Can a United States Strategic Propaganda Campaign Succeed over the Militant Jihad Propaganda Campaign by the Taliban and Al-Qa'ida?

(LAMP Analytical Method)

American Military University

INTL504 Analytic I

Professor Dr. William F. Harlow

Fall 2009

By Shelley E. Smith

Introduction

"Our failure to understand these new forms of war and to recognize that they are popping up all over the globe traps us in habits of inaction that feed and accelerate these armed conflicts and steadily erode our own military advantages." Naval Officer Larry Seaquist[1]

---

[1] Seaquist, Larry. "Community War." *Proceedings of The U.S. Naval Institute*. August 2000. Retrieved; November 25, 2009. http://www.larryseaquist.com/essay-community-war.html

The Fourth Generational War is not only being conducted as a ground war but as an idea war fought through varied types of propaganda and based on visions, concepts, and images, and how they are being interpreted. The United States had a successful propaganda campaign led by President Dwight Eisenhower and the administration. They developed an integrated and unified psychological strategy against the Soviet Union during the height of the Cold War during World War II. Since then the U.S. has not had a successful propaganda campaign.

Past efforts by United States government officials have failed in efforts to battle extremism propaganda and in communications due to American policy and values being viewed by Muslims and others as a push of American propaganda on to the Muslim world. The United States led coalition in Iraq failed to counter enemy propaganda due to the slow speed of U.S. military clearance. The lag due to the time frame allowed the extremists and insurgents to develop conspiracy theories, and lies to influence the people and decision and policy makers.

The advantage for jihad militants to spread their ideology and to maintain their movement of hatred, revenge, calls for revenge, recruiting, and raising money in the environment of airwaves is free and open where anyone can compete around the world. They can produce a vast array of communications through media tools that can bypass military defenses and influence domestic politics which can affect public opinion on a global scale. They continue to propagate strategic and tactical terrorism planning for asymmetrical warfare.

The declassified Key Judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate "Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States" dated April 2006, exhibit: "four underlying factors are fueling the spread of the violent jihad movement: (1) Entrenched grievances, such as corruption, injustice, and fear of Western domination, leading to anger, humiliation, and a sense of powerlessness; (2) the Iraq "jihad"; (3) the slow pace of real and sustained economic, social,

and political reforms in many Muslim majority nations; and (4) pervasive anti-US sentiment among most Muslims - all of which Jihadists exploit."[2]

The war in Afghanistan started in response to Osama bin Ladin-al-Qa'ida terrorism. Al-Qa'ida continues to have many branches and entities that are connected to other organizations and groups. However, now the Taliban are surpassing al-Qa'ida in numbers who are located in Pakistan and Afghanistan and elsewhere. A Taliban victory could produce a rapid proliferation of al-Qa'ida fighters in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. The United States and other regions could potentially see an increase in terrorist threats and acts of terrorism against them.

With the weight of American and coalition war finances; a military and civilian death toll that keeps mounting; weakened state infrastructures; failed states; and rampant corruption, the most logical approach would be to wage a propaganda war to counter Islamic Jihadist extremism propaganda.

Considering the Jihad ideology is weak in logic and the Islamic civilization is under developed in comparison to the West, if a strategic anti-jihad propaganda campaign were applied the Jihadist militants could be forced into a weaker position where they would find it harder to defend their ideology and their representation of their version of Sharia law. The Taliban and al-Qa'ida would have to prove the reasoning behind their hostile and destructive acts against that of a stronger moral and value structure that works for others against what they depict as their own. A United States propaganda campaign could result in an additional more cost-effective method to fight Jihadism in Afghanistan and elsewhere with a reduced death toll overall.

---

[2] Declassified Key Judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate; *Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States*. April 2006. The Director of National Intelligence (DNI), press release. Retrieved; 19, November 2009. http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/Declassified_NIE_Key_Judgments.pdf

Present efforts will be directed at devising new policies of exposing the true nature of the militants as religious violators and their attacks as religious violations with the intention of shifting the paradigm to a debate between the peoples and the militants.

Using the Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction this paper will attempt to answer the following specific question; Can a United States Strategic Propaganda Campaign Succeed over the Militant Jihad Propaganda Campaign by the Taliban and Al-Qa'ida?

Note: This paper opens with a brief description of the understanding of Jihad radicalization and indoctrination in order for the reader to gain a better understanding of the issues and analysis of workings within this paper. There has been much scholarly materials written and discussion weighed through the various media on the subject of the United States involvement in policy and war in Afghanistan. The context of the Literature Review has been woven into the body of work of this paper. There is no attached Appendix to this study.

Understanding Jihad Radicalization and Indoctrination

In order to battle against Jihad propaganda one must understand the aspects of Jihad radicalization and indoctrination based on the fact that propaganda starts with an ideology that consists of a problem and a solution.

Radicalized militant Jihadists believe resistance to U.S. occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq are a legitimate jihad. In-depth research by scholars and analysts, have begun to understand the complex dynamics of radicalization and de-radicalization. Jihadism radicalization occurs when an individual progresses through numerous steps along several possible paths that are

intimately tied to social context and the social mobility in jihad. De-radicalization is the abandonment of violence and a reversion to a normal life.

Indoctrination is an important aspect of the jihad movement. For example, Aballah Azzam is a major martyred figure in the jihad movement. He led the Arab-Afghan movement from its inception in the mid-1980s until his death in November 1989. Since the foundation of al-Qa'ida in the late 1980s, and the rise of the Arab-Afghan movement in the 1990s his writings and speeches are still essential literature for jihadists whose preparation and indoctrination involves Azzam's jihad preparatory stages: emigration (*al-hijra*), preparation (*ali 'dad*), garrison (*al-rabat*), and combat (*al-qital*). The last three are considered indispensable for the participation in combat.[3]

First, is establishing territorial control for training camps; Second, is the insistence on "emigration" (*al-hijra*), in order to establish bonds and loyalties amongst the group; Third, is two additional preparatory stages (*al-i'dad and alrabat*) of educating and indoctrinating recruits; Fourth is the garrison stage (*al-rabat*) ensures the jihadi recruits stay channeled towards the nearby geographical areas (*la hijra ba'd al-fath*) that is to be conquered. The recruits are indoctrinated into understanding they will not be considered a sincere, truly believing, and complete Muslim until they emigrate and break links with their home, family, work, and disengaging from that which links them to the world. They are taught the symbolic and physical journey and duty involving "emigration" will last until the Judgment Day or until the entire world worships God (Allah). "Emigration" is also considered as the path to paradise (tariq al-janna) through martyrdom and death.[4]

---

[3] Lia, Brynjar. "Doctrines for Jihadi Terrorist Training". 2008. Kjeller, Norway, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI); Routledge Taylor & Francis Group. Retrieved; 27, November 2009. 520. http://www.ps.au.dk/fileadmin/site_files/filer_statskundskab/subsites/cir/pdf-filer/p1.pdf
[4] Ibid. 520-521

Scholars discovered that individuals can be drawn into radical circles before they adopt radical ideology, but no one has found a clear answer as to what makes a terrorist.

"Scholars have found evidence of a positive correlation between the level of education and militancy both among Islamic and left-wing radicals (Russell and Miller 1977; Krueger and Maleckova 2003; Krueger 2006; Berrebi 2003; Ricolfi 2005). (Diego and Hertog 2007, 6)."[5]

Within an academic setting there can be found radicalized characteristics for social conservatism that is attracted to religious radicalism. However, "evidence has shown that is not a preclusion of certain political orientation or Jihad ideology in being promoted or taught by those who attain certain academic discipline(s)."[6]

From a presentation on Global Network Terrorism, by Scott Atran, April 28, 2006, per Section I - Sacred Values and Radicalization, under; "Results from interviews with would-be martyrs: From interviews with Islamist militants, we find that individuals who enlist in Jihad, especially would-be martyrs (suicide bombers), often seem motivated by non-instrumental values that trump rational self-interest.

Such values are "non-instrumental" because they do not seem very sensitive to standard calculations regarding cost and benefit, to quantity, to tradeoffs across moral categories (e.g., family vs. God), to commensuration between different cultural frames, or even to the transitive orderings of preferences that define rationality in standard choice and utility theories (i.e., if A is preferred to B, and B is preferred to C, then A should be preferred to C).

---

[5] Gambetta, Diego and Steffen Hertog. "Engineers of Jihad". 2007. Sociology Working Papers: Paper Number 2007-10. UK: Department of Sociology; University of Oxford. 6. Retrieved; 27, November 2009. http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/users/gambetta/Engineers%20of%20Jihad.pdf
[6] Ibid. 6

Violation of such values leads to moral outrage and typically "irrational" vengeance ("get the offender, even if it kills us"). Sacred values appear to support non-instrumental moral action because "virtue has its own reward," and can't be avoided because "I couldn't live with myself otherwise."".[7]

Step 1: The Issue: The Challenge of Jihad Propaganda

For this paper the term propaganda will refer to "war propaganda" with the occasional inclusion of the term "psychological warfare". Each has their own specific meaning and the choice of the chosen definitions is relevant to the activities herein:

"War propaganda refers to persuasion targeted at an internal audience: to bond one's own group, to build morale (a belief in "being right" and in "being able"), to get people to agree, to get involved, to silence internal opposition, to incite to action, and to channel that response.

Psychological warfare refers to persuasion designed to demoralize or terrorize an external audience."[8]

Jihadist propaganda is used to propagate a cause based on an ideology that is rooted to Islam, the Quran, Sharia Law, hadiths, or an ideology. Through acts of intimidation, violence,

---

[7] Atran, Scott. "Global Network Terrorism: I. Sacred Values and Radicalization; II; Comparative Anatomy and Evolution. April 28, 2006. White House, Washington DC; NSC briefing: National Science Foundation and AFOSR-MURI. Retrieved; 30, November 2009. http://sitemaker.umich.edu/satran/files/atrannsc-042806.pdf

[8] Rank, Hugh. Persuasion Analysis. 2008. War Propaganda. Retrieved; 28, November 2009. http://faculty.govst.edu/pa/Political/Cause%20Groups/war_propaganda.htm

and terrorism, this has subjected the Taliban, al-Qa'ida and other group(s) ideology to ethical scrutiny. This has challenged their perspectives and conception of morality and values.

The age of globalization and technology gave way for the development of a social revolution led by terrorist networks as a global Jihad and the propaganda battle is one of ideological warfare. Through technology, varied media, internet, and communications the Taliban and al-Qa'ida incorporated into their scheme of combat Jihad propaganda. Originally communicated by word of mouth and jihad by the pen (*jihad bi'l-qalam*) it soon evolved into the used of varied media that has advanced their propaganda campaign swiftly across global borders, affecting many. The problem is it works and is helping to maintain the jihadist movement. It can bypass American military defenses and the battle ground is in the environment of Fourth Generation Warfare.

According to Major Timothy R. King, "Propaganda does not represent the entire argument and therefore does not rely on reality."[9] He exemplifies that the Jihadist movement shares some similarities with the communist movement. Both have an ideology that promises to restore greatness; are egalitarian; and seek to save people from Western imperialism. However, the difference in the Jihadist movement is it is based on religion, has no clear leader, it lacks unity of effort, and varied actions are contradictory to the ideology. (King 2007, 27 – 29) Therefore, jihadism can be linked to fundamentalists whose sole purpose is to achieve independent irredentism from that of anything Westernized or other.

In *On War*, (1873), by Carl Von Clausewitz, he states violence or physical force is the means and submission of the enemy is the object, whereas, the tendency of the art of war is to

---

[9] King, Timothy R. *Finding Weakness in Jihadist Propaganda*. 2007. A Monograph by U.S. Army, School of Advanced Military Studies. June 2007. Fort Leavenworth, KS: United States Army Command and General Staff College. 7. Retrieved; 27, November 2009.
http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA471796&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf

attain a skillful method of disarming the enemy without bloodshed. He argues the power of

propaganda and of predetermined reactions can be evoked successfully if it is of an internal

interest and if the "obvious interest" is clear to a population. When set in motion against an

external enemy and if the populace is on the side of the government and the troops are in

readiness, they will be successful. He argues the people, the government, the army, and what

they think is a passion that consumes them and is a vital link to harnessing a war. [10]

In *The Idea of Propaganda: a Reconstruction*, (2002), by Stanley Cunningham, he argues

propaganda is unethical and can cause exploitation of information, disregard values and belief

systems, and pose as the basis of knowledge.[11] The average man can not distinguish between

information and propaganda and therefore, it should not be a representative of truth due to its

selective and exploitative nature towards truth.[12] Since propaganda can re-enforce what

individuals believe or value as a norm, it can legitimize a shared value and the collective belief in

a group.[13] The individuals will develop an emotional appetite for war-time propaganda and the

messages will contribute towards their collective or individual passions.[14]

In *Necessary Illusions*, (1989), by Noam Chomsky, he used a five-filtered propaganda

pair-comparison model to demonstrate that media serves the interests of state and corporations

that exemplifies how biases and sympathies will vary accordingly. Chomsky was able to predict

with considerable accuracy how media will function and perform in certain types of situations.

For example, during Vietnam and Nicaragua and the anti-contra movement, the media used

propaganda to reflect the narrowing of tactical objectives in conformity with their societal

---

[10] Clausewitz, Carl Von: Translated by James J. Graham. *On War: Volume I-III*. Third German Edition. 1873. London; N. Trubner & Co. Vol. I-Chapter 1. 1.
[11] Cunningham, Stanley. *The Idea of Propaganda: a Reconstruction.* 2002. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers. 129 – 130.
[12] Ibid. 203
[13] Ibid. 107
[14] Ibid. 145

functions. His prediction from a propaganda model was successful on predicting the blunting of administrative policy of both events. The policies failed and did not restore democracy or establish democracy in other neighboring regions.[15]

In *Management of Savagery*, the author notes when conflicts happen in regions a spontaneous polarization begins to happen among the people. The people will rally around the personages of the country, or party organization, or military organization, or a jihadi organization. They will amongst other things undertake a proper media propaganda campaign with a degree of security and justice by implementing the "sharia, solidarity, preparation, training, and advancement."[16]

Due to the U.S. counter-propaganda failure in the Iraq War and no past counter-propaganda strategy developed after the Iraq War. This has contributed as a major factor in how the jihad propagandist campaign developed, flourished, and became unstoppable over the years for maintaining the Taliban and al-Qa'ida regime and movement.

The United States has since learned from these mistakes. New promising developments have occurred in the challenges of countering al-Qa'ida that could also be applied against the Taliban and other extremists groups in Afghanistan and amongst the neighboring regions.

Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi Saif al Islam al Gadhafi, (son of Muammar al Gadhafi, leader of Libya), had meetings with the former leader of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), commander Noman Benotman, and the Libya LIFG prisoners. The LIFG is one of the world's most effective Jihaist organizations and at one time close to Osama bin Ladin. Saif

---

[15] Chomsky, Noam. *Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic Societies*. 1989. Toronto, ON; House of Anansi Press, Inc. 149-150.

[16] Naji, Abu Bakr: Translated by William McCants. "Management of Savagery". 23 May 2006. U.S.: John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University. 124. Retrieved; 27, November 2009. http://ctc.usma.edu/publications/pdf/Management_of_Savagery.pdf

Gadhafi's original motivation was to bring an end to the civil war in Libya. His other intention was to stop al-Qa'ida's growing influence in Libya.

In 2006, al-Qa'ida documents were captured by U.S. forces in Iraq and showed more Libyans than any other Arab nation were joining al-Qa'ida's. Safi Gadhafi was afraid they would bring the fight to Libya. After two years of secret discussions, Saif Gadhafi and Libyan security officials were able to persuade the LIFG to have a new perspective and write a "new code". This resulted in a 417-page religious document entitled "Corrective Studies." It is a direct challenge to al-Qai'da and all Islamic extremists

"The code's most direct challenge from within the Jihadist ranks to al-Qa'ida is: "Jihad has ethics and morals because it is for God. That means it is forbidden to kill women, children, elderly people, priests, messengers, traders and the like. Betrayal is prohibited and it is vital to keep promises and treat prisoners of war in a good way. Standing by those ethics is what distinguishes Muslims' jihad from the wars of other nations.""[17]

This new code is being circulated amongst Middle Eastern religious scholars, global politicians, and is being debated in the U.S. Several other prominent Middle East Jihadists have turned away from al-Qa'ida and the new code is showing promising signs of slowing down al-Qa'ida recruitment.

The new code in it's self could be a great contribution towards the battle against enemy insurgents and their ideologies in Afghanistan and around the world. It could greatly assist in the challenges that will be faced by the U.S. military in their propaganda campaign and interactive efforts in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

---

[17] Robertson, Nic and Paul Cruickshank. "New jihad code threatens al-Qa'ida". November 10, 2009.CNN News. Retrieved; 29, November 2009. http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/11/09/libya.jihadi.code/

Step 2: The Actors

This paper undertakes the task of presenting an understanding of the following primary actors; the United States, the Taliban and al-Qa'ida. Acknowledging and understanding their perceptions is important to waging a propaganda campaign during the events of conflict and war.

<div align="center">

United States

</div>

Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, United States troops have been engaged in Afghanistan to overthrow the Taliban regime and the safe haven of al-Qai'da operatives. The Pashtun ethnic group straddles the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan and is a large part of the Taliban insurgency. Fears remain of the war in Afghanistan and the Pakistani Taliban destabilizing the nuclear-armed Pakistan. Through a U.S.-supported administration, President Hamid Karzai was installed in Kabul, yet corruption plagued the 2009 elections and there have been concerns that the war in Afghanistan threatens to destabilize the efforts of American foreign policy in the regions.

Though the diverse challenges to U.S. interests are not clearly defined and are not as yet inherently stable in the Middle East, it is important to understand what a strategic propaganda campaign plan would identify. The Army <u>Joint Publication 3-0 Joint Operations</u>: *Joint Command and Control Doctrine Study* defines a campaign plan as identifying the "enemy's centers of gravity." Since we are in a Fourth Generation war of ideologies, the center of gravity can be

identified as an ideology.[18] In the case of the Taliban and al-Qai'da propaganda the center of the gravity would be identified as their ideology and the propaganda relies on ideology.

The report, "Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting Al-Qa'ida's Organizational Vulnerabilities", from the Combat Terrorism Center at West Point, points to the al-Qa'ida organization's adoption of Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) tactics. The strategic and tactical capabilities of 4GW, is in reaching political, economic, social, and military networks, which are as strong as its resources. The overall purpose is to "convince the enemy's political decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit."[19]

The report references to the article "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation," by William S. Lind, COL Keith Nightengale, USA, CAPT John F. Schmitt, USMC and LTC Gary I. Wilson, (1989), presented in the Marine Corps Gazette, presented a predictive argument of warfare that it "would be widely dispersed, largely undefined; war and peace would be blurred; and political infrastructures and civilian society will be the battlefield targets."[20]

4GW makes use of networks to directly attack the minds of the enemy decision makers and their political will. Through the use of psychological operations and propaganda the intent is to gradually erode the enemy's moral, and mental and physical ability to wage war over many years. The objective does not attempt to win through a defeat of enemy forces, but to cause them to eventually lose their will in staying in the fight. 4GW is not measured in months or years, but in terms of generations or decades. Predictive future/scenario analysis is an important and much

---

[18] Joint Publication 3-0 Joint Operations. *Joint Command and Control Doctrine Study*. 01, February 1999. Ft. Monroe, Virginia: Joint Warfare Center. Retrieved; 25, November 2009. www.dtic.mil/doctrine, IV – 8, or http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/research/c2study.pdf#search=%22IV%209-10%22
[19] "Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting Al-Qa'ida's Organizational Vulnerabilities". West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center. Retrieved; 20, November 2009. http://ctc.usma.edu/aq/aq.asp
[20] William S. Lind, COL Keith Nightengale, USA, CAPT John F. Schmitt, USMC and LTC Gary I. Wilson. "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation." USA: Marine Corps Gazette. October 1989. 22-26. cited from the report "Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting Al-Qa'ida's Organizational Vulnerabilities". West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center. Retrieved; 20, November 2009. http://ctc.usma.edu/aq/aq.asp

needed asset from a strategic and tactical standpoint. Therefore, in order to fight the Fourth Generation War in real-time, in order to defeat the enemy, we must think and operate like the enemy and stop inadvertently playing into the militant Jihadist strategies.

On November 13, 2008, Hayden states al-Qai'da had reconstituted training and operational capability, increased its recruitment and its propaganda efforts. Efforts to make safe havens feel less safe will keep them guessing, doubt their allies, question their methods and plans, and priorities; this causes them to spend more time and resources on self preservation.[21]

Ashley J. Tellis argues in her article "Reconciling with the Taliban? Toward an Alternative Grand Strategy in Afghanistan" (2009), the Taliban insurgency has grown domestic roots within Afghanistan's southern and eastern provinces and defeating it will require improvements in governance of Pakistan and Afghanistan. She feels Pakistan and India's rivalry is linked to security competition and the consistent disputes over Kashmir. The Pakistan military have raised various terrorist groups as a strategic reserve for low-intensity conflicts and for geo-strategic reasons as the relationship between the United States and India grows. She further states that engaging available U.S. reinforcements for a strategy of area ownership; implementation of psychological operations and propaganda; integrating the Afghan population into the information operations conducted by troops and civil authorities give the best opportunity of refuting Taliban misinformation.[22]

President Obama and the administration and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are committed on developing a counter-strategy propaganda campaign. The new

---

[21] Hayden, Michael V. "Transcript of Director's Remarks at the Atlantic Council". November 13, 2008. CIA library: Speeches and Testimony. Retrieved; 20, November 2009. https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/speeches-testimony-archive-2008/directors-remarks-at-the-atlantic-council.html

[22] Tellis, Ashley J. "Reconciling with the Taliban? Toward an Alternative Grand Strategy in Afghanistan". 2009. Washington D.C., WA; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Retrieve; 26, November 2009. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/reconciling_with_taliban.pdf

strategy will focus on reconstruction of Afghanistan, bilateral relations, counter-terrorism

strategy, economic improvements, and a U.S. long-term security commitment. However, this

will be difficult due to the deeply rooted anti-Pashtun feelings among the non-Pashtun ethnic

groups who were side-lined by the Pashtun in the different regions since the Pashtun tribal

confederation who has ruled since the creation of the modern state of Afghanistan.

These ethnic differences and the nature of Afghan politics that involve Islamic/Muslim

religious means are intertwined historically with the dynamics of past violent revolts and

conflicts that have gone on for hundreds of years. The on going war in Afghanistan and the

Pashtun exclusion of political power with the Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks are only continuing

the internal ethnic struggles. The Taliban through the support of al-Qa'ida is feeding the internal

conflicts by tactical and strategic means making it more difficult for the U.S. military and allied

coalition to battle against.

During 2009, in a statement made by President Barack Obama, part of the new strategy

of action for success will be "…to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qai'da in Pakistan and

Afghanistan and to prevent their return to either country in the future."[23]

In the fall of 2009, President Obama and the administration began establishing a new unit

in the State Department for propagating a propaganda battle to counter jihad militant propaganda

in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The primary mission plan will be against Taliban's propaganda

whose campaign has proved to work.[24] Because U.S. officials failed in the past in trying to speak

to the Muslim world and battle the propaganda of extremism it led to American policy and

[23] Baker, Aryn and Loi Kolay. "The U.S. in Afghanistan: The Longest War". April 08, 2009. Time.com. Retrieved; 25, November 2009. http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1890243,00.html
[24] Shanker, Thom. *U.S. Plans a Mission against Taliban's Propaganda*. August 15, 2009. Publisher: The New York Times. Retrieved; 19, November 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/16/world/asia/16policy.html?_r=2

American values being viewed as propaganda. A revised effort is being developed in support of American policy.

The information propaganda war effort will run concurrent with the insurgency. The Taliban has unrestricted access to the radio and use it as their main means of communication. Part of the U.S. strategy for success will be to combat the airways. The U.S. strategy is to give a team approximately $150 million a year. This will be spent on local FM radio stations, to counter illegal militant broadcasting, and on expanded cell phone service across Afghanistan and Pakistan. Local journalists will be trained to help produce audio and video programming, pamphlets, posters and CDs to assault the Taliban and their messages.[25]

A U.S. strategic priority is to empower the Afghanistan population with communication and insulate and separate the population from the insurgents by securing the airways, cell phone towers, and cell phone providers. This will enable the people to become less vulnerable to the extremist coercion and intimidation. It will enable them to be better informed about the positive efforts by the Afghanistan government and less susceptible to being steered away from the government. This will open channels for better communication between the Afghans and Pakistan governments and their populations for more effective communication.

The counter-propaganda and/or psychological warfare effort will also seek ways to denigrate the Taliban and al-Qa'ida by exhibiting the various religious violations they inflict through attacks, punishments, and deaths upon innocent civilians in public places and educational centers and will shift the paradigm of debate to the people and the militants.[26]

The United States has recognized both historical war propaganda failures and successes. The new strategy developed from different perspectives for the region of Afghanistan and

---

[25] Ibid.
[26] Shanker, Thom. "U.S. Plans a Mission Against Taliban's Propaganda" August 15, 2009. Washington: NYTimes.com. Retrieved; 27, November 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/16/world/asia/16policy.html

Pakistan and the battle against the Taliban and al-Qa'ida will give a significant moral boost to the troops and the people of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the neighboring regions. Though no one knows the outcome of the affects this new strategy will have the overall goal is viewed as attaining a successful outcome towards the subduing or stopping of the enemy insurgents and the stabilization of a new democratic Afghanistan, with a successful integrated society of the Afghan population.

Taliban and Al-Qa'ida

In 1998, Osama bin Ladin declared war on the United States. The focus of al-Qa'ida has been to dominate, weaken, and punish the U.S. and its allies. The Taliban militant movement is maintained through the Taliban propaganda campaign and al-Qa'ida works in conjunction with the Taliban through a joint communication effort. Both work to defend Islam, attain cultural domination, sustain their ideology as long-term, and to defeat those who are not in line with their ideals. Both remain fairly cohesive and focus on their strategic objectives. Both have been noted for their resiliency and a mutual vision of an extreme fundamentalist social and political order throughout the Muslim world while branching out globally. Both the Taliban and al-Qa'ida have safehaven in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area. Al-Qa'ida's style of warfare is asymmetric in nature.[27]

Al-Qa'ida supports other group's terrorist activities and encourages Muslims globally to take up the cause of violent jihad by spreading jihad propaganda through varied media, the internet, downloadable Taliban mobile phone ring-tones, and books. Both groups have been

---

[27] General Hayden, Michael V. (CIA). "The Current Situation in Iraq and Afghanistan". November 15, 2006: Updated: June 20, 2008. Statement - Senate Armed Services Committee. Retrieved; 27, November 2009. https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2006/DCIA_SASC_Testimony.html

waging an effective propaganda war and understand how information can influence the perception of the Afghan people and others. During 2006, the Taliban had banned television and the internet in Afghanistan. Since then they have been effectively waging a technological media propaganda campaign.

In June 2008, al-Qa'ida began stepping up its propaganda. Ayaman Zawahiri, Osama bin Ladin's top aide was working towards trying to restore the al-Qa'ida credibility in the Muslim world. In April he generated a Web forum open for internet comments while defending the terrorist group and denied the killing of innocent people. Zawahiri said "If any non-combatant was killed, it was "either an unintentional error or out of necessity."[28] By reaching out through the internet and discussing local concerns they continued their efforts for recruits and proclaimed self-defense.

In November 2009, the Taliban has stepped up their propaganda campaign. It is using misleading and deceptive propaganda methods by alleged military successes. They proclaim their messages as the "Voice of Jihad". They have been successfully using internet sites and producing magazines, DVDs of attacks and hundreds of different song cassettes, mournful chants to promote the Taliban heroes and martyrs.[29]

The ability to have access to radio is relatively easy for the extremists and also primitive. The tribal areas of Pakistan have only four legal FM radio stations. The militants have more than 150 illegal low-watt stations, and some of the radio stations are mobile, broadcasting from

---

[28] Williams, Daniel. "Al-Qaeda Steps Up Propaganda as U.S. Claims Progress on Terror". June 17, 2008. Bloomberg.com: Bloomberg Press. Retrieved; 27, November 2009. http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=amZ2Rwqeq9u0&refer=home
[29] "Taliban waging effective propaganda war". November 12, 2009. UPI-United Press International, Inc. Retrieved; 20, November 2009. http://www.upi.com/Top_News/International/2009/11/12/Taliban-waging-effective-propaganda-war/UPI-12401258034424/

vehicles or even donkey carts to avoid detection and extend their reach into the rural communities.[30]

The Taliban and al-Qa'ida's main objective is to attain anatomical demographic control of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other global regions of the world that are to be controlled by an Islamic theocratic authoritarian regime known as a global Islamic World Order. The ultimate ambition is for all to live within the Islamic moral framework under Sharia law and to be inaugurated as a just and righteous society under the eyes of Allah. They continue to perceive this can be achieved and have established a long-term commitment to attain this goal.

1. Countries Affected

a) Afghanistan

Afghanistan has faced three civil wars over the last three decades. It is facing taunting challenges as a war-torn state that is an ethnically fragmented society. After being under a tyrannical rule by a fundamentalist regime the United States, the United Nations, and other international organizations drove the regime from power and a new government was formed to base is ideals around democracy. The Pashtun Tribal Confederation (PTC) has ruled Afghanistan since its creation as the modern state of Afghanistan, but the biggest challenge to the present Afghan government and its' allies is overcoming distrust towards a central authority that is rooted deep in the tribal and clan-based society.

---

[30] Shanker, Thom. "U.S. Plans a Mission Against Taliban's Propaganda" August 15, 2009. Washington: NYTimes.com. Retrieved; 27, November 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/16/world/asia/16policy.html

In relation to 2001 and the current Afghanistan government, under the Presidency of Hamid Karzai, ethnic fragmentation and conflict continue to hinder the national identity. The central government authority and popular support is low, allowing for tribalism, and religious notions can challenge its authority and legitimacy. The government same issues are prevalent as occurred during the last regime.[31]

There is a sharp contrast between Afghanistan and Iraq; conditions of the terrain are more challenging, culture; the literacy rate is very low with a higher rate of illiteracy in the rural areas, and there is greater difficulty identifying the insurgents. Due to the condition of isolation of ethnic groups and due to weather conditions, it is difficult for the government and coalition forces to spread aid and information to counter the Taliban propaganda, an insurgent religious leader's rhetoric, intimidation, and control. The loyalty of the Afghan society in rural areas is very strong and is first and foremost. Tracking of the people exists only at the tribal level and tracking of migratory communities is non-existent.[32]

Since 2006 to 2009, the Taliban and al-Qa'ida has been increasing their propaganda campaign. A war of deception, lies, and misinformation is applied to the Afghan people through the Taliban's chief propagandist, "Ustad" (Master) Muhammad Yassir (AKAs: Qari Yousuf Ahmadi or Zabiullah Mujahid). The Taliban fighters also leave the *jihad bi'l-qalam*, "night letters" (militant notes that threaten violence if local residents cooperate with the government, America or its allies) in villages and to further spread their ideology. Analysts are connecting the increase in the Taliban propaganda campaign to outside assistance by al-Qa'ida. The Taliban are

---

[31] Rhinefield, Jeffrey D. "Implications of Societal Fragmentation for State Formation: Can Democracy Succeed in Afghanistan?". March 2006. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School. Thesis. Retrieved; November 29, 2009.http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA445561&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf

[32] Gray, Denis D. "Afghan War More Challenging Than Iraq". November 28, 2009. U.S.: Huffingtonpost News: Huffingtonpost.com. Retrieved; 29, November 2009. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/11/29/us-soldiers-afghan-war-mo_n_373012.html

deliberately creating sensational events to market to the media to embed a communication to shape public perception through psychological impact.[33]

b) Pakistan

As the war in Afghanistan presses on and the Taliban have increased their propaganda campaign, the war between the Taliban and Pakistan continues to accelerate. Since the assassination of Prime Minister-elect Benazir Bhutto in December 2007, many people predicted the Taliban war would expand. Years prior to the assassination the mullahs of the Salafists in partnership with al-Qa'ida wanted to seize Pakistan gradually and slowly penetrated into the intelligence agencies and bureaucracies. The jihadist Taliban forces entered the Swat Valley and crossed towards Islamabad. While the present government is developing a strategy to dismantle the Taliban enclaves in the Northwest provinces many are concerned the Taliban will try to take over the Pakistan secular government and nuclear country. Many Pakistanis are concerned over the U.S. negotiating with the Taliban; the possibility of it weakening the Pakistan counter-terrorism campaign against the Taliban; and the U.S. and NATO losing both Pakistan and Afghanistan to the Jihadists and al-Qa'ida.[34]

Under disguise of the India-Pakistan territorial dispute is the movement of separatists, religious zealots, terrorists; the neo-jihad combatants of the Bin Ladin connection and the challenges of fundamentalism pushing Islamic reformism and traditionalism. Pakistan and

---

[33] "Taliban winning ground in propaganda war in Afghanistan: report". November 12, 2009. Pakistan. The Nation: Nawaiwaqt Group. Retrieved; 27, November 2009. http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/International/12-Nov-2009/Taliban-winning-ground-in-propaganda-war-in-Afghanistan-report

[34] Phares, Walid. "The Taliban's War on Pakistan". October 27, 2009. World Press.org. Retrieved; 27, November 2009. http://www.worldpress.org/Mideast/3443.cfm#down

Afghanistan have both had to deal with the increase in militant extremist propaganda. Pakistan is already linked to al-Qa'ida and we can not exclude the drug cartels activities in these regions.

According to officials there are only four legal FM radio stations in Pakistan. The militants have more than 150 illegal low-watt stations and some are broadcast from vehicles and donkey carts. This enables them to avoid detection and go into rural and isolated areas to spread their ideology and gain, or maintain their control.[35]

During 2008, it was revealed the Pakistan Taliban continues to rebuild and conduct children's suicide camps who are being indoctrinated as young as seven years old to fight and to be suicide bombers in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The camp in South Waziristan was rebuilt after being destroyed by an offense in Spinkai during January 2008. It is located in a tribal area run by the Pakistan Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud. The South Waziristan camp is run by Qair Hussain in Spinkai Ragzai, and South Waziristan. However, it was estimated that there are over 157 Taliban and al-Qa'ida camps established in Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province and more than 400 support locations.[36] [37]

Since 2008, counter-insurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan had focused on eliminating the sanctuaries and insurgents through the joint Pakistan-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations and the Taliban were disrupted.

Though relations have been rocky between U.S. and Pakistan officials, Pakistani forces battled with al-Qa'ida activists and Taliban militants in South Waziristan during October 2009, to dismantle the Taliban controlled region that was a base for al-Qa'ida. The offensive against

---

[35] Shanker, Thom. "U.S. Plans a Mission Against Taliban's Propaganda" August 15, 2009. Washington: NYTimes.com. Retrieved; 27, November 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/16/world/asia/16policy.html

[36] Roggio, Bill "Taliban rebuild children's suicide camp in South Waziristan". June 2008. Long War Journal. Retrieved; 27, November 2009. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/10/taliban_rebuild_chil.php

[37] Riggio, Bill, "Cross-border strike targets one of the Taliban's 157 training camps in Pakistan's northwest". August 13, 2008. Long War Journal. Retrieved; 27. November 2009. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/08/crossborder_strike_t.php

the Pakistan Taliban was also an effort to ease relations and cooperation to help benefit the refugees in the area.[38]

c) India

India has long accused Pakistan of arming and funding militants on the Pakistan side of Kashmir. There has been much damage inflicted on the Jammu and Kashmir people and the influences from the infiltration by militant extremists and fundamentalist and from by the battles fought between the Pakistan forces and militants.

When China overran India in 1962, in the Sino-Indian War, taking Aksai Chin and overrunning Arunachal Pradesh, they did not stretch their own resources further and withdrew from Arunachal Pradesh back to the Line of Actual Control (LAC). China along with the United States and other nations want the conflict to cease and put forth both India and Pakistan efforts to fight against terrorism and terrorist activities. The bilateral relations are also complicated by the issues of Tibet (Xizang), Sikkim, and Kashmir.

Yossef Bodansky, a contributing editor for the Washington-based journal "Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy" and the director of the U.S. Congress-sponsored Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare "…has relentlessly warned of a China-orchestrated and conspiracy-infested trans-Asiatic "arc of crisis"…a coherent dynamic of grand strategic, if not historical significance." Further he added "…The on-land transportation system-stretching along the traditional Silk Road-is of crucial significance to the consolidation of the Trans-Asian Axis-

---

[38] Hussain, Zahid. "Pakistan Targets Mehsud Hometown". October 20, 2009. Wall Street Journal online: online.wsj.com. Retrieved; 20, November 2009. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125597274002294459.html

Beijing's key to global power posture an strategic safety…reduces the strategic use of the Indian Ocean…increasing the importance of the on-land lines of communications – the Silk Road…"[39]

A military ceasefire has been in place since 2003 between Pakistan and India. However, this does not reduce the fact that the Taliban and al-Qa'ida have branches in India and Kashmir who see India as an Allie of the West. India keeps a strong hold on Kashmir and due to Kashmir being rich in resources tensions continually flair up between India and Pakistan for many reasons. India, Pakistan, and China have territorial claims in Kashmir. China shares borders with parts of Kashmir controlled by Pakistan and India. Pakistan is highly territorial over this region.

Since the 2004 peace process between India and Pakistan, there has been a tremendous decrease in civilian casualties and cross-border conflict, as Pakistan battles against Islamist militants. After 2004, many jihadi groups ceased focusing their militancy exclusively on India or Kashmir and fragmented and morphed into multiple cells with ties to al-Qa'ida and other Pakistani Sunni sectarian groups whose outreach included Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Kashmir, Iraq, Europe, and beyond.

The attack in Mumbai in November 2008, led India to allege a Pakistani jihad group was behind it of which Pakistan officials have denied. India has maintained serious doubts about Pakistan's counter-terrorism efforts and has since conditioned any return to peace negotiations with Pakistan.[40] However, Pakistan does not want trouble with India. Yet, even through this seeming bilateral workability between India and Pakistan, there still exists the violence and propagandist influences of other terrorist groups and organizations that benefits the Taliban and al-Qa'ida for disrupting any type of peace process to advance their cause and beliefs.

---

[39] Wirsing, Robert G. *Kashmir in the Shadow of* War. 2003. NY: Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc. 124 - 125.
[40] Usher, Graham. "The Afghan triangle: Kashmir, India, Pakistan". 06, July 2009. The Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP): Relief Web. Retrieved; 30, November 2009.
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/MWAI-7TQ76S?OpenDocument

d) Kashmir

Since 1947, India and Pakistan have been in several wars and conflicts over Kashmir whose neighbors are India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and China. Kashmir is under the control of both India and Pakistan.

Pakistan separatist-Islamist jihadi groups collaborated and recruited fighters throughout Pakistan that have battled against Indian soldiers and civilians. Jihad fighters embedded themselves in the Swat Valley. Indian and Pakistani forces clashed with the Pakistan Taliban and gained control. Due to the sensitivity issue of the Taliban trying to attain control of nuclear power where jihadi cells joined together. It brought the two regions into negotiations to find a resolution to stabilize Kashmir. The pattern of jihad groups joining together repeated in the southern Punjab and Islamabad and joined up with al-Qa'ida and the Pakistan and Afghan Taliban in the tribal areas on the border with Afghanistan.

After 2004, many jihadi groups ceased focusing their militancy exclusively on India or Kashmir and fragmented and morphed into multiple cells with ties to al-Qa'ida and other Pakistani Sunni sectarian groups whose outreach included Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Kashmir, Iraq, Europe, and beyond.[41]

Since 2004, southern Punjab has had an increase of jihadi propaganda proselytizing for jihad and using seminaries and schools for recruiting centers and eulogizing "martyrs" in Kashmir and Afghanistan. The selection of location was from the traffic that moves in both directions between the Punjab and the tribal areas.[42]

---

[41] Ibid.
[42] Ibid.

Step 3: The Actors Perception of the Issue

United States

The United States perception of the issue is one of perplexity due to the acceleration of increased Taliban and al-Qa'ida propaganda and complicated by having to renew the war in Afghanistan. Much intelligence has indicated Osama bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida had established themselves and training camps within the Afghanistan region and across the Pakistan border.

Renewed vigor in a Jihad propaganda campaign, the rugged terrain of Afghanistan, ethnic divisions, and the illiteracy rate has only exacerbated the problems for the U.S., NATO, and coalition troops. Past insurgents gaining ground and being fought back in Afghanistan and Pakistan has expressed the determination of the Taliban and other militant extremists as al-Qa'ida supports and helps propagate the jihad propaganda campaign.

President Obama and the administration's recent increase in troops with the addition of a new war propaganda and psychological warfare campaign will allow the U.S. military to be able to communicate with those in the rural and tribal areas of Afghanistan. The objective of establishing a more open channel of communication between the Afghan government and the people will also contribute towards an opportunity for economic renewal if the Taliban and al-Qa'ida are abated.

However, the outcome from the agreement that was reached between Saif al Islam al Gadhafi, (son of Muammar al Gadhafi, leader of Libya), and the former leader of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), commander Noman Benotman, and the Libya LIFG shows a

strong sign of promise. The "new code" in the religious document entitled "Corrective Studies" is being circulated amongst Middle Eastern religious scholars, global politicians, and is being debated in the U.S. Several other prominent Middle East Jihadists have turned away from al-Qa'ida and the new code is showing promising signs of slowing down al-Qa'ida recruitment.

Presently, the perception of what affect the U.S. propaganda campaign will have or if it will be a success is determined by officials as still an unknown.

Taliban and Al-Qa'ida

In June 2008, al-Qa'ida began stepping up its propaganda. Ayaman Zawahiri, Osama bin Ladin's top aide was working towards trying to restore the al-Qa'ida credibility in the Muslim world. In April he generated a Web forum open for internet comments while defending the terrorist group and denied the killing of innocent people. Zawahiri said "If any non-combatant was killed, it was "either an unintentional error or out of necessity. By reaching out through the internet and discussing local concerns they continued their efforts for recruits and proclaimed self-defense.

In November 2009, the Taliban has stepped up their propaganda campaign. It is using misleading and deceptive propaganda methods by alleged military successes. They proclaim their messages as the "Voice of Jihad". They have been successfully using internet sites and producing magazines, DVDs of attacks and hundreds of different song cassettes, mournful chants to promote the Taliban heroes and martyrs.

The ability to have access to radio is relatively easy for the extremists and also primitive. The tribal areas of Pakistan have only four legal FM radio stations. The militants have more than

150 illegal low-watt stations, and some of the radio stations are mobile, broadcasting from vehicles or even donkey carts to avoid detection and extend their reach into the rural communities.

The Taliban and al-Qa'ida has not changed their perception of their views towards the West and their Allies. They continue to support their main objective and that is to attain anatomical demographic control of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other global regions of the world that are to be controlled by an Islamic theocratic authoritarian regime known as a global Islamic World Order. The ultimate ambition is for all to live within the Islamic moral framework under Sharia law and to be inaugurated as a just and righteous society under the eyes of Allah. They continue to perceive this can be achieved and have established a long-term commitment to attain this goal.

Step 4: Analysis: Courses of Action

<div align="center">

United States Course of Action

</div>

Three courses of action the United States could take are:

1. The U.S. propaganda campaign will succeed in abating the Taliban and al-Qaida jihad propaganda campaign.
2. The U.S. will increase troops and propaganda assistance to Afghanistan and succeed in abating the Taliban and al-Qaida jihad propaganda campaign.

3. The U.S. will decrease troops and propaganda assistance to Afghanistan and will not succeed in abating the Taliban and al-Qaida jihad propaganda campaign.

Taliban and Al-Qa'ida Course of Action

Three courses of action the Taliban and al-Qa'ida could take are:

1. The Taliban and al-Qa'ida could meet with leaders and stop the insurgency and the jihad Islamist propaganda
2. The Taliban and al-Qa'ida could work to stop other terrorist networks and their terrorist and criminal activities.
3. The Taliban and al-Qa'ida could negotiate for peace and surrender.

Step 5: Research Design

This study will employ using the Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP) methodology. It is a qualitative method of study that shows the sum of the possible interactions between the actors of the Taliban, al-Qa'ida, the United States, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and Kashmir. The method applies the probability of an alternative future in relation to other possible futures from available information that is based on the perceptions of the involved actors. It will demonstrate which predictive future scenario will be likely at a point in time apart from an established past fixed point in time, which can show how a decision that can lead to a future

outcome. However, analysts do not know how future events could change and outcomes can be re-voted.

During the process of the methodology a "pair-wise comparison" is conducted. It compares the combination of actions to other combinations and the outcomes. The outcome with the largest number of votes determines the most relative predictive possibility. The following twelve Steps of LAMP are as follows:

1. Determine the issue for which you are trying to predict the most likely future.

2. Specify the "national" actors involved.

3. Perform an in-depth study of how each national actor perceives the issue in question.

4. Specify all possible courses of action for each actor.

5. Determine the major scenarios within which you will compare the alternate futures.

6. Calculate the number of permutations of possible "alternate futures" for each scenario.

7. Conduct a "pair-wise comparison" of all alternate futures to determine their relative probability.

8. Rank the alternate futures for each scenario for highest relative probability to the lowest based on the number of "votes" received.

9. Analyze each alternate future in terms of its consequences for the issue in question.

10. State the potential of a given alternate future to "transpose" into another alternate future.

11. Determine "focal events" that must occur in our present in order to bring about a given alternate future.

12. Develop indicators for each focal event.

The disadvantages of the LAMP methodology, is in identifying too many possible outcomes. The effectiveness of LAMP is demonstrated through the understanding of each actor's perceptions. However, in the order ranking of the alternative futures, the future probability of occurring is not calculated. The advantages of the LAMP methodology, is it is useful for early warnings of events or situations that are about to occur through the identification of early action indicators.

Step 6: Calculate the Possible "Alternate Futures"

The number of possible alternative futures is formulated for each scenario by the LAMP equation of $X^y=Z$. The number of possible courses of action for each actor is X. The number of represented actors is Y. The number of alternative futures is represented as Z. In raising X to the power of Y it will be expressed as Z which will be conveyed as the number of alternative futures.

In this study there are two actors, but with different courses, therefore, X=2 and Y=2. To express the possible courses of action, the equation is $2^2=4$. Therefore, there are 4 possible alternative futures.

The first table illustrates the eight alternative future permutations. The Taliban and al-Qa'ida can either cooperate, (CO), Compete, (CM), or Withdrawal (WD).

TABLE 1

Actor	United States	Taliban and

		al-Qa'ida
Alt Future 1	**CO**	**CM**
Alt Future 2	**CM**	**CO**
Alt Future 3	**CM**	**WD**
Alt Future 4	**WD**	**CM**

Step 7: Pair-wise Comparison

A pair-wise comparison for tables 2, 3, and 4 will be applied using the above three scenarios. It will compare all of the possible alternative futures and it will be awarding a "vote" to the "most likely" and "least likely outcomes for each scenario.

TABLE 2

Scenario I: The U.S. propaganda campaign will succeed in countering the Taliban and al-Qaida jihad propaganda campaign.	**United States**	**Taliban and Al – Qa'ida**	**Votes**
Alt Future 1	**CO**	**CM**	**1**
Alt Future 2	**CM**	**CO**	**1**
Alt Future 3	**CM**	**WD**	**2**
Alt Future 4	**WD**	**CM**	**2**

TABLE 3

Scenario II: The U.S. will increase troops and propaganda assistance to Afghanistan and succeed in abating the Taliban and al-Qaida jihad propaganda	**United States**	**Taliban and Al – Qa'ida**	**Votes**

campaign.			
Alt Future 1	**CO**	**CM**	**2**
Alt Future 2	**CM**	**CO**	**2**
Alt Future 3	**CM**	**WD**	**3**
Alt Future 4	**WD**	**CM**	**3**

TABLE 4

Scenario III: The Taliban and al-Qa'ida will be abated by the increase in troops and U.S. propaganda campaign and will negotiate for peace.	**United States**	**Taliban and Al – Qa'ida**	**Votes**
Alt Future 1	**CO**	**CM**	**3**
Alt Future 2	**CM**	**CO**	**3**
Alt Future 3	**CM**	**WD**	**2**
Alt Future 4	**WD**	**CM**	**2**

Step 8: Rank the Order of Alternate Futures

Tables 5, 6 and 7 lists from the "most likely" to the "least likely" courses of action for the United

States, the Taliban and al-Qa'ida will take to each of the three scenario courses of action.

TABLE 5

Scenario I: The U.S. propaganda campaign will succeed in countering the Taliban and al-Qaida jihad propaganda campaign.	**United States**	**Taliban and Al – Qa'ida**	**Votes**

Alt Future 1	CO	CM	3
Alt Future 2	CM	CO	1
Alt Future 3	CM	WD	2
Alt Future 4	WD	CM	2

TABLE 6

Scenario II: The U.S. will increase troops and propaganda assistance to Afghanistan and succeed in abating the Taliban and al-Qaida jihad propaganda campaign.	United States	Taliban and Al – Qa'ida	Votes
Alt Future 1	CO	CM	2
Alt Future 2	CM	CO	3
Alt Future 3	CM	WD	1
Alt Future 4	WD	CM	2

TABLE 7

Scenario III: The Taliban and al-Qa'ida will be abated by the increase in troops and U.S. propaganda campaign and will negotiate for peace.	United States	Taliban and Al – Qa'ida	Votes
Alt Future 1	CO	CM	3
Alt Future 2	CM	CO	2
Alt Future 3	CM	WD	2
Alt Future 4	WD	CM	1

Step 9: Analyze the Consequences of the Alternative Futures

In scenario I, the U.S. propaganda campaign will succeed in countering the Taliban and al-Qaida jihad propaganda campaign. The U.S. will use counter war propaganda measures and the people will begin to listen. The Taliban and al-Qa'ida will least likely move to other areas nor negotiation, or cooperation.

In scenario II, the U.S. will increase troops and propaganda assistance to Afghanistan and succeed in abating the Taliban and al-Qaida jihad propaganda campaign. The U.S. will use force to gain areas and the extremists will reluctantly withdraw.

In scenario III, the Taliban and al-Qa'ida will be abated by the increase in troops and U.S. propaganda campaign and will negotiate for peace. In this scenario the possibility of this happening will be least likely. The extremists will resist and continue fighting.

Step 10: Assess the Potential for Transposition

The possibility for an alternative future to transpose into another alternative future still remains. The morals and values will continue to be weighed more due to the new developments of change within the Jihad ranks of the LIFG and other extremists. The new code will have an impact, yet the results may be slow in coming. Much debate and discussions will be conducted amongst Middle East scholars and religious leaders as well as politicians.

There also could be a sudden, laying down of arms if a major impact affected the jihad extremists and there was a withdrawal of a fatwa of violence. This could present room for peace negotiation and a calming of Islamic fundamentalists. The future of these issues is still unknown.

Steps 11 and 12: Determine Focal Events and Indicators

In scenario I, the U.S. propaganda campaign will succeed in countering the Taliban and al-Qaida jihad propaganda campaign.

The focal events are determined by the present activities in Afghanistan and along the Afghanistan and Pakistan border. The sudden shift in cooperation by the Pakistan forces fighting and pushing back the Taliban and al-Qa'ida are a sign of cooperation and of gaining some control.

The indicators point to the method by which new U.S. strategic and tactical operations will be conducted and the utilization of a war propaganda and psychological warfare campaign. With the opportunities to spread the news of government and community opened communication through cell phones and the securing of cell phone providers a positive outcome could come.

In scenario II, the U.S. will increase troops and propaganda assistance to Afghanistan and succeed in abating the Taliban and al-Qa'ida jihad propaganda campaign. A determined focal event of increased troops and an enhance U.S. propaganda campaign that denigrates the enemy and presents a better image of the West. Indicators of open source information show that a increased troops will be advantageous for a harder push against the Taliban and al-Qa'ida and for providing better security for the people. Decreased isolation due to improved and open communication between the government and the people in the rural and tribal areas could draw improved cooperation from the people and the Afghanistan government.

In scenario III, the Taliban and al-Qa'ida will be abated by the increase in troops and U.S. propaganda campaign and will negotiate for peace. Focal events of an increase in Taliban jihad propaganda and the continuous force applied by the Taliban and al-Qa'ida show no signs at

present of the extremists cooperating and seeking a negotiation for peace. As events change, so could indicators, but for the present this is still an unknown.

Conclusion

As President Obama, the administration, and the U.S. military unveil their new strategy for the Afghanistan War it is apparent that bold new moves will be made. Yet, as these events unfold in the future still there remains a "clash of civilizations" due to double standards as seen in the differences between the present international system, international laws, and in the way cultures use a double standard that claim what works for them at a given moment in time, however long that time may be. The continuous conflicts and wars have affected and influenced governments, legal systems, ethnics, religious differences, and cultures. It has had an impact on economies and environments.

Propaganda is present in our daily lives and whether it is by media, written word, or word of mouth it can either cause great harm and upheaval, or produce peace by influencing individuals to listen and sit down and negotiation.

Propaganda can also produce "selective denial" and this has produced a cause for failed states and the collapse of a civilization. How we listen and perceptive propaganda is also relevant towards our perspectives of what freedom and democracy is and should be. There is no justification for violence and propagating conflict and war is an immoral and evil act.

The Taliban, al-Qa'ida, and other extremist groups and individuals propagate their Islamic pursuit of an Islam World Order, but the Islamic culture is not one of individuation[43], which is also causing conflict within the Islamic belief system.

Reflecting if the root of violent Islamic Fundamentalism lies in double standards of international law is arguable. Due to anthropological and historical studies of man in their ethical and religious beliefs, and in the legal systems developed within neighboring regions and tribes; it could be assessed as historical double standards in law have always occurred due to bias, discrimination, corruption, and especially during war. Depending on the root of the cause that triggers retaliation using violence can also be attributed to those policymakers who disregard the vital issue(s) surrounding the main core of a problem.

Simple matters of such that are ignored or denied can cause such conflict incorporated with violence, a branching out of extremism and fundamentalism with additional altered interpretations can occur. As such, the Taliban and al-Qa'ida should be brought up for war crimes and crimes against humanity.

---

[43] Tibi, Bassam, "The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder"; Updated Edition. 2002. Published by University of California Press. 91.

Works Cited

Reference:
Lockwood, Jonathan S. and Kathleen O'Brien Lockwood. "The Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction".1993. Joint Military Intelligence College; American Military University reprint.

Footnotes:
1. Seaquist, Larry. "Community War." *Proceedings of The U.S. Naval Institute*. August 2000. Retrieved; November 25, 2009. http://www.larryseaquist.com/essay-community-war.html

2. Declassified Key Judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate; *Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States*. April 2006. The Director of National Intelligence (DNI), press release. Retrieved; 19, November 2009. http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/Declassified_NIE_Key_Judgments.pdf

3. Lia, Brynjar. "Doctrines for Jihadi Terrorist Training". 2008. Kjeller, Norway, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI); Routledge Taylor & Francis Group. Retrieved; 27, November 2009. 520. http://www.ps.au.dk/fileadmin/site_files/filer_statskundskab/subsites/cir/pdf-filer/p1.pdf

4. Ibid. 520-521

5. Gambetta, Diego and Steffen Hertog. "Engineers of Jihad". 2007. Sociology Working Papers: Paper Number 2007-10. UK: Department of Sociology; University of Oxford. 6. Retrieved; 27, November 2009. http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/users/gambetta/Engineers%20of%20Jihad.pdf

6. Ibid. 6

7. Atran, Scott. "Global Network Terrorism: I. Sacred Values and Radicalization; II; Comparative Anatomy and Evolution. April 28, 2006. White House, Washington DC; NSC briefing: National Science Foundation and AFOSR-MURI. Retrieved; 30, November 2009. http://sitemaker.umich.edu/satran/files/atrannsc-042806.pdf

8. Rank, Hugh. Persuasion Analysis. 2008. War Propaganda. Retrieved; 28, November 2009. http://faculty.govst.edu/pa/Political/Cause%20Groups/war_propaganda.htm

9. King, Timothy R. *Finding Weakness in Jihadist Propaganda*. 2007. A Monograph by U.S. Army, School of Advanced Military Studies. June 2007. Fort Leavenworth, KS: United States Army Command and General Staff College. 7. Retrieved; 27, November 2009. http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA471796&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf

10. Clausewitz, Carl Von: Translated by James J. Graham. *On War: Volume I-III*. Third German Edition. 1873. London; N. Trubner & Co. Vol. I-Chapter 1. 1.

11. Cunningham, Stanley. *The Idea of Propaganda: a Reconstruction.* 2002. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers. 129 – 130.

12. Ibid. 203

13. Ibid. 107

14. Ibid. 145

15. Chomsky, Noam. *Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic Societies*. 1989. Toronto, ON; House of Anansi Press, Inc. 149-150.

16. Naji, Abu Bakr: Translated by William McCants. *Management of Savagery*. 23 May 2006. U.S.: John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University. 124. Retrieved; 27, November 2009. http://ctc.usma.edu/publications/pdf/Management_of_Savagery.pdf

17. Robertson, Nic and Paul Cruickshank. "New jihad code threatens al-Qa'ida". November 10, 2009.CNN News. Retrieved; 29, November 2009. http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/11/09/libya.jihadi.code/

18. Joint Publication 3-0 Joint Operations. *Joint Command and Control Doctrine Study*. 01, February 1999. Ft. Monroe, Virginia: Joint Warfare Center. Retrieved; 25, November 2009. www.dtic.mil/doctrine, IV – 8, or http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/research/c2study.pdf#search=%22IV%209-10%22

19. "Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting Al-Qa'ida's Organizational Vulnerabilities". West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center. Retrieved; 20, November 2009. http://ctc.usma.edu/aq/aq.asp

20. William S. Lind, COL Keith Nightengale, USA, CAPT John F. Schmitt, USMC and LTC Gary I. Wilson. "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation." USA: Marine Corps Gazette. October 1989. 22-26. cited from the report "Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting Al-Qa'ida's Organizational Vulnerabilities". West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center. Retrieved; 20, November 2009. http://ctc.usma.edu/aq/aq.asp

21. Hayden, Michael V. "Transcript of Director's Remarks at the Atlantic Council". November 13, 2008. CIA library: Speeches and Testimony. Retrieved; 20, November 2009. https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/speeches-testimony-archive-2008/directors-remarks-at-the-atlantic-council.html

22. Tellis, Ashley J. "Reconciling with the Taliban? Toward an Alternative Grand Strategy in Afghanistan". 2009. Washington D.C., WA; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Retrieve; 26, November 2009. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/reconciling_with_taliban.pdf

23. Baker, Aryn and Loi Kolay. "The U.S. in Afghanistan: The Longest War". April 08, 2009. Time.com. Retrieved; 25, November 2009.
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1890243,00.html

24. Shanker, Thom. "U.S. Plans a Mission against Taliban's Propaganda". August 15, 2009. Publisher: The New York Times. Retrieved; 19, November 2009.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/16/world/asia/16policy.html?_r=2

25. Ibid.

26. Shanker, Thom. "U.S. Plans a Mission Against Taliban's Propaganda" August 15, 2009. Washington: NYTimes.com. Retrieved; 27, November 2009.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/16/world/asia/16policy.html

27. General Hayden, Michael V. (CIA). "The Current Situation in Iraq and Afghanistan". November 15, 2006: Updated: June 20, 2008. Statement - Senate Armed Services Committee. Retrieved; 27, November 2009.
https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2006/DCIA_SASC_Testimony.html

28. Williams, Daniel. "Al-Qaeda Steps Up Propaganda as U.S. Claims Progress on Terror". June 17, 2008. Bloomberg.com: Bloomberg Press. Retrieved; 27, November 2009.
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=amZ2Rwqeq9u0&refer=home

29. "Taliban waging effective propaganda war". November 12, 2009. UPI-United Press International, Inc. Retrieved; 20, November 2009.
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/International/2009/11/12/Taliban-waging-effective-propaganda-war/UPI-12401258034424/

30. Shanker, Thom. "U.S. Plans a Mission Against Taliban's Propaganda" August 15, 2009. Washington: NYTimes.com. Retrieved; 27, November 2009.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/16/world/asia/16policy.html

31. Rhinefield, Jeffrey D. "Implications of Societal Fragmentation for State Formation: Can Democracy Succeed in Afghanistan?". March 2006. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School. Thesis. Retrieved; November 29, 2009.http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA445561&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf

32. Gray, Denis D. "Afghan War More Challenging Than Iraq". November 28, 2009. U.S.: Huffingtonpost News: Huffingtonpost.com. Retrieved; 29, November 2009.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/11/29/us-soldiers-afghan-war-mo_n_373012.html

33. "Taliban winning ground in propaganda war in Afghanistan: report". November 12, 2009. Pakistan. The Nation: Nawaiwaqt Group. Retrieved; 27, November 2009.
http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/International/12-Nov-2009/Taliban-winning-ground-in-propaganda-war-in-Afghanistan-report

34. Phares, Walid. "The Taliban's War on Pakistan". October 27, 2009. World Press.org. Retrieved; 27, November 2009. http://www.worldpress.org/Mideast/3443.cfm#down

35. Shanker, Thom. "U.S. Plans a Mission Against Taliban's Propaganda" August 15, 2009. Washington: NYTimes.com. Retrieved; 27, November 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/16/world/asia/16policy.html

36. Roggio, Bill "Taliban rebuild children's suicide camp in South Waziristan". June 2008. Long War Journal. Retrieved; 27, November 2009. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/10/taliban_rebuild_chil.php

37. Riggio, Bill, "Cross-border strike targets one of the Taliban's 157 training camps in Pakistan's northwest". August 13, 2008. Long War Journal. Retrieved; 27. November 2009. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/08/crossborder_strike_t.php

38. Hussain, Zahid. "Pakistan Targets Mehsud Hometown". October 20, 2009. Wall Street Journal online: online.wsj.com. Retrieved; 20, November 2009. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125597274002294459.html

39. Wirsing, Robert G. *Kashmir in the Shadow of* War. 2003. NY: Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc. 124 - 125.

40. Usher, Graham. "The Afghan triangle: Kashmir, India, Pakistan". 06, July 2009. The Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP): Relief Web. Retrieved; 30, November 2009. http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/MWAI-7TQ76S?OpenDocument

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. Tibi, Bassam, "The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder"; Updated Edition 2002. Published by University of California Press. 91.