

Michael Rienzi

LAMP Analysis:

A Study on the Possible Reactions of Saudi Arabia and Turkey to an Israeli Attack on Iran

INTL 504

April 21, 2010

Table of Contents

Section	Pgs
Introduction.....	1-2
The Lockwood Analytic Method for Prediction (LAMP).....	3-29
Conclusion.....	30-32
Bibliography.....	33-34

Introduction

The debate and rhetoric has been heating up over the past few months regarding the Iranian nuclear program and rightfully so. We are approaching a crossroads where the situation will either turn for the better or for the worse. The better would entail the Iranian regime either deciding to accept a deal offered by the international community, or is forced to do so because of sanctions. The worse being Iran continues to defy the international community and gets to within a few months of obtaining nuclear weapons. It would be at that point in time where the chances of military confrontation will greatly increase.

There has been much reporting and debate about what the US options are and the possible repercussions in taken military action to destroy or set back the Iranian nuclear program. There has also been much debate about whether Israel would attack Iran or even if they were capable of doing so. For some time now we have heard numerous countries throughout the middle-east expressing their fears of Iran obtaining nuclear weapons, what that would mean to the balance of power in the region and to the increased threat level that it would cause. Lately, we have seen countries like Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain receive US anti-missile batteries to help protect their oil installations and other infrastructure. Countries like the UAE have also purchased fighter planes to build up their airpower and coastal patrol boats to defend their waterways. What all the countries throughout the middle-east have in common with the exception of maybe Syria is their adamant opposition to Iran obtaining nuclear weapons.

At this point in time, all countries involved at the UN and in the middle-east would like to see this issue resolved diplomatically through dialogue, thus the long lasting debate that has been taken place inside and outside of the UN on how best to get Iran to abandon any attempt to

2.

developing nuclear weapons. With time running out on dialogue though, there are numerous countries throughout the middle-east who might be inclined to support military action to take out Iran's nuclear program. While not guaranteed, countries like Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait, UAE and others might support military action taken by the United States on Iran if all other options were already exhausted. Just as important, these governments might be able to reasonable justify to their people why they are supporting the US in these actions.

What I would consider up to great debate is how would these countries react if it were Israel and not the US who initiated the attack on Iran? The disapproval if not out-right hatred of Israel by many countries in the middle-east is well documented. Would these countries be able to justify supporting Israel because it would be in their best interest to see the Iranian nuclear program at the very least delayed by a few years?

Through the use of the LAMP method, we will develop two scenarios and the various future possibilities to the following question: How would Turkey and Saudi Arabia react to an attack initiated by Israel on Iran? I will go into more detail as to why I chose those two countries later on in the study. I would like to point out that I could have chosen any country in the middle-east because all of them have a stake in the Iranian nuclear issue and they would all be involved directly or indirectly if military action were to commence. I chose only two countries to try and keep the study and scenarios from becoming too complicated and where possible outcomes end up raising more questions than providing answers because there were too many actors or variables involved. In concluding this study, I will analysis why this study is important to the United States and what the possible implications are.

The Lockwood Analytic Method for Prediction (LAMP)

As noted above, I will be using LAMP to predict possible futures for two scenarios involving an Israeli attack on Iran due to its perceived nuclear weapons programs. The LAMP consists of 12 steps with the first step (Determine the Predictive Issue) having already been completed in the introduction. *“How would Turkey and Saudi Arabia react to an attack initiated by Israel on Iran?”*

Step 2: Specify the Actors Bearing on the Problem

Like I mentioned earlier I could have included many more actors, but in wanting to prevent the study from getting too complicated, I have limited my actors to two, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. With that said, I believe these two actors Turkey, and Saudi Arabia are the larger of the regional powers in the middle-east and naturally it would be wise to study their possible courses of action or reaction as opposed to the actions of smaller states. Before we move onto step 3, I would like to mention other actors which I consider secondary for this study, Israel and Iran. While this study revolves around war between these 2 countries, it is not their actions or possible futures that are up for debate. For the two scenarios that I will mention later on in step 5, the actions of Israel and Iran are predetermined. This is necessary to be able to study the possible reactions from the 2 main actors, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. To put it another way, the dependent variables are the actions of Israel and Iran in that if Israel does not attack Iran, this study would be pointless. The independent variables are Saudi Arabia and Turkey and their possible reactions to an Israeli attack on Iran.

Step 3: Conduct in-depth study of perceptions and intentions of each actor.

4.

I will now provide you with a detailed background on the 2 main actors, Saudi Arabia and Turkey and their relationships with Israel and Iran.

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia officially known as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a major player in the middle-east and has been for some time now. They are a main ally of the US in the region, even housing our troops during the Persian Gulf War in 1991 and for the years that followed. They are a member of OPEC and the worlds leading exporter of petroleum. This fact alone says all one needs to know about why Saudi Arabia is a major player in the region, if not the world and why countries such as the US find it in their interest to partner with them. But while its Saudi Arabia's oil that makes it a major player with many western countries, its Saudi Arabia's city of Mecca which is considered the holiest of locations in the Islamic religion that makes it a major player with other Muslim countries.

One of Saudi Arabia's major competitors for regional power and thus considered a possible threat, is Iran. Saudi Arabia being predominantly Sunni and Iran being mostly Shiite is a main cause of the two countries animosity towards each other. Saudi Arabia sees Iran as a country run by a radical ayatollah Ali Khamenei and president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad who are trying to spread their influence and ideology throughout the region at the expense of Saudi Arabia and others. Through a minority population of Shia located in Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia feels Iran has the potential of stirring up chaos and strife in the Kingdom and try to undermine the rulers of Saudi Arabia. Up until now, Saudi Arabia has been able to keep a tight grasp on any potential unrest of their people. Saudi Arabia being the number one exporter of oil in the world

5.

as stated earlier and the perception of other countries throughout the middle-east of Saudi Arabia being a mediator for regional issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian crisis and others has given them clout throughout the region, if not the world.

The status of their regional power becomes severely diminished if Iran were to obtain nuclear weapons. "Saudi Arabia is extremely concerned over the possibility of Iran's nuclear proliferation" (Bronson, 2006). Iran in possession of such weapons would be in a position to bully its neighbors and allow them to spread their ideologies without much fear of reprisals. They already see what is happening in the region with Iran's gaining influence over the past few years "When the Saudis look at the region, they see the Iranians gaining momentum in Afghanistan, gaining momentum in Iraq, having continued influence in Lebanon, and potentially gaining momentum in Gaza and Palestine." (Bronson, 2006) This outlook and compounding it with Iran's quest to obtain nuclear weapons instills fear in the Royal family. The urgency of the matter has even led Saudi Arabia's foreign minister Prince Saud al Faisal bin Abdul Aziz to recently question the effects that possible new sanctions would have on Iran's nuclear program, urging the international community to find quicker and more immediate solutions. However, he did not make any recommendations on how to accomplish this.

Saudi Arabia does not have formal ties with Israel. They are a big supporter of the Palestinians and their right to have their own state encompassing the Gaza Strip, West Bank, and a decent portion of the land the Israelis occupy now. They continuously complain to the UN that Israel is always breaking international law through their expansion of settlements and their offensives in Gaza, but never are held responsible for their actions. However, unlike Iran who

6.

supports the Palestinians, particularly Hamas by providing them with weapons and urging them to take up arms against the Zionist, Saudi Arabia has tried to make peace by being a mediator. In 2002 “Saudi Arabia floated an Arab peace plan that calls for a complete Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and East Jerusalem and a fair solution to the crisis of Palestinian refugees in exchange for normalized ties with the Arab world.” (Karam, 2010). While this deal was never accepted by either side, it was an effort by Saudi Arabia to engage the Israelis in hopes of creating peace in the region.

How a common enemy can make for strange bedfellows. It is not inconceivable to think that Saudi Arabia and Israel might align themselves with each other in the face of the greatest threat that is perceived by these two countries, Iran. While any alliance or partnership with Israel is currently being denied by Saudi Arabia who insist they would not support Israel attacking Iran over its nuclear weapons program, there has been reports and intelligence supporting this to actually be the case.

- “Times online has reported that secret talks between Israel and Saudi Arabia over the possible use of Saudi airspace by Israeli warplanes has taken place. It has been reported that the head of Mossad, Chief Meir Dagan has assured Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that Saudi Arabia would turn a blind eye to Israeli jets flying over the kingdom during any future raid on Iran’s nuclear sites.” (Whatley, 2010).
- “The Saudis have tacitly agreed to the Israel air force flying through their airspace on a mission which is supposed to be in the common interest of both Israel and Saudi Arabia” (Zuroff, 2010).

7.

- Former US Ambassador to the UN told several Arab leaders in the Gulf that it was logical that Saudi Arabia would privately agree to Israeli use of their airspace, they wouldn't say it publicly and they might even go so far to condemn it at the UN afterwards. (Zuroff, 2010)
- According to the Daily Express, the director of England M16 discussed a mutual defense against Iran in London with Israel Mossad Director Meir Dagan and security officials from Saudi Arabia. This meeting took place after the discovery of the plant near Qom. (Leyden, 2009)

While these statements suggest that Saudi Arabia will partner with Israel by granting them airspace, it is necessary to keep one fact in mind; the vast majority of Saudi Arabia's population despises Israelis. In a matter of fact, polls in Saudi Arabia have shown that a good amount of the population support Iran obtaining nuclear weapons because it would diminish the power of the US and Israel in the region. The mere notion of Saudi Arabia supporting Israel directly or indirectly could cause a possible revolt in the Kingdom. I would argue the one thing that the Royal family fears just as much as an Iranian nation armed with nuclear weapons is a large scale revolt within its own borders.

On the other hand, Saudi Arabia whether they like it or not might be willing to support an Israeli attack on Iran if there were a high probability of eliminating or at least delaying by many years Iran's nuclear program. I would think that they understand the retaliation they could potentially face from Iran if this were the case, but I imagine this is why they have

8.

recently invested in anti-missile batteries and they would feel somewhat comfortable under the umbrella of US protection. This of course, is what I would gather if they were to indeed allow Israeli to attack.

Turkey

Prior to the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, Israel and Iran were allies. Israel wanted to align themselves with a non-Arab country in the middle-east to counterbalance their enemies in the region. Up until 1979, they found themselves a friend in Iran with the Shah in power. Once the Shah was kicked out during the revolution and its anti-Israeli leaders took charge, Israel needed to find themselves another non-Arab country to align themselves with. This is lead to the creation of a strategic relationship between Israel and Turkey. Their relationship grew through the 80's and 90's. This relationship was primarily a military one with each countries militaries training with each other, sharing technology, intelligence and most importantly, sharing common threats. This was the glue that kept these countries together as allies. Their fear of Iran, Syria, terrorists, and Iraq (during the Saddam Hussein era) was what made such a partnership between the countries vital. Turkey was only one of the three Muslim countries in the region that recognized Israel, with Jordan and Egypt being the other two.

Starting in 2003 and 2004 this all started to change when the relations between the two countries started to chill. There were external and internal factors that caused this. The external factors were the changing of balance between the countries in the Middle East. When Saddam Hussein was removed from power by the US in 2003, it eliminated a major

threat on Turkey's southern border. The Kurdish population was still of concern to Turkey as is still the case today, but with Hussein out of the picture, the threat of an unfriendly government known to initiate wars with its neighbors no longer existed. Turkey has also increased their relationship with Syria over the past few years decreasing another perceived threat for them in the region. Another external factor that affected the relationship between the two countries and what many consider the turning point was the military operations by Israel in Gaza in January 2009 and the continuing blockade of supplies into Gaza. Turkey responded by loudly condemning the Israeli actions in Gaza which Israel did not take too kindly to. The person in Turkey who was the loudest critic of Israel was Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan. "In January 2009 Erdogan stormed out of a debate with Israeli President Shimon Peres at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland – waving his finger at Peres and accusing him of murdering children on the beaches of Gaza." (Synovitz, 2009). He also went on to say "when it comes to killing people, you Israeli's sure know how to kill people." Following this incident, there were other incidents that led to the deteriorating relationship between the two countries. Turkey points to increasing signs of unilateralism in Israel's foreign policy decision and when the new nationalist oriented Israeli govt. came into power during the summer of 2009, they told Turkey they did not want them mediating the talks between Israeli and Syria, which made Turkey feel like they were being pushed aside by Israel. As we moved into the fall of 2009, you had even more friction between the two countries when Turkey announced Israel's exclusion from their hosting of NATO exercises which also included the US, Italy, and other countries. One other public incident that caused friction between the two countries occurred recently when Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister

Danny Ayalon embarrassed Turkish ambassador Ahmet Oguz Celikkol in front of the Israeli media by making him sit in a chair that was lower than his and Ayalon making sure to point it out to the media. This led to the Turkish govt. demanding an apology and Israel refusing to do so.

While there have been many external incidents that have led to a cool relationship between the two countries, there also has been internal factors inside Turkey that makes one believe that Turkey is turning away from Israel for more friendlier relations with the other nations in the region. As I stated earlier, a major factor in Israel relations with Turkey was the relationships between the countries militaries. Over the past few years, Turkey's military which had a large say in the politics of Turkey and the direction of their government has seen their power diminish to the govt. which pronounces itself as a government with deep Islamic roots.

Turkey has made it a point to increase their relationship with Iran recently. Trade between the two countries has increased by 10 billion over the past few years. Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan has even made it a point to talk negatively about any possible Israeli attack on Iran. He has said "if Israel crossed over into Turkey's airspace in order to bomb Iran then their answer to Israel shall be like that of an earthquake." (www.politicaltheatrics.com , 2009). He has also stated "that a pre-emptive strike on Iran's nuclear facilities would lead to disaster in the entire region and would have unforeseeable consequences. (ynetnews.com, 2009). These statements and actions by Turkey have led

Israeli Prime Minister to state “Turkey is consistently gravitating eastward to Syria and Iran rather than westward. This is trend that certainly has to worry Israel.” (Ravid, 2009).

It has been said that Turkey is turning more towards their former foes in the region because they have not yet been accepted to the EU and if they were to be accepted, we would see Turkey do an about face. Regarding Iran’s nuclear program, while Turkey has publicly opposed any attack against Iran, they also publicly opposed Iran’s obtaining nuclear weapons. On March 10, 2009 Turkey’s president Abdullah Gul stated that Turkey would oppose any Iranian efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. They have even offered to assist Iran in transferring the nuclear fuel to other countries to be reprocessed which up until now Iran has refused. While Turkey has been working on their relationship with Iran, they have also done so with Iran’s neighbor Iraq in an effort to try and offset Iran’s power in the region. They also still have pending deals with the Israelis on military equipment, particularly modernizing Turkey’s tanks. If this sale were to go through, this would most definitely go a long way in improving the relationship between the two countries.

“Most analysts predict even though the relationship between Turkey and Israel has cooled off lately, their relationship will survive, though in a reduced form.” (Champion, Mitnick, 2010). This is the case primarily for two reasons, Turkey does not want to harm their relationship with the US because of their souring Israeli relations, and because Turkey does not want to see Iran obtain nuclear weapons because as everyone else predicts, that would be a game changer in the region which would severely diminish Turkey’s power.

Step 4: Specify courses of action for each actor.

For this analysis I created the three most realistic courses of action by the two actors (Turkey and Saudi Arabia). In other words each actor will choose one of the following courses of action if Israel were to attack Iran:

- *(SIP) Support Israel Publicly* – that is too support Israel via allowing the use of airspace, sharing intelligence etc. or at the very least not interfering with Israeli operations through actions or words, and to publicly admit to their population that they are in fact assisting Israel through the means mentioned above
- *(SIQ) Support Israel Quietly/Condemn Publicly* – that is too support Israel via use of their airspace, intelligence, etc. or at the very least not interfere with Israeli operations. However, they condemn Israeli actions publicly to their populace and possibly go as far as condemn Israel's actions at the UN.
- *(DS) Does Not support an Israeli attack on Iran in anyway.*

Step 5. Determine the major scenarios.

For this study, we will create our possible futures off of two scenarios. The scenarios involve the actions of our secondary actors that I mentioned in step 2. If you recall these are the actors that I considered to be the dependent variables and without their predetermined actions, this study would be meaningless.

13.

Scenario 1. Israel launches attacks on Iran to destroy or delay their nuclear weapons program. Iran retaliates by hitting Israeli targets only.

Scenario 2. Israel launches attacks on Iran to destroy or delay their nuclear weapons program. Iran retaliates by targeting Israeli targets as well as US and allied bases located throughout the middle-east, oil installations in other countries throughout the region, and by cutting off the Persian Gulf to oil exports.

Step 6. Calculate the number of alternate futures.

Using the formula $X^y = Z$ where $X=3$ for courses of action $y= 2$ for number of actors and $Z=$ the number of alternative futures. We come up with a number of 9 Alternative futures for each scenario.

Step 7. Do pair wise comparison of each actor.

Scenario 1. Israel launches attacks on Iran to destroy or delay their nuclear weapons program. Iran retaliates by hitting Israeli targets only. In this scenario, Israel launches an attack on Iran via the air and hitting targets containing their nuclear sites. Iran retaliates by launching missiles at the state of Israel and via terrorist attacks through it proxy groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah. They do not launch any attacks against US bases or warships, they do not attempt to cause any major disruption in the Persian Gulf, nor do they attempt to commit any chaos in the neighboring countries. In this scenario, because Israel is the aggressor Iran will feel that most of the world will be on their side. This would make retaliation against neighboring countries not necessary on Iran's part.

14.

ACTOR	Saudi Arabia	Turkey
ALT FUTURE 1	SIP	SIP
ALT FUTURE 2	SIP	SIQ
ALT FUTURE 3	SIP	DS
ALT FUTURE4	SIQ	SIP
ALT FUTURE 5	SIQ	SIQ
ALT FUTURES 6	SIQ	DS
ALT FUTURES 7	DS	SIP
ALT FUTURES 8	DS	SIQ
ALT FUTURES 9	DS	DS

Step 8. Rank order the alternate futures.

ACTOR	Saudi Arabia	Turkey	Votes	Rank
ALT FUTURE 1	SIP	SIP	0	Last
ALT FUTURE 2	SIP	SIQ	2	*T6
ALT FUTURE 3	SIP	DS	3	*T5

ALT FUTURE4	SIQ	SIP	3	*T5
ALT FUTURE 5	SIQ	SIQ	5	4
ALT FUTURES 6	SIQ	DS	7	2
ALT FUTURES 7	DS	SIP	2	*T6
ALT FUTURES 8	DS	SIQ	6	3
ALT FUTURES 9	DS	DS	8	1

- **T – Stands for Tied.**

Step 9 & Step 10. Analyze consequences of alternate futures and possibilities of transposition.

Based on scenario 1 of Israel attacking Iran and Iran responding by hitting targets solely in Israel, the ALT future that got the most votes was ALT. Future 9 where Saudi Arabia and Turkey do not support Israel publicly or quietly. In this situation it would be almost impossible for either country to gain their citizens backing in supporting Israel. As stated earlier, the people of Saudi Arabia despise Israel and while Turkey recognizes Israel, the relations have soured recently. Beyond this is the fact that Iran did not strike back at any other targets in the middle-east with the exception of Israel leaving these other countries unscathed. Turkey and Saudi Arabia would not want to antagonize Iran by backing Israel and raise the possibility of Iran retaliating against either country. While Turkey and Saudi Arabia do not want to see Iran develop nuclear weapons, they would rather see them stopped through sanctions. If military force was the only way of preventing them from developing these weapons, then I believe they

would rather see it conducted by the US, which wouldn't make it a sure bet they could get the support of their people, but at least it would be in the realm of possibility. In this scenario, the two actors would go the UN and try to get them to condemn Israeli actions and pass a resolution that would halt the fighting. I don't believe the 2 actors would launch any attacks themselves on Israel as they would see going to war not being in their best interest. However, if they were to shoot down an Israeli warplane passing through their airspace, the possibilities of they being sucked into the war, increases.

ALT Future 6 received the second most votes. In this future, Saudi Arabia supports Israel quietly while Turkey still does not support Israel. It should be noted that Future 9 could transpose into Future 6 if during the conflict Saudi Arabia suspects Israel actions to be succeeding and it was in fact true that Iran was very close to having a nuclear weapon. In future 6, Turkey still does not support Israel for the same reasons mentioned in future 9. Saudi Arabia on the other hand, decided it's in their best interest to support Israel via use of airspace, sharing Intel. etc. because they feel Iran's weapons program is too much of a threat and needs to be stopped at all cost. In this future, one could imagine that Saudi Arabia see's that sanctions have failed; the US had no desire to attack Iran so Israel was Saudi Arabia's best hope. At the same time, the support is not made publicly because they feel that the populace would not tolerate their support of Israel and could possibly cause unrest in the Kingdom. Saudi Arabia might even go as far too publicly condemn Israel so to better mask their actual support.

ALT future eight received the 3rd most votes. In this scenario, Saudi Arabia does not support Israeli actions, but Turkey does support it quietly. Saudi Arabia would not support Israel

for the same reasons mentioned in future nine. Turkey on the other hand would support them quietly. This would be due to the fact that while Turkey was going out of their way to become more friendlier with Iran while creating a tense relationship with Israel over the past few years; they felt Iran should not get nuclear weapons at any cost because this would be a direct threat to their country. It is also possibly that their moving away from Israel and closer to Iran was nothing more than a front and that they were privately supporting Israel the whole time. A reason for this would be that it would provide them with good cover once Israel commenced military action. Like with Saudi Arabia in ALT. future 6, Turkey would most likely publicly condemn Israel while quietly supporting them.

ALT future five received the 4th most votes. In this future, both Turkey and Saudi Arabia support Israel quietly via Intel., use of airspace etc. Like in future 6, future 9 could transpose into future 5 if both Turkey and Saudi Arabia saw Israeli actions to be successful. In future 5, Saudi Arabia and Turkey could have collaborated in their support of Israel or they could have chosen to do so independently of each other. Nevertheless, they both found it in their best interest to allow Israel to rid Iran of any nuclear program while at the same time keeping their support unknown to their citizens. This strategy could possibly achieve their desired result on halting Iran's nuclear program while at the same time preventing retaliatory attacks from Iran for supporting Israel. Again, both countries would mostly likely condemn Israel publicly.

ALT. Future four was tied for 5th place. In this future, Saudi Arabia supports Israeli actions quietly while Turkey supports Israeli actions publicly. The reasons for Saudi Arabia supporting Israeli actions quietly have been already mentioned numerous times in previous

futures. The difference here would Turkey deciding to support Israel actions publicly. For this to happen, Turkey must have very accurate Intel. showing Iran to be very close to getting nuclear weapons. Turkey decides at this point that they need to put aside any animosity that has been built up with Israel over the past few years and support their actions because it's in their best interest to do so for national security purposes. Turkey would feel that any negative response from the Turkish people to supporting Israel is offset by their national security concerns. At the same time Turkey would make it a point to try and explain to their people this is in Turkey's best interest. They would also lean on the US for defensive support expecting Iranian retaliatory strikes.

ALT. future three was tied with ALT. future 4 in votes. In this future, Saudi Arabia publicly supports Israel while Turkey does not support Israeli actions. If you recall, Turkey not supporting Israeli actions was actually part of future 9 which received the most votes. The big difference here is that in future three Saudi Arabia supports Israel publicly. There is almost no circumstance where one would believe that this could happen under scenario 1. As mentioned below, Saudi Arabia would risk a public outcry in their Kingdom and also face the possibility of Iran using the Shiite community in Saudi Arabia to cause chaos for the Royal Family. In this future, Saudi Arabia would almost definitely be forced to stop support of Israel which could derail Israeli operations and fail to stop Iran's nuclear program.

ALT futures two and seven are tied for 6th place. In these futures, you have either Saudi Arabia or Turkey publicly supporting Israel, which as I stated earlier seem highly unlikely under scenario 1.

ALT future one received no votes; this is where both Turkey and Saudi Arabia both support Israel publicly at the same time. At this point, you should have a good understanding of the relationships between the countries and the scenario taken place. If you do, you would understand why future one received no votes.

Step 7. Do pair wise comparison of each actor. (Repeated for scenario 2)

In scenario 2, Israel launches attacks on Iran to destroy or delay their nuclear weapons program. Iran retaliates by targeting Israeli targets as well as US and allied bases located throughout the middle-east, oil installations in countries throughout the region, and by cutting off the Persian Gulf to oil exports. In this scenario, the US becomes engaged militarily. The threat of a large regional war breaking out is highly likely. Terrorist attacks via Iranian proxy groups are also likely throughout the region. There would be action at the UN with countries such as China and Russia trying to halt the fighting, however, most of the other countries would try to put pressure on Iran to voluntarily give up their nuke program in response for Israel and the US ceasing their attacks.

ACTOR	Saudi Arabia	Turkey
ALT FUTURE 1	SIP	SIP
ALT FUTURE 2	SIP	SIQ
ALT FUTURE 3	SIP	DS
ALT FUTURE4	SIQ	SIP
ALT FUTURE 5	SIQ	SIQ
ALT FUTURES 6	SIQ	DS
ALT FUTURES 7	DS	SIP
ALT FUTURES 8	DS	SIQ
ALT FUTURES 9	DS	DS

Step 8. Rank order the alternate futures. (Repeated for Scenario 2)

ACTOR	Saudi Arabia	Turkey	Votes	Rank
ALT FUTURE 1	SIP	SIP	6	T2
ALT FUTURE 2	SIP	SIQ	6	T2

ALT FUTURE 3	SIP	DS	3	T3 rd
ALT FUTURE4	SIQ	SIP	8	1 st
ALT FUTURE 5	SIQ	SIQ	6	T2
ALT FUTURES 6	SIQ	DS	3	T3 rd
ALT FUTURES 7	DS	SIP	2	T4 th
ALT FUTURES 8	DS	SIQ	2	T4 th
ALT FUTURES 9	DS	DS	0	5 th

- T – Stands for Tied.

Step 9 & Step 10. Analyze consequences of alternate futures and possibilities of transposition. (Repeated for Scenario 2)

Under scenario 2, ALT. Future four received the most votes. Under this future Saudi Arabia supports Israel quietly while Turkey supports Israel publicly. Saudi Arabia has granted airspace to Israel and provides them with Intel. etc. They feel this is necessary to rid Iran of its nuclear program. However, it is possible, that Saudi Arabia did not initially offer there support to Israel, but change only after Iran retaliated by hitting targets throughout the middle-east and closing off the Gulf to oil exports which would directly affect Saudi Arabia. Even though Iran’s actions can be perceived as direct attack on Saudi Arabia, especially if Iran hit Saudi Arabia tankers or oil installations, Saudi Arabia still feels that any public support for Israel could lead to an uprising in the Kingdom, especially by the Shiite community which has ties to Iran. Turkey supports Israel publicly via use of airspace, Intel. etc. because of Iranian actions and the US

being sucked into the war. They hold their relations with the US and NATO above any relations with Iran. Further, they feel Iran's quest for nuclear weapons is a direct threat against their country and they fear that with Iran unleashing their proxy groups to commit terrorist acts in the region, they might also support the Kurds in Northwest Iran to do the same in Turkey.

ALT future one was tied with 2 other futures in votes. Under this future, Saudi Arabia and Turkey both support Israel publicly. Like in ALT. Future eight, both countries might not have not supported Israel initially, but changed afterwards when Iran responded the way they did. The reasons for Turkey support publicly was mentioned in ALT. Future four, Saudi Arabia, on the other hand would decide to support publicly if they felt their citizens now perceived Iran as a direct threat, such as they did during the first Persian Gulf War with Iraq. While, Saudi Arabia was openly supporting Israel, they would also make it a point to show that they were supporting them through their relationship with the US since it was the US who was providing protection to Saudi Arabia. In this future, Iran would expand their attacks on Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Both of these countries would only involve their military in defensive measures, depending on the US for the offensive aspect of the operation.

ALT future 2 was tied with ALT future one. In this future, Saudi Arabia supports Israel publicly, while Turkey supports them quietly. As mentioned above, Saudi Arabia would do so if they felt that their people now see Iran's attacks as a direct threat to their country. Even though Turkey was also feeling Iran's retribution, they would still support Israel quietly because they are working diplomatic channels to stop the war as opposed to having it spread, also not wanting to stir up domestic anger, as well as hoping not to antagonize Iran to the point where they start

supporting the Kurds in Northern Iran and Iraq. Lastly, because of the embarrassment they might feel in going out of their way in distancing themselves away from Israel over the past few years only to turn to back to Israel when things turned for the worse in the region. However, in this future, one can see the possibility of the military in Turkey reversing the recent past and start to regain the loss of power they once had. At this point, I believe Turkey would then have no issues with openly supporting Israel which would make future 2 transpose into future 1.

The 3rd future that was tied in second place was ALT. Future Five. In this future, both Saudi Arabia and Turkey both support Israel quietly. Even though Iran is showing to be a direct threat to both of these countries from their actions, the govts of Turkey and Saudi Arabia feel like they would cause more harm than good by publicly supporting Israel. They feel it could be the catalysis of large uprisings in their countries. They would most likely condemn Israel at the UN while at the same time condemn Iran for their attacks on their respective interests. Future five could transpose into future one if Iran was issuing such enormous damage on these countries that they had no choice but to throw their support behind Israel. This type of situation has the greatest possibility of turning into a larger regional war where multiple countries have resorted to military confrontation.

ALT. Future three came next in votes and was tied with one other future. In future three, Saudi Arabia supports Israel publicly while Turkey does not support Israel at all. Reasons for Saudi Arabia's public support were mentioned above. This is the first time under scenario 2. that we see Turkey not supporting Israel. This would be possible if Turkey felt that Iran's response

wasn't targeting them directly. They decided that Iran becoming a nuclear power was not as great a threat compared to a large regional war breaking out which they would be trying to prevent. They might also feel that Israeli actions had no chance of succeeding so they want to align themselves with Iran understanding they would soon be in possession of nuclear weapons. They would condemn Israel at the UN, and threaten to shoot down Israeli planes. They would do this with the understanding that their alliance with the US and even NATO for that matter would most likely be terminated.

ALT future six was tied with ALT future three. This scenario is very similar to future three with the only difference being that Saudi Arabia supports Israel quietly. The purposes of this were mentioned in future four which received the most votes. Future six could transpose into future three if Saudi Arabia decided to support Israel publicly during the conflict.

ALT. Future seven, eight, and nine, have the least amount of votes with future nine receiving zero votes. Future nine calls for both Turkey and Saudi Arabia not to support Israel at all. Under scenario 2, this would be nearly impossible since both countries were having their interests under attack from Iran, the US involvement in the war, and lastly the perceived threat both countries have of Iran obtaining nuclear weapons.

Step 11. Develop focal events for alternative futures.

In this step we will study the possible event or events that could lead to the occurrence of a particular future. Since some of the futures have very little chance of occurring, we will only look at the possible focal events for the futures with a fair to good chance of occurring.

Under scenario 1, ALT. Future nine received the most votes. In this future, neither Saudi Arabia nor Turkey supported Israel. One could make a reasonable assumption that when it's reported that Iran has gotten very close to developing a nuclear bomb, the world would start to focus on what actions a country like Israel might take. This would lead to headlines in the paper throughout the world and private and public debates. A focal event that might develop from this and would be a prelude to ALT future nine would be public protests on the streets in Turkey and Saudi Arabia towards any perceived strike by Israel. Another event would be a large increase in government officials of either country publicly threatening Israel not to attack Iran. One other possible event could be Iran reaching out to Saudi Arabia and Turkey and making serious concessions towards peace and security (short of giving up their nuclear weapons) to try and buy their friendship. One could make the argument that this is already happening with regards to Iranian/Turkish relations.

ALT. Future six with the second most votes is where Saudi Arabia supports Israel quietly and Turkey does not support Israel. Focal events regarding Turkey would be same as ALT. Future nine. A focal event regarding Saudi Arabia would be the granting permission of airspace before hand, or the sharing of intelligence. Another possible event would be any direct secret talks between high officials in Israel and Saudi Arabia. According to sources mentioned in step 2, these secret talks have already occurred.

ALT. Future eight where Saudi Arabia does not support Israel and Turkey supports them quietly received the third most votes. Refer to ALT. Future nine focal events for Saudi Arabia, as for Turkey supporting Israel quietly; a focal event could be an improvement in relations between

the 2 countries and a return to close relations. Other events could be Turkey finding out that Iran is threatening to harm Turkish interests in the region through their support of the Kurds.

For ALT. Future five where Saudi Arabia and Turkey both support Israel quietly, I have already mentioned possible focal events. One focal event to add in this case would be joint high level meetings between all three countries, possibly mediated by the US or Egypt.

ALT future three and four were tied in votes. The outcomes in these futures differ from any future we already spoke about because at least one of the actors in future three and four support Israel publicly. In ALT future three, Saudi Arabia is supporting Israel publicly. A focal event of this possibility could be Saudi Arabia publicly speaking against Iran's nuclear ambitions and stating that they would consider any action that would rid Iran of their program as a favorable one. Another one would be Saudi Arabia taking part in defensive exercises with the US with some form of participation from Israeli officials. If Iran were to publicly threaten Saudi Arabia or if Iran were to launch attacks on Saudi Arabian interests soon after Israel launched its attack. One other event could be that of Iran publicly admitting to being very close to developing their first nuclear weapon. ALT. Future four has Turkey supporting Israel publicly. Focal events of this would be Iran threatening Turkey or actually attacking Turkey soon after an Israeli attack on Iran. Iran admitting they are very close to developing their first nuclear weapon, and or Iran supporting Kurds in Northern Iran or Northern Iraq.

In regards to scenario 2, all the futures that were compared were the same as in scenario 1. This being the case, there is no need to go over all the possible focal events since they were already covered above.

Step 12. Develop Indicators for each focal event.

In this last step, we will look at possible indicators that might inform us that a possible focal event could be occurring in the near future. You will notice that some of these indicators were mentioned as focal events above and that is because in certain situations it is impossible to differentiate the two in that an action taken by an actor could be seen either as an indicator or the actual focal event itself. For example, protests in the streets of Turkey or Saudi Arabia against any perceived attack by Israel on Iran could be interpreted as the focal event that led either country to not support Israel, or could be interpreted as an indicator of the lack of support Israel will get from these 2 countries if they were to attack. Another example would be any secret talks that were held directly by Israel and Saudi Arabia. This could be seen as a focal event that is necessary to take place before any support is offered to Israel from the Saudi's. This again could be seen as an indicator as well of Israel and Saudi Arabia potentially collaborating with each other towards and future action taken by Israel against Iran.

Below is a list of focal events mentioned above and their possible indicators.

Focal Event: Turkey and or Saudi Arabia threatening Israel not to attack.

Indicators: Turkish and Saudi Arabian govts. stirring up anti-Israeli rhetoric in their countries and at the UN. Making comments such as any attack on Iran is not in the best interest of the region and could not be supported.

Focal Event: Iran makes deals with Saudi Arabia and Turkey to gain their trust.

Indicators: Iran reaches out to Turkey and Saudi Arabia via public and private channels to create treaties of protection for each other, and economic partnerships. Iran guarantees not to support the Shiites in Saudi Arabia or Kurds and Shiites in Turkey. Although highly unlikely, Iran might be willing to share their nuclear technology with these countries in return for them not supporting Israel or the US for that matter.

Focal Event: Saudi Arabia granting permission of airspace to Israel

Indicators: Secret level talks between the 2 nations, especially at the military level. Saudi Arabia continuing to purchase defensive systems from the US and hardening potential targets. Iran attacking targets in Saudi Arabia or preventing their exports could also be an indicator that Saudi Arabia might offer Israel permission for their airspace if they had not done so at the start.

Focal Event: Improvement of Relations between Israel and Turkey.

Indicators: The military once again gaining power in Turkey and having more of a say on external affairs, and or the resumption of Israeli/Turkish military exercises.

Focal Event: Turkey feels threatened by Iran.

Indicator: Turkey starts to accuse Iran of developing nuclear weapons and turns to the world community to stop them via sanctions or force.

Focal Event: Saudi Arabia feels threatened by Iran.

Indicator: Saudi Arabia accuses Iran of developing nuclear weapons and turns to the world community to stop them via sanctions or force.

Focal Event: Iran attacks Saudi Arabian or Turkish interests as a response to an Israeli strike.

Indicator: Iran threatens to do so before hand. Iran cuts any diplomatic ties with either or both of the countries leading up to an Israeli attack or soon after.

Focal Event: Iran admitting to be very close to having a nuclear bomb.

Indicator: Iran announces to their people they have a huge announcement to make regarding their nuclear program, might even imply that the balance of power in the region will now change, or becomes extremely aggressive in their actions against the US, Israel, and their neighbors.

Conclusion

We used the LAMP analysis to try and understand what the possible actions of Turkey and Saudi Arabia would be if Israel were to attack Iran. It's important to mention once again the reason I chose these two countries from the others in the region is due to their status as regional powers in the Middle-East. Why is this study important to the US intelligence community and policymakers? We already know what the possible ramifications would be if Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons. There isn't much of a debate as to whether this represents a threat to the US or not. We will leave the discussion of what options the US should take in dealing with Iran i.e. sanctions, military action, for another study. What I want to touch upon in this conclusion is what the US should do in regards to Turkey and Saudi Arabia's possible reactions. The three main reasons the US should care about the actions of Saudi Arabia and Turkey are; if war were to break out, we would want to try and prevent it from spreading into a larger regional conflict, the US wouldn't want to be put into the uncomfortable position of having to choose which ally to support at the expense of the other, and finally, we would want to assure ourselves that any disruption of oil exported by Iran would be offset by Saudi Arabia increasing production to stabilize world markets as much as possible.

We can assume based on history that we would come to the aid of Israel if they went to war with Iran. We could further assume that if Iran were to retaliate by hitting targets outside of Israel such as US bases or ships, we would commence military action as a response. Based on the results in this paper, it would be in the US best interest to convince Turkey and Saudi Arabia to at the very least prevent a larger regional war from breaking out if Israel were to attack Iran. In

other words, if they are not going to support Israel, the US would hope that they would at least not take part in any actions that might expand the conflict like shoot down an Israeli plane for example. We should use our friendship with Turkey as well with Israel and try to mediate an improvement in relations between the two countries. We should stress the importance of both countries working with each other towards the stability of the Middle-East and guaranteeing security for one another. Increasing economic ties including the sale of military hardware between the two countries would also go a long way in improving relations. This accomplishes two things: first, it opens the door to Turkey possibly supporting sanctions at the UN before any military action were to take place and second, it just might goad Turkey into supporting Israel if not publicly, then quietly if they were to commence military action. I judge this based on the fact that even though we have seen an improvement in relations between Turkey and Iran recently, Turkey see's Iran obtaining nuclear weapons as a serious threat against their national security.

The US should also try to expand on the assumed secret level meetings that have taken place between Saudi Arabia and Israel. If this is false and these meetings have not occurred, then the US should still try to arrange them. Knowing that Saudi Arabia would decline any public support for Israel, we should convince them it would be in their best interest not to take any action that would expand the conflict if Israel were to attack.

The US has already started to provide hardware and security guarantees to Saudi Arabia if attacked by Iran and I believe would do the same regarding Turkey. These countries are already on the US side in not wanting to see Iran develop nuclear weapons, although, both

countries might not be so overt about it for internal reasons. The US needs to play this to their advantage, but not do so in a way that would force either country to not support the US goals or take actions that would expand the conflict in the case of an Israeli attack on Iran. As we have seen in the Middle-East for many years now, every action taken in one country has equal reactions in the neighboring countries. This needs to be taken into account when the US develops its strategy.

References

- Champion, Mark; Mitnick, Joshua. Israel, Turkey Seek to Repair Ties. Wall Street Journal (Online). Jan 18, 2010. www.proquest.umi.com Accessed on 3/21/10
- Erkmen, Serhat. Turkish-Israeli Strategic Cooperation From 1990's until Today. Uluslararası İlişkiler. Vol. 2, Issue 7. Fall, 2005. <http://ciaonet.org> Accessed on 3/21/10
- Greenway, HDS. As Turkey gets friendlier with Syria and Iraq, relations with Israel take a back seat. Global Post. October 21, 2009. www.globalpost.com Accessed on 3/21/10
- Gwertzman, Bernard (Interviewer), Bronson, Rachel Former Adjunct Senior Fellow for Middle East Studies (Interviewee). Bronson: Saudis 'Deeply Concerned' Over Iran's Nuclear Program. Council of Foreign Relations. April 3, 2006. <http://www.cfr.org> Accessed on 3/15/2010
- Karam, Souhail. Israel acts like the world's "spoilt child": Saudi Arabia. Reuters News Agency. Jan 2, 2010. <http://www.reuters.com> Accessed on 3/18/10
- Khaitous, Tariq. International Reactions: What if Israel Attacks Iran? James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. May 22, 2008. <http://cns.miis.edu> Accessed on 3/15/10
- Leyden, Joel. Israel, Saudi Arabia, US, UK Join Forces as Iran Fires Nuclear Capable Missiles. Israel News Agency. Sep. 28, 2009. <http://www.israelnewsagency.com> Accessed on 3/15/10
- Philips, James. An Israeli Preventive Attack on Iran's Nuclear Sites: Implications for the US. The Heritage Foundation. January 15, 2010. <http://www.heritage.org>. Accessed on 3/15/10
- Profile of Saudi Arabia. US Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. January, 2009. <http://www.state.gov>. Accessed on 3/18/10
- Ravid, Barak. Netanyahu: Turkey drift toward Iran is worrying. Haaretz News. November, 2009. www.haaretz.com Accessed on 3/18/10
- Safir, Al. Turkey To Israel: Cross Our Airspace to Bomb Iran & We Will Respond Like an Earthquake. Arab Times. December 8, 2009. www.politicaltheatrics.com Accessed on 3/18/10
- Synovitz, Ron. Turkey-Israel Row Could Signal Geopolitical Change in Region. Payvand Iran News. October 16, 2009. <http://payvand.com>
- Sariibrahimoglu, Lale. Venturing out: Turkey Country Briefing. Janes Defense Weekly. April 21, 2009. <http://search.janes.com> Accessed on 3/21/10.
- Whatley, Stuart. Saudi Arabia, Israel Talks for Shared Airspace Against Iran Denied by Saudis. Huffington Post. Aug. 6, 2009. <http://huffingtonpost.com> Accessed on 3/15/10

Ynet News. Erdogan Warns against Israeli Strike in Iran. Dec. 2009. <http://www.ynet.news.com>
Accessed on 3/18/10

Zuroff, Avraham. Saudis Would Allow Israel to Attack Iran. Israel News Agency. Aug, 2009.
<http://www.israelnewsagency.com> Accessed on 3/15/10