

**Tension in Bosnia:**

**LAMP Pairwise Comparison procedure**

**Tension in Bosnia: Will Bosnia See another War?**  
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*“One way of looking at Yugoslavia’s history since World War II involves seeing its survival as depending upon a strong Bosnia acting as a political buffer between Serb and Croat ambitions.”*

*-Carole Rogel*

**Introduction**

Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia) has been marked by a lengthy history of instability, uncertainty and occasional violence. Scarred by fighting around the time of World War II and again in the early 1990s, Bosnia has had an uncertain future during much of its history.

Although the last Bosnian war, which took place from April, 1992 to October, 1995, was resolved by the Dayton Accords, Bosnia is currently facing difficulties between its two regions, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Federation) and the Repulika Srpska (the RS). These two regions developed during the Bosnian war when the Bosniak and Croat ethnic groups joined together to create the Federation. The RS was formed during the war after ethnic Serbs began an armed attack following a declaration of independence by the Bosniaks and Croats; the Serbs had boycotted the referendum which determined that declaration.

The ethnic lines which underlined the conflict are still in existence today. The Bosnian government is divided along ethnic lines with three different presidents and a

severely lacking central government. The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, or Dayton Accords, established oversight in Bosnia by the Office of the High Representative (the OHR), who is also the European Union Special Representative (EUSR) in Bosnia. The OHR “is an *ad hoc* international institution responsible for overseeing implementation of civilian aspects of the accord ending the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina” and “is working with the people and institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the international community to ensure that Bosnia and Herzegovina evolves into a peaceful and viable democracy on course for integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions” ([www.ohr.int](http://www.ohr.int)).

The OHR holds certain veto powers in Bosnia as well as the ability to dismiss politicians who are deemed corrupt. The OHR has periodically intervened in Bosnia to “break deadlocks, remove obstructive officials, and impose controversial legislation” (Dobbins et al, 2008 140).

Based on the historical lack of success in bringing peace and stability to Bosnia, whether through the implementation of the OHR, United States (U.S.) or European Union (EU) intervention, this paper will ask the general question: Is there hope for peace in Bosnia?

In order to more closely examine this question, we must look at the influence of the international community on Bosnia, particularly through the auspices of the OHR. The OHR was never intended as a permanent position in Bosnia: Its intent was to oversee the implementation of the Dayton Accords. Both the EU and the U.S. desire a Bosnia that is unified under a centralized government. One hopes that the OHR, as well as the

peacekeeping force that has been in Bosnia since the end of the Bosnian war in 1995, will eventually be phased out.

In the meantime, the EU must determine what to do with the role of the OHR; should the office be maintained as its current status or reduced? If it is maintained, should it use its powers of veto and influence over the leaders of the various ethnic sectors of Bosnia more frequently? If the OHR began to exert its influence more by using its current powers, one must be concerned with the reaction of the Serbian ethnic group within the RS region of Bosnia.

With these variables in mind, this paper will conduct a predictive analysis using the Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction and attempt to answer the following question: Will a reduction of the OHR affect stability in Bosnia?

Because Bosnia has had such instability during its history, it is important to examine this region and determine how to improve stability, if it is in fact possible. Without Bosnia, Europe would likely see a great deal of conflict between Serbia and Croatia over the land that is now Bosnia. If Bosnia were to no longer exist, the Balkan region would become even more unstable. Serbia and Croatia would likely get drawn into another Bosnian conflict and it could spread through even more of the region, Kosovo and Macedonia, for example, ultimately leading to U.S. and NATO military involvement (Woehrel 2009 8).

If one was able to resolve the Bosnian conflict, this would be a very important lesson for future diplomacy, particularly in countries which, similar to Bosnia, have different large ethnic groups comprising the population.

Despite its lengthy and turbulent history, Bosnia is not as widely studied as other current events. Bosnia's instability is overshadowed by events in the Middle East, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and concerns about nuclear proliferation in Iran and North Korea, for example.

### **Literature Review**

Although there is a great deal of discussion in the various news media and scholarly community about Bosnia and its potential for conflict in the near future, the presence of any true predictive research projects is notably lacking. Many scholarly publications, as well as more popular media such as the Economist, have articles discussing current difficulties and sources of conflict in Bosnia. As mentioned above, however, the author was unable to find any predictive studies.

It is difficult to determine why there is a lack of predictive research regarding the future of Bosnia. Perhaps because the conflict has not yet approached a violent breaking point, those in the intelligence community do not feel Bosnia is in imminent danger of conflict. Another consideration is Bosnia's past – the memory of the bloody conflict of 1992 – 1995 might lead experts to believe that Bosnia will never return to that extreme a conflict. If conflict in Bosnia was to escalate yet again, international powers such as the EU and the U.S., together with NATO, would likely intervene quickly – much more quickly than their intervention in the Bosnian war in the early 1990s. There is likely guilt and regret on the part of NATO countries that they did not intervene sooner in the Bosnian war due to the ethnic slaughter that occurred.

## Actors and Perceptions

This paper will seek to predict the future of Bosnian stability using the Lockwood Analytical Method of Prediction (LAMP). LAMP is a twelve step method of predictive analysis “based on determining the relative probability of a series of alternate futures, rather than attempting to determine the quantitative probability of their occurrence” ([www.lamp-method.org](http://www.lamp-method.org)). It will be summarized in the forthcoming *Research Design* section.

In order to examine the primary actors in the ongoing Bosnian conflict, one must first follow the first three steps of the LAMP process, in which the main issue is identified as well as the identification of the actors involved. One must also look at a background of the actors in order to determine how they will respond to the issue in question.

### Step 1: Define the issue for which you are trying to determine the most likely future

As mentioned above, this study is trying to determine the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia) with regards to its present and future stability and the potential for another violent conflict in the near future. In order to determine the most likely future, we must examine the three main ethnic groups in Bosnia: the Bosniaks, the Croats and the Serbs. As mentioned above, Bosnia is divided into two regions, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Federation) and the Repulika Srpska (the RS). We must determine whether Bosnia will continue peacefully as a unified country under a stable government, or whether it will face a breakup of the two different regions and/or three main ethnic groups.

*Step 2: Specify the national "actors" involved*

The state of Bosnia consists of a variety of ethnic groups. The three largest groups are the Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs. The ethnic makeup of the population in 2000, according to the CIA World Factbook, is as follows: Bosniak 48%, Serb 37.1%, Croat 14.3%, other 0.6% (2009). These three largest ethnic groups comprise the actors involved in this scenario. Although they are not, by strict definition, national actors, they are the most influential parties in Bosnia's future.

Although there are three main ethnic groups in Bosnia which could be considered actors, the Bosniak and Croat groups, while very different ethnically, can be viewed together as one actor, the Federation. For the purposes of the LAMP study conducted in this paper, the two regions in Bosnia, the Federation and the RS, are the actors that will be used for the LAMP process. However, in examining Bosnia's future there are other actors that, while not a part of the pairwise comparison aspect of LAMP (to be discussed below), are influential in Bosnia's future. Primary among these is the European Union (EU) and, secondarily, the United States (U.S.).

The EU is very influential in Bosnia for a variety of reasons. At the conclusion of the Bosnian war, the EU “took over responsibility from NATO for enforcing the security provisions of the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords” (Dobbins et al, 2008 139). The EU also provides the military peacekeeping mission currently installed in Bosnia (EUFOR). The EU has talked of reducing EUFOR due to their troop involvement in other matters, such as Afghanistan, and because they would like to begin transitioning sovereignty to Bosnia (Woehrel 2009 6). The member countries of the EU would eventually like for Bosnia to

become a member, but that membership is held up by the ongoing political conflict in Bosnia (Woehrel 2009 9).

The U.S. is an influential nation that is also concerned with Bosnia's future. Although the U.S. has gradually reduced its participation in Bosnia since the Dayton Accords, it still has an interest in a stable Bosnia. Should another conflict break out in Bosnia, the U.S. would likely contribute troops to a NATO peacekeeping mission as it did during the Bosnian war in the 1990s. In the present climate, the U.S. already has heavy troop involvement elsewhere, primarily Iraq and Afghanistan, which is an additional reason the U.S. would like to see peace and stability in Bosnia. The U.S. would also like to see Bosnia become a member country of the EU. Membership in the EU, it seems, will naturally lend further stability to Bosnia.

*Step 3: Perform an in-depth study of how each national actor perceives the issue in question*

Before determining the most likely future in Bosnia, one must examine the perceptions of each of the primary national actors as described above, the Federation, which includes the Bosniak and Croat ethnic groups, and the RS, which comprises the Serb ethnic groups. These three groups account for over 99% of the population of Bosnia, and therefore will be the main determining factors of the future of Bosnia.

Throughout Bosnia, the current political landscape is deeply divided along ethnic/nationalist lines. Leaders of the ethnic groups rally their population along purely nationalistic boundaries, which makes potential unity even more difficult.

## The Federation

### ***Bosniak Ethnic Group***

The Bosniak ethnic group of Bosnia is of Muslim ethnicity, although they are not all followers of Islam. Together with the Croat ethnic group, Bosniaks are part of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Bosniaks make up 48% of the population of Bosnia. The Bosniak president in Bosnia's central government is Haris Silajdzic.

The Bosniak ethnic group might have the greatest interest in Bosnian peace and the growth of Bosnia into a strong, democratic European nation. Bosniak leadership has been at the forefront of efforts towards a more centralized Bosnian government rather than the current system which has three separate presidents – one for each of the large ethnic groups.

If Bosnia were to collapse as a nation, the Croat and Serbian ethnic groups both have neighboring countries that could absorb their territory and population, Croatia and Serbia, respectively. In fact, it was largely a desire for territorial expansion on the part of Croatia and Serbia that led to the Bosnian war (Rogel 1998 32). The Bosniak group, however, does not have a comparable nation and “would be a small, landlocked country surrounded by less than sympathetic neighbors” (Woehrel 2009 8).

Historically speaking, the Bosniak group also has the most animosity left over from the Balkan war during the early 1990s. The Bosniak ethnic group suffered a great number of casualties due to the ethnic cleansing that took place at the hands of then Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. Bosniak president Haris Silajdzic, as well as other Bosniak leaders in Bosnia, believe the RS should no longer exist because, they say, “it was created through genocide” (Economist 2009 55). In a September 2008 meeting of the

UN General Assembly, Silajdzic accused the RS of “establishing an ‘ethnic apartheid’ by preventing the return of ethnic minorities,” implying Bosnian Muslims, to the RS territory (Hvidemose and Marzouk 2009).

### ***Croat Ethnic Group***

Croats are the smallest of the three actors which have the most influence in Bosnia. Croats make up 14.3% of the population of Bosnia. The current Croat president in the central government is Zeljko Komsic. Croats are predominantly Catholic. Although the Croat ethnic group is part of the Federation with the Bosniak ethnic group, they did not always have an amicable relationship.

The Croats joined with the Bosniaks in the 1992 referendum to secede from Yugoslavia, but it was because they wanted to unite with neighboring Croatia, rather than remain part of Bosnia (UNHCR). There was fighting between the Bosniaks and Croats early on in the Bosnian war, but they ultimately joined together to fight against the Serbs.

Although the Croats are the smallest of the three actors, they enjoy representation by their own elected president thanks to the three president system set in place by the Dayton Accords. There are still occasional skirmishes among Bosniaks and Croats due to ethnic differences, but hopefully their desire for a unified nation will outweigh the ethnic discrimination that can, unfortunately, occur.

### **The RS**

#### ***Serbian Ethnic Group***

The Serbian ethnic group in Bosnia is the second largest, consisting of 37.1% of the population. The Serbs control the RS region of Bosnia, which is approximately 49% of the country.

The Serbs seem to be the most significant variable with regards to the possibility of a unified and peaceful Bosnia in the future. They have been resistant to efforts by the Bosniak leadership to move the government towards a more centralized entity, which is a step towards Bosnian membership in the EU.

During the Bosnian war, neighboring Serbia was responsible for many of the atrocities that occurred. As mentioned above, Bosniak leadership has called for the dissolution of the RS, arguing that it was attained through genocide. These calls by Bosniak leadership are usually responded to by the RS Prime Minister Milorad Dodik, who threatens to hold a referendum to secede from Bosnia. Calls for the OHR to intervene and remove Dodik from power are also met with threats of secession.

Although the RS frequently makes threats of secession, it is unlikely that it will occur (Economist 2009 55). The fact that secession will not occur, however, “does not mean any kind of reconciliation is in the cards” (Cain 2009). If the RS were to attempt to secede, there would certainly be intervention by at least the EU, but likely by the U.S. and NATO as well.

Since secession would likely escalate into violent conflict, international response would occur quickly. In light of Bosnia’s recent history, it is doubtful that there would be any hesitation from the international community. The Bosnian Serbs are aware of this, but they still use the threat of secession as leverage to advance their political desires.

### **Research Design**

As mentioned above, this paper is using the Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction, or LAMP, to conductive a predictive study which will attempt to answer to

the following question: How will the international community's use of the OHR affect stability in Bosnia?

In order to answer this question, the author will utilize a comparative study in the form of LAMP. LAMP is a twelve-step predictive method which uses a pairwise comparison in order to determine the most likely outcome, depending on potential future scenarios. LAMP is “a hybrid because it borrowed its elements from other analytical and planning methodologies, but combined them in a unique way to produce a different approach to the problem of predictive analysis” (Lockwood and Lockwood 1994 4).

LAMP examines the likelihood of each action by the actors in question, in this case the three largest ethnic groups in Bosnia. The possible future scenarios as well as the potential responses by each actor were determined based on Bosnia’s history as well as recent writings about the political and economic climate in Bosnia. The author used current news and scholarly publications to determine the likely future possibilities.

The pairwise comparison is conducted by comparing each combination of actions to every other combination. For example, if there are 10 possible outcomes, each outcome is compared to nine others. The outcome with the largest number of votes is generally determined to be the most likely, as it is more likely than the other possibilities. This will be seen in more detail during steps six through eight of LAMP during the Analysis.

The twelve steps of LAMP, according to [www.lamp-method.org](http://www.lamp-method.org), are as follows:

- 1) Define the issue for which you are trying to determine the most likely future.
- 2) Specify the national "actors" involved.

- 3) Perform an in-depth study of how each national actor perceives the issue in question.
- 4) Specify all possible courses of action for each actor.
- 5) Determine the major scenarios within which you compare the alternate futures.
- 6) Calculate the total number of permutations of possible "alternate futures" for each scenario.
- 7) Perform a "pairwise comparison" of all alternate futures within the scenario to determine their relative probability.
- 8) Rank the alternate futures for each scenario from highest relative probability to the lowest based on the number of "votes" received.
- 9) Assuming each future occurs, analyze each alternate future in terms of its consequences for the issue in question.
- 10) Determine the "focal events" that must occur in our present in order to bring about a given alternate future.
- 11) Develop indicators for the focal events.
- 12) State the potential of a given alternate future to "transpose" into another alternate future.

The first three steps of the LAMP were utilized above, under *Actors and Perceptions*. In order to arrive at a prediction, one must look at the remaining steps of LAMP, as seen below in the *Analysis* section.

## Analysis

### Step 4: Specify all possible courses of action for each actor

In the current climate, there are not many possible scenarios with regards to the political and economic conflict in Bosnia. The largest source of outside influence is the EU. Ultimately, the EU, and Bosnia itself, would like for Bosnia to become part of the EU, but some, the U.S. and Britain, for example, do not feel the country is ready “to govern itself without international administrators” just yet (Champion 2009).

In addition to the EU as an influence, some of Bosnia’s neighboring countries have an interest in Bosnia’s outcome. As mentioned before, the Bosniaks are the only group in Bosnia that does not have a neighboring country that shares its ethnicity. If Bosnia should disintegrate, the Serb and Croat groups would like be integrated into the Serbian and Croatian nations, respectively, whereas the Bosniak ethnic group would be left with a much smaller, and weaker, Bosnia. Additionally, they would be surrounded by unfriendly nations.

The three most likely courses of action for each of the three actors are:

1. Engage in military action.
2. Continue on steady course under auspices of the new international high representative, Valentin Inzko.
3. Attempt an independent and more centralized government with a less influential high representative, working together.

### Step 5: Determine the major scenarios within which you compare the alternate futures

The most likely and best case scenario in the current climate is that the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia is maintained and continues to work towards peace

and a reduction of tension within Bosnia. However, this will also delay Bosnia's achievement of a more centralized government, which is one of the requirements to be eligible for entry into the EU (Lippman 2009).

A second scenario is the reduction of the role of the high representative. This could be premature, as the three majority groups in Bosnia do not yet seem willing to work with each other. The Croats and Bosniaks, as heads of the Federation section of Bosnia, might work together to improve their country, but there is doubt that the RS will do the same. For the most part, the three groups focus on their own separate interests.

Meanwhile, the RS periodically threatens secession. This is the worst case scenario, as it could lead to an armed conflict. Very few believe this would actually happen, since international support for an independent RS would be virtually nonexistent, but that possibility cannot be discounted. These threats of secession have often been in response to calls by the Bosniak president, Haris Silajdzic, for the outright dissolution of the RS (Lippman 2009).

*Step 6: Calculate the total number of permutations of possible "alternate futures" for each scenario.*

In order to determine the number of possible alternate futures, as described above, we use a simple formula as prescribed by Lockwood and Lockwood:  $X^Y = Z$ . X is the number of possible courses of action for each actor and Y is the number of actors involved (1994 38). X raised to the power of Y will give us Z, the number of alternate futures.

For this particular study, the courses of action for each actor, as described in step 4 above, number three. To reiterate, the possible courses of action are military action

(MA), continuing on the current course (SC) and moving towards a more centralized and cooperative government (WT). For this study, X = 3. The actors in question are the two regions in Bosnia, the Federation and the RS; therefore Y = 2.

Having determined these variables, one can conclude that  $X^Y = 3^2 = 9$ . Therefore, there are 9 possible alternate futures.

In the table below, one can see the 9 possible alternate futures.

Possible Future	Bosniaks/Croats	Serrians
1	MA	MA
2	MA	SC
3	MA	WT
4	SC	MA
5	SC	SC
6	SC	WT
7	WT	MA
8	WT	SC
9	WT	WT

Step 7: Perform a "pairwise comparison" of all alternate futures within the scenario to determine their relative probability.

**Scenario 1: The Office of the High Representative in Bosnia is maintained.**

Possible Future	Bosniaks/Croats	Serrians	Votes	Rank
1	MA	MA	2	7
2	MA	SC	1	8
3	MA	WT	0	9
4	SC	MA	4	5
5	SC	SC	8	1
6	SC	WT	5	4
7	WT	MA	3	6
8	WT	SC	7	2
9	WT	WT	6	3

**Scenario 2: The Office of the High Representative is reduced as a role in Bosnia.**

Possible Future	Bosniaks/Croats	Serbiants	Votes	Rank
1	MA	MA	3	6
2	MA	SC	1	8
3	MA	WT	0	9
4	SC	MA	4	5
5	SC	SC	8	1
6	SC	WT	6	3
7	WT	MA	2	7
8	WT	SC	7	2
9	WT	WT	5	4

**Scenario 3: The Republika Srpska holds a referendum on secession**

Possible Future	Bosniaks/Croats	Serbiants	Votes	Rank
1	MA	MA	6	3
2	MA	SC	3	6
3	MA	WT	0	9
4	SC	MA	8	1
5	SC	SC	7	2
6	SC	WT	2	7
7	WT	MA	1	8
8	WT	SC	5	4
9	WT	WT	4	5

Step 8: Rank the alternate futures for each scenario from highest relative probability to the lowest based on the number of "votes" received.

**Scenario 1: The Office of the High Representative in Bosnia is maintained.**

Possible Future	Bosniaks/Croats	Serbiants	Votes	Rank
5	SC	SC	8	1
8	WT	SC	7	2
9	WT	WT	6	3
6	SC	WT	5	4
4	SC	MA	4	5
7	WT	MA	3	6
1	MA	MA	2	7
2	MA	SC	1	8
3	MA	WT	0	9

**Scenario 2: The Office of the High Representative is reduced as a role in Bosnia.**

Possible Future	Bosniaks/Croats	Serbiants	Votes	Rank
5	SC	SC	8	1
8	WT	SC	7	2
6	SC	WT	6	3
9	WT	WT	5	4
4	SC	MA	4	5
1	MA	MA	3	6
7	WT	MA	2	7
2	MA	SC	1	8
3	MA	WT	0	9

**Scenario 3: The Republika Srpska holds a referendum on secession**

Possible Future	Bosniaks/Croats	Serbiants	Votes	Rank
4	SC	MA	8	1
5	SC	SC	7	2
1	MA	MA	6	3
8	WT	SC	5	4
9	WT	WT	4	5
2	MA	SC	3	6
6	SC	WT	2	7
7	WT	MA	1	8
3	MA	WT	0	9

Step 9: Assuming each future occurs, analyze each alternate future in terms of its consequences for the issue in question.

**Scenario 1: The Office of the High Representative in Bosnia is maintained.**

*Future #5: Both the Federation and the RS maintain the status quo.*

If the status quo is maintained, military action would be very unlikely, although if it did occur it would most likely be instigated by the Serbian group in Bosnia. Political tensions will continue but, with the help of the high representative, the three majority groups will hopefully work towards an eventual agreement. Although this scenario is not ideal, it is the best one can hope for in the present environment.

*Future #8: The Federation attempts to work together while the RS maintains the status quo.*

Although the most likely future in this scenario is that the current course is maintained, it is possible that the Federation, involving the Bosniaks and Croats, would be the first to offer concessions and try to work together with the ethnic Serbians. Although some in the Federation, particularly the Bosniak ethnic group, which suffered great losses during the Balkan war of the early 1990s, would like to see the RS eliminated, the Federation might succumb to outside pressure, such as from the EU or the U.S. Also, as mentioned above, the Bosniaks have the most to lose by the dissolution of Bosnia as a nation. The ethnic Croats and ethnic Serbs both have neighboring countries, Croatia and Serbia, respectively, which would theoretically absorb their population. The ethnic Muslims do not, and would end up surrounded by less friendly nations.

*Future #9: Both the Federation and the RS attempt to work together.*

This scenario is possible although not as likely. If, as mentioned above, the Federation, consisting of the Bosniaks and Croats, offers the metaphorical olive branch due to outside pressure from the EU or U.S., it is likely that the RS would be receiving the same pressure. Additionally, neighboring Serbia might be receiving some outside pressure from the same parties, and in turn attempt to influence the ethnic Serbs in Bosnia to move towards working with the Federation.

*Future #6: The Federation maintains the status quo while the RS attempts to work together.*

This scenario is possible, but would likely only occur very briefly and could very quickly transpose to another future. If recent history is an indicator, it is unlikely that the

RS will be the first to offer concessions in an attempt to improve Bosnia's central government and work towards stability. If the RS was to attempt to work with the Federation and the Federation did not respond, these efforts would not likely last for very long.

**Scenario 2: The Office of the High Representative is reduced as a role in Bosnia.**

*Future #5: Both the Federation and the RS maintain the status quo.*

Although Future #5 is the most likely future in this scenario as well as in Scenario 1, the outcome would be different if the OHR is reduced as an influential factor in Bosnia. The Federation and the RS would most likely maintain their current course to begin with, but the future changes could be drastically different in this scenario. After a period of time, it would be interesting to see whether the reduction of the OHR causes a great deal of change or whether it might lead to the Federation and the RS becoming more set in their courses of actions and even less likely to work together.

*Future #8: The Federation attempts to work together while the RS maintains the status quo.*

As with the first scenario, it is possible that the Federation would be the first to offer concessions and try to work together with the ethnic Serbs. Although some in the Federation, particularly the Bosniak ethnic group, which suffered great losses during the Balkan war of the early 1990s, would like to see the RS eliminated, the Federation might succumb to outside pressure, such as from the EU or the U.S. Also, as mentioned above, the Bosniaks have the most to lose by the dissolution of Bosnia as a nation. The ethnic Croats and ethnic Serbs both have neighboring countries, Croatia and Serbia,

respectively, which would theoretically absorb their population. The ethnic Muslims do not, and would end up surrounded by less friendly nations.

*Future #6: The Federation maintains the status quo while the RS attempts to work together.*

This scenario seems more likely in this scenario, although it could still very quickly transpose to another future. It is more likely, in this scenario, that the international pressure would be enough to convince the RS to finally work towards an agreement with Bosnia, even if the Federation is at first very hesitant and maintains their steady course.

As a response to the reduction of the role of the OHR, outside parties would recognize the potential danger of increased conflict, and therefore see a greater need for the governments in Bosnia to work together. The EU would be especially vested in this working, as they might like to eventually bring Bosnia into the EU. Before they can do that, however, Bosnia needs to have a strong central government.

*Future #9: Both the Federation and the RS attempt to work together.*

This scenario is possible although it is not, unfortunately, terribly likely. This possible future would hopefully occur some time after the OHR office was reduced, after the two concerned parties had a chance to work through some of their differences and finally realize that a compromise will be necessary for there to ever be peace in Bosnia. The EU and U.S. could assist in this by offering rewards for cooperation, such as increased loans and eventual membership in the EU.

**Scenario 3: The Republika Srpska holds a referendum on secession**

*Future #4: The Federation maintains the status quo while the RS engages in military action.*

As is evident in the table above, this is the worst-case scenario. It is likely that this would lead to military action, which would result in the involvement of many other parties, primarily in the form of a NATO peacekeeping force, as ultimately occurred in the Bosnian War of 1992 - 1995. In this possible future, the Bosniaks and Croats might initially try to avert crisis by attempting to maintain status quo as the RS took military action, but their reaction would largely depend on outside forces.

*Future #5: Both the Federation and the RS maintain the status quo.*

Initially, the RS might call the referendum as a purely political maneuver and not take military action. The Federation would not react kindly to the referendum, but there would likely be rapid intervention from other involved parties; primarily the EU and U.S. Nearby nations would also be keeping a close watch on the situation in Bosnia, as any outbreak of fighting could soon affect them as well.

*Future #1: Both the Federation and the RS engage in military action.*

One potential outcome of a referendum of secession by the RS is an outbreak of fighting between the Federation and the RS. Although there would be an almost instantaneous international reaction, it is possible that this fighting could escalate. The main ethnic groups within Bosnia are all proud of their heritage, and unfortunately this can sometimes magnify disputes between groups.

Compounding the potential problem with fighting is the fact that many forces within the EU and U.S. are involved in other conflicts around the globe. Should this

fighting occur before other conflicts have been resolved, there might not be as rapid a response time with regards to sending peacekeeping forces. However, given the history of the previous Bosnian War, neither party will want to repeat the mistakes of the past, so they would likely attempt to respond quickly to prevent a worsening of the conflict.

*Future #8: The Federation attempts to work together while the RS maintains the status quo.*

As with the first and second scenarios, it is possible that the Federation would be the first to offer concessions and try to work together with the ethnic Serbs. Although some in the Federation, particularly the Bosniak ethnic group, which suffered great losses during the Balkan war of the early 1990s, would like to see the RS eliminated, the Federation might succumb to outside pressure, such as from the EU or the U.S. Also, as mentioned above, the Bosniaks have the most to lose by the dissolution of Bosnia as a nation. The ethnic Croats and ethnic Serbs both have neighboring countries, Croatia and Serbia, respectively, which would theoretically absorb their population. The ethnic Muslims do not, and would end up surrounded by less friendly nations.

*Step 10: Determine the "focal events" that must occur in our present in order to bring about a given alternate future.*

**Scenario 1: The Office of the High Representative in Bosnia is maintained.**

*Future #5: Both the Federation and the RS maintain the status quo.*

In order for this future to occur, we will continue to see some instability including persistent political posturing between the leaders of the various ethnic groups. Elections will continue to be decided primarily along ethnic lines, and the OHR will maintain its power but without much exercising of that power.

*Future #8: The Federation attempts to work together while the RS maintains the status quo.*

The Federation will make continued attempts at working together in a more centralized government while the RS continues threats of secession and causes stalemates in the Bosnian political process.

*Future #9: Both the Federation and the RS attempt to work together.*

For this to occur, we will see more positive interaction between the leaders of the three ethnic groups. The Federation will have to cease its calls for the dissolution of the RS, along with its statements that the RS was founded on genocide, and the three leaders would have to begin compromising, eventually negating the need for the OHR.

*Future #6: The Federation maintains the status quo while the RS attempts to work together.*

The RS would have to cease its threats of secession and begin to offer concessions to the Federation. The Federation might be suspicious of these offerings and therefore maintain their steady course for the time being.

### **Scenario 2: The Office of the High Representative is reduced as a role in Bosnia.**

*Future #5: Both the Federation and the RS maintain the status quo.*

In this scenario, both parties would likely be reluctant to take the first step towards working on a more centralized government. There would be continued political posturing from both sides and elections would remain along ethnic lines.

*Future #8: The Federation attempts to work together while the RS maintains the status quo.*

The Federation will make continued attempts at working together in a more centralized government while the RS continues threats of secession and causes stalemates in the Bosnian political process.

*Future #6: The Federation maintains the status quo while the RS attempts to work together.*

The RS would have to cease its threats of secession and begin to offer concessions to the Federation. The Federation might be suspicious of these offerings and therefore maintain their steady course for the time being.

*Future #9: Both the Federation and the RS attempt to work together.*

For this to occur, we will see more positive interaction between the leaders of the three ethnic groups. The Federation will have to cease its calls for the dissolution of the RS, along with its statements that the RS was founded on genocide, and the three leaders would have to begin compromising, eventually negating the need for the OHR.

### **Scenario 3: The Republika Srpska holds a referendum on secession**

*Future #4: The Federation maintains the status quo while the RS engages in military action.*

The Federation would raise much outcry if the RS attempted secession. In the meantime, RS forces would begin gathering and arming in preparation for a conflict.

*Future #5: Both the Federation and the RS maintain the status quo.*

In this scenario, the referendum would largely be political posturing. The Federation would exercise extreme caution in all interactions with the RS. The OHR and EU would become involved in the effort to diffuse the situation.

*Future #1: Both the Federation and the RS engage in military action.*

Both the Federation and the RS would gather forces and arms. The EU would increase the EUFOR peacekeeping force in Bosnia and the OHR could order the various ethnic leaders to step down in an attempt to ease the tension.

*Future #8: The Federation attempts to work together while the RS maintains the status quo.*

The EU would likely urge the Federation to offer some form of concession in order to appease the RS. The Federation would be reluctant to give in as a response to RS threats of secession, but they also do not want to see a collapse in Bosnia, particularly the Bosniak ethnic group.

*Step 11: Develop indicators for the focal events.*

Focal Event: Continued instability including persistent political posturing between the leaders of the various ethnic groups.

Indicators: We would see much the same as is currently going on in Bosnia. The leaders would continue their current approach, being reluctant to offer any concession to other leaders. Bosniak leaders would still call for the RS's elimination, stating it was founded on genocide.

Focal Event: Elections will continue to be decided primarily along ethnic lines.

Indicators: The next presidential election will take place in 2010. If the future will be a steady course, we should see similar results as in the 2006 election. It is unlikely that a more centralized government will be achieved by 2010, so we will see another election of a president from each ethnic group.

Focal Event: OHR will maintain its power but without much exercising of that power.

Indicators: Much of the actions from the OHR, currently held by Valentin Inzko, can be seen as symbolic. For example, his recent letter to the RS National Assembly was largely symbolic; it remains to be seen if he will take more aggressive action ([www.ohr.int](http://www.ohr.int) 2009). We will likely see much of the same – symbolic actions rather than enforcement.

Focal Event: The Federation will make continued attempts at working together in a more centralized government.

Indicators: As mentioned above, although the Bosniak ethnic group suffered many losses during the Bosnian War, they also have the most to gain by a unified Bosnia. It is in their interest, therefore, to work towards the centralized government. The biggest step for the Federation would be a cessation of their calls for the dissolution of the RS.

Focal Event: RS continues threats of secession and causes stalemates in the Bosnian political process.

Indicators: Although it is deemed unlikely that the RS will ever truly hold a referendum of secession, they will continue to use it as leverage to advance their political goals. They will continue to use this in response to any Federation attempts that they view as unfriendly.

Focal Event: The RS ceases its threats of secession and begins to offer concessions to the Federation.

Indicators: In order for this to occur, we would first see outside pressure, primarily from the EU, which would influence the RS to work for peace. They might also succumb to pressure from neighboring Serbia; if the EU or other international organizations put pressure on Serbia they might, in turn, exert influence on the RS to cease unfriendly actions.

Focal Event: The Federation would raise much outcry if the RS attempted secession.

Indicators: We would likely see appeals from the Federation to the EU, and perhaps even a view towards gathering armed forces to prepare for the possibility that the RS will arm.

Focal Event: RS forces would begin gathering and arming in preparation for a conflict.

Indicators: We would see the beginnings of weapons and troop gathering as well as pleas to neighboring Serbia for possible assistance.

Focal Event: The OHR and EU would become involved in the effort to diffuse the situation.

Indicators: We would see an increase in the peacekeeping force in Bosnia, EUFOR, and possibly an addition of NATO troops. The OHR could use its veto power in an attempt to end a stalemate or to depose leaders that are hurting the attempts at stability.

Focal Event: Both the Federation and the RS would gather forces and arms.

Indicators: Both regions in Bosnia would begin arming and looking towards strategic troop placement. Possibly, neighboring Croatia and Serbia would contribute forces or arms in preparation for the outbreak of war in Bosnia, which could spill over into the Balkan region.

Step 12: State the potential of a given alternate future to "transpose" into another alternate future.

As we can see above, the most likely future overall is Future #5, a steady course for both major actors. This has the potential to transpose to even more desirable alternate futures, such as Futures #8 and #6, in which one party aims at working together while the other maintains a steady course, or, the best possible future, Future #9, where both actors begin to work together.

On the other hand, there is also a chance that the peaceful possible futures, as above, could transpose to far less desirable alternate futures. Both actors would be aware that any threat of military conflict would draw enormous attention from the EU and NATO. However, given the ongoing instability in Bosnia, this likely future might only be temporary. Although military action is, at this point, seemingly unlikely, should things begin to decline in Bosnia, there is the potential for a future turn to violence.

If the OHR is either removed or its powers are greatly reduced, this could force the two actors to work together, as in Future #9, but it could also lead to a further deterioration between the two regions. This could transpose to any number of undesirable futures in which the Serb ethnic group takes first military action (Future #4 or Future #7). It is unlikely that the Federation would be the first to take military action.

Military action from the RS, following a referendum of secession as in Scenario 3, for example, could quickly transpose to the least desirable Future #1, in which both parties take military action. Not only would this be extremely negative for the future of Bosnia, it could also involve other Balkan countries, not only Serbia and Croatia, but others in the region.

## **Conclusion**

Bosnia is a very important country in southern Europe, and by extension to all of Europe. Instability in Bosnia has the potential to involve many other nations, not only other countries in the Balkan region but all of Europe. Should this instability eventually lead to war, it would likely involve NATO countries, as it did in the Bosnia war of the early 1990s.

Will the conflict in Bosnia ever be resolved peacefully? Based on the preceding analysis, it does not appear that the instability in Bosnia will be solved in the immediate future, but there is hope that it will eventually be resolved. With continued assistance from the EU, primarily through the auspices of the OHR, hopefully the differences between the Federation and the RS will be able to, if not completely solved, eased enough so that they can work together.

Will a reduction of the OHR affect stability in Bosnia? At the present time, it appears that the OHR should not be reduced in power. This scenario has the potential for transposition to negative alternate futures. Hopefully, in time the regions of Bosnia will be able to work together enough that the OHR can be reduced or even eliminated. At the present time, there are too many variables that can negatively impact Bosnia if its role is reduced.

In order to further study this topic, one must determine if there is a way to get the population of Bosnia to think outside ethnic lines and think more towards the nation of Bosnia. Perhaps extensive surveying of samples of the population will give clues as to how the leaders can work together towards a unified Bosnia without sacrificing the ethnic communities within Bosnia.

At present, the steady course in Bosnia is not ideal, but will hopefully continue until some concessions can be reached between the two regions. Unfortunately, it is extremely difficult to overcome nationalist disagreements, and in Bosnia there are three large ethnic groups with their own desires and beliefs. If Bosnia can overcome the ethnic differences embedded in the nation, they will be able to become a strong nation with a stronger economy and hopefully eventual membership in the EU. A stable Bosnia will help lend stability towards a stable Balkan region. This in turn will lead to a strong Europe.

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## **Appendix A**

### **Research Design**

In order to develop a predictive analysis on the future of stability in Bosnia, the author will utilize the Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH). The ACH is an eight-step process, developed by Richards J. Heuer Jr., used to compare hypotheses and determine which is the most likely (Heuer 1999 95).

The ACH is a good approach to analyzing hypotheses because it “helps an analyst overcome, or at least minimize, some of the cognitive limitations that make prescient intelligence analysis so difficult to achieve” (Heuer 1999 95). It does this by forcing the analyst to find evidence against each hypothesis rather than just support whichever hypothesis they believe to be correct to begin with. It is inconsistent evidence that determines which hypothesis is favored. Consistent evidence does not necessarily prove a hypothesis because “evidence can, and usually does, support more than one hypothesis” (Jones 1998 181).

The eight steps of the ACH, according to Heuer (1999) are as follows:

- 1) Identify the possible hypotheses to be considered. Use a group of analysts with different perspectives to brainstorm the possibilities.
- 2) Make a list of significant evidence and arguments for and against each hypothesis.
- 3) Prepare a matrix with hypotheses across the top and evidence down the side. Analyze the “diagnosticity” of the evidence and arguments – that is, identify which items are most helpful in judging the relative likelihood of the hypotheses.

- 4) Refine the matrix. Reconsider the hypotheses and delete evidence and arguments that have no diagnostic value.
- 5) Draw tentative conclusions about the relative likelihood of each hypothesis.

Proceed by trying to disprove the hypotheses rather than prove them.
- 6) Analyze how sensitive your conclusion is to a few critical items of evidence.

Consider the consequences for your analysis if that evidence were wrong, misleading, or subject to a different interpretation.
- 7) Report conclusions. Discuss the relative likelihood of all the hypotheses, not just the most likely one.
- 8) Identify milestones for future observation that may indicate events are taking a different course than expected.

For the purposes of this research project, step one will only be completed with regards to the identification of potential hypotheses. If this were a “real world” analytical assignment working as an analyst, the first step would involve meeting with team members to brainstorm various hypotheses. Because this is a research paper, the author will come up with a list of likely hypotheses based on the research conducted during the course of this study.

### **Case Study**

*Step 1: Identify the possible hypotheses to be considered. Use a group of analysts with different perspectives to brainstorm the possibilities.*

In examining the future of Bosnia with regards to political stability, one must examine the possible future interactions between the two regions of Bosnia, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Federation) and the Repulika Srpska (the RS).

Since the end of the Bosnian War which occurred from 1992 – 1995, these two sides have had continued political conflict which has interfered with the possibility that Bosnia will attain a strong central government.

In order to help facilitate peace in Bosnia, part of the Dayton Accords, which ended the Bosnian War, established the Office of the High Representative (OHR). The OHR “is an *ad hoc* international institution responsible for overseeing implementation of civilian aspects of the accord ending the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina” and “is working with the people and institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the international community to ensure that Bosnia and Herzegovina evolves into a peaceful and viable democracy on course for integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions” ([www.ohr.int](http://www.ohr.int)).

There are several hypotheses about Bosnia’s future stability.

- 1) The OHR will maintain its current position and the Federation and RS will maintain their current course.
- 2) The role of the OHR will be reduced by the EU, forcing the Federation and the RS to make concessions and attempt to improve their relationship, leading to a more stable Bosnia.
- 3) The role of the OHR will be reduced by the EU, causing the relationship between the Federation and the RS to deteriorate further and increasing the potential for violent conflict. The EU and possible NATO will be forced to intervene.

*Step 2: Make a list of significant evidence and arguments for and against each hypothesis.*

- The Bosniak ethnic group has the greatest interest in maintaining Bosnia. Unlike the Serb and Croat ethnic groups, the Bosniaks do not have a neighboring country that shares their ethnicity. If Bosnia were to break up along ethnic lines, the Bosniaks would be left with “a small, landlocked country surrounded by less than sympathetic neighbors” (Woehrel 2009 8).
- Some Bosniak leaders believe the RS should not exist, saying that “it was created through genocide” (Economist 2009 55).
- Serb ethnic group has been resistant to efforts by Bosniak leadership to move towards a more centralized Bosnian government.
- RS leadership periodically threatens to hold a referendum of secession.
- EU would rapidly respond to any RS attempts at secession.
- Indications of possible violence would see a quick response from the EU and likely from NATO as well, including an increase in the peacekeeping force in Bosnia (EUFOR).

*Step 3: Prepare a matrix with hypotheses across the top and evidence down the side.*

*Analyze the “diagnosticity” of the evidence and arguments – that is, identify which items are most helpful in judging the relative likelihood of the hypotheses.*

Jones makes the recommendation when comparing each item of evidence with each hypothesis to label it either “C,” for consistent, “I,” for inconsistent, or “?” if it is ambiguous (1998 187). The author will use this coding system to diagnose each item of evidence relevant to the three hypotheses.

In the table below, the hypotheses are the columns and the items of evidence are in the rows. For each item of evidence, the author will determine its relevance to each hypothesis.

Evidence	Hypotheses		
	The OHR will maintain its current position; the Federation and RS will maintain their current course	The role of the OHR will be reduced by the EU, forcing the Federation and the RS to make concessions and attempt to improve their relationship, leading to a more stable Bosnia	The role of the OHR will be reduced by the EU, causing the relationship between the Federation and the RS to deteriorate further and increasing the potential for violent conflict. The EU and possibly NATO will be forced to intervene
Bosniaks lack support of a neighboring country with similar ethnicity; would be left with much smaller nation if Bosnia were to break up	C	C	?
Bosniak leadership says RS should not exist, because created by genocide	C	I	C
Serbs resistant to Bosniak efforts towards a more centralized government	C	I	C
RS leadership periodically threatens secession	C	I	C
EU would rapidly respond to any RS attempts at secession	C	I	?
Indications of possible violence would see a quick response from the EU and likely from NATO as well, including an increase in the peacekeeping force in Bosnia (EUFOR).	C	?	?

*Step 4: Refine the matrix. Reconsider the hypotheses and delete evidence and arguments that have no diagnostic value.*

In the table above, most evidence has a diagnostic value. The last two pieces of evidence, indicating the rapid response time from the EU and/or NATO, might not be useful in this case because those pieces of evidence, in and of themselves, would preclude some of the hypotheses in advance. That is to say, for example, the RS would be aware that if they attempted to secede the EU would immediately respond; that knowledge could possibly deter them from doing so.

However, one must be careful, in this case, to not succumb to an analytical fallacy. One cannot assume that the RS will necessarily act rationally when it comes to the question of secession; they may very go ahead with a referendum even if they are aware of likely consequences.

*Step 5: Draw tentative conclusions about the relative likelihood of each hypothesis.*

*Proceed by trying to disprove the hypotheses rather than prove them.*

Based on the evidence above, at this point it would be unwise for the EU to reduce the role of the OHR. It seems evident that this reduction could lead to deterioration in Bosnia. Although there is a chance that a reduction in the power of the OHR might force the Federation and the RS to cooperate, there is also a chance that it could push them further away from reconciliation. Without the OHR, the political process in Bosnia will continue to stalemate, even if the Federation offers concessions in an attempt to improve the central government.

On the other hand, the OHR has yet to resolve the difficulties in Bosnia. Although the office has helped end stalemates in Bosnia, there is still a lack of stability in Bosnia

14 years following the Dayton Accords. At some point, the EU must examine how useful the OHR is and whether it will ultimately help improve the situation in Bosnia.

Considering the EU's desire for peace in Bosnia and a concern about a return to violence, at this point it seems unlikely that they will remove the OHR. Even if maintenance of the current status quo in Bosnia is not ideal, the alternatives, without the OHR, are likely too risky for the EU to consider at this point. For now, the evidence supports the first hypothesis: that the OHR will continue its current role and we will see a continuation of the current situation in Bosnia.

*Step 6: Analyze how sensitive your conclusion is to a few critical items of evidence.*

*Consider the consequences for your analysis if that evidence were wrong, misleading, or subject to a different interpretation.*

The most critical item of evidence, or assumption, is that the EU and/or NATO will intervene should relations between the Federation and the RS deteriorate to violence. If the EU decides to leave Bosnia to its own devices, other hypotheses would have to be introduced and the third hypothesis, that the relationship between the Federation and the RS will deteriorate further and possibly resort to a violent conflict, could be much more likely.

Without EU or NATO intervention, it is possible, perhaps even likely, that Bosnia will end up in a civil war. Not only would this be disastrous for the population of Bosnia, but it could draw in other countries in the Balkan region into the crisis. At the very least, it is likely that Croatia and Serbia would intervene in assistance of their ethnic friends in Bosnia. We might also see other Balkan nations become involved as well. In the worst

case scenario, we might once again see ethnic cleansing attempts against the Bosniak ethnic group.

While it is true that the Bosniak ethnic group is driven by a desire for a unified Bosnia because of their potential weakness without one, they would not ignore a military threat from the RS. They would hope to be joined by Croat forces to prevent RS attempts at secession. Without international intervention, this would lead to an all out civil war. Although the assumption that the EU and/or NATO would intervene is critical in this case, it is extremely unlikely that international interests would watch a rehash of the Bosnian War of the early 1990s.

*Step 7: Report conclusions. Discuss the relative likelihood of all the hypotheses, not just the most likely one.*

Based on the matrix above, the most likely conclusion is that, for the time, the OHR will maintain its current office and the two regions of Bosnia, the Federation and the RS, will continue their current course. Hopefully, eventually the two parties will arrive at a way to work together and work towards a more centralized government in Bosnia. In the meantime, the OHR will work to end stalemates and maintain relative peace in Bosnia.

Although it is unlikely at the present time that the role of the OHR will be reduced, it is hoped that eventually it will no longer be necessary. It was not intended to be permanent, but to assist in the implementation of the Dayton Accords. Should the time occur that the OHR is reduced or removed, in theory it would be at a time when Bosnia has become more stable and less likely to end up in a violent conflict. This makes the third hypothesis the least likely, though it can probably never be completely ruled out.

If the OHR is eventually removed, one would hope for continued stability in Bosnia. Based on the history of the majority ethnic groups in Bosnia, there might always be the possibility that relations could decline in response to a relatively minor incident. If this should occur, Bosnia could end up right back to where it is at the present time – in political stalemate and having to rely on outside parties to maintain peace, or, worse, the nation could disintegrate.

*Step 8: Identify milestones for future observation that may indicate events are taking a different course than expected.*

There are possible future events that could indicate trends away from the most likely hypothesis. The RS could, as they have been threatening, hold a referendum of secession. This would lead to heavy intervention from the EU, and possibly an increase in the EUFOR peacekeeping force in Bosnia. The OHR would have to utilize its power to contain the threat, possibly removing RS leadership that it deems responsible. This action could have drastically negative effects. The RS could view it as an aggressive and unfair action, leading it towards violent action against the Federation or against peacekeeping forces.

One issue that would have to be resolved in order for there to be total peace in Bosnia is the Bosniak view of the Serbs as having committed genocide. It is difficult to imagine how this might be resolved, or whether it is even possible. Bosniak leadership calls for the elimination of the RS often lead to threats by the Serb President to hold the referendum of secession.

Ideally, the Bosniaks might be able to come to terms with the history in an interest of unity and a stronger Bosnian state, and/or perhaps the RS could offer some form of concession, possibly in the form of an apology, to appease the Bosniak ethnic group.

### **Final Comments**

Based on the analysis using the ACH, it is likely that Bosnia will continue its current course. While this is not ideal, some of the alternatives, such as an outbreak of civil war or a return to the genocide attempts during the previous Bosnian War, are certainly less desirable. One hopes that the current course will eventually lead to a more stable Bosnia.

Although the OHR was meant as a temporary office in Bosnia, it is evident that it will be necessary for the time being. There is too much uncertainty as to what would happen if that office were to be reduced in power or eliminated. With the current instability in Bosnia, it would be too risky to change the office of the OHR and leave the two regions to attempt working out their differences without any international intervention.

### **Comparison to LAMP Analysis**

Using the ACH, we arrive at very similar conclusions as when utilizing the Lockwood Analytical Method of Prediction (LAMP). Based on the evidence above, we conclude that Bosnia will, for the time being, maintain its steady course with a strong OHR in place. Using the LAMP, we reach a similar conclusion using the pairwise comparison of the most likely actions of the Federation and the RS.

There are some important similarities between the two methods that contribute to the strength of their analytical method. Perhaps most importantly, both methods

emphasize future events that can lead to a change in the current conclusion; the LAMP refers to them as “focal events” while the ACH refers to “milestones.” By making a list of possible future events that could change the analyst’s conclusion, it allows the results of the analysis to be useful in the future, and also gives intelligence collector specific things to look for in the field.

The main difference between the two methods lies in the hypothesis testing. While the ACH lays out the most likely hypotheses and determines the most likely one, the LAMP examines more of a “living” future. It “is based on one key assumption about the future; that it is the sum total of the interaction of free will of the national actors involved” (Lockwood and Lockwood 1994 21). With LAMP, instead of examining multiple hypotheses, we examine the question of Bosnia as a whole, and look at how the actors in question, in this case the Federation and the RS, will respond to different scenarios.

Although the general conclusions are similar, there is a difference in results between the ACH and LAMP. While the ACH concludes that the first hypothesis is the correct one, the LAMP concludes that the actors will react in a certain way in response to different potential scenarios. Both can answer the general question, what will happen in Bosnia? But the LAMP results are more useful in an ongoing event.

One positive aspect of the ACH is the way it attempts to disprove each hypothesis, rather than just support it. By seeking inconsistencies, rather than just the evidence which supports a hypothesis, it leads to a more vigorous examination. This helps eliminate some of the biases that are unavoidable to the analyst. However, there is still a chance that the analyst can overlook some hypotheses. This can be partly solved by

step 6 of the ACH. By looking at which evidence is most essential, the analyst is forced to consider what would happen in cases of denial and deception, where the evidence might not come from the most reliable source. The analyst must ask themselves what other hypotheses there might be if evidence turns out to be wrong.

No form of analysis is going to completely overcome the analytical biases to which everyone is susceptible. The ACH manages to avoid some of them by not allowing the analyst to just pick their preferred hypothesis and attempt to support it.

The LAMP method, although also not perfect at eliminating biases, is the more robust analytical method. It leaves room for ongoing events and bases the judgments of the actors' "free will" on a detailed study of the actors. Ideally, this allows the analyst to determine the actions of the main actors based on their background, or worldview. In conducting the pairwise comparison, it will be relatively simple for the analyst to redo the exercise if another scenario appears imminent or as certain focal events or indicators occur. This is especially straightforward if the analyst uses a software program to conduct the pairwise comparison.

Both the ACH and LAMP have their merits as analytical methods. Ideally, we can occasionally turn to both to examine what the future may hold. For a longer term, simple "yes or no" type question, the ACH might work better to simply test hypotheses asking whether or not an event will occur. For an ongoing question, LAMP is more effective because it acts as more of a living analytical method. It can account for constant changes and takes into consideration the motivations of each actor. Paired with detailed country studies, which can allow the analyst to better understand the actor's worldviews, LAMP

can be very effective at determining the outcome of any number of possible future scenarios.

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