperatives more urgent than they are today....repeatedly defying its obligations under international law and appalling the world with the most abhorrent, irresponsible rhetoric from a world leader in many years. Ahmadinejad has declared that Iran’s nuclear program has “no brakes” and the Iranian regime has brazenly disregarded demands from both the International Atomic Energy Agency and the United Nations Security Council for a full suspension of its enrichment related and reprocessing activities. There is now a major international coalition of countries asking Iran to abandon a nuclear weapons capability” (Burns, 2007, p.7).

In the May 2006, Hearings Before The Committee on Foreign Relations experts discuss the history of Iran, the history and science behind its nuclear program as well as some added concerns for the future. In a display of what turned out to be incredible insight, Albright, the president of the Institute for Science and International Security, outlined a scenario of potential concern. In his statement he maintained that the best way that Iran could create enriched uranium for weapons production would be to build a clandestine, small gas centrifuge plant to make weapons grade uranium. Dr. Albright concluded that the plant could only be for the purpose of nuclear weapons production, so

would need to be made secretly. His scenario closely described the site at Qom discovered in the fall of 2009.

Of specific interest were also comments from (then) Senators Biden and Obama. Biden offers a balanced assessment of the leadership in Iran, “I do not regard the Tehran regime as irrational, but the framework for their decision making is very different from our own” (Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing 2006, p.3).

The panel experts also have other material that supplies rich and current information on the Middle East, nuclear science and history and the policy and leadership of Iran. Some of the noted experts include: Dr. Robert Einhorn, Dr. Albright, Dr. Pollack, Mr. Sadjadpur, Dr Clawson and Dr. Kemp.

The concerns with a nuclear Iran are not limited to this current situation, but are part of a larger nuclear issue. As such, the discussions concerning Iran should be held in a larger context. In that way, decision makers, strategists, leaders and the international community can more deeply comprehend the impact and far-reaching consequences of their decisions not only on the future of nuclear expansion, but global security and responsibility. For that reason, material discussing the economics of nuclear spread, the security risks, and methods to address nuclear non proliferation are included in this study.

Experts in nuclear strategy offer well rounded approaches to theories on non-nuclear proliferation, reducing nuclear risk and the connection between nuclear energy and climate change in Daedalus, The Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Sagan and Miller, in “Nuclear Power without Proliferation” differentiate among the expansion of nuclear power and its spread. This definition is important in the further risk classification they outline. The ‘expansion’ of nuclear power is the buildup of nuclear facilities within nations that currently have power plant and nuclear energy. ‘Spread’ refers to the new programs developing or waiting for approval in states without any nuclear energy.

According to Sagan and Miller, three criteria should be explored in relation to the ‘spread’ of nuclear power. In order to insure that new nuclear programs are managed effectively and securely, the states will need to have “good governance characteristics” which includes “high political stability, low degrees of corruption, strong regulatory competence and high governmental effectiveness scores” Secondly, it is required that all new states must agree with the IAEA safeguards. Of specific interest, according to the article, historically states that have attempted secret weapons programs have been by non-democratic governments. Finally, to insure overall international security, states that have internal terror attacks within their own borders cannot insure that they can provide safeguards for new nuclear facilities (Sagan and Miller 2009, p.9). Other articles share equally as compelling thoughts about the future of nuclear energy and the implications to global security and can help to shape policy and direction for years to come.

Two other categories of research lent insights into diplomacy and foreign affairs from a United States and Russian perspective. In Surrender Is Not an Option, John Bolton, former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations provides background into some internal impressions of the US executive team relative to the United Nations and international diplomacy. With regards to Iran, Bolton shares insights into Iran’s nuclear weapons program. He illustrates a country that has misled and deceived the public. One example is in the following statement about a conversation with then Secretary of State Colin Powell. In 2004, after announcing his resignation, Powell had follow-up interviews, some that involved questions about Iran. Colin Powell remarked, “I have seen some information that would suggest they have actively been working on delivery systems. You don’t have a weapon until you can put it in something that can deliver a weapon. I am talking about what one does with a warhead. We are talking about information that says they not only have missiles, but information that suggests they are working hard about how to put the two together” (Bolton 2009, p.316).

Another perspective of the United States and Middle East relations comes from Yevgeny Primakov, former Soviet Intelligence Operative and Prime Minister of Russia, in Russia and the Arabs. He addresses a history of U.S. and Soviet interaction in the

Middle East from a Russian view. In his picture of US involvement he maintains that the United States' covert use of extremists in the Middle East resulted in the concerns of today. He further states that it was US policy that has served to create many of the current problems and the mistrust of the West in Iran. "The reckless policy paved the way to the tragedy of 2001. All along, the Mujahideen had planned to turn against the United States once they'd rid Afghanistan of the Russians" (Primakov, 2009, p.91). He also reflects that now the United States and Russia can mend the problems there. He adds, "There has been a fresh rapprochement between the United States and Russia on settling the conflict in the Middle East" (Primakov, 2009, p.91).

Offering an insight into Iran's nuclear program and the problems with some of the recent EU proposals from Iran's perspective, Muhammad Sahimi, Professor of Chemical Engineering and Materials of Science, University of Southern California, presents a staunch argument for Iran's frustration. He compares the offers from Iran by the EU and by his reflection some of the items that are presented to Iran extend the provisions of the NPT. For example, in article 36, it requests that Iran, "make a legally binding commitment not to withdraw from the NPT and to keep all Iranian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguard under all circumstances" (Sahimi 2005, p.40). Sahimi further explores the agreements and find areas that create a different understanding for the stalemate and the refusals for dialogue.

Another physicist and policy official, Gordon Prather, agrees in part with Sahimi and offers yet another reason for Iran's behavior. He argues that fuel is running out at the Tehran reactor that produces medical isotopes. The expense to modify the current uranium is not cost effective and sanctions prevent Iran from purchasing the fuel needed on the open market. One option they have is to shut down the Tehran reactor. The other is to sub-contract and send out the uranium to Russia to be processed. When the French suggested that they must send it all out in one batch, Iran was concerned about the vulnerability and risk, so the dialogue ended there.

The one common denominator expressed by each author or expert is that nuclear power and the future of global security is a complex matter, requiring time, commitment and dedication from responsible world citizens. They also present many perceptions of the intentions, the capability, as well as the rational and incentives behind the actors connected to the Iranian nuclear dilemma. Understandably, there is no easy solution to the future of non-nuclear proliferation and a lot of work to be done.

METHODOLOGY/ RESEARCH DESIGN

The type of research design used for this study is the Lamp Method, also known as The Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction. Unlike other approaches, a characteristic of LAMP addresses the concept and impact of “free will” on potential future events (Lockwood and Lockwood, 1993). For this methodology the process involves examining how multiple variables may impact the future of complex situations. Much like a chess match in which the players may look beyond the strategy or consequences of one move to anticipate the various possible responses and future counter responses to several moves, LAMP looks at how the ‘free will’ of each actor can and does impact the course of future events in a similar type of multi-dimensional approach. Unlike the game, future possibilities of complex political events, for example, are obviously not isolated to a board or limited to two players with predetermined goals and more easily calculated moves. Instead, it is important to look beyond and try to understand the varying perceptions of each actor, ideally their hidden intentions and goals, to best determine the potential choices each may make.

LAMP is highly regarded and gives analysts a methodology to look at and project a wide range of future possibilities. This, then, can provide decision makers with a tool to potentially shape or impact that future simply by having a deeper comprehension of the actors and events involved. There are some limitations, however. First, by its very name, LAMP (Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction) suggests that future predictions are possible which, at least in regards to the Intelligence Community, can set

up expectations for the consumer that are not necessarily realistic. If policy or strategy is to be shaped around LAMP outputs, then it is important to be clear with the consumer that LAMP is not a crystal ball, but a methodology to best determine the decisions actors may take based on the certain events, their reactions and perceptions to the events and to each other as well as the specific goals, legitimate or not, each actor may have. So, also like its name, LAMP serves to illuminate and bring into the light items and events perhaps not initially seen or considered.

The outcome of LAMP can be shaped by the quality and availability of current and past information which can be effective or equally problematic. Among the intelligence agencies, there have been examples when important information has been discounted, other information has been highlighted or exaggerated inappropriately, or information has not been available or disclosed at the time of an analysis, which has resulted in poor reporting of future assessments. Naturally, this would be a limitation that LAMP shares. If the information to properly assess a situation, leader or event is not available or flawed, the outcome may be limited or flawed as well. When using LAMP, deep knowledge of the subject matter can help one to produce a higher quality product. Without having the capacity to truly comprehend the political structure, religious perspective, or ambition of a world actor, the process is limited. Thus being said, it is the very complex nature of these events as well as their impact on each other that LAMP anticipates, making it a strong technique for this type of study.

One final complication presented when using this methodology is that, without a software program, it is necessary to limit actors to a manageable number. The alternate future and pairwise comparisons can become cumbersome to an analyst if there are too many actors or possible courses of action to account for. This can lead to shaping the process to fit the model, for example excluding an actor or action, as opposed to having a working formula to consider all relevant participants.

LAMP has twelve steps as follows:

1. Determine the issue for which you are trying to predict the most likely future.

2. Specify the national “actors” involved.
3. Perform an in-depth study of how each national actor perceives the issues in question.
4. Specify all possible courses of action for each actor
5. Determine the major scenarios within which you will compare the alternate futures.
6. Calculate the total number of permutations of possible “alternate futures” for each scenario.
7. Perform a “pairwise comparison” of all alternate futures to determine their relative probability.
8. Rank the alternate futures for each scenario from highest relative probability to the lowest based on the number of “votes” received.
9. Assuming that each future occurs, analyze each alternate future in terms of its consequences for the issue in question.
10. State the potential of a given alternate future to “transpose” into another alternate future.
11. Determine the “focal events” that must occur in our present in order to bring about a given alternate future.
12. Develop indicators for the focal events (Lockwood & Lockwood, 1993, pp. 27-28).

Each stage gives the analyst opportunities to frame scenarios, events and actors from different perspectives and examine how they may interact and impact each other and future events. The final three stages allow one to look even farther beyond the initial possible futures, and to consider the events that may further impact or transpose those moments into other alternate futures. This not only helps to illustrate possible future scenarios, but captures the deeper connections among actors and events in a manner that can be illuminating for strategists and policy makers alike.

Again, LAMP is a complex methodology used to gain insight into possible futures. It calls for the analyst to examine possible events that can occur to further impact those

futures, which makes this a powerful tool and can help to develop deeper long-range thinkers and strategists just by the very nature of the technique.

ACTORS

Every country of the global community, especially co-signers of the NPT could be interested parties in regards to Iran; however for this paper, the actors will be limited to Iran, the United States, Israel, and the P5 + 1. The P5 + 1 represent the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany. The purpose for selecting the 5 +1 states as a whole body is related to process as well as policy. By grouping them together, it allows the opportunity to examine their roles and relationship to Iran's nuclear program, while simultaneously keeping the method manageable.

UNITED STATES

“Our relations with Iran have not yet returned to normal, and the process of implementing the January 19, 1981 agreement with Iran is still underway. For these reasons, I have determined that it is necessary to continue the national emergency declared in November 14, 1979, with respect to Iran, beyond November 14, 2009.

(President Barack Obama, 2009)

Recent History of US perception of Iran's Nuclear Program

In the 1950's, as part of the Atoms for Peace program, the United States was an integral support to Iran as it started its nuclear program. With U.S. and Western assistance, the Shah of Iran made plans for the construction of over 23 nuclear power stations, receiving full support from the White House. This cooperation continued until the Iranian Revolution and 1979 Hostage Crisis, when at that time, relations between the United States and Iran became strained, diplomatic ties were severed and the United States imposed sanctions against Iran. In the years following the 444 days that US diplomats were confined in Iran, Iran has been placed on the US State Department list of states that sponsor terrorism (1984) the leadership of Iran has been known to profess and support apocalyptic theology; and rhetoric concerning the United States (“The Great

Satan”) and its allies has been at the very least critical, at times threatening. It should not be surprising that since then, the US perspective of Iran’s nuclear program has shifted and it regards the former ally with deep skepticism and mistrust.

One of the important issues regarding the controversy with Iran’s nuclear program is in the area of enrichment. Uranium enrichment at low levels can power nuclear stations and at high levels it can produce uranium needed for weapons. The process, in very basic laymen’s terms, is to build up the percentage of U-235 in uranium ore in order to split the nucleus, create a chain reaction and by harnessing the energy in a nuclear reactor and create power. When enriched uranium levels reach around five percent, then it is high enough to be used in civil or peaceful nuclear reaction. For a long range nuclear weapons system, the levels have to be enriched to ninety percent. One method of enriching uranium is by centrifuge with approximately 3000 needed for high levels of uranium enrichment (Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing 2007, p. 27). Some of the primary areas of controversy in regards to Iran surround its enrichment program, but also its reporting (or lack of) to the IAEA and whether it has the intent or capability to build nuclear weapons and for what purpose.

Following 9/11, there was a short period of strategic cooperation between the United States and Iran. According to U.S. Special Envoy James Dobbins and Leverett, “The Bonn Conference would not have been successful without Iran’s cooperation...They had real contacts with the players on the ground in Afghanistan and they proposed to use that influence in continuing coordination with the United States.” From one perspective, opportunities for negotiations and discussion were available with Iran; however from other camps, there was a push for regime change in Iran. The term “axis of evil’ was coined during that time period and as a result, diplomacy and dialogue was affected. During the next few years, Iran continued to work toward diplomatic engagement and in 2003 a proposal was sent to Geneva offering assistance with Iraq in exchange for an end to US “hostile behavior and rectification of status of Iran in the US...and recognition of Iran’s legitimate security interests in the region with according (appropriate) defense capacity. “According to knowledgeable observers of Iranian policy making, the ambition to be recognized as a legitimate power in the Persian Gulf, with a seat at the table in any

regional discussions, has been a major motivation for many years for the Iranian national security establishment to reach an agreement with the United States” (Porter, 2009, p.1). This information offered insight into some of the areas that are important to Iran.

Just prior to 2003, the United States had grave concerns over the Iran’s non-compliance with IAEA regulations and guidelines and its intentions towards enrichment. Harsh criticism came from then UN Ambassador John Bolton’s statements concerning the view of Iran’s lack of transparency and illegal activity in regards to nuclear proliferation at that time. In 2003, Bolton reported that statements made by the Iranian government that they were fully cooperating with the IAEA were ‘flatly untrue’ (Bolton 2007, p.145). Comments made by President Bush, at the time; were equally, if not more aggressive concerning his impression of Iran. On November 6, 2003, according to Bolton, President Bush commented that Iran was “clearly lying about its nuclear intentions...and the IAEA was unwilling to challenge Iran and looked the other way in the face of obvious violations of Iran’s Safeguard Agreement.” (Bolton 2007, p. 143) He stated that there would be a ‘Nuclear Holocaust’ against Israel if Iran ever was armed and Israel may have to launch a pre-emptive first strike. Though the United States did not act on these perceptions, to reflect just how seriously the United States saw a nuclear armed Iran as a threat at this time, on May 6, 2004, the US House of Representatives voted, almost unanimously, for Resolution 398, which enabled the US government “to use all appropriate means to deter, dissuade, and prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.” The Senate followed suit, and voted to give President Bush or a future administration first strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities if necessary (Bolton, 2007, p.143).

In 2003, following IAEA censure, the EU-3 offered Iran nuclear reactor technology if they ceased uranium-enrichment activity, which they accepted by stating that Iran had ‘voluntarily and temporarily suspended uranium enrichment activities, but would resume if and when they felt it would benefit their country’ (Bolton, 2007, p. 146). Bolton felt that this strategy opened the door to allow Iran the time to develop a more advanced system and work through their issues related to nuclear fuel. These feelings of mistrust laid further ground work to the US position today.

Years later, on April 11, 2006, Iranian President Ahmadinejad announced that Iran had successfully enriched uranium. "I am officially announcing that Iran joined the group of those countries which have nuclear technology" (Samdii, 2007, p. 1). Over the next two days, U.S. Secretary of State, Condolezza Rice and President Ahmadinejad both responded to this announcement of Iran's nuclear developments. Rice indicated that the Security Council must move to induce Iran to change the direction of its nuclear pursuits in which Ahmadinejad responded, "Our answer to those who are angry about Iran achieving the full nuclear fuel cycle is just one phrase. We say: Be angry at us and die of this anger," because "We won't hold talks with anyone about the right of the Iranian nation to enrich uranium." (Samdii, 2007, p. 1) Iran fully intends for the world to recognize it as a nuclear power as well as its rights to enrichment.

By the beginning of 2009 a new president and White House approach to foreign policy did not limit concerns regarding Iran. In an interview with George Stephanopoulos in January, President Obama expressed the following in regards to the direction of Iran's nuclear program.

Well, I think that Iran is going to be one of our biggest challenges. And as I said during the campaign, you know, we have a situation in which not only is Iran exporting terrorism through Hamas, through Hezbollah, but they are pursuing a nuclear weapon that could potentially trigger a nuclear arms race in the Middle East."

– President Obama (Interview with George Stephanopoulos, January, 2009)

In September 2009, evidence was provided indicating that Iran has been creating a secret uranium enrichment facility at Qom, an act clearly in non-compliance to the NPT and IAEA regulations. President Obama remarked, "The size and configuration of this facility is inconsistent with a peaceful program...Iran is breaking rules that all nations must follow – endangering the non-proliferation regime." (Boston World, 2009,) One concern with this new development, outside of the non-compliance issues – is that depending on the type of centrifuge they plan to use, the possible timeline for Iran to have uranium enrichment to produce a nuclear weapon can be as close as seven months

to two years away. Since it takes approximately 60,000 centrifuges to provide 1,000 megawatt power plants with fuel, according to (Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing 2007, p. 37), it leaves the world to question what the legitimate nuclear purpose could be for the Qom factory.

This new information shifted attitudes around the world and affected US policy as reflected in a recent announcement by the US State Department. It also further indicates a deeper commitment on the part of the White House to engage the world leaders in this process.

The following announcement by the State Department outlined the resolution passed on November 27, 2009 by the IAEA Board of Governors in regards Iran's continued non-compliance. It stated that twenty-five members out of 35 which included Russia and China voted in favor of the resolution which included some of these intentions:

1. To encourage Iran to immediately comply with the Security Council resolutions, suspend construction at the Qom or Fordo enrichment location and to meet the requirements of the Board of Governors of the IEA.
2. To advise Iran to meet full compliance with its safeguards obligations, and to confirm that there are no other undeclared facilities in Iran;
3. To insist that Iran cooperate fully with the IAEA and provide access and information required to resolve the outstanding issues and concerns.

As for the United States, it has taken a two track policy approach in regards to Iran which includes working in consultation and partnership with the P5 +1 and other world nations to present a united front, seeking engagement first, but also preparing a timeline, sanctions and more severe consequences if Iran does not comply. The announcement was clear to emphasize the commitments on behalf of other nations, notably Russia and China. (State Department, 2009, p. 1)

In response, Iran sent a letter to the IAEA stating that it was only legally responsible for notifying the agency 180 days before nuclear materials enter the site which will not be for six more months. It further stated that it does not recognize the resolution as legal, binding or accurate. Iran repeated its continued statements that it is seeking a legitimate, peaceful nuclear program and will continue to despite, threats, sanctions or resolutions and subsequently turned down an offer made by the P5 + 1. Under its terms, Iran would transfer to 75-80 percent of the uranium it has to date enriched at a low level of about 3 percent to Russia. It would then go to a third country, for example, France and a year later sent back as fuel rods (IAEA, 2009, p. 3).

In December 2009, a Times of London article stated that a document that was discovered indicates that Iran has been working on a neutron indicator, which is used in detonating a nuclear weapon. The information may or may not be valid, but as a result of the 2003 pre-Iraqi flawed intelligence, many are slow to believe this ‘smoking gun.’

President Obama has given Iran until the end of the year 2009 to respond, but so far, Tehran is perceived as having ended the dialogue initiated by Washington. They repeat that their program is peaceful and that nuclear weapons are not part of the Iranian policy. With negotiations currently at a standstill, the next step by each participant will be an essential part in the outcome of security for the Middle East, the world and will set the stage for the future of nuclear programs and policy in the years to come.

Communication Dynamics/ Diplomatic Philosophy

Before examining possible futures it can be important to look at some communication dynamics as well as the perceptions and deeper implications they may suggest.

When President Obama was first elected, President Ahmadinejad sent a warm congratulatory note to the new American leader. In January of 2009, however, Iran had

cooled significantly when, in an overture of good will and in an effort to ‘extend an open hand’, President Obama reached out to the people of Iran. The response sent clearly reflects Iran’s mistrust of Israel as well as the alliance the United States shares with it. “..If you say change in policies, then halt your support to the uncultivated and rootless, forged, phony, killers of women and children Zionists and allow the Palestinian nation to determine its own destiny.” (Daraghi, 2009, p. 1) In December 2009, President Ahmadinejad compared the current US administration to the Bush administration. It may be interesting to observe that President Chavez also has been comparing President Obama to President Bush in terms of foreign policy. The attempt seems to be to unit those against a common enemy. President Obama, with his ‘outstretched hand’ is not as easy to vilify as the President who stormed the Middle East in response to 9/11. In terms of next steps from the United States it is important to pay attention to these nuances as well as how the United States may occur to Iran, the other world nations and at the negotiating table.

Former UN Ambassador John Bolton outlined various diplomatic approaches and how others may perceive or react to US methods. One is called the ‘moral equivalency’ approach. In this perspective, the non-US nation, Iran, holds a ‘Blame America First’ position. (Bolton, 2007, p. 452) Iran, in its response to President Obama, in January, professed a moral high ground which fits this model or approach. According to this perspective the United States is responsible for or supports most of the world’s problems. As a result, any attacks from terrorist groups are the fault of the US, brought on by its own actions, its position in the world and its involvement in world affairs. (Bolton, 2007, p. 452) Examples of this are peppered in rhetoric coming from Iran which at times is loaded with criticism and blame for Western views and policy.

Though the United States is not to blame for terrorist attacks against its allies or its citizens, Primakov offers some explanations to how US involvement and actions created an atmosphere of unresolved anger and bitterness toward the United States from extremist groups within the Middle East. “At the time, many Americans believed that using Islam as a weapon against the Soviet Union was trading a lesser evil for a greater

good, but they were clearly in the throes of self-delusion.” (Primakov, 2009, p. 91) By using the philosophy of jihad as a means to US ends, a culture of extremism was supported and to some extent, used. The validity of these claims is believed to be true in the international community. As a result, the United States is viewed in some areas with deep mistrust, fear and some nations legitimately have concerns for their future security that they will work, covertly or overtly, to protect. Recognizing how the US may have contributed to some of the Middle East rifts can be helpful in finding new ways to address the Iranian nuclear program or at least to understand the perspective of some of the current actors.

The rhetoric from Iran can appear more as a tactic and less a desire to discuss legitimate versus non legitimate issues. It may help to have others represent Iran to balance the rhetoric of Ahmadinejad as many of his comments help to create an atmosphere of mistrust. At the same time, however; it can be dangerous to discount this type of rhetoric as flamboyant, when it could be reflective of more deep rooted feelings and perspectives in regards to how rights, legality and religion may overlap. There is a view in some factions in Iran of religious superiority, the perspective of the actor is that all actions or beliefs they have is sanctioned by God and thus carries the weight of spiritual legitimacy. Some of this may be part of Ahmadinejad’s internal fabric. His spiritual advisor, Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, according to an article by Larry Kelly, proclaimed Ahmadinejad as the one chosen to usher in the return of the Hidden Imam (Kelly, 2006, p. 1). Yazdi has a website where he has posted articles that he has authored which may or may not influence the President of Iran. The following is from an article called, “Towards a Comprehensive Defense of Islam and Islamic Culture” “...and to establish the Just Islamic System all over the world in order to pave the way for the reappearance of Baqiyat-allah al-a’dham...The factor is the coalition of the forces of infidelity and hypocrisy, the servants of dollars and euros/gold and silver, and influential oppressors and traitors...On economic fronts, it appears as economic sanctions and international efforts against the progress.. In the light of these acrimonious realities, it is our pressing obligation to prepare ourselves for a wide range struggle against all this all-out attack by the infidels and the arrogant forces...And if this war needs cultural

weaponry, proper maps and plans of action, collective efforts and incessant attempts, as it requires sincere intention, inflexible determination, vast information and modern media for communication. Therefore, we all ought to do our best to enhance our religious knowledge and to learn various methods of defending our beliefs and values such as advancing our studies and instructions, establishing centers for deliberation and discussion and employing all possible means of communication and all techniques for education and training.” (Yazdi, 2009)

For this study, the quote above is not meant as a representation of Islam thinking or philosophy, but shares insight into the position of the spiritual leader of Ahmadinejad and therefore may reflect some insight into the President and his motives as well. This can help to illuminate how deep rooted beliefs may actually influence a leader, shaping his or her decisions, goals and perspectives of the other world participants and their legitimacy.

To further understand how religion is significant in regards to politics in some factions in Iran Lewis explains: Factions within Iran link religion and politics together in a manner that the West is not always familiar with. “In this society the distinction between secular and religious is unknown – in law, in jurisdiction, or in authority... Where the basis of identity and cohesion in society, the bonds of loyalty and duty in the state, are all conceived and expressed in religious terms, the familiar Western distinction between religion and politics, between religious and political attitudes and activities becomes irrelevant and unreal... Political dissatisfaction – itself perhaps socially determined – finds religious expression; religious dissent acquires political implication.” (Lewis, 1968, p. 21)

This is powerful in regards to dialogue and listening to changes in religious discussion for indications of political shifts among these groups. Religion is connected to political justification. As a way of being and seeing the world, the pursuit of nuclear power is intertwined with religious and political philosophies that are important to understand in terms of working to shift the potential direction of a faction through diplomacy. War, politics, nuclear ambitions, and leadership seem part of national identity and fabric in Iran in a way that is deeply entrenched in religion even in dialogues with the West.

When Ahmadinejad met with Dianne Sawyer in December 2009, he spoke of Jesus Christ as part of his interview. When diplomacy is severed, the United States is ‘The Great Satan’.

This leads into another US approach to diplomacy, the mirror image. According to Bolton, this is one in which the United States approaches negotiations expecting the country involved to have the same negotiating style and perspectives. If a country, such as Iran, does not share the same approach, believes or takes the position that the United States is immoral and is the cause for problems in the world, then an outstretched hand may be interpreted as weakness. One article recorded a response from Ahmadinejad as, “We say to you that you are in a position of weakness. Your hands are empty. You can no longer promote your interests from a position of strength.” (Kelly, 2009, p. 30) This position is supported by Joseph Cirincione, a nuclear weapons expert and president of the Ploughshares Fund. His perspective concerning the US approach to Iran is for the new Obama administration to stay away from debates over Iran's intent because "when you're talking about negotiations in Iran, it is dangerous to appear weak or naive." (Miller, 2009, p. 1) In a classic tale of history repeating itself, these words echo a statement made in 1961. At that time, Penkovsky, a Soviet mole, “warned his debriefers that Khrushchev was bound and determined to win his battle with the West by rattling nuclear weapons. ...Khrushchev considered Kennedy a weak man who would back down before his threats.” (Trento, 1999, p. 240)

Other scholars state that in the West, “diplomacy is a synonym for appeasement”, but Iran has a practice of “taqiyya” which is ‘religiously-sanctioned deception’ and kitman, which is secrecy. It is much like the deception and disinformation during the Cold War, except that it is religiously based. According to Bernard Lewis, taqiyya is “a concealment of one’s true beliefs in the face of danger.” And “when the inner truth was concealed, it did not matter greatly what outward form of legal observance was adopted.” (Lewis, 1968, p. 83)

An example of this style, though it may have a different influence, is from a quote from a former Iranian negotiator, Rouhani, where he suggests that he fooled the Europeans. “While we were talking to the Europeans in Tehran, we were installing equipment in parts of the facility in Isfahan, but we still had a long way to go. In fact, by creating a calm environment, we were able to complete the work on Isfahan’. As a result of the negotiations with Europe, ‘we are in fact much more prepared to go to the UN Security Council.” (Bolton, 2007, p. 324)

Though Iran does indicate that it is against their policy to have nuclear weapons, according to Andrew Campbell, Gharavian, a disciple of Yazdi and senior religious leader, declared a fatwa in 2006 providing a ‘theological sanction for Iran’s future use of nuclear weapons’. It gave a ‘justified counter-measure’ against other nuclear powers under Islamic holy law. He stated, ““When the entire world is armed with nuclear weapons, it is permissible to use these weapons as a counter-measure. According to Sharia too, only the goal is important.” (Campbell, 2006, p. 2) Some consider this statement counter to Iran’s nuclear policy which claims to be only for peaceful purposes. This could be another example of duplicity, for if Iran did not have or intend to have nuclear weapons, why would they need a fatwa three years ago? According to Kerr’s recent assessment on Iran, Khamenei has issued a fatwa against nuclear weapons, but that announcement was in 2005 a year prior to Yazdi. (Kerr, 2007, p. 14)

A final perspective of Iran’s high level of confidence is that they have progressed farther with its nuclear production than first anticipated. When Iran seems open to dialogue, some claim that it is only a tactic to stall and distract the international community from hidden sites or other acts that go against treaty. Others, however, perceive that Iran’s President has lost internal and international support and by demonizing American, hopes to maintain the view of a common enemy (The Great Satan) as well as justification for the illegal pursuit of a nuclear program.

US Concerns of a nuclear armed Iran

All agree that Iran has the right to seek nuclear power for peaceful purposes. The United States is concerned that the lack of transparency and cooperation with the IAEA may be an indication that Iran is hiding its intent to have a nuclear weapons program. Other implications that concern the United States include:

- A. Iran has been testing missiles recently and if it is able to develop a long range intercontinental ballistic missile arsenal as part of a nuclear weapons program, then the allies and the United States could be vulnerable, given the recent cancellation of the Poland/Czech Republic missile defense treaty.
- B. Iran could become a nuclear safe haven to support terrorism which could either limit a US response to terrorism against America or its allies. At the very least it could encourage or strengthen the resolve of those desiring to strike the United States. Iran is one of four nations listed as a state sponsor of terrorism according to the U.S. State Department. They have admitted to sending support to Hamas and Hezbollah. In that regards, arming Iran with nuclear weapon's capability is a very real threat from many perspectives.
- C. There are serious concerns about the apocalyptic philosophy that comes from Iran though some believe that the Mullahs in power use this messianic language as an 'opiate of the masses.' Within six months of President Ahmadinejad's rise to power, he predicted that the Twelfth Imam would return within two years. The Twelfth Imam is believed to have disappeared down a well in Qom (the site of the hidden nuclear site) and upon his return infidels including Sunni Muslims would be destroyed. Ahmadinejad is professed to be the individual chosen to usher in the Imam and the end of the world with it. Others believe that most of Iran's politicians want to stay in power and do not subscribe to these beliefs, but Ahmadinejad has been open in professing this perspective and some maintain that the Iranian nuclear program seems to be symbolically tied into this belief. (Kelly, 2009, p. 39)
- D. Rhetoric from Iran has been hostile toward Israel, Ahmadinejad has gone so far as to state that Israel should be 'wiped of the map' and Israel has very legitimate concerns for its safety (CNN.com, 2009). Just as with the example of Iraq, Israel

- could launch a pre-emptive strike rather than wonder about potential annihilation. Iran has stated that if Israel launched a first strike, Iran would assume US support to those actions even if the United States publicly denounced such actions.
- E. Iran could attack Israel in a pre-emptive strike. Iran has been testing a Shahab-3 missile which puts Israel in range (Reuters,2009). Israel would not hesitate to strike back and in this case, most likely with US support.
 - F. Other states could see this as an opportunity to pursue a nuclear weapons program themselves. Many countries are more concerned about this potential outcome, than a threat coming from Iran. Some hypothesize that if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, then other smaller states will rationalize their pursuits as well, creating vast new problems for world security and strategy. With continued proliferation comes the possible development of new and more user-friendly types of nuclear weapons, giving new opportunities for terrorist activity.

Background on recent turnaround nuclear states

The conversation over non-nuclear proliferation has changed significantly since the Cold War nuclear stand-off. Today, the concerns range from ‘loose nukes’ to nuclear smugglers (like A.Q. Khan) to rumors of Al Qaeda seeking to acquire a weapon and just as the threat of terrorism has become asymmetrical, so too has the possibility of nuclear armed states become more unpredictable. North Korea continues to add bombs to its arsenal pushing neighboring countries to speculate over their own nuclear options. The consequences of continued nuclear arms expansion could be devastating and lead the world into a future of nuclear terrorism. Today Iran, Turkey, Egypt and Libya are some of the countries that have started a civil nuclear program. Within the last few years, more joined the list of those seeking ‘peaceful’ programs. The world is still learning how to manage the spread of nuclear power and should address Iran appropriately to usher in a new age of nuclear power as effectively as possible. Fortunately, there are examples of

turnaround nuclear programs. These include South Africa, Ukraine, Brazil and Argentina as well as Libya. For the most part, these countries gave up their pursuit as a result of economic incentives, diplomacy and assurance of their security. Libya took years of interaction and continuous diplomacy and negotiation, though it also insisted that the United States restrain from attempting a regime change. There are other countries, such as South Korea, that was pursuing a weapons program, but that situation was also reversed through economic incentives. These examples can offer a template for Iran, the P5+1 and the United States to follow though specific areas would have to be readdressed.

US POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION

Based on the perceived threats to United States security both home and abroad, the United States is in a position where it is necessary to weigh the cost and benefits to Iran's nuclear program and policy as well as the options to maintaining US security.

1. Negotiations – Dialogue and negotiations are an essential aspect of conflict, but in this case, as relations are strained among the United States and Iran, it will take some finesse. In all the examples of countries that turned around their pursuit of nuclear power, there were common denominators that included negotiation, economic incentives, diplomacy and assurance of regional security. Libya, also once considered a terrorist haven, took years of interaction, continuous diplomacy and negotiation prior to (originally) forgoing its nuclear ambitions.

One concern of negotiations is that it can give the impression of legitimacy. This means that the United States will hold conversations with a state that from a US perspective sponsors terrorism and disregards international treaty. The current administration has strongly encouraged negotiations as strength, an olive branch; however, as mentioned,

negotiations in this case run a risk of legitimizing its adversary, giving it an opportunity to spread disinformation and reduce international pressure (Bolton, 2007, p.423. For negotiations to be successful, they should be part of a larger context, be on-going and, involve other neutral parties and encourage direct talks over second party talks. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, a hot line was set up for direct talks between the United States and the Soviet Union. When the topic is nuclear proliferation, with consequences that can impact the whole world, world leaders have a responsibility to talk directly, exploring every avenue to minimize the potential for future escalation.

2. Sanctions: For sanctions to be effective they would have to be appropriate, ideally have P5 + 1 support and be part of a larger process. Many believe that U.S. sanctions have not been effective. US sanctions have included a trade embargo, the transfer or sale of items used in the development of nuclear weapons or delivery system, travel restrictions and some loans have been limited. The recent sanctions may be in the area of trade or imports of petroleum or they may be tailored to better fit Iran's current political landscape. One reason that sanctions may not be the best approach include: 1. they may reverse the political protests that are weakening the internal structure of Iran. 2. Russia and China may not stay committed if the sanctions seem too severe. They are open to incentives and talks. 3. Iran is used to sanctions and they will use the increases to gain public sympathy, resulting in political backfire for the United States.

Others believe that the sanctions will add enough pressure to the internal protests to effectively encourage Iran to cooperate with its nuclear program.

3. Defense Umbrella: In an interview late 2009, Secretary of State Clinton described a strategic option to counter the threat of a nuclear armed Iran. She stated that the United States would create a defense umbrella to fortify the Middle East in areas around Iran and U.S. interests. This would hedge the potential Iranian threat, reduce its perception of power and serve to protect U.S. forces and allies (Rosen, 2009).

4. A Multi-tiered Approach: Many experts have been examining the various US options in regards to Iran, and there is a sense in some camps, both national and international, that sanctions and negotiations are just something to do which Iran will not take seriously. Setting the tone for the rest of the world, if Iran is to be encouraged, then it will take a full commitment and a multi-tiered approach. This means, unfortunately, at first, sanctions, real sustainable support from the P5 +1, the flex of military muscle, the increase of US intelligence networks and added security, but also diplomacy, direct talks, negotiations and a wide range of incentives such as, (but not limited to): options for international inclusion (for Iran), support for a civil nuclear program, the opportunity to be recognized as a ‘legitimate power in the Persian Gulf’ and to have its name restored in the United States. Other areas to address: regional security for Iran, the war against drugs, concerns with Afghanistan and Iraq as well as the possibility of lifting other sanctions. These are just some of the ways to open up more points of convergence as well as possibilities for the future. (Senate Hearings, 2009)

Success is also dependant in part on the cooperation of the P5 +1, notably China and Russia. For this, the United States needs to maintain strong ties and find incentives to keep both China and Russia engaged in this pursuit. Support for the internal conflict in Iran may work to the benefit of the United States if the result is a regime change.

5. US Support Pre-emptive Attack from Israel: This is an option, but not a favored one. If Iran reaches break-out capacity and other factors arose that threatened the United States as well as Israel, there is a concern that Israel would strike Iran. The nuclear sites are so spread out, that the damage is stated to only put off the possibility of nuclear arms a few years. The political backlash and the regional destabilization would make such an attack a last resort.

6. US attack in Iran: This is also an option, though not favored as most likely a last resort. A military operation in Iran at this time could, as in the case of Israel, risk political backlash and regional destabilization. While the United States has continued military engagements in both Afghanistan and Iraq, it is unlikely that the United States

citizens would support a third. It would strain US resources and create gaps of further mistrust in many areas of the world especially following the invasion in Iraq.

IRAN

POLITICAL INFLUENCES

Iran is a democracy, though its system is not like that of the United States. The position of the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei is determined by the Assembly of Experts. The President, Ahmadinejad, is elected, which was a point of contention and political protest this year. Ahmadinejad has appeared on Larry King, spoken with Anne Curry and Dianne Sawyer, so the West may recognize him as the leader of Iran; however, he is in charge of domestic policy, and the Supreme Leader is in charge of foreign and nuclear policy.

The factions in Iran seem split in the goals for Iran and how the nuclear program is connected. Strong proponents of the health of Iran's economy view the nuclear program as a sub-goal where as the philosophy of hard-liners like President Ahmadinejad, who do not adhere to economics first, believe the best goal is nuclear power and perhaps weapons at all cost. A third group sees balance between economics and nuclear power and also sees the benefits of having good ties with the west. (Senate Hearings, 2009).

Currently, there is significant political and social unrest in Iran. The tensions come from two separate areas which together could topple the government – the democratic opposition movement involved in recent protests and the frustrated separatist groups from the minority regions of Iran. The opposition movements, lead by Mousavi, are anti-government movements that represent an embittered working and middle class. As a result of the country's economic crisis, cuts are being made in social welfare programs,

subsidies and the promise of cash payments may be diverted to other income support measures (Narsi, 2004).

Some of this tension influenced Ahmadinejad's response and has been reflected in recent events. Originally Ahmadinejad seemed open to the possibility to send enriched uranium to Russia or Turkey to be upgraded and sent back. The Majlis and Mousavi fully denounced such a plan because they felt they would relinquish control of their uranium, which then Ahmadinejad reported back to the United States. As reflected in some of the current uprisings, Ahmadinejad has also been involved in heated debate over phasing out of the price subsidies that has been in place for food, water, transportation and fuel. These had been created to ease the burden of the lower and middle class when oil and gas prices rose, but the government cannot reach an agreement of how or what to do with the new price increases. One of Ahmadinejad's platforms was directed toward helping the poor and part of the current leadership struggle is to determine if the lower income population should receive assistance when prices are reset to reflect current costs (Jones, 2009, p. 3).

At the same time, separatist groups located in the outskirts of Iran, want a larger share of the profits coming from resources in their area such as oil. Some separatists want to break away into a separate confederation or independent nations (Harrison, 2009, p.1). These concerns are important because now that the United States has a presence in Iraq, there is some common interest. Both Iran and the United States would like to see a unified Iraq. The United States believes it would promote stability in the region and Iran sees this as a way to prevent Kurds from Iraq, Iran and Turkey from forming their own republic. In regards to a nuclear agreement, this could be an area of common ground. It could also be an area of breakdown because the Iranian government also believes that the United States causes problems for Iran, especially in this area. There is speculation that though the United States wants a unified Iraq, it would also like to assist the Kurds in forming their own republic which could impact Iran severely while offering opportunities to the United States to have easier access to oil. The most potentially dangerous threat to Iran is the separatist movement outside Khuzestan where 80 percent of Iran's crude oil revenue is (Harrison, 2009, p. 1).

The leadership within Iran blames the White house for some of the current political dissent, most likely because in 2006, Secretary of State Rice asked for funds to support the pro-democratic movement in Iran as a 'peaceful' method of encouraging regime change. The United States has a reputation for applying strategies to impact foreign governments. In the case of Libya, as mentioned before, part of the agreement connected to relinquishing its nuclear program was the express understanding that the United States would not interfere in regime change. Iran, too, shares that perspective, though it may or may not be accurate, it reflects an area that can be addressed within the greater context of its nuclear ambitions.

Iran's Nuclear Program

The Shah had a vision for Iran's nuclear program, anticipating that oil production would reach peak production and Iran would need to develop other sources of sustainable energy. Nuclear power seemed to be the best approach because it seems economically feasible and also compliments a global warming program. With Western support the Shah made plans for an extensive nuclear program until the Iranian Revolution in which the program continued with much less assistance.

Iran has had plans to build up to 300 reactors, but has continued to insist that its pursuits have always been peaceful. In 2003, the IAEA announced that Iran had failed to meet specific NPT obligations and though no evidence of a weapons program was indicated, as a result of at least six acts of non-compliance, requests were made to Iran to cease its enrichment program. In exchange, an arrangement would provide international support and cooperation in the peaceful pursuit of an Iranian nuclear program. Iran countered by offering to allow extensive IAEA inspections, give up plutonium reprocessing and to transfer all current enriched uranium into fuel rods. Some in the international community agreed, however the United States insisted that Iran suspend its enrichment. Iran continues to argue against relinquishing its enrichment program and others in the Non-Aligned Movement, concerned about nuclear fuel production becoming a monopoly, agreed with Iran.

After the recent discovery this year of a secret facility, the P5 +1 suggested again that Iran send out the uranium to be enriched in Russia or Turkey then have it returned to Iran. Iran initially seemed open to that approach, but then would not agree; an indication of mistrust toward the current United States administration and the recognition of its right to seek a peaceful nuclear program, answerable to the IAEA.

Iran's response to the site at Qom includes the following: It maintains that it has always been in compliance and that it still had time to contact the IAEA in regards to Qom. The second claim is that since the United States had pressured other states not to assist Iran, they needed to act in secrecy. After the IAEA Board of Governors reported Iran's noncompliance with its safeguards agreement to the UN Security Council, the Council demanded that Iran suspend its enrichment program. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has argued that the sanctions are "illegal," imposed by "arrogant powers," and that Iran has decided to pursue the monitoring of its self-described peaceful nuclear program through "its appropriate legal path," the International Atomic Energy Agency. (Iran Response to IAEA Resolution, 2009)

The P5 + 1 deadline for Iran to agree to ship uranium out of the country will be over at the end of 2009. The Iranian President has restated that it will not comply.

Possible Concerns

Iran has a variety of concerns to contend with when considering its next moves which include:

1. **US backed Strike.** They are concerned about the possibility that the United States or Israel will strike. Iran has stated that it would perceive a strike by Israel as one sanctioned by the United States. A strike would be geared at shutting down the nuclear sites which are located all over Iran. The potential destruction at such a massive strike would be devastating with no guarantee that Iran's nuclear program would be destroyed.

2. **Sanctions and Blockade.** Iran has indicated that further sanctions would not affect its economy, but their current economic situation is tense. Severe sanctions would affect the Iranian economy, causing further political unrest and impacting the Iranian people.

3. **Embarrassment.** Iran risks international and domestic embarrassment if it can not find a way to meet its nuclear goals with integrity.

4. **Loss of Internal Controls.** According to Iran, The Iranian Foreign Ministry also issued a statement on Friday saying Iran sees no need to commit itself to voluntary cooperation with the agency since its fundamental rights as an NPT signatory are not being observed. They call the new report an ‘anti-Iran’ resolution. One concern is that it will no longer control the uranium enrichment needed for its civil program.

5. **Economic Concerns** for the future. Peaceful pursuit of nuclear power will be necessary for Iran once it starts to lose oil production.

6. **Nuclear Monopoly.** They do not want other nations having monopoly on world nuclear power.

7. **Internal Consequence.** The nuclear enrichment program is more than the pursuit of economic alternatives to fuel or energy, but it has also become a symbol of Iran joining the international community as an equal participant, of its independence from Western imperialism, and will legitimize their position in the international community. To lose this cause they run the potential of collapsing from within.

8. **Security Risks.** Iran is not the only Middle Eastern nation seeking nuclear power. Instead, it is flanked on many sides by other states that are pursuing similar interests including Turkey, Egypt, Libya, and the AE. Israel, it is highly accepted, is armed. This leaves Iran potentially vulnerable and anxious to stay ahead of the nuclear power game. They may also be further concerned in regards to the potential of increased nuclear weapons in the Middle East and genuine concerns about US expansion in the region.

9. **US Expansion.** There are at least other nations seeking nuclear power. As a result of the attention to Iran's program it may feel as though it has been targeted as part of a larger US agenda. With US forces next door in Iraq and Afghanistan, Iran may speculate that they could be next.

10. **Only Way to Protect Borders.** Many countries, including Iran, share a very real perspective that the United States has two courses of action, its way or military action. The engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq have concerned Iran and other world nations, especially as there is no balance to the power wielded by the United States. Some perceive various methods to equalize power in the world: seek cooperation and alliances with each other as in the example of Iran, Venezuela, and Cuba. Another approach to balance power is terrorism and a third is nuclear weapons. So, to prevent the United States from invading your country, the premise may go, build a nuclear weapons program. (North Korea).

11. **Economic Concerns.** Fuel is running out at the Tehran reactor that produces medical isotope. Sanctions prevent Iran from purchasing any and the cost to modify current uranium is not cost effective. They can either shut down facility or sub contract enrichment to Russia. The French want the whole amount shipped out at once which would leave Iran too vulnerable (Prather, 2009, p. 1).

Possible Courses of Action

Iran has many courses of action, though not all realistic or feasible. Below is a list of some, though this list is not exhaustive.

1. **Pre-emptive strike on Israel.** Concerned that Israel will launch an offensive against, Iran, Tehran and its senior officials have discussed the possibility of a pre-emptive strike. Iran has considered policy against Israel and American interests in the Middle East, but according to Iran, the new policy would target only Israel (Gray, 2009, p. 1).

2. **Ignore Sanctions.** Iran can ignore sanctions and the recent resolution and continue to enrich uranium. Working only with the IAEA, they may not feel compelled to engage in talks with any other nations.
3. **Ignore resolutions,** withdraw from IAEA. Iran has discussed withdrawing from the IAEA as a possible response to recent events
4. **Open up talks** – Reach out to the countries of the world to try to get support, but continue enrichment. Encourage to have other perspectives from Iran shared with public and not only Ahmadinejad. His rhetoric can work against Iran and does not instill confidence
5. **Comply with IAEA**
6. **Build relations with Cuba,** Venezuela, North Korea and either Russia or its neighbors in an alliance against the United States. Finance Hezbollah and other terrorist networks around the world and prepare for an opportunity to weaken the United States and its allies. This may not be realistic, but even as an outlier should not completely disregarded either.

ISRAEL

Israel, the only country in the Middle East to most likely possess nuclear weapons and not belong to the NPT, is the most concerned about a nuclear armed Iran. This is not surprising considering rhetoric from Iran that Israel should be ‘wiped off the face of the earth.’ Mistrust between the two countries has escalated and Israel is convinced that Iran is pursuing a weapons program. Concerned about the threat of Iran, in 2008 Prime Minister Mofaz stated "If Iran continues with its programme for developing nuclear weapons, we will attack it." (Haaretz.com, 2008) These thoughts were then later echoed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, “You don't want a messianic apocalyptic cult controlling atomic bombs,” "When the wide-eyed believer gets hold of the reins of power and the weapons of mass death, then the entire world should start worrying, and that is what is happening in Iran." (Reals, 2009)

With the Arab/Israeli conflict as a backdrop, Israel sees itself as the David and the Arab world, Goliath in a David and Goliath scenario and will not hesitate to strike first if

waiting seems to threaten Israeli national security. A deeper consideration, however, is if Israel does attack Iran without US support, a rift may develop between the two countries comparable to the Suez Canal split. Various military scenarios conclude in the same manner that despite the level of success, air strikes from Israel will only delay Iran's nuclear progress. Over the next months and years, Israel will need to weigh the risks of non-attack versus the risk and consequences of attack. For this reason, Israel will most likely wait unless absolutely necessary to strike, if at all.

Concerns of a Nuclear Armed Iran

1. Attack from Iran
2. Attack from Iranian sponsored terrorist groups that would be made bolder and perhaps sanctioned by an armed Iran
3. A build up of nuclear states in the Middle East contributing to regional insecurity
4. Loss of power leverage for Israeli security

Options:

1. **Diplomacy and Deterrence:** Israel has a few options that seem rational for its security. Using diplomacy and deterrence, Israel can work with the international community towards containment. This seems to be its best overt option.
2. **Covert Action:** Other options would include covert activity to stay aware of the status of Iran's political and nuclear progress.
3. **Air Strike:** To launch an air strike against Iran, Israel would most likely require US support for refueling and access to airspace. During Afghan and Iraq involvement, such support is unlikely. Iran's nuclear sites are spread out, so though Israel could damage some sites, the consequences to Israel may outweigh the benefits of military action unless security was an immediate concern. Unless, Israel could demonstrate a legitimate security risk for the attack, the global community would not condone it. Iran would be

justified in the pursuit of a nuclear weapons program which, like a nuclear snowball rolling down hill, would further destroy negotiations and may encourage terrorism. Also, an attack would not necessarily prevent a nuclear weapons program even if the launch was successful rather only suspend the program for a few years. As a long term sustainable strategy to deter Iran from the pursuit of nuclear weapons, attack, then would not seem a reasonable option. As a defense strategy, against an actual attack from Iran, Israel would receive support and justification, but other causes of military actions would most likely result in severe backlash affecting Gaza, retaliation, relations with the United States and the censure of the international community as well.

4. **Build External Relationships** - One opportunity, for example, is Israel's relationship with Russia and how it may impact support in talks or diplomacy with Iran. Though U.S. and Russian relationships after the Georgia conflict were strained, Israel and Russia are working on a drone agreement that will benefit Russia. It may not be enough to counter the motivation that Russia has in keeping ties with Iran unfettered, but it is one area that Russia is interested in working with Israel on. In Russia and the Arabs, the author contends that the Russian/Israeli relationships have improved and sees Russia's new policy to seek settlements and regional stability in the Middle East (Primakov, 2009, p. 386).

THE P5 +1

On October 1, after Iran's missile testing, the UN Security Council's five permanent members and Germany met to discuss Iran's nuclear program, non-compliance and sanctions. The permanent five include China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States and Germany. France has commented that Iran has entered into a diplomatic stalemate by not responding to the proposals for enrichment. Instead, following the recent 2009 IAEA resolution, Iran announced that it would build ten more sites which again, like the facility at Oom, did not seem to fit into a civilian nuclear program. Based on Iran's failure to cooperate, France said it was preparing to move toward sanctions. Britain also made it clear that it was one hundred percent committed to sanctions if Iran did not suspend enrichment work. Germany is concerned about trade

with Iran and the effects that sanctions would have on its economy. Both Russia and China, also economically tied to Iran, called for patience and suggested they look for diplomatic solutions. They are also both part of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and signed the Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation which has as part of its policy to help maintain security in the region which includes interventions by the United States.

By the end of December, Russia announced that sanctions were not on the table, the United States said that it was modifying sanctions and China seems to have withdrawn from the idea of sanctions at the moment as well.

Russia and China have strong ties and economic relationships with Iran, so it may be helpful to review some of their perspectives more closely: In 2006, from “The Prospects of Russian Mediation and the Iranian Nuclear Crisis”, some of the following positions were listed and include: (Sokov, 2006, p. 1)

- Russia will continue to condone uranium enrichment
- Will not support economic/political sanctions, but will from individual countries
- Will continue economic and political relations with Iran
- Russia (and China) will continue to cooperate with Iran under terms of Shanghai Cooperation Organization
- Military options from US or Israel will strain US/ Russian relations
- Not support Iran nuclear weapons program
- Display value of democracy vs. use of force to international community

Options:

Currently the P5 + 1 appear divided on the idea of sanctions. China, Russia and Germany have economic ties to Iran and could be negatively impacted by certain sanctions. China and Russia have expressed concern that Iran may become Iraq 2, which they do not support and have indicated that as a political or economic means, they

also do not support sanctions. Many also feel as though sanctions have been applied but are not effective, so some on the P5+1, though they support the non-proliferation efforts in regards to Iran, they do not support all the methods. China has conflicting economic incentives with Iran, the United States and the EU, belongs to the P5+1 and the SCO, and defers decisions about Iran as to Russia as much as possible to avoid any potential negative financial consequences. Diplomatic techniques in Asia are also much different than in the West or the Middle East, but China is resolved to a non nuclear armed Iran as well as preventing military engagement from the United States.

It is the presence or absence of full support from the P5+1 that can help tip Iran closer toward nuclear cooperation. As long as the P5+1 do not reach a consensus, then the power of the council is limited. Though the United States believes that unification should be in the area of sanctions, there may be other approaches that have been missed, but that can carry equal if not greater weight especially if met with a united front. The following options are the ones considered for this study:

1. Fully support sanctions and other approaches to deter Iran from nuclear weapons program
2. Partially support sanctions or other approaches made to deter Iran from nuclear weapons program
3. Do not support sanctions or other approaches to deter Iran from nuclear weapons program (military engagement)

MAJOR SCENARIOS

For the purpose of this analysis, the possible courses of actions, or scenarios, to be considered will be based on Iran's decisions first. The stage has been set and the world is waiting for Iran's next move, which in this case, includes one of the following four scenarios:

- Continued Non-compliance.
- Non compliance and withdraw from the IAEA
- Pre-emptive strike on Israel or US interests

- Comply with IAEA guidelines

Each of these scenarios could prompt a wide range of reactions and responses from the international community and, in particular, the actors selected for this assessment. To determine the possible and most likely futures, the next step is to calculate the total number of possible permutations of the actors for each scenario.

ALTERNATE FUTURES

According to LAMP, the equation for calculating the number of “alternate futures” that are possible is $X^y=Z$, with X being equal to the number of courses of action available to each actor. Y represents the number of actors involved, assuming that they are the same. For this study, to keep the process manageable, some of the possible actors have been limited. The number of actions are also varied: the United States has five possible future actions, Israel – two and the 5 + 1 nuclear states - three. As reflected, this does not include Iran, whose actions are reflected by the initial scenarios, so will not be included as part of the equation. The result is $5(1) \times 2(1) \times 3(1) = 30$ possible “alternate futures” for the United States, Israel and the P5 + 1 nuclear states in response to Iran’s behavior as reflected by the four scenarios. The purpose for selecting the 5 +1 states as a whole body, as mentioned earlier, is related to process as well as policy. It does simplify the methodology to keep the actors and actions somewhat limited, however, it is important to pay attention to both China and Russia as well as the larger context of the 5 +1 in regards to working with Iran. By grouping them together, it allows the opportunity to examine their roles and relationship to Iran’s nuclear program, while simultaneously keeping the method manageable. Also, as the United States has been successful in gaining the support of the 5+1 including China and Russia which has been monumental in the ongoing dealings with Iran, their collective efforts are as significant, if not more, than the individual actions of China and Russia alone.

The following alternate futures and their corresponding abbreviations are:

United States:

- MA = Multi-tiered approach
- S = Sanctions
- AP = Assist Iran Nuclear Program
- PA = US or US supported military attack
- NP = Negotiate, use incentives, persuasion

Israel

- MO = Military Option
- D = Diplomacy

P5 + 1

- CS = Complete Support, The P5+1 fully support sanctions or other approaches to deter Iran from nuclear weapons program
- SS = Some Support – Some members partially support sanctions or other approaches to deter Iran from nuclear weapons program
- NS = No Support – Members of the P5+1 do not support sanctions or other methods to deter Iran from nuclear weapons program (military engagement)

TABLE 1 – ALTERNATE FUTURES

| Possible Future | United States | Israel | 5+1 |
|------------------------|----------------------|---------------|------------|
| 1 | MA | MO | CS |
| 2 | MA | D | NS |
| 3 | MA | MO | SS |
| 4 | MA | D | CS |
| 5 | MA | MO | NS |
| 6 | MA | D | SS |
| 7 | S | MO | CS |
| 8 | S | D | NS |
| 9 | S | MO | SS |
| 10 | S | D | CS |
| 11 | S | MO | NS |
| 12 | S | D | SS |
| 13 | AP | MO | CS |
| 14 | AP | D | NS |
| 15 | AP | MO | SS |
| 16 | AP | D | CS |
| 17 | AP | MO | NS |
| 18 | AP | D | SS |
| 19 | PA | MO | CS |
| 20 | PA | D | NS |
| 21 | PA | MO | SS |
| 22 | PA | D | CS |
| 23 | PA | MO | NS |
| 24 | PA | D | SS |
| 25 | NP | MO | CS |
| 26 | NP | D | NS |
| 27 | NP | MO | SS |
| 28 | NP | D | CS |
| 29 | NP | MO | NS |
| 30 | NP | D | SS |

CREATING PAIRWISE COMPARISONS

Once the alternate futures have been completed, the next step is to create a pairwise comparison of each alternate future. The equation to determine the amount of pairwise comparisons that will result after comparing each alternate future to each other is:

$X = (n-1) + (n-2) \dots + (n-n)$ with X being equal to the number of pairwise comparisons to be made and n representing the total number of futures to be analyzed.

For this model, $n = 30$ and X equals 435.

Scenario 1 - Non-compliance toward break-out capabilities

| Future | United | Israel | 5+1 | Votes |
|---------------|---------------|---------------|------------|--------------|
| 1 | MA | MO | CS | 12 |
| 2 | MA | D | NS | 24 |
| 3 | MA | MO | SS | 13 |
| 4 | MA | D | CS | 27 |
| 5 | MA | MO | NS | 14 |
| 6 | MA | D | SS | 26 |
| 7 | S | MO | CS | 15 |
| 8 | S | D | NS | 23 |
| 9 | S | MO | SS | 16 |
| 10 | S | D | CS | 28 |
| 11 | S | MO | NS | 17 |
| 12 | S | D | SS | 28 |
| 13 | AP | MO | CS | 6 |
| 14 | AP | D | NS | 9 |
| 15 | AP | MO | SS | 7 |
| 16 | AP | D | CS | 11 |
| 17 | AP | MO | NS | 8 |
| 18 | AP | D | SS | 10 |
| 19 | PA | MO | CS | 1 |
| 20 | PA | D | NS | 3 |
| 21 | PA | MO | SS | 1 |
| 22 | PA | D | CS | 4 |
| 23 | PA | MO | NS | 2 |
| 24 | PA | D | SS | 5 |
| 25 | NP | MO | CS | 18 |
| 26 | NP | D | NS | 21 |
| 27 | NP | MO | SS | 19 |
| 28 | NP | D | CS | 20 |
| 29 | NP | MO | NS | 11 |
| 30 | NP | D | SS | 25 |
| TOTAL | | | | 435 |

Scenario 2 - Non-compliance and withdraw from the IAEA

| Future | United | Israel | 5+1 | Votes |
|---------------|---------------|---------------|------------|--------------|
| 1 | MA | MO | CS | 12 |
| 2 | MA | D | NS | 24 |
| 3 | MA | MO | SS | 13 |
| 4 | MA | D | CS | 29 |
| 5 | MA | MO | NS | 14 |
| 6 | MA | D | SS | 28 |
| 7 | S | MO | CS | 15 |
| 8 | S | D | NS | 23 |
| 9 | S | MO | SS | 16 |
| 10 | S | D | CS | 27 |
| 11 | S | MO | NS | 17 |
| 12 | S | D | SS | 26 |
| 13 | AP | MO | CS | 6 |
| 14 | AP | D | NS | 9 |
| 15 | AP | MO | SS | 7 |
| 16 | AP | D | CS | 11 |
| 17 | AP | MO | NS | 8 |
| 18 | AP | D | SS | 10 |
| 19 | PA | MO | CS | 0 |
| 20 | PA | D | NS | 3 |
| 21 | PA | MO | SS | 1 |
| 22 | PA | D | CS | 4 |
| 23 | PA | MO | NS | 2 |
| 24 | PA | D | SS | 5 |
| 25 | NP | MO | CS | 18 |
| 26 | NP | D | NS | 21 |
| 27 | NP | MO | SS | 19 |
| 28 | NP | D | CS | 20 |
| 29 | NP | MO | NS | 11 |
| 30 | NP | D | SS | 24 |
| TOTAL | | | | 435 |

Scenario 3 – Pre-emptive attack on Israel

| Future | United | Israel | 5+1 | Votes |
|---------------|---------------|---------------|------------|--------------|
| 1 | MA | MO | CS | 25 |
| 2 | MA | D | NS | 15 |
| 3 | MA | MO | SS | 26 |
| 4 | MA | D | CS | 17 |
| 5 | MA | MO | NS | 24 |
| 6 | MA | D | SS | 16 |
| 7 | S | MO | CS | 22 |
| 8 | S | D | NS | 12 |
| 9 | S | MO | SS | 23 |
| 10 | S | D | CS | 14 |
| 11 | S | MO | NS | 21 |
| 12 | S | D | SS | 13 |
| 13 | AP | MO | CS | 3 |
| 14 | AP | D | NS | 2 |
| 15 | AP | MO | SS | 4 |
| 16 | AP | D | CS | 0 |
| 17 | AP | MO | NS | 5 |
| 18 | AP | D | SS | 6 |
| 19 | PA | MO | CS | 29 |
| 20 | PA | D | NS | 7 |
| 21 | PA | MO | SS | 27 |
| 22 | PA | D | CS | 8 |
| 23 | PA | MO | NS | 28 |
| 24 | PA | D | SS | 15 |
| 25 | NP | MO | CS | 20 |
| 26 | NP | D | NS | 10 |
| 27 | NP | MO | SS | 19 |
| 28 | NP | D | CS | 11 |
| 29 | NP | MO | NS | 18 |
| 30 | NP | D | SS | 9 |
| TOTAL | | | | 435 |

Scenario 4: Comply with full transparency

| Future | United | Israel | 5+1 | Votes |
|---------------|---------------|---------------|------------|--------------|
| 1 | MA | MO | CS | 13 |
| 2 | MA | D | NS | 25 |
| 3 | MA | MO | SS | 12 |
| 4 | MA | D | CS | 26 |
| 5 | MA | MO | NS | 11 |
| 6 | MA | D | SS | 24 |
| 7 | S | MO | CS | 5 |
| 8 | S | D | NS | 19 |
| 9 | S | MO | SS | 7 |
| 10 | S | D | CS | 17 |
| 11 | S | MO | NS | 6 |
| 12 | S | D | SS | 18 |
| 13 | AP | MO | CS | 14 |
| 14 | AP | D | NS | 27 |
| 15 | AP | MO | SS | 16 |
| 16 | AP | D | CS | 29 |
| 17 | AP | MO | NS | 15 |
| 18 | AP | D | SS | 28 |
| 19 | PA | MO | CS | 1 |
| 20 | PA | D | NS | 6 |
| 21 | PA | MO | SS | 2 |
| 22 | PA | D | CS | 5 |
| 23 | PA | MO | NS | 3 |
| 24 | PA | D | SS | 4 |
| 25 | NP | MO | CS | 8 |
| 26 | NP | D | NS | 22 |
| 27 | NP | MO | SS | 9 |
| 28 | NP | D | CS | 23 |
| 29 | NP | MO | NS | 10 |
| 30 | NP | D | SS | 21 |
| TOTAL | | | | 435 |

RANKING THE ALTERNATE FUTURES

Scenario 1 - Non-compliance toward break-out capabilities

| Future | United | Israel | 5+1 | Votes |
|---------------|---------------|---------------|------------|--------------|
| 10 | S | D | CS | 29 |
| 12 | S | D | SS | 28 |
| 4 | MA | D | SC | 27 |
| 6 | MA | D | SS | 26 |
| 28 | NP | D | CS | 25 |
| 30 | NP | D | SS | 24 |
| 8 | S | D | NS | 23 |
| 5 | M | D | NS | 22 |
| 26 | NP | D | NS | 21 |
| 29 | NP | MO | NS | 20 |
| 27 | NP | MO | SS | 19 |
| 25 | NP | MO | CS | 18 |
| 11 | S | MO | NS | 17 |
| 9 | S | MO | SS | 16 |
| 7 | S | MO | CS | 15 |
| 5 | MA | MO | NS | 14 |
| 3 | MA | MO | SS | 13 |
| 1 | MA | MO | CS | 12 |
| 16 | AP | D | CS | 11 |
| 18 | AP | D | SS | 10 |
| 14 | AP | D | NS | 9 |
| 17 | AP | MO | NS | 8 |
| 15 | AP | MO | SS | 7 |
| 13 | AP | MO | CS | 6 |
| 24 | PA | D | CS | 5 |
| 22 | PA | D | SS | 4 |
| 20 | PA | D | NS | 3 |
| 19 | PA | MO | CS | 2 |
| 21 | PA | MO | SS | 1 |
| 23 | PA | MO | NS | 0 |
| TOTAL | | | | 435 |

Scenario 2 - Non-compliance and withdraw from the IAEA

| Future | United | Israel | 5+1 | Votes |
|---------------|---------------|---------------|------------|--------------|
| 4 | MA | D | CS | 29 |
| 6 | MA | D | SS | 28 |
| 10 | S | D | CS | 27 |
| 12 | S | D | SS | 26 |
| 28 | NP | D | CS | 25 |
| 30 | NP | D | SS | 24 |
| 8 | S | D | NS | 23 |
| 5 | M | D | NS | 22 |
| 26 | NP | D | NS | 21 |
| 29 | NP | MO | NS | 20 |
| 27 | NP | MO | SS | 19 |
| 25 | NP | MO | CS | 18 |
| 11 | S | MO | NS | 17 |
| 9 | S | MO | SS | 16 |
| 7 | S | MO | CS | 15 |
| 5 | MA | MO | NS | 14 |
| 3 | MA | MO | SS | 13 |
| 1 | MA | MO | CS | 12 |
| 16 | AP | D | CS | 11 |
| 18 | AP | D | SS | 10 |
| 14 | AP | D | NS | 9 |
| 17 | AP | MO | NS | 8 |
| 15 | AP | MO | SS | 7 |
| 13 | AP | MO | CS | 6 |
| 24 | PA | D | CS | 5 |
| 22 | PA | D | SS | 4 |
| 20 | PA | D | NS | 3 |
| 19 | PA | MO | CS | 2 |
| 21 | PA | MO | SS | 1 |
| 23 | PA | MO | NS | 0 |
| TOTAL | | | | 435 |

Scenario 3 – Pre-emptive attack on Israel

| Future | United | Israel | 5+1 | Votes |
|---------------|---------------|---------------|------------|--------------|
| 21 | PA | MO | SS | 29 |
| 19 | PA | MO | CS | 28 |
| 23 | PA | MO | NS | 27 |
| 3 | MA | MO | SS | 26 |
| 1 | MA | MO | CS | 25 |
| 5 | MA | MO | NS | 24 |
| 9 | S | MO | SS | 23 |
| 7 | S | MO | CS | 22 |
| 11 | S | MO | NS | 21 |
| 27 | NP | MO | SS | 20 |
| 25 | NP | MO | CS | 19 |
| 29 | NP | MO | NS | 18 |
| 4 | MA | D | CS | 17 |
| 6 | MA | D | SS | 16 |
| 2 | MA | D | NS | 15 |
| 10 | S | D | CS | 14 |
| 12 | S | D | SS | 13 |
| 8 | S | D | NS | 12 |
| 30 | NP | D | CS | 11 |
| 26 | NP | D | SR | 10 |
| 30 | NP | D | SC | 9 |
| 22 | PA | D | CS | 8 |
| 20 | PA | D | NS | 7 |
| 18 | PA | D | SS | 6 |
| 17 | AP | MO | NS | 5 |
| 15 | AP | MO | SS | 4 |
| 13 | AP | MO | CS | 3 |
| 14 | AP | D | NS | 2 |
| 18 | AP | D | SS | 1 |
| 16 | AP | D | CS | 0 |
| TOTAL | | | | 435 |

Scenario 4: Comply With Full Transparency

| Future | United | Israel | 5+1 | Votes |
|---------------|---------------|---------------|------------|--------------|
| 4 | MA | D | CS | 29 |
| 6 | MA | D | SS | 28 |
| 16 | AP | D | CS | 27 |
| 18 | AP | D | SS | 26 |
| 28 | NP | D | CS | 25 |
| 30 | NP | D | SS | 24 |
| 10 | S | D | CS | 23 |
| 12 | S | D | SS | 22 |
| 14 | AP | D | NS | 21 |
| 2 | MA | D | NS | 20 |
| 8 | S | D | NS | 19 |
| 26 | NP | D | NS | 18 |
| 15 | AP | MO | SS | 17 |
| 17 | AP | MO | ND | 16 |
| 13 | AP | MO | SC | 15 |
| 1 | MA | MO | CS | 14 |
| 3 | MA | MO | SS | 13 |
| 5 | MA | MO | NS | 12 |
| 29 | NP | MO | NS | 11 |
| 27 | NP | MO | SS | 10 |
| 25 | NP | MO | CS | 9 |
| 9 | S | MO | NS | 8 |
| 11 | S | MO | SS | 7 |
| 7 | S | MO | CS | 6 |
| 20 | PA | D | NS | 5 |
| 22 | PA | D | CS | 4 |
| 24 | PA | D | SS | 3 |
| 23 | PA | MO | NS | 2 |
| 21 | PA | MO | SS | 1 |
| 19 | PA | MO | CS | 0 |
| TOTAL | | | | 435 |

ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATE FUTURES

Scenario one: Iran's non-compliance and continuation toward breakout capability.

Based on current rhetoric from Iran, scenario one seems to be the most likely position Iran will take in the near future. Within the last month, President Ahmadinejad reiterated his position that Iran will not be 'bullied' and will not succumb to international pressure when Iran is only pursuing nuclear power within its rights. Iran fully intends to continue its nuclear program.

Alternate futures #10 and #12

Two alternate futures received tie votes, alternate future #10 and #12. These futures reflect: *#10 - US Sanctions, Israel Diplomacy, Complete Support from P5+1*

#12 – US Sanctions, Israel Diplomacy, Some Support from P5+1

The key differentiator in these two futures is the support or waning support that the P5 +1 give in regards to sanctions. In this scenario, sanctions would be an immediate response necessary to show consequences without escalating tensions in the Middle East to a point that withdraw would be difficult. In the midst of economic and political turmoil, Iran is even more determined to demonstrate success in the pursuit of nuclear power. The goal may not necessarily, at this time, be to build a nuclear arsenal. Instead, Iran may need to use the nuclear program as a distraction from internal problems, to unify the splintered and disgruntled factions and as a promise of future nuclear freedom. Iran also has potential concerns about their Tehran reactor running out of fuel, so will need to find a solution soon (Prather, 2009, p. 1). Sanctions will afford all actors limited time to gauge the impact of Iran's political and economic faltering landscape and how it may affect the nuclear program before the next move.

The United States has already introduced the topic of sanctions and started to align this process aware that sanctions that are too harsh run the risk of negatively impacting protesters, the economically destitute and those seeking regime change. As a result, the United States may seek to tailor sanctions in a manner to impact the upper and ruling classes.

The term ‘diplomacy’ in regards to Israel does not constitute a diplomatic relationship with Iran, but that it will cooperate with the United States and the P 5 +1 in a global effort toward deterrence and diplomacy. This is initial cooperation that could change. Most likely Israel will eventually seek its own options as well which could include covert action.

In regards to sanctions, Britain and France have already committed support in this area. Germany has expressed reluctance for economic reasons, but has indicated a nod if necessary. China and Russia have conflicting interests, so for these two countries, sanctions become an important balancing act. Some of the following are points they have in common:

- Both have significant economic ties to Iran
- Both have equally strong incentives to support the West
- They may have regional security concerns and may not want the United States to have more leverage in the Middle East
- China and Russia have been repeatedly against harsh sanctions and support diplomacy and incentives, though Russia will support individual country incentives and China may follow some of Russia’s lead. China has strong economic ties with Iran, the United States and the EU giving it less incentive to be in the middle
- Both will most likely call for talks and patience unless Iran escalates tensions and sanctions becomes the better option to war.
- Both have incentives and responsibility to safeguard against proliferation and maintain a commitment to diplomacy and world security
- Both are against US or Israeli military conflict. They may not want to link themselves to what may appear to be primarily a United States agenda or repeat of Iraq 2003
- Their support would weigh heavily against Iran, but not sure what long term international economic consequences to harsher sanctions

As a result of the complex and conflicting roles that China and Russia have, they will most likely waiver back and forth on certain issues depending upon their own countries

interests as well as the level of escalation, threat or concern especially between Iran and the United States.

In consideration of the effect of sanctions, this approach may not be effective, but may be a necessary first step. Iran has insisted that sanctions would not affect its pursuit of nuclear power. As history reflects, sanctions have been imposed against Iran for decades with little deterrence, so in that respect, Iran may be correct. Included with the current set of sanctions, new restrictions would need to be sensitive to the growing discord within the regime. The infrastructure in Iran is tense and could affect the future of the regime in Iran as well as impact the nuclear strategy. Iran is in the process of lifting price subsidies which will impact the poor and middle class. That in turn will eventually impact the economy as a whole. Sanctions geared toward impacting decision makers and the upper middle class may be more likely to prompt action among those more able to influence Iran's leaders. It also may create an atmosphere that calls for regime change which could be in the best interest of the United States and Israel.

This alternate future may transpose over time either as a result of problems within Iran, escalated conflict, compliance from Iran, or another future may impact events in an entirely separate direction. The point is that this future represents a quick response, but not a long term sustainable result. Single track techniques, responses or diplomacy at this stage will most likely prove ineffective, but can be an important part of the process at times.

Another concern in regards to sanctions is Iran's relationship with Chavez. He has been recently engaging in anti-American rhetoric and seems more than willing to supply Iran with the imports necessary to minimize the effects of some sanctions if needed.

Alternate future #4 and #6

The next two futures are also very similar to each other and to the first futures. The difference is that instead of limiting its options to sanctions, the United States widens the

approach to what is referred to for this study, a multi-tiered approach. The differences between #4 and #6 are the amount of support from the P5+1.

The futures are: #4 US Multi-tiered approaches, Israel diplomatic, P5+1 complete support and #6 US Multi-tiered approaches, Israel diplomatic, P5+1 some support

These futures could get the most votes, but it is not yet apparent if the United States has all the resources in place to start in this position. In this scenario – the goal is to encourage Iran to comply with the IAEA recommendations through a combination of sanctions and diplomacy as well as slight military pressure. MA stands for multi-tiered approach which calls for addressing issues with Iran on many levels, from grassroots to policy, with as much support from the international community as possible. In this scenario, the United States continues to build relationships and alliances within the 5 + 1 especially, finding increased incentives to keep China and Russia engaged. A sub-goal is to find ways for the P5+1 to build a united front. From a diplomatic perspective, President Obama continues dialogue with Russia about gradual nuclear disarmament to show the international community the United States commitment to the NPT. This will afford the US a greater position and legitimacy when addressing the concerns of Iran's nuclear program. It is also in Russia's interest as one of the leading nuclear powers to support non-proliferation efforts. Part of this dialogue will include the responsibility Iran has as a nuclear state to abide by IAEA regulations, illustrating that the pursuit and rights of civil nuclear power come with specific guidelines and commitments as part of the international agreement set forth in the NPT. For the future of non-nuclear proliferation, this is an opportunity for Russia, the United States and the P5+1 to create a foundation for future world security.

Russia and the United States should also work together on energy efficiency approaches which could save both countries significant amounts of money, resources and dependency over time. This cooperative effort in both areas (non-proliferation and energy) would set standards for the future in terms of international cooperation on significant issues. These efforts could include types of participation on all levels – for

example - school projects, to grass root contributions to national committees which could demonstrate the world a US and Russian commitment to improved lives and communities. This is just one example of building global cooperation efforts which, though seemingly unrelated to non-proliferation, will help to form stronger bonds among people that are built on shared experiences which then contributes to national security. As seen in the example of Iran, the US limited contact has left the United States in the dark at times especially in regards to their nuclear program. Building opportunities to understand more about the cultures of the world, the specific expression, nuances, customs, habits, beliefs and intentions (like Iran) can provide the United States with a better foundation on which to make assessments and therefore national security strategy as well as gaining greater opportunities to be good stewards in the world.

These approaches are not limited to Russia or Iran, but they are necessary as part of a comprehensive approach to address the US reputation overseas and how that can impact national security in the form of reducing state sponsored or other terrorism and encouraging cooperation with Iran. Unfortunately, one global concern is that the United States is, as Iran said, a 'bully'. People do not always feel bad when a bully is hit. Part of this overall approach should be to change that image. President Bush made tough decisions during a time of national crisis after a rare, brutal and globally public attack on US soil. He aggressively sought to prevent a re-occurrence and succeeded. The US reputation, however, paid a price, which President Obama now, can work to repair.

Diplomacy and relationship building without a commitment to strength and security only leaves a nation vulnerable to attack. It can be a difficult balance to 'extend a hand', but also set appropriate military boundaries and expectations. Committed and firm sanctions, as those mentioned above, are also important and necessary parts of this scenario. With a multi-tiered approach, China and Russia may offer some support if they are part of a more balanced approach, which is essential. A strengthening of United States military presence in the Middle East may also be a consideration as mentioned by Secretary of State Clinton. In an interview, Secretary of State Clinton mentioned that if Iran were to gain nuclear weapons, then the United States would create an extensive defense umbrella in the Middle East which would guarantee a mutually assured

destruction and would strip Iran of a hedge on power in the region (Fox News, 2009). Preparing for that process may be in the best interest of the United States at this time, depending on how close Iran is to potential break out capability. Building up of a US missile defense system would also represent how the world, specifically the United States, would respond to a nuclear armed State. Strength would be an essential element, but also diplomatic leadership, broad incentives and willingness to dialogue in a multi-tiered approach.

This scenario also includes building a greater intelligence capacity, not only in regards to Iran, but including it as part of continued national security. Continued intelligence networks with US allies to share information in regards to activities in the Middle East will limit surprise in regards to Iran and will also set the foundation for future intelligence flow. The United States has had limited access to information about Iran as a result of the broken ties between the two nations, but also as a result of limited language experts. Part of this sustainable process would also be to facilitate programs of mutual understanding and common ground and open the door for future relationships, perhaps through education, music, the arts or other forums that can make it possible for the United States to have better contact and comprehension of the Iranian people.

Lastly, but not limited to, this scenario also provides for increasing incentives and broadening the negotiation landscape, discussed in fuller detail below.

Israel, in this scenario, also is supportive of the United States process, but may seek other non-strike approaches as well to insure security. For the near future, military strike does not seem to be the most rational option for Israel, not only because it may not receive support from the United States, but also because the sites in Iran are so spread out, the damage to the nuclear program would be minimal, while civilian casualties could be high offering justification for Iran to pursue a nuclear weapons program. Israel would support the United States approach which would, as many believe, delay the possibility of nuclear weapons capabilities for at least one more year. This would give Israel greater time for its national defense strategy. Israel could also work to build Arab/Israeli relationships and peace around its own borders.

The P5 + 1 in this scenario would support the West except perhaps in regards to sanctions. It would help create incentives and opportunities to encourage Iran to comply with the IAEA. Part of the incentive for the P5 + 1, is that once Iran complies and sanctions eventually lifted, other types of economic gain could be possible. Past examples of countries that have given up their nuclear programs, were successful because the incentives outweighed the economics of pursuit. Iran would not abandon its nuclear program because it lacks both economic sense and it would cause Iran to forfeit international and national credibility. Symbolic and economic hopes are also tied to the pursuit of nuclear power, so sanctions and incentives alone most likely will not be enough to deter Iran. Strength, global diplomacy, incentives, sanctions, dialogue and creativity are needed which may include some 'thinking way outside the box'. In this scenario, the 5 + 1 creates an atmosphere of limited inclusion to allow Iran the possibility of compliance without 'losing face', though sanctions stay in place until that time may come.

Scenario two: Non-Compliance and Withdraw from the NPT

This act by Iran would signal the world that they are pursuing nuclear weapons. This would create a potential and very real threat to both the United States, Israel and others in the Middle East, revealing a consistent duplicity from Iran and calling their intentions further into question. Military strike would most likely not be a recommended automatic 'trigger-finger' response, though Israel and the United States would more seriously consider and further plan for such an option, recognizing that by withdrawing from the NPT Iran has probably considered the consequences of military engagement from either party and had prepared to some extent. There are various reasons for Iran to withdraw which include a dedication to nuclear arms for the purpose of establishing power and recognition in the Middle East, that internal and external pressures push Iran to appear bolder, or it could be part of a greater and more dangerous strategy against the United States and its allies. For the United States an immediate military response would not be possible as it would be necessary to go through proper channels. As a result, a multi-tiered approach would be the more likely alternate future. In this case transposing to a future that involves military engagement would be a considered next step.

Alternate Future # 4 and #6

The futures are: *#4 US Multi-tiered approaches, Israel diplomatic, P5+1 complete support and #6 US Multi-tiered approaches, Israel diplomatic, P5+1 some support*

The next two futures are also very similar to each other and to the first futures. The difference is that instead of limiting its options to sanctions, the United States widens the approach to what is referred to for this study, a multi-tiered approach. Future #4 and #6 are different from each other by the levels of support from the P5+1

The reason this won more votes than one with a military strike for the reasons mentioned above. Military action may not be the best response as the degree and timing of Iran's nuclear capability may lend the situation more time to prepare, plan and encourage Iran to select a different course of action. Military preparations would begin, however, for the seriousness of this future to be fully appreciated by Iran, though as a result of the consequences and backlash, a military option should be a final option after all others are exhausted. As the goal of the United States and Israel is to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons capability, focused sanctions would be part of the initial response as well as fervent attempts to limit assistance to Iran from other countries such as Venezuela, Bolivia and North Korea as well as other countries neighboring Iran. Inclusion of the 5 +1, specifically Russia and China, as well as the EU and other NPT signers would create significant international pressure on Iran. This directive would be more serious than in the previous scenario and even wider. As Venezuela may support Iran, and is rumored to have Hezbollah groups in country, this scenario would monitor that connection as well, perhaps extending the defense umbrella to include those areas of vulnerability. As stakes are higher in this scenario, time would be a factor. If Iran does not retract, then this situation would most likely transpose to a more aggressive and hard-lined approach. According to Bolton, "Nowhere is delay more costly in contemporary terms than in WMD proliferation, where time is often the critical component in determining whether a proliferation effort will succeed or fail." (Bolton, 2007, p. 430)

Part of this approach would be for the United States to step up in terms of nuclear leadership. Many nations in the last few years have taken steps to start ‘peaceful’ nuclear programs and North Korea has created and tested a nuclear bomb. The risk of more abuse in the area of nuclear freedoms has just expanded exponentially and if the nuclear leaders of the world do not take decisive leadership, then the consequences could be dire. After everyone has nuclear weapons will be too late. Now is the time to shape the future with Iran and North Korea as the example – It is the result of their defiance that other countries may justify their own.

Though Israel is working with the United States, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would be preparing for attack, also concerned that in anticipation, Iran might strike first. Though currently it seems to be in Israel’s best interest to seek options other than military, it is somewhat of a wild card. Pre-emptive strike has worked to Israel’s benefit in the past, however, with so much military confrontation in the Middle East, it would just serve to further disrupt regional security and further polarize nuclear tensions.

The 5 + 1 would support this approach at first in order to avoid military conflict. In this scenario, it has an even more significant role. Some fundamental issues seem to be essential to address first in regards to Iran’s security and ability to maintain integrity for a potential change. A vision for the future which includes Iran’s participation should be discussed, global cooperation in regards to the pursuit of Iran’s peaceful pursuit of nuclear power, participation in various international groups and an opportunity to be removed from the list of state sponsors could be among the list of incentives that the 5 + 1 presents to Iran. However, at the same time, Iran, with its rhetoric about ‘only for peaceful purposes’ would need to take accountability and understand the deeper repercussions of nuclear proliferation that are impacted by its example. A change in course would be mandatory and it must be a united effort in this regard or the future of nuclear power will become much more dangerous for those here as well as generations to come.

It would be important for the 5 + 1 to also recognize that for Iran security also includes other nations in the region pursuing nuclear programs including Turkey, Egypt, Libya

and the UAE. Israel is also a threat, which would need to be addressed. There is already a nuclear race in the region and Iran would need some assurances that remaining a peaceful program would be in its best security interests.

Finally, especially in terms of limiting escalation, direct talks would be a part of this future. During the Cold War, there are examples of the leaders the Soviet Union and the United States speaking directly. Done correctly, direct talks do not need to minimize one's position or suggest agreement or compliance with the other. In this case, as the consequences of escalation could lead to war and when the security of the world could be at stake, leaders talk directly. This builds respect for the severity of the issues, and as leaders also reflects their dedication to avoid conflict and potential loss of human life. As part of a comprehensive and multi-tiered approach, direct talks are part of a larger strategy which in this scenario would offer greater possibilities for the future.

Alternate future #10

US sanctions, Israel diplomatic, P5+1 fully supportive

This future is much like alternate future #4, except that instead of having a wide range of options, the United States imposes sanctions only as an immediate response. Israel and the 5+1 initially cooperate with the hope that sanctions will encourage Iran to cooperate with IAEA and recommit to the NPT. The stakes are higher, so Russia and China readily support sanctions. This future is one that has not seemed successful in the past and could very likely transpose quickly into another future based on the reactions of the other actors.

Alternate future #12

US sanctions, Israel diplomatic, P5+1 some support

#12 received the next highest votes. Much like alternate future #10, except it receives less support from the P5+1. In this scenarios, most likely the sanctions are too harsh or relations with either China and the United States or Russia and the United States has been

strained, limiting the amount of support on or the other will provide. This alternate future seems likely to quickly transpose into other futures given the right set of conditions.

SCENARIO THREE: PRE-EMPTIVE ATTACK ON ISRAEL

This would be not only a devastating move by Iran, but would signify that Iran had thought out the consequences with much deeper strategic implications or unless Iran had the impression that Israel would launch a first strike. Otherwise, the attack would not seem probable as such a move would jeopardize Iran's goals, giving the United States and Israel a legitimate and necessary reason for an unrelenting military engagement.

Though it would not seem to be in Iran's best interest to launch an attack, this scenario does help present how a military option can limit the possibilities to transpose to other events. Also, since the leader of Iran has professed apocalyptic beliefs as well as a desire to be rid of Israel and martyrdom for one's faith has been a practice among the terror groups connected to Iran, it would seem irresponsible to discount simply because it does not fit into a western view of rational thinking. Rationality, in this case, is subjective.

Alternate future # 19

It represents a future that the U.S. supports or leads an attack against Iran, Israel attacks and the P5 + 1 support retaliation.

Though this scenario does not seem likely, it is important to consider some of the strategy options. There are various methods that Iran could utilize which include direct attacks or terror attacks though Hezbollah or Hamas toward Israel the United States or both. Iran could attack Israel as part of a larger strategy involving the United States. That could lead to attacks against US forces in the Middle East. Hezbollah terrorists training in Venezuela could launch an aggressive campaign at various locations in the United States. (Winchell, 2009, 1) Russia though not directly involved perhaps

indirectly made it possible by weaken US security. Motivated by U.S. support to Georgia, or concerned about a strong US presence in the Middle East and what that might eventually mean to Russian interests, the Russians convinced the United States to relinquish the Poland/Czech missile defense system, and then negotiated a missile deal with Iran that could offer Iran greater defense against US, Israeli and Allied Forces. In September of 2009, Chavez met with Russia, praised Putin for standing up to the United States and made arrangements to purchase 4 billion dollars worth of arms to counter a Columbian-US relationship. None of these countries attack Israel or the United States directly, but through terrorism, prompting Israel to immediately respond to with a military strike. In this scenario, Israel is prepared. Recently, Israel sent a submarine capable of launching a nuclear missile to the Red Sea through the Suez Canal, it has developed and tested anti-ballistic missiles and ran military exercises that are similar to ones that would be simulated against Iran (Katzman, 2007, p. 42).

Though it seems unlikely, all three countries have past grudges with the United States. Chavez has said on more than one occasion that the United States will fail within the next decades. Iran has also echoed similar sentiments at times. To be linked with an old adversary is something that the United States may want to watch closely. It can be easy for history to fall into old patterns; Cuba, the Middle East, Russia, Venezuela and nuclear arms is a way for the global community to restore an age old equilibrium of power -a dangerous concept in this new age of asymmetrical threats.

“Russia’s greater involvement in the region has been welcomed by all Middle East nations, including Israel, where the public increasingly sees how detrimental it is to have a one-sided policy of alignment with a single global power – the United States – in a world that is ever more complex and polarized.” (Primakov, 2009, p. 367)

Especially, if attacked by Hezbollah, the United States would have no option, but to respond in a cooperative effort with Israel including air strikes. The conflict would be long and engaged and may not be contained to the Middle East. If it was the result of a pre-emptive attack, missile strikes would be dedicated to destroying the nuclear capabilities and missile launching systems of Iran. The consequences would be

devastating, both in loss of life, but also in resources spent and deep chasm left in the aftermath.

Futures #23 and #21

These are the next futures and represent attacks supported or led by the United States, attacks by Israel with the P5 +1 not in support of retaliation.

These are the next futures and represent attacks supported or led by the United States, attacks by Israel with the P5+1 offering limited support

To launch an air strike against Iran even in response to an attack, Israel would most likely require US support for refueling and access to airspace. During Afghan and Iraq involvement, direct support could strain US resources, however, an attack by Iran would be viewed as an attempt to ‘wipe Israel off the map’ and as a result, the United States supports Israel in a response. . According to the NATO treaty, which extends to Israel, Japan and Australia, US nuclear protection extends beyond the borders of the United States “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them shall be considered an attack against all -and to assist such Parties as it deems necessary” (Doty, 2009, p. 136).

Though military support from the US may overextend United States Forces, it would be possible to launch a cooperative air strike with Israel. Iran has been testing missiles that most likely can hit Israel, so military and missile sites would also have to be targeted as part of a first offensive. With US assistance, a continued air strike could successfully eliminate many of the above ground targets, while others would require multiple strikes. Another consideration in light of US assistance is that with additional resources available, Israel would be less likely to consider a nuclear strike as a defensive move.

The aftermath of a war would be multi-fold depending upon the level of containment. As a response to a pre-emptive attack, the United States could consider a complete

invasion into Iran. This would potentially reinforce a particular and negative world view of the United States regardless of who initiated conflict. For Israel, regional peace and stability would be compromised and the tear in Arab-Israeli peace initiatives would be affected. Many dislike and mistrust the US and this event could lay seeds for future terrorism, aggression and conspiracy theories in which the United States would need to be prepared.

In regards to the nuclear program, there would need to be stringent protocol in place to manage the new states that want nuclear power and an awareness that new types of security concerns may arise as a result of the conflict and the spread of nuclear power.

Alternate future #1 and #3

. This future indicates a situation in which the United States takes a multi-tiered approach; Israel attacks and the P 5 + 1 support US approach

Alternate future #3 United States taking a multi-tiered approach, Israel attacking Iran and P5+1 offering some support

In the first future, the United States backs Israel in attack against Iran, however in the last two, the United States attempts a multi-tiered approach with Iran, which would most likely result in attempt to contain the aggression. Iran and Israel may trade a few strikes, though Israel will most likely attempt to take out some of the nuclear and missile sites if possible. If Iran launched a first strike, it would most likely be strategic and aimed at limiting Israel's response. The United States and P5+1 would need to work to limit increased escalation to prevent the deployment of nuclear weapons. The United States in this scenario would be focusing on creating options for future stability. The result of not more directly supporting Israel when it was attacked could severe good relations between the two countries. As a defense strategy, against an actual attack from Iran, Israel would receive support and justification, but there would still most likely be backlash affecting

Gaza, retaliation, and maybe relations with the United States. Iran would be censured and the West would legitimate reasons to force Iran to give up its nuclear program.

SCENARIO 4: COMPLY WITH FULL TRANSPARENCY

This would be the most ideal scenario and would complement the professed goals of each party - that Iran pursues a peaceful nuclear program. If Iran chose to work with the IAEA and the 5 +1, there would still be need for trust building on both sides, but it would represent a move in the right direction for opportunities to work together and have dialogue. It would also serve as the foundation for future nuclear programs. In this situation, Iran would agree to stop enrichment and send uranium to Russia to be converted into fuel rods, opening its doors to transparency and more thorough IAEA inspections. Iran, Russia, China, Israel the United States and the P5+1, if successful, should be globally recognized and should create a standard for future programs to follow, as part of a norm which includes transparency, cooperation and compliance. Nuclear power should not be expressed as a 'right' but as a privilege and responsibility.

You cannot hope to build a better world without improving the individuals. To that end each of us must work for his own improvement and at the same time share a general responsibility for all humanity, our particular duty being to aid those to whom we think we can be most useful. – Madame Curie

Alternate Future # 4 and #6

United States-Multi-tiered approach, Israel-diplomacy, P5+1 Complete Support

United States-Multi-tiered approach, Israel-diplomacy, P5+1 some Support

This scenario would call for a multi-tiered approach. As the only difference between the two futures is in the amount of support from the P5+1, and as in this scenario Iran has committed to pressing forward in cooperation, both futures will be considered together.

A dedication to full transparency would still require a commitment from the United States, Israel and the P 5+1 to insure a seamless and sustainable process. Trust building on both sides would be a necessary component and progress toward other security issues should be taken as well.

The goal should be a comprehensive agreement "for the development of relations and cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect and the establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme." This cooperation would include regional security, trade and investment, civil aviation, energy, telecommunications and agriculture. It is my belief that only through negotiations can confidence be created and a comprehensive and durable solution to the Iran question achieved. This would be good for Iran, good for the region and good for the world (ElBaradei, 2008). Other confidence building measures would be to cease heavy water facilities and work toward regional stability.

Open dialogue should include Iraq, Hezbollah and Hamas, drug trade as well as how to create a secure environment for Iran with neighbors who are also seeking nuclear programs. As Iran's economy seems to be a vital concern, nuclear programs that support the processing of medical and industrial isotopes could be developed in Iran as opposed to money spent on centrifuge and uranium enrichment. Regional and global pride would be a part of such a worthy endeavor as well as the pride that would come from turning the economy around.

This opportunity would also give the United States a chance to build relationships and gain deeper insight into a country that it has had limited access to in the past. It would give Iran the opportunity to be included into world affairs more directly. Part of the unique characteristic of this approach is its flexibility to shape itself to the given context. In this scenario, severe sanctions would not be necessary. Opportunities to build dialogue, to begin lifting other sanctions, to address global terrorism and help insure Iran's security would be part of this future.

Israel takes a deterrence and diplomatic position, perhaps unsure of this particular development. Israel would most likely have some mixed response. To insure regional stability, the United States and the P5 + 1 would need to provide more stringent oversight, modify the IAEA inspections and keep Iran in the spotlight to limit possibilities for clandestine behavior. A larger approach to regional stability would be the next step for Israel and the Middle East process.

The 5 + 1 sees opportunities to build other economic ties with Iran. It also works with Iran to address the security concerns mentioned previously in regards to the nuclear (civilian) race that is occurring in the Middle East. Turkey, Egypt, Libya and the UAE are all seeking nuclear programs which should be addressed if Iran is committed to transparency and compliance in order to set a foundation of future regional stability. Strengthening of the International Security Council and IAEA is also fundamental to address the future of civilian nuclear programs and would be part of a 5 + 1 conversation in this future.

Alternate Future #16 and #18

US Support of Iran's Peaceful Nuclear Program, Israel Diplomatic, P5+1 Full Support

US Support of Iran's Peaceful Nuclear Program, Israel Diplomatic, P5 Some Support

These two futures are very similar with the difference being in the amount of full support from the P5+1. The goal of cooperation from Iran has initially been met in this scenario. In this new situation, the essential criterion is trust, oversight and accountability. In the past, Iran was not always forthcoming with IAEA inspections. Rigorous oversight would be necessary as part of the trust building among nations. The United States, then, would agree to back away from attempts at regime change. The trust building would move forward in that manner, and would allow continuing dialogue in the shape of both

direct and three party talks which would help to serve all interested parties and opens up more opportunities for future growth and sustainability. A dedication to full transparency from Iran would still require a commitment from the United States, Israel and the P 5+1 and the NPT signers would work to help Iran with their peaceful program. Talks should include topics connected to regional security such as Iraq, Hezbollah and Hamas, drug trade as well as how to create a secure environment for Iran with neighbors who are also seeking nuclear programs. As Iran's economy seems to be a vital concern, nuclear programs that support the processing of medical and industrial isotopes could be developed in Iran as opposed to money spent on centrifuge and uranium enrichment. Opportunities for Iran to join the World Trade Organization would be considered. Strengthening of the International Security Council and IAEA is also fundamental to address the future of civilian nuclear programs and would be part of P5 + 1 conversations. Regional and global pride would be a part of such a worthy endeavor as well as the pride that would come from turning the economy around.

The possibilities from this scenario open up many more options for peace and economic engagements, but it would be essential that Iran allow much more transparency. To illustrate their commitment to trust building, they would change to light water reactors, ship uranium out right away, and be open to a more stringent IAEA inspection process. As part of trust building and attention to Iran's integrity, a system could be in place for all new nuclear states to send out uranium for enrichment which would create another safeguard and would eliminate isolating Iran in that regard. It would become a standard practice in the spread of nuclear power.

Alternate Future # 28

Negotiations and Incentives from US, Israel-Diplomacy, Full Support from P5+1

In this future, the United States focuses primarily on negotiations and incentives with Iran, a much less comprehensive approach than a multi-tiered approach. Without sanctions, China and Russia are much more cooperative. Having had concerns that Iran

would eventually be invaded much like Iraq, Russia and China have been slow to participate in any techniques that seem aggressive or bent toward an attempt of regime change. In this scenario, with the United States pursuing dialogue and incentives, the P5 +1, especially China and Russia become more engaged and committed to insuring that Iran complies completely. Israel is comfortable with the prospect of non-nuclear armed Iran, but Iran's goal of being a regional leader is an item Israel may not support.

Just as with the previous future, the 5 + 1 sees opportunities to build other economic ties with Iran and to partner in the goal of creating isotopes. It also works with Iran to address the security concerns mentioned previously in regards to the nuclear (civilian) race that is occurring in the Middle East. Turkey, Egypt, Libya and the UAE are all seeking nuclear programs which should be addressed if Iran is committed to transparency and compliance in order to set a foundation of future regional stability. Opportunities for Iran to join the World Trade Organization would be considered. Strengthening of the International Security Council and IAEA is also fundamental to address the future of civilian nuclear programs and would be part of P5 + 1 conversations.

TRANSPOSITION OF ALTERNATE FUTURES

Now that the Alternate futures have been ranked and discussed, it appears that for all parties to have at least one common stated goal met, a peaceful nuclear program for Iran, based on the status quo, a wide and comprehensive approach must be addressed which includes, for now, sanctions, incentives, diplomacy, dialogue and creativity as well as a vision for future stability and non nuclear proliferation. Each participant has a legitimate responsibility to guard their own security in the process, yet that should not limit the combined objective of Iran's civilian nuclear peace program. Committed involvement by China and Russia within the 5 + 1 would be an essential part of the overall and continued success of this effort.

The next step is to determine if these alternate futures can transpose into another and determine the focal events that must happen in the present to bring about the relative futures. Part of this step also includes determining the indicators for each focal event.

Transposition occurs when one actor or action changes the perspective or actions of another. Again, as with the illustration of a chess game, as one move is made, it opens up the possibility for a variety of counter moves to be possible. Transposition occurs in much the same way: a change in action shifts the possibilities of one alternate future into another. Somewhat like the butterfly effect, each actor and act has the potential to impact all possible futures. This process helps to illuminate the interconnected dynamic of human interactions. Using the more probable alternate futures for each scenario the following examples will model the concept of transposition.

SCENARIO ONE: NON-COMPLIANCE, IRAN CONTINUES ON CURRENT PATH TOWARD BREAK OUT CAPABILITY

Alternate future #10

This scenario and alternate future corresponds most closely to the current status quo. The United States is proposing sanctions, Israel is in a position of deterrence and diplomacy and the 5 + 1 have committed support in this immediate process. This current position of all actors represents one that is very flexible and transposition to other futures would come with some ease. As China and Russia have been known to waiver support, #10 can easily transpose to #12 (limited support P5 +1) or #8 (no support P5 + 1).

In the past, sanctions have not been entirely effective and some critics maintain that sanctions may not be enough or backfire. Lack of progress or timing could encourage the United States to transpose from # 10 to #4 (Multi-tired approach from United States, Israel deterrence/diplomacy and 5 + 1 supporting process) which provide a more comprehensive solution.

At anytime, Israel may feel that the potential threat of Iran's program too great or the timeline to breakout capacity too limited and may seek an independent military option transposing from #10 to #12 (US sanctions, Israel engages military strike on Iran, 5+1 limiting and withdrawing support) or #4 to #3. (US multi-tiered approach, Israel attack with waning support from 5 +1) Retaliation from Iran could prompt either overt or covert support from the United States transposing #10 or #3 to #15 (US support or led attack on Iran, Israel attack, 5 + 1 withdrawing support) or # 17, which also would reflect waning support from Russia or China.

Transposition can work in a positive direction as well. If sanctions or a multi-tiered approach is effective, (#10, #4), then Iran may find that it is in its best interest to comply. Alternate futures #10 and #4, then could transpose to a future that includes support from the United States and a path toward common ground diplomacy. (#16, Support from the United States, diplomacy from Israel and support from 5 +1)

SCENARIO TWO: NON-COMPLIANCE, WITHDRAW FROM NPT

The top rated immediate futures for this scenario are #4 (US has a multi-tiered approach, Israel deterrence and diplomacy, 5 + 1 supporting US approach) and #10, (US sanctions, Israel deterrence and diplomacy and support from 5 + 1) however, as Iran has shifted from the status quo to a more fixed and threatening position, alternate futures for this scenario will most likely shift quickly if no progress is made. For example, alternate future #4 can switch to alternate future #1 which includes a military strike from Israel if Israel senses that Iran is at breakout stage.

SCENARIO THREE: IRAN LAUNCHES PRE-EMPTIVE ATTACK.

One interesting aspect of LAMP and specifically during the transposition stage, it becomes evident of how flexible or locked a process can be by how easy or difficult it may be to transpose from one future to the next. This is evident in Scenario three in which Iran launches a pre-emptive strike. Once military option is selected, there are very few alternate futures to transpose to, collapsing other choices to only those that include a military response. Each act taken from that future has the potential of further

limiting other alternate future responses. With a future that seems to include the expansion of nuclear programs, this is a dangerous and narrow space to be in.

If we start at alternate future #10, the closest to status quo (US sanctions, Israel diplomatic and 5 + 1 supporting process) at the time of a pre-emptive attack from Iran, #10 would most likely transpose to either #1 (US multi-tiered approach, Israel attack, 5 +1 support US) or to #19 which involves US support or led aggression, Israel's military response and 5 +1 support which could include military support as well.) From #1, alternate futures are easier to still transpose to. From #19 which represents, in this scenario, aggression from most actors it is much more difficult to transpose to another alternate future.

SCENERIO FOUR: COMPLY WITH IAEA GUIDELINES

In this scenario, the alternate future provides opportunity for the futures to transpose to many futures, even those not included in the study. Unlike scenario 3, that limits alternate futures, scenario 4, is in a position to further transpose future possibilities, providing actors with more possible rational futures that would serve their interests without conflicting directly with the security or legitimate interests of each other. Alternate future #4 which represents the United States attempting to coerce and encourage Iran to accept uranium enrichment to Russia package and comply with IAEA, Israel using diplomacy and working with West and the P5 +1 initially also trying to convince Iran could easily shift to #5 if Iran suddenly withdrew from the NPT and reiterated aggressive anti Israeli rhetoric. # 5 is just like #4, except that it includes a military strike from Israel.

Focal Events and Indicators:

Focal events are points or situations that can influence one immediate future enough to change it to another future. They are similar to Indications and Warnings methodology and they can help to determine what actions may be present that might move one position to another situation. For example, the movement of troops, a change in policy or rhetoric may be an indicator that a country or individual is preparing for a specific event or

position such as war or change in leadership. In self-defense, sometimes the concept is coined the 'tell'. (It is similar to a 'tell' in poker). An attacker often has pre-attack cues such as removing his or her coat or he or she may stop talking or tighten his or her fists, etc. In this same way, indicators can let analysts or leaders know that something has changed that may be important in regards to future action. The baseline futures that will be considered for this stage of will be the same as the four scenarios listed above.

Scenario 1

#10: US Sanctions, Israeli Diplomacy, Complete Support from P5 +1

Focal Event: Iran continues toward breakout capability,

Focal Event: US begins to apply new set of sanctions

Focal Event: Israel supports US direction

Focal Event: P5 +1 openly support sanctions

#12: US Sanctions, Israeli Diplomacy, Some Support from P5 + 1

Focal Event: Iran Continues toward breakout capability

Focal Event: US applies new set of sanctions

Focal Event: Israel supports US direction

Focal Event: Not all members of P5 +1 openly support sanctions. Russia and China encourage open talks and dialogue

#4: US Multi-tiered Approaches, Israeli Diplomacy, P5 +1 Complete Support

Focal Event: Iran continues toward break out capacity

Focal Event: The United States launches multi-tiered approach which includes using a combination of sanctions, diplomacy, international and military pressures, and dialogue

Focal Event: Israel openly supports US Direction

Focal Event: P5 +1 fully support US direction

#6: Multi-tiered Approaches, Israeli Diplomacy, P5 +1 Some Support

Focal event: Iran continues toward break out capacity

Focal Event: The United States launches multi-tiered approach which includes using a combination of sanctions, diplomacy, international and military pressures, and dialogue

Focal Event: Israel openly supports US Direction

Focal Event: Not all members of P5 +1 support US approach

Scenario Two: Non-Compliance and Withdraw from the NPT

#4: US Multi-tiered Approaches, Israeli Diplomacy, P5 +1 Complete Support

Focal Event: Iran continues toward breakout capacity, openly withdraws from NPT
Focal Event: The United States launches multi-tiered approach which includes using a combination of sanctions, diplomacy, international and military pressures, and dialogue
Focal Event: Israel openly supports US Direction
Focal Event: P5 +1 fully support US direction

#6: Multi-tiered Approaches, Israeli Diplomacy, P5 +1 Some Support

Focal Event: Iran continues toward breakout capacity, openly withdraws from NPT
Focal Event: The United States launches multi-tiered approach which includes using a combination of sanctions, diplomacy, international and military pressures, and dialogue
Focal Event: Israel openly supports US Direction
Focal Event: Not all members of P5 +1 support US approach

#10: US Sanctions, Israeli Diplomacy, Complete Support from P5 +1

Focal Event: Iran continues toward breakout capability, openly withdraws from NPT
Focal Event: US begins to apply new set of sanctions
Focal Event: Israel supports US direction
Focal Event: P5 +1 openly support sanctions

#12: US Sanctions, Israeli Diplomacy, Some Support from P5 + 1

Focal Event: Iran Continues toward breakout capability, openly withdraws from NPT
Focal Event: US applies new set of sanctions
Focal Event: Israel supports US direction
Focal Event: Not all members of P5 +1 openly support sanctions. Russia and China encourage open talks and dialogue

Scenario Three: Pre-emptive attack on Israel

19: US Supports or Leads Attack Against Iran, Israel Attacks and the P5 +1 Support of Retaliation

Focal Event: Iran launches Pre-emptive attack on Israel
Focal Event: US retaliates either directly or supports Israel
Focal Event: P5 +1 openly support retaliation
Focal Event: Israel retaliates, engaging in direct military confrontation with Iran

23: Attacks Supported or Led by the United States, Attacks by Israel, P5 +1 not in Support of Retaliation

Focal Event: Iran launches Pre-emptive attack on Israel
Focal Event: US retaliates either directly or supports Israel
Focal Event: Members of P5+1 do not support attack or retaliation
Focal Event: Israel retaliates, engaging in combat with Iran

21: Attacks Supported or Led by the United States, Attacks by Israel with the P5 +1 Offering Limited Support

Focal Event: Iran launches Pre-emptive attack on Israel
Focal Event: US retaliates either directly or supports Israel
Focal Event: P5 +1 has mixed response to retaliation from US and Israel, some support, but not all
Focal Event: Israel retaliates, engaging in combat with Iran

#1: US Takes a Multi-tiered Approach, Israel Attacks and P5 +1 Support US Approach

Focal Event: Iran launches Pre-emptive attack on Israel
Focal Event: US begins multi-tiered approach to limit Middle East conflict
Focal Event: P5 +1 openly support US approach
Focal Event: Israel retaliates, engaging in combat with Iran

3: United States Takes a Multi-tiered Approach, Israel Attacks Iran and P 5 +1 Offer Some Support

Focal Event: Iran launches Pre-emptive attack on Israel
Focal Event: US begins multi-tiered approach to limit Middle East conflict
Focal Event: P5 +1 offer limited support to the US approach
Focal Event: Israel retaliates, engaging in combat with Iran

Scenario #4 Iran Complies With Full Transparency

#4: US Takes Multi-tiered Approaches, Israeli Diplomacy, P5 +1 Complete Support

Focal Event: Iran continues toward breakout capacity, openly withdraws from NPT
Focal Event: The United States launches multi-tiered approach which includes using a combination of sanctions, diplomacy, international and military pressures, and dialogue
Focal Event: Israel openly supports US Direction
Focal Event: P5 +1 fully support US direction

#6: US Takes Multi-tiered Approaches, Israeli Diplomacy, P5 +1 Complete Support

Focal Event: Iran completely complies with NPT and IAEA
Focal Event: The United States launches multi-tiered approach which includes using a combination of sanctions, diplomacy, international and military pressures, and dialogue
Focal Event: Israel openly supports US direction
Focal Event: P5 +1 openly support the US direction

16: US Support of Iran's Peaceful Nuclear Program, Israel Diplomacy, P5 + 1 Full Support

Focal event: Iran completely complies with NPT and IAEA
Focal Event: The United States supports Iran's peaceful nuclear program
Focal Event: Israel openly supports US direction
Focal Event: P5 +1 openly support the US direction

18: US Support of Iran's Peaceful Nuclear Program, Israeli Diplomacy, P5+1 Some Support

Focal Event: Iran completely complies with NPT and IAEA
Focal Event: The United States supports Iran's peaceful nuclear program
Focal Event: Israel openly supports US direction and Iran's compliance
Focal Event: P5 +1 offer limited open support

#28: Negotiations and Incentives from US, Israeli Diplomacy, Full Support from P5+1

Focal Event: Iran completely complies with NPT and IAEA
Focal Event: The United States supports Iran's peaceful nuclear program, though continues negotiations and incentives to maintain transparency
Focal Event: Israel openly supports US direction and Iran's compliance
Focal Event: P5 +1 openly support the US direction

KEY INDICATORS

Event - Iran Continues Toward Breakout Capacity

Key Indicator: Iran ignores requests for time line, refuses dialogue claiming that there is no legal basis for sanctions

Key Indicator: Iran reaches out to other countries for support with enrichment as well as international support

Key Indicator: Iran imports gas from Venezuela in preparation of sanctions

Key Indicator: Ahmadinejad claims Iran's pursuit of nuclear power successful and legitimate

Key Indicator: Ahmadinejad openly announces that Iran will continue to seek enrichment and the peaceful pursuit of nuclear power

Key Indicator: Anti-Western and anti-Israeli rhetoric from Iran
Key Indicator: Medical Isotope nuclear facility needs more enriched uranium for processing
Key Indicator: Political unrest and economic instability continues
Key Indicator: Iran seeks support from Non-Aligned Movement, countries that have concerns about the monopolization of nuclear fuel.

Event – United States Begins to Apply New Set of Sanctions

Key Indicator: State and local governments start to divest from companies doing business with Iran.
Key Indicator: US seeks financial sanctions against IRGC; also seeks bank sanctions
Key Indicator: The United States convinces Saudi Arabia to ship oil to China to make up for potential loss of Iranian export to China
Key Indicator: US Congress passes further gasoline sanction legislation
Key Indicator: The US seeks trade sanctions resolution from Security Council
Key Indicator: US meets with EU in regards to extending international trade sanctions
Key Indicator: Energy firms end gas trade with Iran

Event – P5+1 Openly Support New Set of Sanctions

Key Indicator: China and Russia openly support sanctions
Key Indicator: Security Council votes for sanctions against Iran’s oil and gas industries
Key Indicator: P5 +1 continue to insist that Iran accept proposals offered by P5+1 regarding uranium enrichment

Event - P5 +1 Do Not Fully Support Sanctions, Division among Members

Key Indicator: China and/or Russia encourage talks and negotiations with Iran
Key Indicator: China vetoes package of Security Council sanctions
Key Indicator: Russia vetoes package of Security Council sanctions
Key Indicator: Russia and China continue to cooperate with Iran under terms of Shanghai Cooperation Organization

Event – Israel Supports the Direction of the United States

Key Indicator: Israel calls for tough international sanctions against Iran
Key Indicator: Israel withholds “pre-emptive attack” rhetoric
Key Indicator: Israel continues talks with China and Russia
Key Indicator: Israel openly supports the United States, meets with US diplomats

Event - US Moves to More Cohesive Multi-tiered Approach Which Includes Using a Combination of Sanctions, Diplomacy, Incentives, International and Military Pressure as Well as Added Approaches.

Key Indicator: Sanctions do not alter Iran's path to break-out capacity
Key Indicator: Iran denounces the use of sanctions, but claims that they will be open to further talks and negotiations
Key Indicator: International community voices impatience at Iran's direction and ineffectiveness of sanctions
Key Indicator: United States begins increasing pressure directly and through other countries
Key Indicator: Other countries, such as Turkey, France and Russia engage in dialogue with Iran in regards to seeking alternatives to Iran's uranium enrichment program
Key Indicator: Israel threatens military action

Event – Iran Continues Non-Compliance toward Breakout Capacity, Then Withdraws From NPT

Key Indicator: Iranian Parliament warns (again) that increased pressures and failed talks will force Iran to withdraw from NPT
Key Indicator: Iranian religious leaders publically declare a fatwa/religious sanction for the use of nuclear weapon
Key Indicator: IAEA stickers removed from sites, Iran distances from IAEA
Key Indicator: Iran further develops relationships with Cuba, Venezuela and other potential trade partners not affected by sanctions

Event – Iran Launches Pre-emptive Strike on Israel

Key Indicator: Increased activity among Hamas and Hezbollah, attacks against US and US allies
Key Indicator: Iran withdraws from NPT
Key Indicator: Shift in Iranian behavior to more aggressive, separatist, mobilizes and tests missiles
Key Indicator: Increased weapons testing (Iran), build up of arsenals
Key Indicator: Increased anti-Israeli, US and apocalyptic rhetoric
Key Indicator: Iran attack on Israeli or US forces
Key Indicator: Attacks on Israeli Airstrips
Key Indicator: Violence erupts in Middle East prompting Iranian attack

Event - United States Supports Israel in Response attack against Iran Either Directly or Indirectly

Key Indicator: United States deploys missile defense to Israel
Key Indicator: United States supplies Israel with fuel for air attacks.
Key Indicator: United States military builds up in gulf and Middle East region
Key Indicator: US openly recognize Israel's right to self-defense
Key Indicator: United States launches defensive attack against Iran

Event – Israel Reacts by Attacking Iran

Key Indicator: Israel attacks nuclear sites

Key Indicator: Israel requests for airspace

Key Indicator: Israel makes request for refueling options

Key Indicator: Israel increased intelligence on Iran

Key Indicator: Israel prepares citizens for further conflict through pamphlets, media, civilian evacuations

Key Indicator: Israel requests access to air space

Event – US Does Not Support Conflict between Iran and Israel, Immediately Moves to Multi-Tiered Response

Key Indicator: Joint Chiefs of Staff opposes bombing Iran

Key Indicator: The United States does not send missile defense or fuel to Israel

Key Indicator: The United States lacks popular support to engage in another conflict

Key Indicator: Strain on military troop deployment

Key Indicator: Limited international support

Event -Full Compliance and Cooperation from Iran in Regards to Nuclear Transparency

Key Indicator: Iran continues to dialogue with P5+1

Key Indicator: Iran maintains relationship with IAEA

Key Indicator: Iran offers full transparency with nuclear program

Key Indicator: Iran agrees to send low-enriched uranium to Russia and France to operate their medical research reactor.

Key Indicators: Iran reaches out to the United States, makes valid steps for removal from terrorist list

Key Indicator: Potential regime change

These lists are by no means exhaustive. For one event to change, all focal points or indicators do not have to occur. Much like when a driver changes lanes, you may expect that he or she will signal, check both mirrors, and then cross over the lines that separate one lane from another. However, a blinking turn signal does not always indicate that someone is changing lanes. In a similar way, events or changes in action may indicate a possibility that certain events are more or less likely to occur. In that way, they can be a helpful guideline to monitor future possibilities.

In the situation with Iran, it has been interesting to note that some events can close down or significantly limit other possible futures. For example, a pre-emptive strike limits the options that include diplomacy or sanctions as such an act leads to escalated conflict, polarizing nations and possibilities. The current status quo is frustrating to the United States and its allies and is also a tense position for Iran to be in; however, many futures are still possible. The future can transpose just as easily to one that is mutually acceptable for all parties or to one that further divides nations. In regards to the larger future of the potential expansion of nuclear power and security within the Middle East, it can be important to pay attention to the ways events unfold. In this way, global citizens may be collective participants in finding solutions not discovered before and shape a direction for a more sustainable and cooperative future.

Conclusion

“We have entered a world where the nuclear industry cannot be part of the problem; it must be an active part of the solution. It must help create a world where countries must replace the alleged prestige and status of possessing nuclear weapons or sensitive nuclear technologies with new emphasis on the efficiency and pragmatism of producing electricity for peaceful purposes.” (Lauvergeon, 2009)

The conversation over non-nuclear proliferation has changed significantly since the Cold War nuclear stand-off. Today, the concerns range from ‘loose nukes’ to nuclear smugglers (like A.Q. Khan) to rumors of Al Qaeda seeking to acquire a weapon and just as the threat of terrorism has become asymmetrical, so too has the possibility of nuclear armed states become more unpredictable. Conversely, the nuclear conversation also presents opportunities to reduce carbon emissions and potentially global warming and to have greater resources for electricity. The benefits to nuclear energy, however, must be discussed in the context of global security and the reality is that there are still sufficient concerns that need to be addressed especially as the list of states seeking nuclear power is growing. Treaties and policies are only as effective as the signers and the accountability

process connected to the treaty. Iran and North Korea are two examples which need to be addressed before more rogue nuclear ambitions occur. Answers will not come easy and will most likely take much time, but it is time worth dedicating.

This paper sought to illustrate how complex the nuclear issue in regards to Iran, exploring various futures and their potential effects in the context of nuclear containment. One benefit to the LAMP technique is that, even for a layman, it provided a format to organize future ideas and possibilities. From there, it set a framework to further assess cues or ‘tells’ that might be indicators of future events. It also helped to create a body of work that can be added to or built into a larger project.

One insight that came from this study is that for a future that includes a process for continued civil nuclear expansion, it will take dedicated commitment, insightful decision makers, and global cooperation efforts. As discussed by policy makers, experts, authors and diplomats, the situation in Iran will take an on-going, comprehensive strategy applying both soft and hard techniques. Iran presents a specific dilemma with future implications not only for stability and power dynamics in the Middle East, but for the future perceived effectiveness of the IAEA and the trust the international community can put in the spread of civil nuclear programs. This example will set a foundation for the structure of the spread of nuclear power and energy for years to come. It is a hope, that like many examples before, Iran and the international community will find grounds for cooperation and future global possibility that may yet not even be imagined.

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