

LAMP PAPER

WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF A UNITED STATES DECISION TO
ATTEMPT TO OUST IRAQ'S SADDAM HUSSEIN?

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STEP 1: Determine the issue for which you are trying to predict the most likely future.

What are the potential consequences of a United States decision to attempt to oust Iraq's Saddam Hussein?

Since the end of Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, Iraq and its leader Saddam Hussein have been a thorn in United States foreign policy specifically in the Mideast. In his opening 2002 State of the Union address, President George W. Bush described Iraq as part of the "axis of evil" and that "Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror." In recent months' rhetoric and open statements, the Bush cabinet appears to be serious planning a campaign to drive out Iraq's Saddam Hussein. As the United States advances in this direction, it must be able to anticipate and forecast potential transformations in the situation in order to advance its foreign policy. The United States must understand the possible consequences in the region should it move to oust Saddam Hussein.

STEP 2: Specify the national "actors" involved.

There are three national actors. The two major actors involved are: the United States, personified by President George W. Bush and his administration; and Iraq, personified by President Saddam Hussein.

As a somewhat involved player since the Persian Gulf War, the third actor will be defined as the United Nations. It should be understood that allies of the United States, neighboring Arab states to Iraq, and even world and Arab opinion are included as part of this actor. The U.N., key allies, and the Arab states could be listed as separate actors and subsequently analyzed below. However, the United States' decision to act or not to act is based on the overall combination of all of these players actions. As such, I have combined them as one national actor theoretically responsible for speaking for all--the United Nations.

STEP 3: Perform an in-depth study of how each national actor perceives the issue in question.

Overview

The Persian Gulf War began in August 1990, when Iraqi forces invaded and occupied Kuwait. The conflict culminated in fighting in January and February 1991 between Iraq and an international coalition of forces led by the United States. By the end of the war, the coalition had driven the Iraqis from Kuwait.

The end of the fighting left some key issues unresolved, including UN sanctions against Iraq, which did not end with the war. On April 2, 1991, the Security Council laid out strict demands for ending the sanctions: Iraq would have to accept liability for damages, destroy its chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles, forego any nuclear weapons programs, and accept international inspection to ensure these conditions were met. If Iraq complied with these and other resolutions, the UN would discuss removing the sanctions. Iraq resisted, claiming that its withdrawal from Kuwait was sufficient compliance.

Many Western observers believed the victory was hollow because Saddam Hussein was still in power. At first, when Hussein was greatly weakened, Western powers believed a rebellion might succeed in overthrowing him. Meanwhile, potential rebels within Iraq believed they might receive international help if they rebelled. But when the Shiite population of southern Iraq rebelled shortly after the cease-fire, they were greeted not with international help but with Iraqi military forces returning from the southern front. It quickly became clear that the rebels would receive no international help, although several governments gave them verbal support. Under the terms of the cease-fire, which established "no-fly zones" in the north and south, Iraqis could not attack the Shiites with airplanes, but could use helicopters, which they did to great effect. Spontaneous and loosely organized, the rebellion was crushed almost as quickly as it arose.

The defeat of the Shiites made the debate over helping Iraqi rebels even more urgent. Ultimately, however, most Western governments decided that if Hussein collapsed, Iraq might disintegrate, ushering in a new round of regional instability. A short while later, Kurds in the

north of the country rebelled, and they too received no help. The Kurds were able to withstand Hussein longer than the Shiites, in part because they had a history of organized, armed resistance. In the end, though, the Kurds achieved only a very modest success: a UN-guaranteed haven in the extreme north of the country. No permanent solution—such as Kurdish self-rule—was negotiated.

The UN continued to maintain most of the economic embargo on Iraq after the war, and several coalition countries enforced other sanctions, such as the no-fly zones. As hardships to the Iraqis mounted, the consensus on sanctions decayed. The United States, the United Kingdom, and Kuwait insisted on maintaining the sanctions, however, arguing that many of the hardships were the fault of the Iraqi government. For example, the sanctions allowed Iraq to sell limited amounts of oil for food and medicine if it also designated some of the revenue to pay for damages caused by the war. Until December 1996, Iraq rejected this deal as an infringement on its sovereignty. Hussein also complicated matters by mobilizing forces on the Kuwaiti border in late 1994 and by interfering with the work of UN inspectors. This interference nearly led to renewed military conflict in 1998, but a UN-brokered agreement allowing the inspectors to resume work averted the immediate crisis. Reports that Iraq was continuing to block inspections prompted the United States and Britain to launch a four-day series of air strikes on Iraqi military and industrial targets in December. In response, Iraq declared that it would no longer comply with UN inspection teams, called for an end to the sanctions, and threatened to fire on aircraft patrolling the no-fly zones. Since then, Iraq has continued to challenge the patrols, and U.S. and British planes continue to strike Iraqi missile launch sites and other targets.

United States

Though somewhat verbose, the United States perception on the issue is best summarized in the “Saddam Hussein's Iraq” report prepared by the U.S. Department of State, released September 13, 1999 and updated March 24, 2000. Includes analysis of the impact of sanctions, failure to disarm, and war crimes. Rather than quote the entire report, summaries of vital sections

have been included, closing with the most important--a summary of US policy towards Iraq.

In the *Executive Summary*, the purpose is listed as to present the facts concerning Iraq under Saddam Hussein. There are a wealth of charges and counter-charges concerning actions undertaken by Saddam and by the international community towards Iraq. Based on publicly available information, the facts contained in this report demonstrate that under the regime of Saddam Hussein, Iraq continues to repress its people, threaten the region, and obstruct international efforts to provide humanitarian relief. The United States is helping the Iraqi people in their efforts to bring about a regime that is committed to living in peace with its neighbors and respecting the rights of its citizens. The United States wants to see Iraq return as a respected and prosperous member of the international community, and as the evidence shows, this is unlikely to happen as long as Saddam Hussein is in power. As long as Saddam Hussein is in power, the United States is determined to contain the Iraqi regime and prevent it from threatening the region or its own people. The United States will also continue its efforts to increase humanitarian relief for the people of Iraq, over the obstructions of the regime.

The *Impact of Sanctions Summary* states that sanctions were imposed on Iraq by the international community in the wake of Iraq's brutal invasion of Kuwait. They are intended to prevent the Iraqi regime access to resources that it would use to reconstitute weapons of mass destruction. Sanctions can only be lifted when Iraq complies fully with all relevant UN Security Council resolutions. Saddam Hussein's regime remains a threat to its people and its neighbors, and has not met any of its obligations to the UN that would allow the UN to lift sanctions. The international community, not the regime of Saddam Hussein, is working to relieve the impact of sanctions on ordinary Iraqis.

Sanctions are not intended to harm the people of Iraq. That is why the sanctions regime has always specifically exempted food and medicine. The Iraqi regime has always been free to import as much of these goods as possible. It refuses to do so, even though it claims it wants to relieve the suffering of the people of Iraq.

Saddam Hussein's priorities are clear. If given control of Iraq's resources, Saddam Hussein would use them to rearm and threaten the region, not to improve the lot of the Iraqi people. There is ample proof that lifting sanctions would offer the Iraqi people no relief from neglect at the hands of their government

In the *Iraqi Obstruction of Oil-For-Food* Summary it states that thanks to the oil-for-food program, the people of Iraq, especially those in the north, are getting needed foods and medicines. The program would be even more effective if the Iraqi regime were cooperating. Iraqi obstruction of the oil-for-food program, not United Nations sanctions, is the primary reason the Iraqi people are suffering.

Oil-for-Food Program Helps Iraqis and Iraqi Obstruction, not Sanctions, Hinders Effectiveness. For five years, Iraq resisted international efforts to establish the oil-for-food program. The fact of the matter is, however, that the government of Iraq does not share the international community's concern about the welfare of its people. Baghdad's refusal to cooperate with the oil-for-food program and its deliberate misuse of resources are cynical efforts to sacrifice the Iraqi people's welfare in order to bring an end to UN sanctions without complying with its obligations.

In the *Misuse of Resources by the Regime* Summary, it states that rather than spend money to help its people, Iraq's leaders enrich themselves. With Iraqi oil revenues burgeoning, it's hard to understand why the people of Iraq aren't better off. The reason is because the government of Iraq is mismanaging the oil-for-food program, either deliberately or through incompetence. While the people of Iraq go wanting, their leaders enrich themselves

In addition to the revenues generated under the oil-for-food program, the government of Iraq earns money from other sources which it controls. Rather than spend these funds to help the people of Iraq, Saddam Hussein chooses to build monuments to himself. In addition, he deprives those in need of water and other scarce resources in order to favor elites and other supporters of the regime.

In the *Repression of the Iraqi People* Summary, it states that Saddam Hussein's repression of the Iraqi people has not stopped. He is draining the southern marshes, causing grave environmental damage and forcible relocation of civilians in an attempt to eliminate opposition to the regime. He is murdering Shi'a clerics. He is destroying villages and forcibly relocating people in both the north and the south and destroying villages in the south. International human rights groups and others are gathering evidence and working to establish an international criminal court to try Saddam and his senior aides for war crimes and crimes against humanity. He has used chemical weapons against his own people.

In Resolution 688 (1991), the UN Security Council condemned the Government of Iraq's repression of the Iraqi civilian population, which it concluded threatened international peace and security in the region. The Council demanded that Iraq immediately end this repression and allow immediate access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq. Iraq has neither ended the repression of its civilian population nor allowed outside organizations access to help those in need. The government of Iraq uses military force to repress civilian populations throughout the country, resulting in the deaths of thousands and the destruction of entire villages.

The nature and magnitude of the crimes committed by Saddam Hussein and his regime since 1980 demand that all efforts be made to hold those individuals accountable for their crimes. We believe that Saddam Hussein and key members of his regime should be brought to justice for their past and current crimes.

In the *Evading U.N. Resolutions and Failure to Disarm* Summary, it states that while its repression of the Iraqi people continues, the Iraqi regime still is far from complying with its obligations under United Nations Security Council resolutions. It has not fully complied with a single resolution. It has not fully declared and destroyed its WMD programs. It has not ceased concealment of its WMD. It has not responded fully to questions from UNSCOM and the IAEA. (UNSCRs 687, 707, 715, 1051) It has not returned Kuwaiti and Third Country POWs and

Missing Persons (UNSCRs 686 and 687). 605 Kuwaiti POW/MIAs and 34 Saudis remain unaccounted for. It has not returned all stolen Kuwaiti property (UNSCR 686). In fact, some is still deployed with Iraqi military units. It has not stopped repressing its civilian population (UNSCR 688).

UNSCR 687 and related resolutions 707, 715, and 1051 stipulate that Iraq must provide full, final and complete disclosure of all aspects of its nuclear, chemical, biological, and long-range missile weapons programs; allow unconditional inspection access by international monitors; cease any attempt to conceal, move, or destroy any material or equipment related to these programs; and cooperate with UN monitoring of relevant Iraqi facilities and trade activities.

When these resolutions were passed, it was expected that compliance would require no more than 90 days. Instead, nine years later, sanctions remain in place because Iraq has decided to (1) hide weapons and major components of these programs, (2) secretly destroy older, less-capable weapons and equipment, and (3) give UN inspectors fraudulent declarations to mask weapons and equipment that are still hidden.

In the *Iraq is a Regional Threat* Summary, it states that Iraq under Saddam Hussein remains dangerous, unreconstructed, and defiant. It has not disarmed. It has never apologized or expressed regret for the invasion of Kuwait. It continues to repress its people. This is a dangerous regime that threatens its neighbors, has a long history of aggression, has ambitions to dominate the Gulf by force, and retains the capability to do so. Far from apologizing for its invasion of Kuwait, Iraq continues to assert that its actions were justified.

Not only does Baghdad consider its invasion of Kuwait "honorable," but Saddam Hussein has gone so far as to call for the overthrow of fellow Arab leaders and to attempt to murder the Emir of Kuwait and former president George Bush.

Saddam retains the capability to inflict significant damage upon Iraq's neighbors and its own civilian population

Without sanctions, Saddam would be free to use his resources to rearm and make good on

his threats against Kuwait and the region.

In the *War Crimes Summary*, it states that Saddam Hussein and his closest aides have committed a long list of criminal violations of international humanitarian law and the laws and customs of war. Saddam Hussein and his closest aides should be investigated, indicted, and prosecuted for these crimes. The goal of the United States is to see Saddam indicted by an international tribunal. The US is gathering its own evidence against Saddam and providing support to groups working on Iraqi war crimes issues.

Saddam Hussein seized power in 1979. The list of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by Saddam Hussein and his regime is a long one.

The United States wants to see Saddam and his close aides investigated, indicted, and if possible, prosecuted by an international tribunal. The Yugoslav war crimes tribunal's May 1999 indictment of Slobodan Milosevic for crimes against the Muslim Kosovar Albanian people shows that when crimes are committed on the scale that Saddam Hussein has committed them, justice should be done not just in the name of the victims, but in the name of all humanity. The United States is helping international efforts to gather evidence.

Saddam Hussein's Iraq is a brutal police state and so the collection of evidence of the crimes of the regime is difficult to obtain. Opposition groups work with great courage to bring this news to the world. We are working with Iraqi opposition and human rights groups in support of their efforts to collect additional evidence of Saddam's war crimes. Opposition and human rights groups' efforts include:

The U.S. Government is providing grants to a number of NGO's working on Iraqi war crimes issues. Grants have been provided for gathering evidence, translating captured Iraqi documents written in Arabic into other languages, making evidence of Iraqi war crimes available on the Internet, and taking steps to preserve written, visual and testimonial evidence of the crimes committed by Saddam Hussein's regime. International efforts to draw attention to the war crimes record of the Iraqi regime has already begun:

The Summary of *U.S. Policy* toward Iraq best outlines the US perception on the issue of this thesis. The United States wants to see Iraq return as a respected and prosperous member of the international community. As long as Saddam Hussein is in power, however, the US doesn't believe that that's going to happen.

Given Saddam Hussein's long record of aggression against his neighbors and repression of his own people, and absent any proof that he has in fact disarmed, it is important that the international community remain united in containing this dangerous regime. At the same time, the US is working to relieve the suffering of the Iraqi people through humanitarian relief.

Saddam's record over the past 10 years, however, demonstrates that he will never comply with UN resolutions and that he will continue to repress his own people and threaten his neighbors. That is why the US believes that the only way to address the security needs of the international community and the needs of the people of Iraq is through a new government in Baghdad, one that is committed to living in peace with its neighbors and respecting the rights of its citizens. Iraq, the region, and the world would be better off with a new government in Iraq.

- The US supports the territorial integrity of Iraq. One nation, whole and free. Saddam Hussein is not what's holding Iraq together; he's what's breaking it apart.
- The United States believes that if there is to be change, it must come from within Iraq, led by Iraqis. We do not seek to impose an American solution or a foreign opposition on the people of Iraq.
- In a post-Saddam Iraq, the United States will take the lead to foster economic development, restore Iraqi civil society, rebuild the middle class, and restore Iraq's health and education sectors.

Iraq

The Iraqi perception to the issue is best summarized through a review of the timeline primarily since 1991.

In July 1979 the president, Ahmed Hasan Al-Bakr, was replaced by Saddam Hussein, his vice president, chosen successor, and the true ruler of Iraq. Saddam then assumed both of the

vacated offices and purged political rivals in order to assure his position. Once more the political situation flared into hostilities with Iran. On September 17, 1980 Saddam declares the Iraqi/Iranian borders agreement (Algiers Agreement) null and void, claiming the whole of Shatt el-Arab back to Iraq. The Iran-Iraq War, which began 5 days later on September 22, 1980, lasted for eight years and had a crippling effect on the economy of both countries; in which after eight years of war no territory had been gained by either side but an estimated one million lives had been lost. In July 1988, Iran accepted the terms of UN Resolution 598, and the cease-fire came into force on 20th August 1988. Before Iraq had a chance to recover economically, it was once more plunged into war, this time with its invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

The invasion was the result of a long-standing territorial dispute. Iraq accused Kuwait of violating the Iraqi border to secure oil resources, (on July 17, 1990 Saddam Hussein accused Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates of flooding the world oil market. In addition, he singled out Kuwait for the production of oil from a disputed supply, the Rumaila oil field), and demanded that its debt repayments should be waived. Direct negotiations were begun in July 1990, but they were destined soon to fail; along with reassurance from the United States making a claim that they would not get involved (the famous meeting of Saddam Hussein with April Glaspie, the United States Ambassador to Iraq, on the 25th of July, 1990). This was the go ahead that Hussein needed. Arab mediators convinced Iraq and Kuwait to negotiate their differences in Jiddah, Saudi Arabia, on August 1, 1990, but that session resulted only in charges and countercharges. A second session was scheduled to take place in Baghdad, the Iraqi capital, but Iraq invaded Kuwait the next day. Iraqi troops overran the country shortly after midnight on 2nd August 1990. The U.S. fell short on its claim to not get involved and instantly declared interest in keeping Saudi Arabia safe. The United Nations Security Council and the Arab League immediately condemned the Iraqi invasion. Four days later, the Security Council imposed an economic embargo on Iraq that prohibited nearly all trade with Iraq. Iraq responded to the sanctions by annexing Kuwait as the 19th Province of Iraq on August 8, prompting the exiled Sabah family to call for a stronger

international response. Over the ensuing months, the United Nations Security Council passed a series of resolutions condemned the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, implementing total mandatory economic sanctions against Iraq. Other countries subsequently provided support for "Operation Desert Shield". In November 1990, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 678, permitting member states to use all necessary means, authorizing military action against the Iraqi forces occupying Kuwait, and demanded a complete withdrawal by 15th of January 1991.

When Saddam Hussein failed to comply with this demand, the Gulf War (Operation "Desert Storm") ensued on the 17th of January 1991 (3 a.m. Iraq time), with allied troops of 28 countries, led by the US launching an aerial bombardment on Baghdad. The war, which proved disastrous for Iraq, lasted only six weeks, one hundred and forty thousand tons of firearms had showered down on the country, the equivalent of 7 Hiroshima bombs. Probably as many as 100,000 Iraqi soldiers were killed and tens of thousands of civilians. Allied air raids destroyed roads, bridges, factories, and oil industry facilities (shutting down the national refining and distribution system)' and disrupted electric, telephone, and water service. Conference centers and shopping and residential areas were hit. Hundreds of Iraqis were killed in the attack on the Al-Amiriyah bomb shelter. Diseases spread through contaminated drinking water because water purification and sewage treatment facilities could not operate without electricity. A cease-fire was announced by the US on 28th February 1991. UN terms for a permanent cease-fire were agreed by Iraq in April of that year, and strict conditions were imposed, demanding the disclosure and destruction of all stockpiles of weapons.

A few days after the war had ended, popular insurrections broke out in southern Iraq and in Kurdistan in the north, where rebels took control of most of the region's towns. The United States (President George Bush) again fell short of its commitments in protecting the uprising, let the people exposed. Units of the Republican Guard that had survived the conflict acted with extreme brutality and gained the upper hand in the Basrah, Najaf and Karbala regions. In the southern cities, rebels killed Baathist officials, members of the security service and other

supporters of the regime.

Meanwhile, in Kurdistan, Iraqi helicopters and troops regained control of the cities taken by the rebels and there was a mass exodus of Kurds, fearing a repeat of the 1988 chemical attacks, to the Turkish and Iranian borders. By the end of April there were 2.5 million refugees. In late April 1991, it was announced that there had been an agreement to implement the Kurdish peace plan of 1970; however, again, negotiations were stalled on the delineation of the borders of the Kurdish autonomous region with the Kurds insisting on the inclusion of Karkuk.

The United States, in an attempt to prevent the genocide of the Marsh Arabs in southern Iraq and the Kurds to the north, declared “no-fly zones” north of the 36th parallel and south of the 32nd parallel. The Clinton administration judged an alleged attempted assassination of former President George Bush while in Kuwait to be worthy of a military response on 27 June 1993. The Iraqi Intelligence Headquarters in Baghdad was targeted by 23 Tomahawk cruise missiles, launched from US warships in the Red Sea and Arabian Gulf. Three missiles were declared to have missed the target, causing some collateral damage to nearby residential housing and eight civilian deaths.

A military conflict was brewing between two Kurdish rival parties. Kurds had often disputed over land rights, and as their economic and political security deteriorated in the early 1990s, the conflicts became more extreme.

In May 1994 supporters of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) clashed with supporters of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), leaving 300 people dead. Over the next two years the PUK and KDP fought several more times, eventually devolving into a state of civil war. In August 1996, leaders of the KDP asked Saddam Hussein to intervene in the war. Hussein sent about 30,000 troops into the US-protected Kurdish region, capturing the PUK stronghold of Irbil. The KDP was immediately installed in power. The United States responded with two missile strikes against southern Iraq, but in early September Iraq again helped KDP fighters, this time taking the PUK stronghold of As-Sulaymaniyah.

In October 1994, Iraq moved some Republican Guard units towards Kuwait, an act that provoked a large-scale US troop deployment to the Gulf to deter any Iraqi attack. The move was interpreted as a sign of Saddam's frustration with the continuation of UN sanctions, but afterwards he took a more moderate line, agreeing to recognize the existence and borders of Kuwait. In the months that followed his position appeared to become more precarious as dissatisfaction with his rule spread in the army and among the tribes and clans at the core of his regime. In June clashes broke out with the Dulaimi tribe, which supplied many of his senior officers after one of them was said to have been secretly executed by the regime. These culminated in the brutal suppression of demonstrations in the town of Ramadi by troops under the control of Saddam son, Uday, and in a subsequent attack on Abu Grein prison by a dissident military unit dominated by members of the Dulaym tribe.

In May 1995 Saddam sacked his half-brother, Wathban, as Interior Minister and in July demoted his notorious and powerful Defense Minister, Ali Hassan al- Majid, known popularly as 'Chemical Ali' because of his role in gassing operations in Kurdistan. These personnel changes were the result of the growth in power of his two sons, Uday and Qusai, who were given effective vice-presidential authority in May 1995. They have been able to remove most of Saddam's loyal followers and it is clear that Saddam feels more secure protected by his immediate family members. In August Major General Hussein Kamil Hassan al-Majid, his Minister of Military Industries and a key henchman, defected to Jordan, together with his wife (one of Saddam's daughters) and his brother, Saddam, who was married to another of the president's daughters, and called for the overthrow of the regime. In response, Saddam promised full co-operation with the UN commission disarming Iraq in order to pre-empt any revelations that the defector could make.

The weakening of the internal position of the regime occurred at a time when the external opposition forces were as weak as ever, too divided among themselves to take any effective action. At the same time, France and Russia have pushed for an easing of sanctions. US determination to keep up the pressure on Iraq has prevailed however. In any case, the apparent

weakening of the regime was illusory, not least when the two defectors returned home and were killed, apparently by other clan members, in an awful warning to other potential defectors. In fact, during 1996, the regime's grip on power seemed to have significantly strengthened despite its inability to end the UN sanctions against it.

In August 1996, leaders of the KDP asked Hussein to intervene in the war. He sent at least 30,000 troops into the Kurdish enclave protected by international forces, capturing the PUK stronghold of Irbil. The international forces retreated from the enclave rather than intervene in the dispute. The KDP was installed in power. The United States responded to Hussein's incursion with two missile strikes against southern Iraq, but the following month Iraq again helped KDP fighters, this time taking the PUK stronghold of As Sulaymaniyah. By 1997, the KDP with Hussein's assistance ruled most of northern Iraq.

In September 1998 the PUK and KDP signed an agreement calling for the establishment of a joint regional government. Although implementation of the agreement proceeded more slowly than planned, it resulted in an end to the fighting between the two groups.

The economic crisis in Iraq continued to worsen since 1995 and 1996. Prices are high, food and medicine shortages were rampant, and the free-market (unofficial) exchange rate for the dinar is in severe decline. Hussein blamed the UN sanctions for the Iraqi suffering. Although the sanctions continued, in April 1995 the UN Security Council voted unanimously to allow Iraq to sell limited amounts of oil to meet its urgent humanitarian needs. Iraq initially rejected the plan but then accepted it in 1996; it began to export oil at the end of that year. In 1998 the UN increased the amount of oil Iraq was allowed to sell, but Iraq was unable to take full advantage of this increase because its production capabilities had deteriorated under the sanctions.

Hussein's insistence that UN weapons inspectors leave nearly brought Iraq into another military crisis in early 1998. However, UN secretary general Kofi Annan negotiated an agreement that secured Iraq's compliance and averted military strikes by the United States and its allies. In December, in response to reports that Iraq was continuing to block inspections, the

United States and Britain launched a four-day series of air strikes on Iraqi military and industrial targets. In response, Iraq declared that it would no longer comply with UN inspection teams, called for an end to the sanctions, and fired on aircraft patrolling the “no-fly zones.” Through today, Iraq continues to challenge the patrols, and British and U.S. planes strike Iraqi missile launch sites and other targets. Inspectors departed Iraq and have not returned.

Hussein’s Iraq views the sanctions as the reason behind the Iraq people suffering. It views the “no-fly zones” as violations on its sovereignty. Despite several rebellions, coup attempts, and forced isolation from the international community, Saddam Hussein has painted himself as an Arab and Muslim hero who for the last decade has taken on the Western world and has not been defeated. Hussein has succeeded in facing down all challenges to his rule.

United Nations

The perception of the third actor is a combination of the U.N., key US allies, and Arab states best summarized through the UN perspective.

A longstanding tension exists between many of those that comprise the third actor (referenced through this thesis as the UN) and the United States. The UN constrains the United States by creating the one coalition that can rival U.S. power—that of all other nations. The United States has a streak of isolationism in its foreign policy that runs counter to the idea of the UN. But the UN also benefits the United States in many ways. It amplifies U.S. power because the United States usually leads the UN coalition. It helps keep world peace, which the United States is not rich or strong enough to do by itself. And it helps keep the world stable, providing a good climate for international trade. The United States gives the United Nations major financial backing and credibility in the arena of world problems. The United Nations gives the United States a route through which to extend its own foreign policy and agenda. The UN has and can keep the United States in check when it disagrees with US policy. However, without the United States and its continued support, the United Nations legitimacy in dealing with the various world problems and crises is severely hampered.

STEP 4: Specify all possible courses of action for each actor.

The two actors have two options each:

United States:

- A. Attempts to oust Saddam Hussein.
- B. Does not attempt to oust Saddam Hussein.

Iraq:

- A. Saddam Hussein does not remain in power.
- B. Saddam Hussein remains in power.

United Nations:

- A. Support efforts to oust Saddam Hussein.
- B. Do not support efforts to oust Saddam Hussein.

STEP 5: Determine the major scenarios within which you will compare the alternate futures.

Scenario 1: Diplomatic Action (DA) - Through diplomacy, the United States forces Saddam Hussein from power.

Through various diplomatic actions, the United States works with the United Nations to develop and enforce new sanctions. Inspectors are allowed to return to search for weapons of mass destruction. Containment through enforcement of the No-Fly Zones and economic sanctions would continue until the Iraqi government fully complies and submits to post-Persian Gulf War resolutions. Once enacted and full Iraqi compliance is obtained, a drive for free and democratic elections would follow bringing about a change in government.

Scenario 2: Overt Military Action (MA) - The United States executes some form of overt military action to oust Saddam Hussein from power.

Frustrated by diplomatic endeavors, enforcement of sanctions, and actions of the last decade, the United States develops a military operation designed to oust Saddam Hussein from power. The overall operation would be based upon clear objectives and would be carried out with full force. The Bush administration would only execute the campaign with the firm belief and calculated understanding of success regardless of outside opinion. While certain aspects of the overall operation would have to be covert, the overall aspect of the operation would be overt and military in nature.

Scenario 3: Covert Political Action (PA) - The United States ousts Saddam Hussein through covert political action.

Unsure of the success of military action and frustrated by diplomatic actions of the last decade, the United States covertly works with allies, neighboring states and groups within Iraq. The United States would provide financial support and training through advisors to the states and groups involved. The United States might be possibly be forced to consider political bartering within other areas of the Mid-East. If carried out, neighboring states would pressure the Iraqi government economically and even religiously. Groups such as Kurds, Shia, and even Sunni,

would internally apply pressure through continued civil disobedience, defections, and other coercive actions.

STEP 6: Calculate the total number of permutations of possible “alternate futures” for each scenario.

Using the formula $X^y = Z$, where X equals the total number of courses of action available, y equals the total number of actors and Z equals the total number of alternate futures for comparison.

Scenario 1 (DA): $2^3 = 8$

Scenario 2 (MA): $2^3 = 8$

Scenario 3 (PA): $2^3 = 8$

STEP 7: Perform a pairwise comparison of all “alternate futures” to determine their relative probability.

Scenario 1: Diplomatic Action (DA)

Possible Future	United States	Iraq	United Nations	Votes
1	A	A	A	6
2	A	A	B	3
3	A	B	B	7
4	B	B	B	5
5	B	B	A	2
6	B	A	A	0
7	B	A	B	1
8	A	B	A	4

Scenario 2: Military Action (MA)

Possible Future United States	Iraq	United Nations	Votes
1	A	A	6
2	A	B	7
3	A	B	5
4	B	B	3
5	B	A	2
6	B	A	0
7	B	B	1
8	A	A	4

Scenario 3: Political Action (PA)

Possible Future United States	Iraq	United Nations	Votes
1	A	A	2
2	A	B	4
3	A	B	7
4	B	B	6
5	B	A	2
6	B	A	0
7	B	B	4
8	A	A	3

STEP 8: Rank the “alternate futures” for each scenario from highest relative probability to the lowest based on the number of “votes” received.

Analysis above and in works cited indicates the Bush administration is seriously considering action in some form to oust Saddam Hussein from power. The U.S. and its fragile coalition’s containment policy has bolstered Hussein’s appeal within Iraq, the Arab world, and abroad as he continues to remain in power beating the alliance at its own game. As seen during the last decade, the possibility of forcing Saddam Hussein from power via diplomatic actions and even covert political actions have ended in failure. Even though the United Nations would support the Scenario 1 (DA), diplomacy thus far has ultimately been unsuccessful in the eyes of the Bush administration. Covert political actions have been botched or not fully followed through on, and as such, groups and neighboring states are less likely to want to become involved.

Actions and bartering required for the Scenario 3 (PA) may be too costly to achieve the objective

Because of this, Scenario 2 (MA) will be examined as the most likely scenario that the United States will follow. The possible futures of Scenario 2 (MA) have been arranged below from those receiving the most votes to the least, or none. For the purpose of this thesis, we will not discuss each of the alternate futures that are possible. We will analyze the four that received the most votes and are the most like futures.

Scenario 2: Military Action (MA)

Possible Future	United States	Iraq	United Nations	Votes
2	A	A	B	7
1	A	A	A	6
3	A	B	B	5
8	A	B	A	4
4	B	B	B	3
5	B	B	A	2
7	B	A	B	1
6	B	A	A	0

Assumptions for Scenario 2 (MA):

The Bush administration will have attempted to build support with allies, major members of the United Nations, and key Arab states.

Iraq will have attempted to re-establish/strengthen ties within the Arab world.

The overall situation between Israel and the Palestinians will not have escalated to an all-out overt war.

The U.S. war on terrorism will trim down from large-scale military operations to small-scale special operations.

Iraq will continue to attempt to make itself appear to be oppressed on by the United States.

The United States will continue to attempt to demonstrate that Iraq is a major part of the “Axis of Evil.”

Counter to any normalization efforts, Iraq will follow through with action(s) that violate(s) existing UN resolutions and sanctions.

The United States will discover evidence justifying overt military action.

The United States’ operational plan will have a clear objective and a high probability of

success.

Alternate future (AF) 2 received the most votes with seven votes, followed by AF 1 with six votes, AF 3 with five votes, and AF 8 with four votes.

STEP 9: Assuming that each future occurs, analyze each “alternate future” in terms of its consequences for the issue in question.

What are the potential consequences of a United States decision to attempt to oust Iraq’s Saddam Hussein?

Alternate Future 2

AF 2 predicts that the United States is successful in ousting Saddam Hussein from power through overt military action even without the support of the United Nations, major Arab states, and quite possibly key allies. Without the support, the United States would be forced to be absolutely sure in the necessity of removing Hussein. The Bush administration would also have to be as positive in its planning, objectives, and equally confident of the potential success of the overall mission. Iraq would resist and attempt to paint itself as the underdog being picked on by the superpower. Upon removing Hussein, the United States would have to be ready to respond to the effects of the vacuum in the Iraqi government. Diplomatically, the United States, after going it alone, would also have to respond to potential backlash from allies, Arab states and the United Nations. A Bush administration objective would have been met but at the expense of world opinion possibly negatively affecting United States’ national interests in the region. Regional instability could ensue.

Alternate Future 1

AF 1 predicts that the United States is successful in ousting Saddam Hussein from power through overt military action with support from key allies, major Arab states, and the United Nations. With less diplomatic pressure because of the support from the allies, Arab states, and the United Nations, the Bush administration would have more flexibility in executing an overall response to remove Hussein. The support and the flexibility creates the ideal scenario for the

United States from which to operate increasing possible response options. The removal of Hussein would be viewed as something necessary for overall global stability especially in light of the war against terrorism and control of weapons of mass destruction. Iraq would still resist and attempt to paint itself as the underdog being picked on by the superpower. The United States would still have to be ready to respond to the effects of the vacuum in the Iraqi government. Regional stability would be maintained along with both United States' and United Nations' interests being met.

Alternate Future 3

AF 3 predicts that the United States is not successful in its attempt to oust Saddam Hussein from power through overt military action with the added burden of not having support from the United Nations, major Arab states, and quite possibly key allies. Without the support, the United States would be forced to be absolutely sure in the necessity of removing Hussein. The Bush administration would also have to be as positive in its planning, objectives, and equally confident of the potential success of the overall mission. Iraq would resist and attempt to paint itself as the underdog being picked on by the superpower. Failure to remove Hussein, the United States would have to respond by either pulling out totally from the region, risking further escalation, or attempting to regain a status quo to the situation as it is today. A pull out would lead to an huge failure of United States foreign policy with a potential effect for the U.S. worldwide. Further escalation without the support of the United Nations, Arab states, and allies would continue to damage U.S. interests potentially leading to the same overall failure. Attempting to regain a status quo would be difficult in light of the lack of support from the United Nations, Arab states, and key allies. With this failure, regional instability could ensue. Iraq would be tempted to once again view Kuwait as a potential target. United States national interests within the region and worldwide would be in jeopardy.

Alternate Future 8

AF 3 predicts that even with support from allies, major Arab states and the United Nations, the United States is not successful in its attempt to oust Saddam Hussein from power through overt military action. With less diplomatic pressure because of the support from the allies, Arab states, and the United Nations, the Bush administration would have more flexibility in executing an overall response to remove Hussein. The support and the flexibility creates the ideal scenario for the United States from which to operate increasing possible response options. The removal of Hussein would be viewed as something necessary for overall global stability especially in light of the war against terrorism and control of weapons of mass destruction. Iraq would still resist and attempt to paint itself as the underdog being picked on by the superpower. Failure, however, would damage not only United States interests but also that of the United Nations, involved Arab states, and allies. With the support of these players, the United States could possibly maintain a status quo similar to the situation as it is today. Iraq would make Hussein an Arab and Muslim hero who had taken on the pagan infidels and won. Long term Arab and Muslim support could fade. With this failure, regional instability could ensue. Iraq would be tempted to once again view Kuwait as a potential target. United States' and United Nations' interests within the region and worldwide could be in jeopardy.

STEP 10: State the potential of a given alternate future to "transpose" into another alternate future.

The futures in all of the scenarios listed above have the possibility to "transpose" into other futures at a later time. For the same reasons stated in Step 8, the four above Scenario 2 (MA) futures will be examined in depth along with the alternate futures in both Scenario 1 (DA) and Scenario 3 (PA) that received the most votes.

Scenario 1 (DA) Alternate Future 3 to Scenario 2 (MA)

Based on recent United States foreign policy and State Department actions, Scenario 1 (DA) Alternate Future 3 (US diplomatic efforts fail in gaining overall outside support to oust Hussein)

has possibly already occurred and as such the Bush administration is now reviewing overt military options--a transposition to Scenario 2 (MA). Scenario 1 (DA) Alternate Future 3 received the most votes within Scenario 1 (DA).

Scenario 3 (PA) Alternate Future 3 to Scenario 2 (MA)

Without knowing in full US actions within the covert political arena, Scenario 3 (PA) Alternate Future (US covert political efforts fail in gaining overall outside support to oust Hussein) has also possibly occurred and again the Bush administration is now reviewing overt military options--a transposition to Scenario 2 (MA). Scenario 3 (PA) Alternate Future 3 also received the most votes within Scenario 3 (PA).

Scenario 2 (MA) Alternate Future 2 to Alternate Future 1

If the United States appears to be successful in overt military action in ousting Saddam Hussein, fickle allies, Arab states, and even the United Nations may become supportive in order to share in the glory of U.S. actions. Further motivation for the switch would be to regain favor with the United States along with the added economic and security benefits that come with siding with a superpower.

Scenario 2 (MA) Alternate Future 1 to Alternate Future 2

If the United States appears to be unsuccessful in overt military action in ousting Saddam Hussein, supportive allies, Arab states, and even the United Nations may vacillate on their backing. These players would not want to share in the blame for a potential failed operation. Their pull of support could have an effect on their overall standing with the United States if the US is successful in ousting Hussein.

Scenario 2 (MA) Alternate Future 8 to Alternate Future 3

If the United States appears to be unsuccessful in overt military action in ousting Saddam Hussein, supportive allies, Arab states, and even the United Nations may vacillate on their backing. These players would not want to share in the blame of for a potential failed operation nor have to deal with the diplomatic and foreign policy crisis that would arise from the US's

failure to oust Saddam Hussein.

STEP 11: Determine the “focal events” that must occur in our present in order to bring about a given “alternate future”.

Alternate Future 2

U.S. diplomatic and covert political actions fail.

U.S. attempts to build support for military actions fail.

Iraq attempts to re-establish/strengthen ties within the Arab world.

The overall situation between Israel and the Palestinians will not escalate to an all-out overt war.

The United States will use apparent Iraqi violations of U.N. sanctions or other evidence tying Iraq to terrorist organizations as proof to justify overt military action.

Alternate Future 1

U.S. diplomatic and political actions that would prevent overt military actions fail.

Bush administration builds support for military action with allies, major members of the United Nations, and key Arab states.

Iraq attempts at re-establishing/strengthening ties within the Arab world fail.

The overall situation between Israel and the Palestinians will not escalate to an all-out overt war.

Iraq will conduct action(s) that violate(s) existing UN resolutions and sanctions.

The United States and the coalition will use Iraqi violations as proof to justify overt military action.

Alternate Future 3

U.S. diplomatic and covert political actions fail.

U.S. attempts at building support for military actions fail.

Iraq attempts to re-establish/strengthen ties within the Arab world.

The overall situation between Israel and the Palestinians will not escalate to an all-out

overt war.

The United States will use apparent Iraqi violations of U.N. sanctions or other evidence tying Iraq to terrorist organizations as proof to justify overt military action.

Alternate Future 8

U.S. diplomatic and political actions that would prevent overt military actions fail.

Bush administration succeeds in building support for military action with allies, major members of the United Nations, and key Arab states.

Iraq attempts to re-establish/strengthen ties within the Arab world fail.

The overall situation between Israel and the Palestinians will not escalate to an all-out overt war.

Iraq will conduct action(s) that violate(s) existing UN resolutions and sanctions.

The United States and the coalition will use Iraqi violations as proof to justify overt military action.

STEP 12: Determine indicators for the focal events.

Alternate Future 2

Dispatched high-ranking U.S. State officials unsuccessfully attempt to coordinate support for actions outlined in Scenario 1 (DA).

Kurd and Shia groups within Iraq refuse offers of any U.S. assistance.

U.N. members and Arab nations publicly warn the U.S. not to attempt any large-scale military action against Iraq.

Iraqi participation within Arab summits is received positively by the Arab members.

Israeli/Palestinian acts of aggression are held in check and do not escalate.

In the war on terrorism, U.S. military operations in Afghanistan decrease.

In the war on terrorism, U.S. military operations in the Philippines and the Horn of Africa do not expand.

Through propaganda, Iraq attempts to make itself appear to be oppressed on by the

United States.

Through the press and official statements, the United States will continually demonstrate that Iraq is a major part of the “Axis of Evil.”

Iraq will appear to conduct action(s) that violate(s) existing UN resolutions and sanctions.

The United States will use Iraqi violations or other evidence tying Iraq to terrorist organizations as proof to justify overt military action.

Saudi Arabia refuses to allow U.S. forces based in its kingdom to participate in any offensive operations against Iraq.

Turkey refuses to allow U.S. forces based in its country to participate in any offensive operations against Iraq.

Due to the lack of support, the United States will adjust location of forces and increase military strength within the area.

Alternate Future 1

Dispatched high-ranking U.S. State officials unsuccessfully attempt to coordinate support for actions outlined in Scenario 1 (DA).

Kurd and Shia groups within Iraq refuse offers of any U.S. assistance.

Key U.S. allies publicly support U.S. efforts against Iraq.

Iraqi participation within Arab summits is received negatively by the Arab members.

Israeli/Palestinian acts of aggression are held in check and do not escalate.

In the war on terrorism, U.S. military operations in Afghanistan decrease.

In the war on terrorism, U.S. military operations in the Philippines and the Horn of Africa do not expand.

Through propaganda, Iraq attempts to make itself appear to be oppressed on by the United States.

Through the press and official statements, the United States will continually demonstrate that Iraq is a major part of the “Axis of Evil.”

Iraq conducts action(s) that violate(s) existing UN resolutions and sanctions.

The United States will use Iraqi violations or other evidence tying Iraq to terrorist organizations as proof to justify overt military action.

Saudi Arabia allows U.S. forces based in its kingdom to continue to participate in any military operations against Iraq.

Turkey allows U.S. forces based in its country to continue to participate in any military operations against Iraq.

The United States and the coalition will adjust forces and increase military strength within the area.

Alternate Future 3

Dispatched high-ranking U.S. State officials unsuccessfully attempt to coordinate support for actions outlined in Scenario 1 (DA).

Kurd and Shia groups within Iraq refuse offers of any U.S. assistance.

U.N. members and Arab nations publicly warn the U.S. not to attempt any large-scale military action against Iraq.

Iraqi participation within Arab summits is received positively by the Arab members.

Israeli/Palestinian acts of aggression are held in check and do not escalate.

In the war on terrorism, U.S. military operations in Afghanistan decrease.

In the war on terrorism, U.S. military operations in the Philippines and the Horn of Africa do not expand.

Through propaganda, Iraq attempts to make itself appear to be oppressed on by the United States.

Through the press and official statements, the United States will continually demonstrate that Iraq is a major part of the "Axis of Evil."

Iraq will appear to conduct action(s) that violate(s) existing UN resolutions and sanctions.

The United States will use Iraqi violations or other evidence tying Iraq to terrorist

organizations as proof to justify overt military action.

Saudi Arabia refuses to allow U.S. forces based in its kingdom to participate in any offensive operations against Iraq.

Turkey refuses to allow U.S. forces based in its country to participate in any offensive operations against Iraq.

Due to the lack of support, the United States will adjust location of forces and increase military strength within the area

Iraq successfully defends against any attempts to topple Hussein.

Alternate Future 8

Dispatched high-ranking U.S. State officials unsuccessfully attempt to coordinate support for actions outlined in Scenario 1 (DA).

Kurd and Shia groups within Iraq refuse offers of any U.S. assistance.

Key U.S. allies publicly support U.S. efforts against Iraq.

Iraqi participation within Arab summits is received negatively by the Arab members.

Israeli/Palestinian acts of aggression are held in check and do not escalate.

In the war on terrorism, U.S. military operations in Afghanistan decrease.

In the war on terrorism, U.S. military operations in the Philippines and the Horn of Africa do not expand.

Through propaganda, Iraq attempts to make itself appear to be oppressed on by the United States.

Through the press and official statements, the United States will continually demonstrate that Iraq is a major part of the "Axis of Evil."

Iraq conducts action(s) that violate(s) existing UN resolutions and sanctions.

The United States will use Iraqi violations or other evidence tying Iraq to terrorist organizations as proof to justify overt military action.

Saudi Arabia allows U.S. forces based in its kingdom to continue to participate in any

military operations against Iraq.

Turkey allows U.S. forces based in its country to continue to participate in any military operations against Iraq.

The United States and the coalition will adjust forces and increase military strength within the area .

Iraq successfully defends against any attempts to topple Hussein.

Conclusions:

Actions that will occur might well be a mix of all three of the scenarios above...with the basic goal of changing Iraqi leadership. The United States will continue to attempt diplomatic efforts with the United Nations and Arab States. The Bush administration will continue to attempt covert negotiations with Iraq dissidents. The track record of both diplomacy and covert political actions has not been good. The common denominator in all of the actions is the threat of some military action should Iraq not change its ways. Iraq has been a thorn in the side of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. The U.S. cannot focus better attention on issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian problem, Iran, or even the war on terrorism because of the focus it has to place on the Hussein regime. The Bush administration will act to remove Saddam Hussein from power.

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