

The Future of Central Asia's Stability: A Predictive Study of Pakistan's Responses to American, Tribal and Indian Actions

Nicholas Ratermann

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*"I against my Brothers; my Brothers and I against my Cousins; my Family against the Tribe; my
Tribe against the Stranger"*
-Egyptian Proverb about Asabiyyah (social cohesion) attributed to Ibn Kahldun's Muqqadimah

I. Introduction

Since the attacks of 9/11, Pakistan has been recognized as a major lynchpin in America's Global War on Terror. However, until recently, the Pakistani government was seemingly uncooperative in assisting with US-led strategies in the region. Although the US provided significant financial assistance to the Pakistani government – by most estimates over 15 billion US dollars – they continually failed to act in accordance with the US' strategic efforts on the Pakistani side of the border. At one point, against the wishes of the US, the Pakistani government initiated a non-aggression pact with the Pakistani Taliban to ensure they did not carry out attacks inside Pakistan's borders. Furthermore, there were significant media flaps following US strikes against the Taliban and affiliated al Qaida targets located in the Pakistani border regions. Because of these, and many other less publicized actions, the US and Pakistan seemed to be at polar odds regarding strategic goals in the region. This changed, not solely due to increased US pressures or diplomacy, but because of the backlash against the Taliban by the

majority moderate Islamic clerics and Sufi Islamists, who themselves had been victimized by harsh Taliban Shariah Law (Shah, 2009).

Looking into the recent history of the Pakistani Government's relationship with the Taliban and Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) leaders, we can begin to understand the significant dynamics which led to the current issues we are facing. The FATA consists of 12 administratively autonomous regions of western Pakistan. Together with the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) which lies to the north and the province of Balochistan (or Baluchistan) to the south, these three administrative divisions (two provinces and one territory) form the greater part of Pakistan's border with Afghanistan (Leventis, 2007). Within Pakistan, these three areas have been the center of gravity for the US led war on terror. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and subsequent US withdrawal from Pakistan, the Pakistani government was left with a void in its security status. It viewed India as its major security threat and took measures to counter India's growing military and political pressures in the Kashmir regions. After sixty years of conflict with Pakistan, India still views them as their greatest adversary, and bases much of their national strategy to counter the perceived threat from Pakistan. These historical responses were, in part, the foundation for Pakistan's acceptance of fundamentalism in its NWFP. To counter India's military domination, Pakistan grew non-conventional forces in the form of terrorist groups to fight a pseudo-proxy war in both Kashmir and India's Muslim providences. These measures included supporting the Taliban's rise to power in Afghanistan and encouragement of militant Muslim groups in the FATA and NWFP to counter India's military domination. After the attacks on 9/11 and subsequent US led removal of the Taliban and al Qaida forces in Afghanistan, however, Pakistan began to fear US intentions to utilize India as a powerbase for Operation Enduring Freedom. Pakistan, in an effort to counter

India's influence in the region, agreed to cease support for the Taliban and joined the US in the War on Terror (Hodes, 2007).

Following multiple complaints by the US government about Pakistan's lack of relevant actions supporting the War on Terror, the Pakistani government led a short offensive against al Qaida, the Taliban and their supporters in 2006. This quickly led to the Pakistani tribal leaders call for a ceasefire in South Waziristan in April 2006. The original ceasefire began in June 2006 when, under significant military pressure from Pakistan, the Pakistani Taliban in North Waziristan also agreed to certain terms. They agreed not to shelter foreign militants and would cease cross-border attacks into Afghanistan. In return, Pakistan agreed to withdraw its troops from North Waziristan, would stop targeting local militias, and released many insurgents with links to the Taliban. Although attacks continued, the "Waziristan Accords" were formalized in September 2006 with Taliban leader, Mullah Omar's, approval. US intelligence reporting showed after the Waziristan Accords, cross-border attacks increased from 40 attacks in two months prior to the agreements to 140 in the following two months. Even though there was significant intelligence obtained indicating the Taliban had all but ignored two of the three stipulations – cross border attacks and housing foreign fighters – Pakistan declined to pursue military actions against them. Not until 11 Arab fighters were killed by US missiles within Pakistan's borders in January 2007 did Pakistan begin to concede the Accord had been counterproductive to reigning in the militant activities in Waziristan (Behuria, 2007).

Following Pakistan's perception of the Taliban's breaking aspects of the non-aggression pact, Islamabad significantly changed their activities against the Taliban. Unfortunately, the activities taken by Pakistan following the collapse of the Waziristan Accord was not in favor of the US or Coalition Forces in Afghanistan. Instead, in a surprising move, the Pakistani military

sided with the pro-Taliban clerics in an effort to rid the region of foreign fighters from Uzbekistan and other Central Asian countries. Under renewed criticism, then Pakistani President Musharraf threatened to pull out of the Coalition against terror. Musharraf recognized the limitations of his Frontier Corps in NWFP and FATA, primarily due to the reluctance of the majority Pashtun Frontier Corps officers to fight other Pashtun tribesmen. Musharraf limited military activities to US-led attacks against foreign fighters and members of the al Qaida network, careful to distinguish between al Qaida and domestic Taliban members in press conferences (Behuria, 2007). Pakistan's actions, or lack thereof, against the Taliban continued to be under significant scrutiny by the coalition and world opinion.

In May 2009, Pakistan finally shifted focus and began down a course supporting its internal security and, coincidentally, simultaneously supporting US strategic goals in the region (AP, 2009). While this recent development is still too new to accurately assess its effectiveness, we can utilize the actors' behaviors to begin to predict future responses and outcomes in effectively combating terrorism and security stability in the region. This leads to two questions which will be explored in detail for this research:

- 1.) General Research Question: Will Pakistan's recent counterterrorism offensive assist in stabilizing the region?
- 2.) Specific Research Question: What are the potential actions from external forces that will affect the Pakistani government's offensive against the Taliban in the FATA and NWFP?

II. Literature Review

There were few substantive predictive literature studies found which covered Pakistan's relatively recent increase in counterterrorism efforts. There was, however, a multitude of peer reviewed, albeit superficially, predictive studies and papers found which both criticized and

praised different policies carried out by the Pakistani government over the past eight years. Most of these papers attempted to “predict” what the authors believed would occur in the region based on Pakistan’s actions utilizing historical examples from the British and Russian occupations and attempting to provide insight into the dynamic nature of Pakistan’s tribal regions. Only a few referenced in this literature review provided qualitative or scientific foundations for their assessments, however. Most appeared to utilize a scenario-based analysis to determine what “would have/could have” happened had Pakistan acted differently. While these reviews do not provide a foundation to build on any solid predictive analysis, they are important to show the lack of scientific analysis used during assessments of the “predictive” nature of the available studies.

In his article, “Reconsidering American Strategy in South Asia: Destroying Terrorist Sanctuaries in Pakistan’s Tribal Areas”, Vikram Jagadish argues that Pakistan’s strategy has failed to achieve its desired results because of local tribal norms, weak nature of previous [peace/cease-fire] agreements between the Taliban and Pakistani military, Pakistan’s ill-equipped military units and ideological fissures in the Pakistani establishment. Jagadish also recommends how the US and Coalition Forces (CF) should pursue their strategy while remaining cognizant of the tribal norms, training Pakistani forces, promoting development in the tribal areas and eliminating the terrorist sanctuaries through covert means (Jagadish, 2009).

Jagadish’s study accurately describes Pakistan’s rift with US and CF objectives, when Pakistan has often exhibited significantly differing and self-serving options. This has been well documented in numerous other opinion pieces and journalistic papers, however Jagadish shows how Pakistan had initially argued internally about supporting the US led attacks against the Taliban. The Pakistani government did this for several reasons; first to ensure their own survival

and prosperity by retaining a peace accord with the Taliban government. This was not only to keep the Taliban from migrating into and attacking their interests, but also to provide key trade routes into Central Asia. Pakistan also used their ties with the Taliban to train their own fighters for use against India in Kashmir and retain a reserve force of additional Jihadist fighters for an anticipated future all-out war with India. The Taliban-Pakistan ties were so close in fact, Pakistan almost declined to cooperate with the US in order to protect their strategic interests in the Taliban government. Only through intensive negotiations and guarantees of end-game results favorable to Pakistan, were the decision makers in Pakistan agree to side against their former allies (Jagadish, 2009).

Jagadish also provides many recommendations on how to ensure cooperation with moderate leaning Afghani and Pakistani tribesmen. Most of these required little to no analytical process, and seem to be common reiterations of activities which are already being undertaken. For example, he suggests using Afghani Special Forces soldiers to assist with the counterinsurgency, claiming they have the logical knowledge of the region. He also suggests bringing ethnic Pashtuns from the US and Western countries to assist in the NWP and FATA. Jagadish does not include in his paper the efforts currently being undertaken, however. Most of his recommendations are the cornerstones of Counterinsurgency Doctrine and have been in place for many years throughout both Pakistan and Afghanistan. He makes an attempt at predicting future scenarios based on historical actions, however does not have any qualitative evidence to support his analysis or assertions. Since his paper was published, some of his predictions have since been proven incorrect based on current actions of the Pakistani government. He predicted the Pakistani Army and Frontier Guards would be replaced by a “beefed-up” police force, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) strikes would be discontinued, and the CFs would be removed

from the region. Even though he placed no qualitative background other than historical views of Pakistani politicians' past rhetoric, his assumptions were in a large part the basis for his recommendations. He provided very few alternative futures, instead relying on almost absolute scenarios with little flexibility. In other words, as long as everything Jagadish predicted would have unfolded, then his recommendations would have been legitimate (Jagadish, 2009).

In a more objective study, Rabia Aslam examines Pakistan's role in the region in his study "Rethinking 'Wana': A Game Theoretic Analysis of the Conflict in the Tribal Region of Pakistan." Aslam purports the purpose of his study was to analyze the ongoing conflict situation between the government of Pakistan and the tribal population groups residing in the tribal belt along the Pakistan–Afghanistan border, while Pakistan aids the United States in the "War on Terror." Aslam attempts to apply simple game theoretic models to the situation in Waziristan and to accommodate the influence of the third party (in this case, the United States) on the strategies as well as on the Nash equilibrium of the players in this situation of conflict. Aslam determined Pakistani actions towards the tribal governments, coupled with US involvement, would directly influence the tribal responses. Aslam's game theory showed how the tribes might find it profitable to rebel and retaliate against the Pakistani government in the subsequent periods due to the grievances caused by the actions of government in the first period. Aslam concluded the government of Pakistan therefore seriously needs to rethink and reform its strategy for dealing with the tribal groups identified in his study (Aslam, 2008).

Overall, Aslam's game theory provided a very objective view of the Pakistani governments actions, along with the tribal responses. He is able to show how each player in the scenario (the US, Pakistan, and tribal groups) can make decisions which benefit them in a rational choice scenario, however the reaction from the decisions would circle back into the

equation and potentially change the scenario. To this end, Aslam was careful to explain limitations in his study, specifically the longer term considerations of Pakistani actions against the tribal groups not being considered. Because there would be countless external factors for long term assessments, Aslam focused on Pakistan's counterinsurgency options to identify possible near-term results (Aslam, 2008).

Another predictive paper written to explore options available in Afghanistan was written by Shanthie Mariet D'Souza. D'Souza's paper, "Talking to the Taliban: Will it Ensure 'Peace' in Afghanistan?" details how the lack of visible progress on the reconstruction activity and insecurity has alienated the Afghan populace in the remote areas of South and East Afghanistan. D'Souza attempts to answer two key questions relevant to this research paper: Will [an increase in counterinsurgency (COIN)] measures help erode the support base for the Taliban leadership, and would [COIN] lead to durable peace in Afghanistan. D'Souza successfully argues that military might is not enough to counter insurgencies, rather occupying forces must first erode the support base in which insurgencies flourish, then convince the opposition that reconciliation is the only negotiating strategy available (D'Souza, 2009).

D'Souza also argues for a "hold and build" strategy instead of a "clear and sweep" policy, suggesting the coalition forces do not have an effective COIN strategy to protect the local communities from reprisals from the Taliban. By bringing the moderate Taliban and their supporters into a rebuilding project, the Afghan government will not only reduce the number of Taliban, but will show its people that their intentions are to support and protect them. She shows the difficulties in doing this however, primarily citing the perceived (legitimately so) rampant corruption at almost every level of the Afghan government. Regardless of the perceptions, she

provides independent studies showing how an overwhelming percent of local citizens affected by the conflict are in favor of reconciliation (D'Souza, 2009).

D'Souza fails, however, to demonstrate how the current COIN strategies have either succeeded or failed. There have been numerous projects throughout Afghanistan doing many of the same suggested actions D'Souza recommends. Because of these exclusions, decision makers who could have taken away many points from this article could simply attribute it to academic critique of the progress of the war. Had she compared her recommendations against those already undertaken, she could have provided an objective argument to instigate needed changes in the COIN strategies. With a side by side comparison, D'Souza's identification of impediments to the reconciliation process could be addressed by the appropriate authorities. Another strong point which D'Souza could have used to show the importance in reconciliation is the inherent knowledge that most, if not all, local tribes have strong familiar ties to the Taliban, either being former members themselves, or close family members who are still actively engaged in the insurgency. Because of the close relationship with the insurgents throughout the area, many locals have divided loyalties between their own desires for stability and the safety and security for family members affected. If the moderate insurgents were incorporated into the reconciliation process, it would demonstrate the ability to bring the local population onto the side of the Afghan government.

These articles provide a strong foundation in which to further predict potential outcomes of the recent increase in Pakistan's activities, along with providing historical context of past attempts at predicting the actors' behavior and establishing the primary actors' perceptions. All of the articles were written prior to the May 2009 Pakistani offensive against the Taliban and extremist groups in FATA and the NWFP, however. By providing Pakistan's previous

inconsistencies in dealing with the Taliban and including their recent actions, we can attempt to provide a better understanding at the eventual outcome utilizing predictive analytical methods.

III. Research Design

When establishing a predictive study, there are several analytical models to consider. For this study the Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP) will be utilized. The LAMP method makes use of a number of the characteristics and processes of other predictive methods and includes the recognition of the importance of free will on potential events. When dealing with political relations, each actor has an individual voice which at any given time can make a decision that will change the perception and behavior of other actors influenced by the original decision. Therefore, the key to an effective predictive study by the LAMP method is to understand not just the actors, but the actors' perceptions of events so as to effectively assess and compare the potential "decisions" to be made by each actor. The LAMP method is organized to determine possible future actions by considering perceptions of all actors involved in the scenario to determine alternate futures events (Lockwood & Lockwood, 1993).

LAMP is a twelve step program focusing on relative probability. Each step of the LAMP process requires a review of both the event that you are trying to predict as well as the perceptions of each actor involved in the event. The steps of the LAMP method are:

1. Determine the issue for which you are trying to predict the most likely future.
2. Specify the national "actors" involved.
3. Perform an in-depth study of how each national actor perceives the issue in question.
4. Specify all *possible* courses of action for each actor.
5. Determine the major scenarios within which you will compare the alternate futures.
6. Calculate the total number of permutations of possible "alternate futures" for each scenario.

7. Perform a “pairwise comparison” of all alternate futures to determine their relative probability.
8. Rank the alternate futures for each scenario from highest relative probability to the lowest based on the number of “votes” received.
9. Assuming that each future occurs, analyze each alternate future in terms of its consequences for the issue in question.
10. State the potential of a given alternate future to “transpose” into another alternate future.
11. Determine the “focal events” that must occur in our present in order to bring about a given alternate future.
12. Develop indicators for the focal events (Lockwood & Lockwood, 1993, pp. 27-28).

While utilization of the LAMP method attempts to address free will in the actors’ decision making process, it is impossible to determine every behavior of every actor. This is even more pronounced when reviewing Pakistan’s recent historical inconsistencies when dealing with the Taliban and tribal groups. Pakistan’s free will provides a significantly uncertain amount of continuity in its future actions. However, we can still utilize the LAMP process to determine the effectiveness of their actions, if they continue (or cease to continue) along certain paths. Simply put, Pakistan’s actions are the most uncertain “wild card” in this predictive study. Utilizing extensive research and personal experiences in Afghanistan and counterinsurgency activities, the lack of cultural understanding into the perceptions of the actors can be mitigated. Significant effort was placed at removing cultural biases and perceptions of the actors, however no analyst can fully remove oneself from preconceived ideals. Any inference of cultural bias or perception is unintentional.

IV. Actors & Perceptions

After reviewing the available literature for this study, it was readily apparent there was resounding consensus of the primary actors regarding Pakistan's efforts at countering the insurgency in Afghanistan. There are several states which have vested interest in Pakistan's actions, as the fallout from those actions will indirectly affect most of the region through retaliatory actions and Taliban rhetoric encouraging hostilities. There are not, however, many actors which will have both the interest in Pakistan's handling of the Taliban and insurgency with the capability to influence their actions. The most likely actors to play an influential role into Pakistan's ability to stabilize the region are:

- 1) The US (and CF, including the central Afghan government),
- 2) Tribal Leaders in the NWFP/FATA (including migratory tribes on the eastern providences of Afghanistan), and
- 3) India

Each actor has their own self interest in mind with differing beliefs of how the stabilization should occur. In order to effectively predict the Taliban's responses to Pakistan's actions, we must analyze the actors involved to determine their specific outlook on Pakistan's activities in thwarting violence in the tribal regions and minimizing their support to the Taliban.

1) The US and Coalition Forces, including the central Afghan government

The US and Coalition Forces objectives are probably the most evident, with the White House' policy statement, "White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's Report on US Policy Toward Afghanistan and Pakistan", specifically detailing the national strategy and intentions of the US in the region. The US has a vested national security interest in the region, and benefits from cooperation amongst coalition and regional states. In Pakistan, the US recognizes the state's sovereignty, however is exceptionally cognizant of limitations of the

Pakistani government to act; not only with regards to their military and civil capabilities, but also with the popular support against them. The goal of the US is to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaida and its safe havens in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The paper specifically points out the US' belief that "without more effective action against [the insurgent and terrorist] groups in Pakistan, Afghanistan will face continuing instability" (White Papers, 2009).

The US' objectives therefore are to:

- a. Disrupt terrorist networks in Afghanistan and especially Pakistan to degrade any ability they have to plan and launch international terrorist attacks.
- b. Promote a more capable, accountable, and effective government in Afghanistan that serves the Afghan people and can eventually function, especially regarding internal security, with limited international support.
- c. Develop increasingly self-reliant Afghan security forces that can lead the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism fight with reduced US assistance.
- d. Assist efforts to enhance civilian control and stable constitutional government in Pakistan and a vibrant economy that provides opportunity for the people of Pakistan.
- e. Involve the international community to actively assist in addressing these objectives for Afghanistan and Pakistan, with an important leadership role for the UN.

To do this, the US plans to increase all elements of its international power – diplomatic, informational, military and economic. Increases in foreign assistance are to be implemented to ensure regional stability is encouraged with the surrounding countries. Additionally, the US plans to increase its perception management strategies to convince Afghanistan and Pakistan that the US is a long term partner. The White Paper recommended many increases in civil assistance

to both Afghanistan and Pakistan. It recommended the following steps be done in concert to produce the aforementioned desired end state.

1. Execute and resource an integrated civilian-military counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan. The military forces in Afghanistan will be utilized for two priority missions: 1) securing Afghanistan's south and east against a return of al Qaida and its allies, to provide a space for the Afghani government to establish effective government control and 2) providing the Afghan security forces with the mentoring needed to expand rapidly, take the lead in effective counterinsurgency operations, and allow the wind down combat operations. The US recognized in order for this to work, a counter-insurgency strategy must integrate population security with building effective local governance and economic development.

2. Resourcing and prioritizing civilian assistance in Afghanistan. By increasing civilian capacity the US plans to strengthen the relationship between the Afghan people and their government. A dramatic increase in Afghan civilian expertise is needed to facilitate the economic development of the provincial and local levels, provide basic infrastructure, and create alternatives to the insurgency.

3. Expanding the Afghan National Security Forces: Army and Police. The Afghan National Security Forces must substantially increase its size and capability.

4. Engaging the Afghan government and bolstering its legitimacy. International support for the election is necessary for a successful outcome. The US plans to ensure the security and legitimacy of voter registration, elections, and vote counting. The overall legitimacy of the Afghan government is also undermined by rampant corruption and a failure to provide basic services to much of the population over the past 7 years. Where Afghan systems and institutions have benefited from high quality technical assistance and mentoring, they have made great progress. Making such support more consistent with qualified mentors to advise and monitor officials, pushing such efforts to the

provincial and district levels, and channeling more assistance through Afghan institutions benefiting from this high quality support will help restore and maintain the legitimacy of the Afghan government.

5. Encouraging Afghan government efforts to integrate reconcilable insurgents. The US recognizes individuals such as Mullah Omar and the Taliban's hard core that have aligned themselves with al Qaeda are not reconcilable and cannot make a deal that includes them, the war in Afghanistan cannot be won without convincing non-ideologically committed insurgents to lay down their arms, reject al Qaeda, and accept the Afghan Constitution. Practical integration must not become a mechanism for instituting medieval social policies that give up the quest for gender equality and human rights. This integration must be Afghan-led, however.

6. Including provincial and local governments in building efforts. The US will work with the Afghan government to refocus civilian assistance and capacity-building programs on building up competent provincial and local governments where they can more directly serve the people and connect them to their government.

7. Breaking the link between narcotics and the insurgency. The Afghan narcotics problem causes great concern due to its ties to the insurgency, the fact that it is the major driver of corruption in Afghanistan, and distorts the legal economy. The Coalition's new authorities permit the destruction of labs, drug storage facilities, drug processing equipment, and drug caches and should contribute to breaking the drug-insurgency funding nexus and the corruption associated with the opium/heroin trade. Crop substitution and alternative livelihood programs that are a key pillar of effectively countering narcotics have been disastrously underdeveloped and under-resourced, however, and the narcotics trade will persist until such programs allow Afghans to reclaim their land for licit agriculture. Targeting those who grow the poppy will continue, but the focus will shift to higher level drug lords.

8. Mobilizing greater international political support of our objectives in Afghanistan.

9. Bolstering Afghanistan-Pakistan cooperation. The US understands the need to institutionalize stronger mechanisms for bilateral and trilateral cooperation.

10. Engaging and focusing Islamabad on the common threat. Successfully shutting down the Pakistani safe haven for extremists will also require consistent and intensive strategic engagement with Pakistani leadership in both the civilian and military spheres. The engagement must be conducted in a way that respects, and indeed enhances, democratic civilian authority.

11. Assisting Pakistan's capability to fight extremists. It is vital to strengthen efforts to both develop and operationally enable Pakistani security forces so they are capable of succeeding in sustained counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations.

12. Increasing and broadening assistance in Pakistan. Increasing economic assistance to Pakistan - to include direct budget support, development assistance, infrastructure investment, and technical advice on making sound economic policy adjustments - and strengthening trade relations will maximize support for our policy aims; it should also help to provide longer-term economic stability. Assistance should also support Pakistani efforts to 'hold and build' in western Pakistan as a part of its counterinsurgency efforts.

13. Exploring other areas of economic cooperation with Pakistan.

14. Strengthening Pakistani government capacity. The White Paper suggested key efforts should include fostering the reform of provincial and local governance in the FATA and NWFP. Islamabad needs support to enhance the services and support in areas cleared of insurgents so that they have a real chance in preventing insurgents from returning to those areas.

15. Asking for assistance from allies for Afghanistan and Pakistan. The US' efforts are a struggle against forces that pose a direct threat to the entire international community. For the mission in Afghanistan, the US plans to continue to seek contributions for combat forces, trainers and mentors, strategic lift, and equipment from our friends and allies. The US will also pursue major international funding and experts for civilian reconstruction and Afghan government capacity

building at the national and especially the provincial and local levels. In Pakistan, the US will urge allies to work closely both bilaterally and through the 'Friends of Democratic Pakistan' to coordinate economic and development assistance, including additional direct budget support, development assistance, infrastructure investment and technical advice on making sound economic policy adjustments. Similarly, the US should ask them to provide technical advice and assistance in strengthening government capacity, such as improving Pakistani institutions (White Paper, 2009).

2) Tribal Leaders in the NWFP and FATA

Obviously, not all tribal leaders within the NWFP and FATA are anti-US and anti-Pakistani militants. In fact, most simply wish to live their lives without the interference from outside actors. Because of the significant dynamics within the multiple tribes spread throughout NWFP and FATA, one cannot identify specific strategic goals for all tribes. Instead, in order to establish a general understanding of the tribal mentalities, we must look at the basic ideologies of the region which drive the tribes' actions. One of the best ways to understand these ideologies are to examine the previous agreements the tribes have made with both the Taliban and respective Afghan and Pakistani governments.

The best venue to identify these goals, are to look at recent accomplishments Pakistan has made at converting moderate tribal leaders' cooperation. In the Swat Valley, Pakistani Frontier Corps were able to convert thousands of tribal groups into localized militias under tribal, not government, control. While this endeavor, called "lashkar", is still too early to determine its effectiveness, the rate at which local volunteers have developed the lashkar implies the previously held assertion the tribes were unconvertible is definitely under question. While critics decry the potential for the lashkar to break from Pakistani control and begin in-fighting, the successes have thus far been significant at removing Taliban and al Qaida fighters. Since they

were initiated against other Pashtun fighters, it is not likely they will reorganize to side with the Taliban (Shah, 2009).

Also of importance is the impact of the Waziristan Accords. There, over 200 tribal leaders came together to discuss methods to remove Pakistani government influence. The leaders agreed to several issues, and while most were quickly broken, can be described as insight into the desires of the tribal leaders. They obviously do not want government interference, either from Pakistan or the US. At the same time, they understand that by supporting the Taliban and al Qaida, they are bringing additional attention to themselves from both governments. With the Pakistani counterinsurgency platform continuing to turn remote villagers towards their side, the original Waziristan Accord points could be readdressed and strengthened in Pakistan's favor under the lashkar organization versus anti-governmental forces (Behuria, 2007). It is important to note, the signers of the Waziristan Accords were tribal leaders affiliated with, or members of, the Pakistani Taliban. In the remote areas of the FATA and NWFP, it is often difficult to differentiate between the Taliban and otherwise neutral (or moderate) tribal leaders. The reason behind this is the Taliban often assimilate themselves into the tribal groups through familiar or tribal lineage, or through force. With the tribal groups unable or unwilling to counter the assimilation, they often take up arms with the insurgent groups to win favor or further their own agendas. The groups identified for this study should be limited in scope to those tribal groups which have been assimilated, not the hard core fanatics which terrorize the region – they are understood to be unable to be swayed through any means of counterinsurgency program.

3) India

While not a direct player in Pakistani actions, India's actions will indirectly affect Pakistani and Tribal Leaders' responses, possibly to the detriment of internal stability in the

tribal areas. India's primary strategic goals with respect to Pakistan, is to curb the rampant terrorism affecting India's sovereignty. Of note, India still views Pakistan's end game as being one which causes as much destruction within India through direct insurgency in Kashmir, extending support to terrorist activities, and supplying terror groups with arms and explosives. India does not want a fundamentalist Pakistani government, but may inadvertently pressure Pakistan into such a status by going to war over Kashmir. India wants a moderate Pakistan – they are very concerned about the possibility of war with a nuclear-armed fundamentalist state. India is putting tremendous pressure on Islamabad to reign in Islamic militants operating in Kashmir, but knows it cannot push too far for fear of actually inciting war. The more pressure India puts on Pakistan, the more Pakistan requires/relies on the US to step in and mitigate the situation. India's threat of war empowers Pakistan to more firmly control the fundamentalists, who want to cause a war with India in order to gain power within Pakistan. Whether or not India goes to war with Pakistan is a large driver on the nature of Pakistan's government (Verma, 2009).

V. Potential Courses of Action

In the LAMP analysis, we must understand that the outcome of each actor is uncertain and predicting the future is not completely possible. There are several courses of action each actor can take, however. The US and Coalition Forces play significantly into the equation, since pressure on Pakistan to support their efforts has historically been required for Pakistan to act. These pressures include monetary and economic incentives, along with acceptance of Pakistan's nuclear ambitions and active negotiations with India. Indirect pressures include the US projection of neutrality in the Kashmir region, along with diplomatic measures to favorably influence world opinion of Pakistan's commitment of regional stability. Finally, with popular

support for the war in Afghanistan waning, the US could opt to withdraw from Afghanistan as they did in Iraq, leaving internal security to the fledgling Afghan government.

The local tribal leaders also play a very important role in this study. Of the more than 200 tribes, most desire limited government activities within their lands. To complicate predicting their actions, most have familiar or tribal ties to the Pashtun Taliban forces, increasing their pre-disposition for supporting the Taliban's activities. Their potential courses of action include conceding to Pakistan's attempts to counter the Taliban. A variety of recent reporting implies the local tribes have turned on much of the Taliban's strict Sharia teachings due to damage it has caused their people. Supporting the Taliban also caused additional problems for the tribal leaders as attacks against the Taliban and al Qaida have occurred on their "turf". This could, of course, be used by the Taliban to solidify the tribal leaders' support against the Pakistani and US/CFs counterinsurgencies efforts. Finally, the tribal leaders could retain the status quo of providing support to the Taliban, but expressing their neutrality in the conflict. In doing so, the tribal leaders would attempt to negotiate with Pakistan in an effort to cease attacks in their lands.

India plays a more indirect role in the eventual outcome of this study. Since India and Pakistan are historical rivals, it is understood the cautious stance India has shown at supporting Pakistani moves. The distrust between the nations has resulted in an uneasy stand-off between the nuclear neighbors. India still firmly believes, possibly legitimately so, that Pakistan continues using terror groups to conduct proxy wars designed to destabilize their country. India's responses will be considered indirect actions at the ultimate determination of Pakistan's capability at stabilizing the regions, as they play a role at molding Pakistan's actions.

From each of the actors' potential courses of action, there can be three eventual outcomes. First, and most ideally, the actions will stabilize the region. For the region to be stabilized, it is assumed that Taliban insurgents and al Qaida forces will not be able to conduct significant attacks on targets outside of the immediate region. Stabilization does not presume all terror groups will be eradicated, rather that their operating environment is lessened to the point they cannot operate openly without the fear of being discovered. This includes reducing the local support from tribal groups, increased counterterrorism activities from the actors, and limited number of destabilizing attacks which can be logically carried out. Second, the actions of the aforementioned participants could destabilize the region. While to anyone who has operated in the FATA and NWFP this sounds impossible to achieve, it is described as an increase in terror group and insurgency capabilities. Finally, the actions of the participants could have no direct affect on the Taliban or al Qaida capability to operate.

The following is a summary of potential courses of action for each of the actors:

The United States and Coalition Forces can:

- 1) Take unilateral action within Pakistan
- 2) Cooperate with/support Pakistan's offensive against the Taliban
- 3) Withdraw completely from the region

Tribal Leaders can:

- 1) Support/accept Pakistani COIN efforts (Cooperate fully with Pakistan)
- 2) Support Taliban efforts
- 3) Negotiate with Pakistan

India can:

- 1) Take unilateral actions against Pakistani based terror groups
- 2) Support/accept Pakistani COIN efforts

VI. Major Scenarios

Within the methodology of LAMP analysis, the possible courses of action for Pakistan are considered "scenarios" or the different situations from which the analyst is attempting to

determine the most likely future. For Pakistan, there are really three major scenarios that should be considered: 1) Pakistan can take unilateral actions, both military and economic, and deny the US and CF efforts, including UAV and intelligence sharing. 2) Pakistan can decide to become full partners in the war on terror, and cooperate fully with a US-led offense against the Taliban and al Qaida within the FATA and NWFP. 3) Finally, Pakistan can negotiate another ceasefire with the Taliban and tribal leaders, preventing further actions within the region. To make these decisions, Pakistan must consider their current predicament on how to appropriately handle the tribal leaders who have historically had close ties with the pro-Taliban mullahs and religious leaders. Pakistan's change in support from pro-Taliban groups to anti-Taliban militias is an undermining effort for tribal leaders who have historically desired limited Pakistani government interference. More importantly is Pakistan's inconsistency in dealing with the Taliban. If, like in 2006, Pakistan determines the military offensive is not working and decides to negotiate with the Taliban, the stability of the region could again be threatened. Finally, Pakistan could revert to its earlier stance of limiting US and CF activities within its sovereignty, effectively limiting strategic engagements against the Taliban and al Qaida.

The following are the major scenarios which Pakistan could take:

- 1) Take unilateral action within their borders (deny CF assistance in their internal struggle against the Taliban)
- 2) Cooperate with/support US and CF offensive against the Taliban
- 3) Negotiate another ceasefire with the Taliban

VII. Permutations of Possible Alternate Futures for Each Scenario

In order to determine the number of alternate futures, we must couple the actors with their courses of actions. To do this, LAMP provides a simple equation: $X^Y = Z$, with X being the number of actions created for each actor, Y being the number of actors involved, and Z being the number of alternate futures available for comparison. With two actors with three actions each,

and one actor with two actions, we can determine $3^2 = 9 \times 2^1 = 18$. According to the LAMP methodology, we can expect there are 18 possible alternate futures. From these possible futures, we can create a table of alternate future combinations and perform a pairwise for comparison.

For simplicity in the following tables, we will utilize the following abbreviations to identify actions each of the actors could take for the alternate futures:

- UA - Take unilateral action
- CO – Cooperate
- WD – Withdraw/Negotiate
- TA – Support the Taliban

TABLE 1 – Alternate Future Permutations

Possible Future #	US/CF	Tribal Leaders	India
1	UA	CO	UA
2	UA	CO	CO
3	UA	TA	UA
4	UA	TA	CO
5	UA	WD	UA
6	UA	WD	CO
7	CO	CO	UA
8	CO	CO	CO
9	CO	TA	UA
10	CO	TA	CO
11	CO	WD	UA
12	CO	WD	CO
13	WD	CO	UA
14	WD	CO	CO
15	WD	TA	UA
16	WD	TA	CO
17	WD	WD	UA
18	WD	WD	CO

VIII. Pairwise Comparison of Possible Alternate Futures

Using Table 1, we must now create a pairwise comparison for each alternate future for each scenario. Pairwise comparison is described as being a method of

comparing the likelihood of each alternate future against other possible futures. We can compare the likelihood of possible future #1 against future #2 and determine which is more likely based on the actors' desires. This continues until all possible futures are compared against each of the other futures in the table. Using the formula, $X = (n-1) + (n-2) \dots + (n-18)$ when X is the total number of pairwise comparisons, and n is the total number of possible futures (already identified as 18), we find $X = 153$ pairwise comparisons to be made for each of the three scenarios. From this number, we must sort and weigh the pairwise comparisons for each of the three scenarios using votes for each possible future. These votes indicate which alternate future seems the most likely and allows for the most likely possible futures related to each of the three scenarios. The following tables display the voting results from the pairwise comparisons made of all the possible futures related to each of the scenarios which could occur.

TABLE 2 – Scenario #1: Pakistan Takes Unilateral Actions

Possible Future #	US/CF	Tribal Leaders	India	VOTES
1	UA	CO	UA	12
2	UA	CO	CO	13
3	UA	TA	UA	9
4	UA	TA	CO	16
5	UA	WD	UA	8
6	UA	WD	CO	17
7	CO	CO	UA	11
8	CO	CO	CO	10
9	CO	TA	UA	5
10	CO	TA	CO	15
11	CO	WD	UA	6
12	CO	WD	CO	14
13	WD	CO	UA	3
14	WD	CO	CO	2
15	WD	TA	UA	0
16	WD	TA	CO	7
17	WD	WD	UA	4
18	WD	WD	CO	1

TABLE 3 – Scenario #2: Pakistan Fully Cooperates with US and CF

Possible	US/CF	Tribal	India	VOTES
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Future #		Leaders		
1	UA	CO	UA	9
2	UA	CO	CO	11
3	UA	TA	UA	13
4	UA	TA	CO	8
5	UA	WD	UA	6
6	UA	WD	CO	7
7	CO	CO	UA	10
8	CO	CO	CO	16
9	CO	TA	UA	14
10	CO	TA	CO	15
11	CO	WD	UA	12
12	CO	WD	CO	17
13	WD	CO	UA	2
14	WD	CO	CO	3
15	WD	TA	UA	1
16	WD	TA	CO	0
17	WD	WD	UA	4
18	WD	WD	CO	5

TABLE 4 – Scenario #3: Pakistan Negotiates a Ceasefire with Taliban

Possible Future #	US/CF	Tribal Leaders	India	VOTES
1	UA	CO	UA	14
2	UA	CO	CO	11
3	UA	TA	UA	17
4	UA	TA	CO	16
5	UA	WD	UA	15
6	UA	WD	CO	13
7	CO	CO	UA	7
8	CO	CO	CO	3
9	CO	TA	UA	12
10	CO	TA	CO	10
11	CO	WD	UA	9
12	CO	WD	CO	6
13	WD	CO	UA	2
14	WD	CO	CO	0
15	WD	TA	UA	8
16	WD	TA	CO	5
17	WD	WD	UA	4
18	WD	WD	CO	1

IX. Rank the Alternate Futures

After determining the number of votes each possible future receives in each scenario, we can determine which of the futures are most likely for the corresponding scenario. For a better depiction of this determination, the tables are ranked by the number of votes each possible future received from the possible future with the highest relative probability to the lowest. The following tables depict the ranked alternate futures by vote given each scenario:

TABLE 5 – Scenario #1: Pakistan Takes Unilateral Actions

Possible Future #	US/CF	Tribal Leaders	India	VOTES
6	UA	WD	CO	17
4	UA	TA	CO	16
10	CO	TA	CO	15
12	CO	WD	CO	14
2	UA	CO	CO	13
1	UA	CO	UA	12
7	CO	CO	UA	11
8	CO	CO	CO	10
3	UA	TA	UA	9
5	UA	WD	UA	8
16	WD	TA	CO	7
11	CO	WD	UA	6
9	CO	TA	UA	5
17	WD	WD	UA	4
13	WD	CO	UA	3
14	WD	CO	CO	2
18	WD	WD	CO	1
15	WD	TA	UA	0

TABLE 6 – Scenario #2: Pakistan Fully Cooperates with US and CF

Possible Future #	US/CF	Tribal Leaders	India	VOTES
12	CO	WD	CO	17
8	CO	CO	CO	16
10	CO	TA	CO	15
9	CO	TA	UA	14
3	UA	TA	UA	13
11	CO	WD	UA	12
2	UA	CO	CO	11
7	CO	CO	UA	10
1	UA	CO	UA	9
4	UA	TA	CO	8
6	UA	WD	CO	7
5	UA	WD	UA	6

18	WD	WD	CO	5
17	WD	WD	UA	4
14	WD	CO	CO	3
13	WD	CO	UA	2
15	WD	TA	UA	1
16	WD	TA	CO	0

TABLE 7 – Scenario #3: Pakistan Negotiates a Ceasefire with Taliban

Possible Future #	US/CF	Tribal Leaders	India	VOTES
3	UA	TA	UA	17
4	UA	TA	CO	16
5	UA	WD	UA	15
1	UA	CO	UA	14
6	UA	WD	CO	13
9	CO	TA	UA	12
2	UA	CO	CO	11
10	CO	TA	CO	10
11	CO	WD	UA	9
15	WD	TA	UA	8
7	CO	CO	UA	7
12	CO	WD	CO	6
16	WD	TA	CO	5
17	WD	WD	UA	4
8	CO	CO	CO	3
13	WD	CO	UA	2
18	WD	WD	CO	1
14	WD	CO	CO	0

X. Analysis of Alternate Futures

Scenario 1 - Pakistan takes unilateral action within their borders

In the first scenario, we can determine some of the more probable outcomes by reviewing the top four most likely alternate futures in the event Pakistan decides to take unilateral action within their borders. We will also describe the least likely outcome from this scenario to put the study into perspective. The scenario takes into account intelligence operations and sharing which have historically occurred between the US and Pakistan with regards to counterterrorism activities, and assumes the status quo is maintained. This scenario would preclude outside influences from the US and CF other than the current level of involvement, including the limited intelligence sharing. It would also have Pakistan conducting all counterterrorism operations to include targeting and capture missions for all Taliban and insurgent leaders without significant cooperation with the US or CFs.

Alternate Future #6 received the most votes from the analyst with 17 of the possible 153, since when compared with each of other Alternate Futures there was not a more likely outcome (i.e. it outranked the other 17 Alternate Futures). This Alternate Future indicates that if Pakistan were to rely on unilateral action within their borders, the US and CF would be required to follow suit and take unilateral and unsponsored actions within the FATA and NWFP also. With pressure coming from both the US/CF and Pakistan, it is likely the Tribal Leaders would attempt to negotiate again, similar to the Pakistani offensive in 2006 which led to the Waziristan Accords. Since the Tribal Leaders have historically taken the path which causes them the least damage in the immediacy of the situation, it is more likely they will follow historical trends of negotiating a ceasefire to prevent significant damage and/or occupation of the Pakistani forces. With insurgents focused on their immediate threat coming from the Pakistani forces and cross border threats from the US/CF in Afghanistan, it is equally unlikely much attention will be given at carrying out attacks within India. This has been shown in the past with major attacks

originating during times of relatively less action within the FATA and NWFP. With lessened attacks and perception of Pakistani action against the Taliban and terror groups, it is most likely that India will refrain from taking unilateral actions against the groups to prevent retaliation from Pakistan and censorship from the US.

Alternate Future #4, likewise takes a similar turn and earned 16 votes from the analyst with only Alternate Future #6 being determined as a more likely outcome. With the same processes coming from Pakistan and the US/CF taking independent unilateral actions against terror groups, there is a possibility the Tribal Leaders which are caught between the two sides will perceive they have no other option then to side with the Taliban. With the historical tribal and familiar ties found within the FATA and NWFP to the insurgents, the Tribal Leaders may opt to support their relatives and tribal relations. A common Islamic saying “I against my brothers, my brothers and I against my cousins, my family against the Tribe, and my Tribe against the Stranger” drives home this Alternate Future. If the Tribal Leaders view the independent, but unilateral, actions against their Pashtun “brothers”, they may opt to fight their “cousins” of the Pakistani government and side with the insurgent groups. As before, Pakistan’s actions, coupled with the US pressures, would likely prevent India from becoming involved unilaterally within Pakistani border areas.

Alternate Futures #10 and 12 earn 15 and 14 votes respectively. These two Alternate Futures show that if Pakistan decides to take unilateral actions, the US and CF would cooperate with their decision. Using logic, it is not likely the US would completely cut off all interactions with Pakistan, rather would try and cooperate as much as the Pakistani government officials allowed. During these Alternate Futures, the US and CF would likely respect Pakistan’s attempts to handle their sovereignty’s issues, but volunteer support. This support would likely

come in the form of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles attacks against strategic targets, increased intelligence and targeting sharing and military equipment and sales. The US would likely still carry out unilateral activities, however would have significantly more cooperation with the Pakistani government than seen in the past. The Tribal Leaders in this case would also have two decisions – either side with the Taliban or negotiate a ceasefire. With the overt cooperation from the US, these Alternate Future actions from the Tribal Leaders are anticipated to be reversed. With the view that the US is cooperating with Pakistan, a deeper rift will develop between the Tribal Leaders and the Pakistani government whom they would likely view as selling out to US pressures. In these Alternate Futures, the Tribal Leaders will more likely side with the Taliban in an effort to counter the US presence. It is also possible the Tribal Leaders could take a path which causes the least immediate harm to them and negotiate, however this is less likely with the US' presence and/or cooperation. Again, it is not likely in either of these scenarios that India would take any unilateral actions within Pakistan's borders in an attempt to keep the focus on the terror groups.

The Alternate Future which received the least number of votes from the analyst (none) was Alternate Future #15. In this Alternate Future, it was determined that all of the other 17 Alternate Futures would likely play out before the US withdrew from attempting to fight the Taliban and insurgency in the FATA and NWFP, the Tribal Leaders sided with the Taliban and India's direct involvement within Pakistan's borders. This of course, takes into consideration that the current dedication from the US and varying Pakistani political views are retained. There are no ways to logically include every eventual actor and possible scenario, however with the current status and direction in the region, the previously described top four Alternate Futures are

more likely to play out in the event Pakistan decides to take unilateral action within the FATA and NWFP.

Scenario 2 – Pakistan fully cooperates with the US and CF offensive

It is also very likely, and much more preferred from the US' standpoint, that Pakistan will decide to fully cooperate with the US and CF offensives in the FATA and NWFP.

Understanding the counterinsurgency doctrines, the more states which support a like cause, the more successful the outcome will be. Using this doctrine, the US has provided extensive pressures, both economically and diplomatically, to persuade Pakistan at coming into full fold of the US' and NATO's strategic goals in the region. For varying political and domestic reasons, Pakistan has taken an extremely hardline role at maintaining its sovereignty rights within its own borders. This scenario examines the Alternate Futures of the actors should Pakistan decide to fully cooperate in a truly combined/joint effort at countering the insurgencies within the FATA and NWFP. This scenario would include Pakistan's acceptance of a full US support contingent operating within its borders, most likely Special Forces and intelligence units. It would also provide for diplomatic assistance at negotiating terms of agreement with the moderate Imams and Tribal Leaders, along with acceptance of internationally funded counterinsurgency operations to include infrastructure rebuilding, along with medical and educational programs in the fundamentalist strongholds.

The most likely Alternate Future, earning 17 votes from the analyst, is Alternate Future #12 where the US and CF will quickly jump to cooperate if Pakistan provides an opportunity to work jointly with them. Their combined efforts, especially the counterinsurgency operations and surgical removal of fundamentalist insurgent leaders, should lead to the Tribal Leaders quickly reaching a negotiation settlement with Pakistan. Based on their actions from the Waziristan

Accords and recent anti-terror militias throughout the region, it is highly likely most in the area will support a peace offering from a Pakistani-led operation. With the US and Pakistan cooperating in the region, it is not likely India would risk antagonizing the relationship that could prove to be beneficial for them. Because of this, it is not likely India would conduct any unilateral actions and would accept and/or cooperate with any counterinsurgency operations.

The second most likely Alternate Future to occur, with 16 votes from the analyst, is Alternate Future #8, where the US and CF cooperate, India agrees to remain at least neutral, but the Tribal Leaders turn against the Taliban and fundamentalist religious leaders. Again, this has been seen within the past few years with the anti-terror militias formed in the region. This Alternate Future would assume significant support to these militias are retained, coupled with a significant increase in counterinsurgency operations in an effort to not only secure the support of the militias, but also the general public. While not the most likely Alternate Future, it is by far the best case scenario to meet US and CF strategic objectives to stabilize the region. If all actors are in full cooperation, there is less likely a chance for insurgency groups to continue running freely without reprisals in the region. From the lessons learned in Iraq, we can see how the religious violence was significantly lessened when the Sunni militia groups were brought into the fold of cooperation to form the Sons of Iraq militia groups. This in part, led to the relative stabilization of several previously believed unsecurable areas of Iraq. The same concept should be utilized if this scenario appears to unfold; immediate integration of the local anti-terror militias into the CF (or better under Pakistani control), similar to the Sons of Iraq or even the Northern Alliance cooperation early in the Afghan War.

Alternate Future #10 provides the same background reasoning as Alternate Futures #12 and #8, but takes into regards the deep set distrust of the US from the Tribal Leaders. In this

Alternate Future, the US and CF again cooperate fully with Pakistan's acceptance for full support to its counterterrorism operations and India remains supportive (or at least neutral). The Tribal Leaders however, chose to solidify behind the fundamentalist religious leaders in the area and join in resisting both the Pakistani and US involvement. Because of the deep distrust of the Pakistani government involvement, coupled with the even greater distrust and (dare I say) general hatred, of the US, this Alternate Future is relatively likely as well. This is even more pronounced with recent polling favoring the Taliban almost 3:1 over the US in parts of the NWFP. The same polling showed the general feeling amongst those polled that the US posed a greater threat to them than even al Qaida. This Alternate Future provides that even significant counterinsurgency missions would not be able to effectively turn the tides of resentment which have been imbedded over the past 40 years within a reasonable time.

The final reviewed Alternate Future #9 takes into consideration the US and Pakistani cooperation, but similarly to Alternate Future #10, the Tribal Leaders side with the Taliban. Unlike the previous Alternate Futures discussed, this Alternate Future has India taking unilateral action against their priority terrorist targets within Kashmir. A lingering distrust of the Pakistani security services and India's identified goals at countering terrorism is the result of this Alternate Future. If India perceives the US and Pakistan are not able to secure the region effectively enough to provide security of India's strategic interests, they will likely take unilateral actions to secure it themselves. This Alternate Future will likely come to effect following another attack within India similar in scope as the Mumbai attacks.

In this scenario, the least likely Alternate Future to occur is #15. If Pakistan requests full cooperation in its efforts to counter insurgency groups within its borders, it is almost totally unlikely the US and CF would withdraw from the region, specifically with the current trends in

US strategic policy in the region. While it is less unlikely the Tribal Leaders would side with the Taliban, or that if they did, India would take unilateral actions against terror groups located within its nuclear capable rival, this Alternate Future received no votes from the analyst specifically due to the extremely low likelihood the US would withdrawal in the face of Pakistani requests for assistance.

Scenario 3 – Pakistan negotiates with the Taliban

The final scenario takes into consideration of a repeat of Pakistan's actions during the 2006 Waziristan Accords. In this scenario, Pakistan's initially strong military efforts against the insurgents and terror groups wanes and they decide to enter into negotiations with the Taliban. As in the previous Waziristan Accords, the insurgent groups agree to certain terms of negotiation which provide Pakistan a "face-saving" veneer to display their counterterrorism efforts. Alternate Future #3 is identified as the most likely eventual result of this scenario and almost exactly follows the results of the Waziristan Accords. Soon after Pakistan enters into the negotiation, the insurgency is offered free reign to operate, thus increasing its capability to conduct cross-border attacks. Sensing this, the US enters into unilateral strikes against the Taliban and insurgency leaders within Pakistan, likely leading to censure from Islamabad. The Tribal Leaders, seeing the US attacking their Pashtun "brothers", more readily support the Taliban operations which create a downward spiral of separation between the US' actions within the region and the Tribal Leaders' distrust of the US intentions. As with the Waziristan Accords, the ability for the Taliban and terror groups to operate is opened so much that increased attacks are likely to occur not only in Afghanistan, but also in India. These increased attacks could prompt India to also take (or best case scenario, threaten to take) unilateral actions against the terror groups, as it did following the Mumbai attacks.

Another Alternate Future presents itself similarly in Alternate Future #4. Using almost identical reasoning with the US and Tribal Leaders' actions, India could opt to refrain from conducting unilateral actions within Pakistan. This Alternate Future would be more likely if certain focal events do not occur, specifically attacks within their country or against their interests. Even if the US took unilateral actions against the Taliban and the operating environment became so permissive that terror groups could come and go as they please, as long as attacks did not occur (and no intelligence was received regarding impending attacks) within India, it is unlikely they would take preemptive actions against the terror groups.

Similarly, Alternate Future #5 shows the US taking unilateral actions against Taliban targets inside Pakistan and India, depending on the focal points of increased attacks on their own interests. This Alternate Future however, shows the Tribal Leaders attempting to negotiate with the Pakistani government in the wake of continuous bombardments and attacks from the US and India which directly affect their immediate well being. Again, certain focal events would have to occur, however with the actions of the Pakistani government being one of allowing freedom of movement for the insurgents it is likely history would repeat itself in the continuously dynamic environment.

Another Alternate Future identified as one of the more likely to play out is Alternate Future #1. In this Alternate Future, the US and India both initiate unilateral strikes within the FATA and NWFP, however the Tribal Leaders could choose to cooperate with the Pakistani government. While not the most likely future, there are some key points to be examined regarding the previous actions. First, the Pakistani government has made significant improvements at integrating the Tribal Leaders within the fight against insurgent groups. The Pakistani Frontier Corps' support and organization of Tribal militias to assist in their efforts to

quell insurgencies has been relatively successful and, barring further rifts between the Tribal Leaders and the Pakistani government, the counterinsurgency efforts are likely to continue in a positive manner. This support, vice isolation, provided from the Pakistani government should encourage cooperation from the Tribal groups. Second, the continuous strikes from the US could provide the final convincing argument for the Tribal Leaders to choose a side which provides a more stable environment. With the previously discussed intentions from the Tribal Leaders being one which satisfies their most immediate security, they may realize a cooperative effort to rid their areas of insurgencies are more beneficial for their people. Of course, history has shown us there is an unsteady relationship between the Tribal Leaders and Pakistani government, and an even greater distrust for the US and Indian intentions. A key focal event that must remain in place is Pakistan's continued use of counterinsurgency methods to win the hearts and minds of not only the Tribal Leaders, but their tribal members as well.

Looking at the opposite spectrum for this scenario – Alternate Future #14 – we see, as the other least likely Alternate Futures of the other scenarios, the US withdrawing from their efforts in Pakistan. Furthermore, the likelihood of India cooperating with Pakistani negotiations make it even more unlikely. Finally, with these three actions taking place (including Pakistan's negotiation with the Taliban), it is even more unlikely the Tribal Leaders would agree to cooperate with the Pakistani government; they simply have more motivation to satisfy their immediate security by siding with the Taliban.

XI. Potential for Alternate Futures to Transpose into Others

After examining the top ranked Alternate Futures for each scenario, we must also understand there is a great likelihood for each of the Alternate Futures to transpose into other Alternate Futures. The transposition from one Alternate Future to another is explained by the

LAMP process as being analogous to a chess game. For example, if actor A conducts an action (i.e. chess player moves a piece during their opening move), then actor B will conduct an action directly in correlation to actor A's action (i.e. the other chess player opens with a move which he hopes places him in an advantage according to his strategy) (Lockwood and Lockwood, 1993, pg 54-55). This transposition of actions can be limitless and opens the analysis up for ever increasing links to other Alternate Futures. Using historical basis and the actors' stated or displayed strategic goals and perceptions, however, we can narrow down the more likely outcomes from the already identified most likely Alternate Futures for each scenario.

Scenario 1 - Pakistan takes unilateral action within their borders

Looking at the top Alternate Futures for the first scenario, we can see how one actor's decisions would directly affect the others. This is most obvious with the reactions of the Tribal Leaders, already identified as having the least articulate and/or most basic strategic goal of the four actors in this study. Using the information previously discuss for this scenario, we can understand that Pakistani and the US unilateral action against the Taliban, coupled with India's cooperation (or non-interference) with Pakistan are all direct players on the Tribal Leaders' actions – either negotiating with Pakistani forces or supporting the Taliban. When one actor's actions are changed however, in this scenario the US' decision to cooperate with Pakistan instead of simply taking unilateral actions themselves, it changes the outcome of the Tribal Leaders' action. The Tribal Leaders choose to support the Taliban when the US cooperates with Pakistan. As mentioned earlier, this is assessed as being due to the Tribal Leaders' identified distrust of the US' goals. This distrust directly influences the outcome of the Alternate Futures' votes.

Likewise, if we continue through the other Alternate Futures, we that India's involvement also plays a greater role in the Tribal Leaders' decisions. India's cooperation and non-

interference provides the Tribal Leaders little motivation to take actions against them – India is a non-player in the Tribal Leaders’ views as long as they are not directly affected by India’s actions. Once India does become involved in unilateral actions against the Taliban, however, the situation is assessed as being a cause of the Tribal Leaders’ support of the Taliban.

Taking the scenarios into consideration, we know Pakistan’s aggressiveness against the insurgency has also been significantly dynamic over the past decade. The Pakistani government has shifted focus and strategies since the Taliban’s seizure of power in Afghanistan and continued through the US led war. It is extremely likely that even if any specific Alternate Future were to unfold, the resulting future would be a causation for another scenario to unfold, thus keeping Alternate Futures in constant cyclical rotation. For example, if Pakistan does take unilateral action and the top voted Alternate Future occurs – US takes unilateral actions, India does not interfere, and the Tribal Leaders insist on negotiation – it is very likely Pakistan could accept the request for negotiation. Once the negotiations begin, it is also possible the Pakistani government would enter into negotiations with the Taliban as well. This would then change the scenario to scenario #3, and more Alternate Futures would be introduced under that scenario.

Scenario 2 – Pakistan fully cooperates with the US and CF offensive

With the Alternate Futures assessed as being most likely if Pakistan fully cooperated with the US, we see similar transpositions between the Alternate Futures. We again see, probably with a higher likelihood, that if all three actors – Pakistan, the US and India – cooperate under a single strategic goal, the Tribal Leaders’ actions are the only consideration for the top three voted Alternate Futures. Once one of these actors changes their actions, however, we see the predisposition unfolding with the Tribal Leaders siding with the Taliban in most cases. This is more pronounced with India’s unilateral actions, however can also be seen to a lesser extent if

the US were to act unilaterally. When both the US and India take unilateral actions, but Pakistan advertises its desires to cooperate, the Tribal Leaders are still assessed as being more likely to side with the Taliban.

Each of these Alternate Futures plays out in a seemingly predictable scenario of if A, then B, then C with each action capable of being made independently, but ultimately resulting in a predetermined pattern of likelihoods. In this scenario, it almost always appears that the US will cooperate with Pakistan, however in the event the Tribal Leaders side with the Taliban, US unilateral actions remain possible. This is also true of India; not until the medium and lower ranked Alternate Futures do we start to assess India would take unilateral action against the Taliban. These Alternate Futures were given some consideration based on India's perception of Pakistan's usage of insurgents in the FATA and NWFP to conduct a proxy war against them.

Again, this scenario is capable of transposing into another scenario. If the most likely Alternate Future unfolds, there are still high probabilities that changes in the Pakistan government will change their tactics based on popular support and Tribal Leaders' demands. In these cases, it is very likely that even if Pakistan originally agrees to cooperate, they may change their minds depending on the Tribal Leaders' actions. If they negotiate, as expressed in Alternate Future #12 (the future with the most votes), Pakistan could agree to the terms of the Tribal Leaders and decide to negotiate with the Taliban. This would change the scenario again, and thus present new Alternate Futures based on the actors' subsequent actions.

Scenario 3 – Pakistan negotiates with the Taliban

In the final scenario, the top voted Alternate Futures all show the US taking unilateral actions against the Taliban in spite of Pakistani negotiations. This would be due primarily in the historical experiences seen during the Waziristan Accords. Not wanting to provide the Taliban

and al Qaida the same freedom of movement to operate in again, the US will most likely not stand by while Pakistan does nothing. This is especially true since Pakistan's previous failure to aggress against the Taliban was shown to directly negatively affect the US's interests. Also shown in this scenario is how India's actions are expressed to an extent according to the Tribal Leaders' actions, however other Focal Events would have to unfold for them to act. The Focal Events needed to be present are outlined in more detail below.

XII. Focal Events and the Indicators that Must Occur to Bring About a Given Alternate Future

In each of the three scenarios, there are specifically identified Focal Events which must occur to bring about a given Alternate Future. Each of these Alternate Futures could be examined individually, however the analyst has chosen to identify and assess those Alternate Futures which would be most beneficial for, and/or directly affect, the US' national security goals given each scenario. Since Pakistan's actions are expressed by the scenarios, and the US must operate within those given scenarios, the analyst has decided to limit the discussion of the Focal Events to those which would affect the US' strategic goals in the region.

Scenario 1 - Pakistan takes unilateral action within their borders

In the event Pakistan takes unilateral action against the Taliban and insurgents, and subsequently denies the US and CF from operating within their borders, the Alternate Future assessed to be most in line with the US' strategic goals for the region are Alternate Futures #2, followed in preference by Alternate Futures #8, #12, and #6. Alternate Future #2 is assessed as being the most beneficial for US policy, as it provides for the US' unilateral strikes against specific high value targets within the FATA and NWFP, the Tribal Leaders agreeing to

cooperate with Pakistan's counterinsurgency efforts, and India remaining non-provocational. Following historical incidents within the region for both Alternate Future #2 and #6, the primary Focal Events which will unfold for this Alternate Future to become reality will be witnessed with additional rifts or political fallout between the US and Pakistan. This could be brought upon by countless incidents; from changes in Pakistani political goals, overthrow or coup of the ruling party, or with withdrawal of US funding for counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations for Pakistan's military.

For Alternate Futures #8 and #12 to occur, Pakistan will have to prove to the US it can conduct an effective offensive against the Taliban within the FATA and NWFP. If the Taliban is able to be controlled or removed from the tribal areas, the Tribal Leaders will be more likely to cooperate with the Pakistani Frontier Corps. Focal Event indicators for this Alternate Future will be self-evident with an increase in cooperation from the Tribal Leaders, to include increases in pro-government (or at least anti-Taliban) militias, Pakistani control of those militias, and an increase in acceptance of counterinsurgency support by the Tribal Leaders.

Other Focal Points which could affect all of the above Alternate Futures include if Pakistan begins to perceive an increase in US-Indian relationships, especially in the nuclear weapons standoff between India and Pakistan. If the US initiates any negotiations which favor India, either economically, diplomatically, or militarily, Pakistan could possibly take actions to stop or reduce US activities against the Taliban in their borders. Finally, if popular support against the Pakistani government begins to indicate a potential coup, the sitting political party will most likely take actions to appease the threat, and will more likely distance themselves from the US than risk losing their hold on political power.

Scenario 2 – Pakistan fully cooperates with the US and CF offensive

Scenario 2 is assessed by the analyst as being most beneficial to support US strategic goals in the region. Any time full cooperation can be achieved from all parties, the more stability can be established within the region. Within this scenario, Alternate Future #8 is assessed as being the most in line with the US' strategic objectives in the region, with all actors agreeing to cooperate. For this Alternate Future to unfold, there will need to be several Focal Points to fall into place. First and foremost, the US-Pakistani diplomatic relationship will need to be fully solidified. Unless both countries agree on a strategic end goal for the security of the region, differing objectives will continue to drive rifts in the tactical and operational missions within Pakistan's borders. Also important is continuing financial support from the US to Pakistan's counterinsurgency mission. This financial support provides another benefit for this Alternate Future as well – cooperation from the Tribal Leaders. Counterinsurgency doctrine plays a key role at gaining the trust and cooperation from the local populace, and winning the hearts and minds of the Tribal Leaders has been deemed as one of the key points at securing regional security. As mentioned before, the support of the Tribal Leaders provides an environment not conducive for terror groups and the Taliban to operate freely.

Using the principal of Asabiyyah, or social cohesion, we understand that the Tribal Leaders will be more open to cooperate with Pakistani forces than US or CF military forces. Unfortunately, the same principal tells us the Tribal Leaders are more inclined to support their immediate Pashtun tribesmen, also. As long as counterinsurgency operations led by Pakistan can be pursued, even if financed in part by the US, the Tribal Leaders could begin to change their longer standing support to the Taliban and insurgents in the region. This is even more pronounced when the Tribal Leaders' primary objective – immediate security – will begin to be perceived by the local populace as being provided by the Pakistani government. To do this,

increased protection from the Pakistani Frontier Corps against retaliatory strikes from the Taliban will need to be highly advertised and/or recognized from the local populace. With the stabilization of the FATA and NWFP, there will be decreased chances for terror groups to operate freely, thus a lessened perception from the Indian government of Pakistan's state support for the terror groups. The analyst assesses that the Indian government would not desire a provocation action between the two nuclear rivals as long as they perceive Pakistan's attempts to limit terror group's operational capacity.

Alternate Futures #12 and #2 also provide avenues in which the US' strategic goals would be seen as well. In Alternate Future #12, the aforementioned Focal Events will have to occur, with the only difference being the Tribal Leaders negotiate with the Pakistani government. Under this scenario, the Pakistani government continues cooperating with the US and CF, however agree to negotiate with the Tribal Leaders, bringing them into the same alignment as their strategic goals. Of course, this Alternate Future will quickly turn the Tribal Leaders into two possible actions; either cooperate with the Pakistani government as seen in Alternate Future #8, or full integration and support to the Taliban as seen in Alternate Future #10. Either way, other Pakistani actions towards the Tribal Leaders can be adjusted as needed to better meet both the Pakistani and US strategic objectives.

Alternate Future #2 provides for similar Focal Points as well, with the only difference being if the US does not perceive Pakistan's capability to effectively target high value targets within the FATA and NWFP. During this Alternate Future, the US reserves the right to conduct unilateral strikes against specific targets inside Pakistan. While this Alternate Future could be either with or without Pakistani knowledge, the Focal Points for this future to unfold would not emerge until Pakistan provided a glimpse at their capabilities. If they fail to effectively act on

information in a timely manner, or if opportunities against specified targets are missed, the US will likely decide to operate unilaterally in certain situations. Some Focal Point indicators for this Alternate Future include the perception of the relationship dynamic between the Pakistani Security Services (ISI) and the Taliban. In the past, the ISI was criticized for warning their previous Taliban assets of both US and Pakistani military attacks. If the US continues to obtain information of ISI interference into the strike capabilities, it is assessed the US will discontinue full cooperation in more sensitive strikes and risk censure of the Pakistani government for unilateral actions.

Scenario 3 – Pakistan negotiates with the Taliban

The final scenario's Alternate Futures also have specific Focal Points and indicators which will drive the dynamics of regional security. If Pakistan enters into negotiation with the Taliban, the analyst assesses Alternate Future #2 as being the most in line with US strategic goals. For this Alternate Future to occur, the Tribal Leaders will have to cooperate with the Pakistani government; while it is unlikely with any ceasefire with the Taliban, portions of the negotiated terms would have to include Pakistani control over populace centers in the FATA and NWFP. This would prevent the Talibanization of the region, and secure the Tribal Leaders' primary goals of immediate security. Keeping the Taliban from retaliatory strikes against the Tribal groups would require a Pakistani presence in at least the moderate locations. US negotiations with India would also have to be established to prevent their unilateral strikes within the tribal regions, which would likely cause increased tensions that could revert the tentative peace between the two states.

Alternate Future #6 again provides for similar capabilities for US strategic objectives, however provides the Tribal Leaders' negotiation with the Pakistani government as well. This

would be indicated through an increase in the rise of pro-government tribal militias, and would likely take continued counterinsurgency operations throughout the moderate regions. This would ensure the continued cooperation from the militias while securing the immediate objectives of security for the Tribal Leaders. As with most other Alternate Futures favoring US and CF objectives, this Alternate Future would provide for US unilateral actions targeting specific threats within Pakistan. Likewise, it provides that no future terror attacks originating in Pakistan are carried out against India. The lack of attacks, or intelligence concerning future attacks, will ensure India does not conduct unilateral strikes within the FATA and NWFP. Doing so would likely change the aspects of this study by increasing the number of actions and scenarios for all actors.

XIII. Conclusion

Using the LAMP process to attempt to “predict” the future successes at stabilization of the region shows there are a multitude of actions which can be taken by the individual actors. While the LAMP methodology provides each actor the capability of free will in their actions, an examination of the process allows one to break down and rank the potential Alternate Futures based on both the actors’ perceptions and goals, along with historical actions taken by each. With these Alternate Futures defined and analyzed, decision makers are able to utilize the results at planning for each Alternate Future as they unfold. While this study did not include classified information, the open source results identified in the actors’ past actions show the likely future actions if the relationships remain at the status quo. A more thorough review of the process could be included if other actors – such as breakaway terror groups, Pakistani political movements, or even third state actors, such as Iran – begin to influence the situations. As new

information unfolds, analysts can utilize this process to update the scenarios and potential actions from each of the actors. The methodology also provides a baseline for inclusion of classified information, which could be included in the pairwise comparisons for a more detailed assessment.

At current, however, the author has provided three scenarios which the US and CF will eventually have to operate in over the foreseeable future: 1) Pakistan conducts unilateral actions against the Taliban, 2) Pakistan fully cooperates with the US and CF efforts against the Taliban, and 3) Pakistan again negotiates a ceasefire with the Taliban. While the LAMP methodology is not meant to be a magic mirror into an absolute future, it does provide a thorough review of each of the possible Alternate Futures given each of the scenarios. Under each of these scenarios, we can see the most likely Alternate Futures which will play out with identifiable Focal Points predicting which futures that strategists and senior decision makers can begin planning for.

At the onset of this assessment, there were two research questions the analyst wished to answer: 1) Will Pakistan's recent counterterrorism offensive assist in stabilizing the region? and 2) What are the potential actions from external forces that will affect the Pakistani government's offensive against the Taliban in the FATA and NWFP? The research has provided avenues for US and CF can take which will influence Pakistani, Tribal Leader and Indian actions that should provide a more stabilized region. The research also showed how each of the individual actors' free will decisions could either support or distract from Pakistan's offensive against the Taliban. By understanding the Focal Events and their indicators for each of the Alternate Futures, the US and CF can adjust their own actions to persuade Pakistan to change their actions. Since most of the other actors' (Tribal Leaders' and India's) actions identified in this assessment are tied directly to Pakistan's decisions, the US and CF can focus their influence on the Pakistani

government to shape the threat environment utilizing basic counterinsurgency objectives throughout the FATA and NWFP.

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