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IN520 ANALYTIC METHODS

Rearming Georgia
LAMP Study
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IN520 Analytic Methods
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In August 2008 the Russian Army entered Georgia ostensibly to protect Russian citizens in the breakaway Georgian republic of South Ossetia. Not content to eject the Georgian Army from the breakaway republic, the Russians went on to occupy much of Georgia proper. After attriting the Georgian Army and destroying stockpiles of western supplied arms and equipment and with the urging of the international community, the Russians withdrew to South Ossetia, which then declared its independence, from Georgia, as did the breakaway Republic of Abkhazia. Russia immediately recognized the Independence of the two breakaway regions. Following the short conflict Poland and the Czech Republic accepted the Proposed basing of American Missile defenses on their respective territories. The Russians responded with threats of nuclear destruction and the world wondered if the Cold War had returned.

Increased economic ties between Russia and the EU add a new dimension to competition between the East (Russia) and the West. Moscow can exert a great deal of pressure on the EU through its control of much of Europe's energy supply. Much of that energy comes from the Caspian basin. Those resources not controlled by Russia or Iran pass through the Caucasus, this includes pipelines in the Republic of Georgia.

The US looks to a new beginning with a President whose electoral campaign promised to regain Americas' respected place in the world. But a change in leadership does not alter vital

national interests, such as alternatives to Middle Eastern oil and maintaining strong European alliances. If Russia is set on challenging the United States then the US must either neutralize them or find a means to subvert them, that is, to convince them their interests are better served in alignment with our own.

With the economic crunch the US government will prioritize where it will expend resources. Georgia sitting astride vital pipelines as it does deserves to be high on the list of priorities. It is in our interest to develop a pro-US block in the Caucasus Region to a monopoly over energy resources by the Russians. This means rearming and retraining the Georgian Army or ceding the region to the control of others.

If the Georgian Army performed as poorly as portrayed by some in the media, is it cost effective to rearm them? After many years, beginning in 2003, of training by the US military and resources expended by the American government surely the Georgians should have made a better showing. We need to examine how the Russian were able to so readily defeat an American trained Army and then determine if it is possible to make the necessary improvements so that it does not happen again. Barring that the US must find another means of sustaining National interests in the Region.

Since the war in Aug 2008 the world has taken renewed interest in Russia's place in the world. In depth studies will come with time but even now there has been a plethora of materiel written on the subject from every possible viewpoint. Where we find the interests of the various countries involved best laid out is at the source. The Internet gives access to Government websites where is found the sometimes-explicit discussion of a country or Organization's views. Other times there are hidden agendas, which the analysts then attempt to decipher.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The breakup of Yugoslavia accentuated Russia's loss of influence in the world after the fall of the Soviet Union. The recent independence of Kosovo highlighted the West's ability to impose its will while ignoring that of Russia. Kosovo's independence was accompanied by warnings that other breakaway regions may push for independence. Georgia's Abkhazia and South Ossetia were often cited as examples. Russia recognized the two regions' independence seemingly as payback for Kosovo.

Russia is seeking to reestablish itself as a world leader if not attempting an outright challenge to the U.S dominant position. A good place to begin understanding Russian intentions is Vladimir Putin. Although replaced as President of Russia by Medvedev, Putin has retained power for himself in his current position as Prime Minister. When Putin became President of Russia in 1999 he laid out his plans for Russia in the paper, *Russia at the turn of the Millennium, Public Affairs*, (Putin, 1999), and in an autobiography, *First Person* (Putin and others, 2000). Putin explained his desire to return Russia to its place of influence in the world by rebuilding the Russian Peoples' confidence in the State and their pride in the Country. He stated it was necessary to rebuild Russia's strength in order to have a secure place at the table. The West was able to ignore Russia and impose its will during the Kosovo Crisis of 1999 because Russia lacked the power necessary to be considered a serious influence.

Putin claimed he was not adverse to NATO expansion, but didn't feel Russia was a full-fledged participant in the process of enlarging NATO. Putin said, "I don't see any reason why cooperation between Russia and NATO should not develop further, but only if Russia is treated as an equal partner," (Putin, 2000, p177). Interestingly Putin called the Soviet interventions in

Hungary and Czechoslovakia mistakes that resulted in Russo-phobia in Europe. This seems to be a mistake he repeated in Georgia.

He speaks of Patriotism and Pride as important to the health of the country without which the nation is not capable of great achievements. And the might of a country is manifest in its ability to lead. Other strengths he speaks of are intellectual and natural resources. Putin wants Russia to rise to the “summits of world civilization.” Indeed he states Russia will always be a great power because it has cultural and economic characteristics that make it so.

Putin states communism was not a sound economic system. In order to recover, Russia had to make its own way by combining principles of the market economy with the unique qualities of Russia. He encouraged economic growth through foreign investments, integration into the global economy and gaining acceptance into WTO. Recent statements by Medvedev that WTO is not important to Russia are probably false. Putin says one of the problems of the post-Soviet years was a lack of clear national objectives. To rectify this a Strategic Research Center was established which would develop long-term strategy. Putin has followed through on much of the plan laid out in 1999-2000. In view of this long term planning, it is likely the events in Georgia were calculated well in advance and Russian desire to join the WTO likely remains.

After Russia and the United States, Europe is the third great actor in the Georgian drama. The European Unions’ increased economic ties with Russia add a new dimension to competition between the East (Russia) and the West (US and EU), which did not exist during the Cold War. Europe may find itself reliant on Russian energy if alternatives are not pursued and kept open. A monopoly over energy resources would provide the Russians a powerful means of bending European policy to its will. Unlike Russia, however, Europe does not present a united front or

clear set of objectives. Europe can be divided any number of ways. A distinction between “Old” Europe dominated by Germany and France and “New” Europe dominated by Poland has sometimes been made. A better distinction is between the European Union and NATO.

The European Unions Institute for Security Studies, ISS, is a European think tank, (Fischer, 2002). Recent analysis on Russian relations and the Georgian conflict can be found here. The ISS claims Russia as an important market for European goods and services. Economic interdependence exists between the EU and Russia; Europe is Russia’s most important trade partner and Russia is the most important energy supplier to the EU. The EU expressed a desire to develop a strategic partnership with Russia but acknowledges this is becoming increasingly difficult.

The ISS asks itself whether a new bipolarity has emerged, with authoritarian Russia on one side and the democratic Euro-Atlantic alliance on the other. And if so should the EU align its strategy with NATO’s? The EU believes conflict resolution comes not from military power but from working together with other world leaders and wants Russia to be counted among the conflict resolvers rather than among the conflict makers, (Vasconcelos, 2002). The ISS cites Yugoslavia as an example of conflict resolution through multi-lateral cooperation, this overlooks the NATO bombs required to bring the conflict to an end and Russian discontent with the independence of Kosovo. In fact there remains some question as to whether the Yugoslav conflict is resolved at all.

It appears to the EU that Moscow miscalculated in assessing the strength of the West’s reaction to the Georgian war. Although military confrontation between East and West is not likely the consequences of the war are according to the ISS; accelerated deployment of US

Missile defenses in Europe, continued NATO enlargement with renewed enthusiasm and a potential increase in US/Georgian Security cooperation.

The Europeans credit Russian belligerence with escalating the Georgian crisis and also blame the US for neglecting to use its leverage on Georgian President Saakashvili to avert the crisis. The Europeans place most fault on Saakashvili and the Bush administration gets blamed for encouraging Saakashvili through omitting to stop the increasing tensions.

The ISS believe Russia and US need each other; the US needs Russian cooperation in Afghanistan, North Korea and Iran, and Russia needs the US for acceptance into the WTO and to integrate into the global economic system. Europe feels President-elect Obama's priorities are to sort out Iraq and Afghanistan, and Russia's cooperation on these matters is more important than Tbilisi. Obama will not push for Russia's isolation, (Zaborowski, 2002). The EU is likely correct in assessing the new US administration will seek some measure of reconciliation with the Russians.

Although largely a European organization, or at least an organization made up largely of European countries, NATO has a different agenda than the EU and is generally more in line with US policy. Again this organizations' policy can be found on their website, (NATO, 2008). NATO expresses a commitment to Georgia's eventual entrance into the alliance and to helping the country recover from the recent conflict.

NATO offered Georgia an Intensified Dialogue on membership in September 2006. At their Summit in Bucharest in April 2008, NATO leaders agreed that Georgia would become a member of the Alliance. A December summit to look again at Georgian membership was cooler to the idea. Although officially, NATO is all for Georgian membership, reality maybe slightly

different as Germany appears less enthusiastic since August.

Georgia, for its part, remains enthusiastic in its desire to Westernize. Its aims are laid out on government websites such as that of the Ministry of foreign affairs, (MFA, 2008), and of the Ministry of Defense of Georgia, (MOD, 2008). Georgian aims are quite simple; strengthen its ties to the West. Georgian Official sites leave no doubt in the mind of the reader that Russia is seen as the enemy. Georgia Knows it needs a powerful ally to offset the power of Russia. And so Georgia redoubles its efforts to join NATO and renew its ties to the United States.

With the Bush Administration winding down and the Obama administration not yet in place, the world is waiting to see what changes will come from the White House. Until something concrete emerges from the new administration, Congress may provide the best views on US policy. Two recent Congressional reports deal directly with the implications of the Georgian problem, *Russia-Georgia Conflict in South Ossetia: Context and Implications for U.S. Interests*, (Nichol, 2008) and, *Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests*, (Nichol, 2008), both written by Jim Nichol since the war in August.

Both reports cite congressional support for Georgia, and also lay out the case against Russia for provoking the conflict. The first report gives the time line from Saakashvilis' election in 2003 to the war in 2008 and points out Russian military exercises in July were likely a rehearsal for the August war. The report recognizes Russia may have wanted to punish the West for recognizing Kosovo's independence, for seeking to integrate former Soviet states into Western institutions, as well as for developing oil and gas pipeline routes that bypass Russia.

Russia tried to gain support for its actions in Georgia from Central Asian countries but

found China less than enthused with encouraging breakaway republics seeking independence. The US can foster political, economic and military ties in the Caucasus in order to end the regions' dependence on Russia. American private investment in Azerbaijan's energy sector is seen as a means of countering the Russian monopoly on energy resources passing through the region. NATO is still interested in Georgian membership but Nichol acknowledges this has become more problematic. Russian can make supplying Afghanistan more difficult if the US continues to push for Georgian membership in NATO.

Key issues for Congress regarding the Caucasus are support for Georgia's integration into Western institutions including NATO, Azerbaijan's energy development, and perhaps for increasing the region's role as a trade and security corridor linking the Black Sea and Caspian Sea regions. Some members of Congress are pushing for greater U.S. aid and attention to conflict resolution to help countries in the Caucasus, while other members call for caution in becoming involved in this volatile region. It is up to the new US administration to set the course.

A review of the major Western media outlets begins with an article by Judy Dempsey in the International Herald Tribune, (Dempsey, 2008). The European based missile shield is Obama's first big foreign policy test. After Russia invaded Georgia, Poland gladly accepted US missile bases on its' territory. The Tribune claims Russia is far behind the US in conventional weapons and so Russia wants to keep nuclear weapons to compensate for this weakness. The assessment that Russia lags behind the US in conventional weapons is certainly correct. The Tribune asks if Russia is bluffing about basing Iskander missiles to target Europe. Promises by Russia to mass-produce the missile have not materialized. Nevertheless Russia is likely to demand abandonment of missile defense in Europe in return for cooperation with the new administration.

Former American Ambassador to the UN John Bolton wrote an article for the Washington Post, (Bolton, 2008). In it he states there won't be a new cold war and that it would not be wise to isolate Russia. Bolton advises, rather than punishing Russia, coerce them into cooperation. Russia has been threatening US interests over the Iranian Nuclear program, selling conventional weapons to Syria and Iran, using energy to intimidate the Europeans, and becoming friendly with Venezuela. According to Bolton it is in our real interest to have access to oil from the Caspian that is not controlled by Russia or Iran. If Russia is given a free pass regarding its violence in Georgia it may be emboldened to try it again elsewhere. While Europeans hope that being nice will be reciprocated, Bolton argues it is weakness rather than strength that provokes the Russians. His point being that it is easier to get Russia to cooperate if you are asking from a position of strength rather than of weakness.

The New York Times ran an article by Thom Shanker, (Shanker, 2008). He discusses Russia's military modernization program. After the Soviet Union fell Russia's Army fell to the status of a third world country. Russia is now improving weapons and equipment and also the training and health care of its troops. The Creation of a professional NCO corps able to provide tactical leadership is underway. The revitalization of the military would allow Russia to place more pressure on its neighbors. Russia learned from its ineffectual involvement in the Yugoslav breakup that its foreign policy is not credible without real military power behind it. Russia is extending its global reach once again. According to Shanker, exercises with Venezuela serve to "annoy" the United States. That's a lot of time and expense to be an annoyance, we must assume, from the plans laid out in 1999-2000 above, that Putin has more in mind than being merely a nuisance. However, rebuilding Russia's Military costs money, and a struggling

economy won't support everything Putin has laid out, so Russia may well have to compromise on some points.

According to two articles in the Space & Missile Defense Report, Rockville (Sep 29, 2008), (Oct 13, 2008), Russian moves in Georgia are pushing the Czechs and Poles closer to the US. The mistakes of the Cold War in creating Russo phobia in Europe have been recreated. For the Czech Republic and Poland, having the United States build and staff the missile bases means Russia would be less likely to invade those countries, even though Russia recently invaded another former Soviet republic, Georgia. Russia shows its hand in threatening nuclear war if missile defense continues, it is not able to credibly threaten a conventional invasion of Eastern Europe.

Marc Champion of the Wall Street Journal (Champion, 2008) is less optimistic than others, citing Germany's opposition to the Ukraine and Georgia's roadmap to membership in NATO. Caving to Pressure from Moscow the Ukraine announced gas deals with Russia and supports Russia joining the WTO. Champion points to the opposition of Germany to US policy that the new administration must deal with. Economic interest in Russia may trump Germany's solidarity with NATO allies. Champion points out a division within NATO. On one side those, like Germany, who don't want to get drawn in to the conflict. NATO would be obligated by the alliance to fight for Georgia against Russia, and feel it was Georgia's desire to enter NATO that pushed Russia to attack. On the other side are those with the US, who felt that not speeding up Georgian membership encouraged the Russian attack.

Champion goes on to show how other countries such as the Ukraine are caving in to Russian strong-arm tactics as well as being enticed by low prices for Russian gas. Nevertheless,

tensions persist between Kiev and Moscow. Mr. Putin on Thursday again accused Ukrainian personnel of manning guns that shot down Russian aircraft during the war in Georgia.

James Lyons wrote in the Washington Times, (Lyons, 2008) that Russia used local “thugs” to provoked Georgia into the August war. Like others, Lyons asks if the war was Russian payback for Kosovo or a warning to its neighbors not to get too close to the West. If so, according to Lyons, the plan backfired, causing the Czechs and Poles to hurriedly sign the missile deal with the US. Russia’s actions in Georgia unified the European US alliance says Lyons. He also states claims the Russian objective was to expand control of energy transit pipelines in the region to gain political leverage as well as for the economic benefit. Lyons down plays Russian military, reporting thirty percent of their tanks broke down before crossing the border, however he gives no source for this claim nor for the report that the Russians lost seven or eight aircraft over five days. He does state Russian cyber Internet attacks were effective but gives no details. Lyons does give some pertinent analysis stating Putin sees the use of energy as a political weapon and that in spite of wealth gained from energy resources, Russia needs European investment to stay afloat. Lyons advocates lowering the price of oil thus hitting Russia in the pocketbook as the best means of keeping Russia under control.

Outside of the mainstream media there are other voices by such as EurasiaNet, which has been sometimes cited in US Congressional Reports, (Nichol, 2008). The stated aim of EurasiaNet is to promote “informed” decision making among policy makers. The Central Eurasia Project of the Open Society Institute (OSI), a private operating and grant making foundation owned by noted billionaire George Soros, operates EurasiaNet. EurasiaNet provides information and analysis about political, economic, environmental and social developments in

the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus, as well as in Russia, the Middle East, and Southwest Asia. The website presents a variety of perspectives, utilizing a network of correspondents based both in the West and in the region. As stated EurasiaNet is attempting to influence decisions, presumably decisions it agrees with and so makes available its material free of charge. For those willing to pay, organizations whose aim is to earn a profit may provide more evenhanded analysis.

Perhaps the most important for profit source of information and analysis is Stratfor. Stratfor claims to be the world's leading online publisher of geopolitical intelligence. Stratfor was founded by Dr. George Friedman in 1996, is privately owned and provides intelligence for private corporations, the US and foreign governments. Stratfor seems to assume competition between the US and Russia. Stratfor sees an antagonistic Russia as the only real threat to US security. Stratfor predicts Russian strategy will be to keep the US occupied with Latin America in order to gain freedom of action along its own borders. Conversely US strategy must be to maintain pressure along Russia's periphery, which will keep them tied down, and unable to interfere in US interests elsewhere, (Zeihan, 2008).

There are as many views on the crisis as there are writers so it may be useful to summarize the generally agreed sequence of events before continuing with this study. In July Russia held military maneuvers with a scenario strikingly similar to events that transpired in August, after the exercise the Russian troops remained near the border. The Georgians hosted a NATO exercise, also in July, aimed at coordinated operations in Afghanistan, participants had departed Georgia before August.

Exactly who began the conflict is disputed, Georgia claims South Ossetian separatists provoked the Georgians to attack while Russia claims Georgian President Saakashvili mounted a

surprise attack on the unsuspecting Ossetians. The Georgians rapidly occupied most of South Ossetia. The Russians then intervened claiming Russian peacekeepers and Russian citizens were in danger. Russian Air strikes quickly destroyed Georgian Command nodes and other military installations. Russia admits to losing four aircraft, the Georgians claimed to have shot down 14 Russian planes.

The Russians not only ejected the Georgians from South Ossetia but pushed in to Georgia itself from that region as well as from Abkhazia the break away republic in western Georgia. The Russians halted short of the Georgian capital Tbilisi after the French President Sarkozy appealed to the Russians for a cease-fire. The Russians eventually pulled back to more or less the original positions of their peacekeepers in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The Two break away regions declared independence from Georgia, this independence was immediately recognized by the Russian. Most observers agree Georgia is not likely to regain its breakaway territories any time soon.

The political fall out of the war may not yet be resolved but obviously the Russians won the military contest. Little analysis has been forthcoming as to the effectiveness or lack thereof of the Western trained Georgian Armed forces. Nor has there been much study of Russian effectiveness. The Russia Army has been described as both well disciplined and as a criminal rabble which included Chechen mercenaries. The Russians overwhelmed the Georgians, but there are indicators that the Russian operation was anything but smoothly run. The Georgians, despite western training, proved incapable of mounting a coordinated defense. Certainly there are lessons to be learned upon a closer look at the conflict.

LAMP 2 and 3: Actors and Perceptions

Nations will either cooperate with other Nations in order to achieve the best results for all, or will compete seeking to gain advantage over the others in an attempt to further its self-interest and, when possible, diminish the advantages of its competitors. It is in the light of this worldview of competition and cooperation that this study will analyze the perceptions and possible behaviors of the various actors involved in the Georgian question.

The Georgian crisis highlights the complexities of the Southern Caucasus region, which also includes Azerbaijan, and Armenia. Turkey and Iran also have vested interests in the southern caucas. In order to maintain a reasonably focused study the number of actors will be limited to those with the greatest power of influence, those being Russia, the U.S. the E.U. and of course, the focal point of the crisis, Georgia.

Russia

Russia Is attempting to regain its position as a major world leader, lost with the fall of the Soviet Union. Stripped of the former Soviet Republics once forming a buffer as well as providing resources and manpower, Russia found its power drastically reduced. Added to this was the collapse of the economy, rampant crime, conflict in Chechnya and a weak and chaotic central government. Coming to power in 1999 Vladimir Putin noted Russia's inability to influence events during the Kosovo crisis. Both the EU and NATO began an expansion with an almost complete disregard for Russian interests. Putin set about returning Russia to its rightful place as a world leader able to influence events and consulted by the other world powers. He began by first setting his house in order, gathering power to himself cracking down on crime and corruption. Understanding the dire position the average Russia found themselves in, Putin conceived a major overhaul of the economy bringing it in line with the Western capitalist system. Even without the former Soviet Republics, Russia possesses vast natural resources, which Putin

brought back under central control in order to benefit the nation. A restoration of National pride was completed with the crushing of the Chechen resistance.

Even with victory in Chechnya, Russia knows its Army is not, man for man, equal to those of the West. Russia makes up for this through numbers. This works well against smaller adversaries such as the Chechens and Georgians, but against a stronger adversary the Russians are still found wanting. In Georgia many of the Russian Soldiers displayed a lack of discipline and there appeared to be many maintenance issues, some say the Russians took their time pulling back after the cease fire because they were unable to do so with so many broken down vehicles. Russia is modernizing not only equipment but more importantly by creating a western style professional NCO corps.

In order to continue with the upgrades to the military as well as to continue the rebirth of the Russia Nation in general Putin needs cash. Most of that cash comes from energy resources; some has come from the export of nuclear technology such as running a power plant in Armenia and selling technology to the Iranians. Other sources are natural gas and oil. The major consumer of Russian natural gas and oil is Europe. In addition to resources from Russian soil, oil from the Caspian Sea is transported to Europe via Russian pipelines. Azerbaijan is a major Caspian basin oil producer; much of its oil is also consumed by Europe. Rather than transport its oil via Russian pipeline Azerbaijan has the option of Western built pipelines crossing Georgia to the Black sea and then on to Europe cutting the Russians out of the profit. The Turks are also working to gain a profit from a pipeline crossing their country.

The Russians want to maintain as much control over the caucas as possible in part to maintain control of the energy supply to Europe. Partially this is purely profit driven but also control over Europe's energy gives the Russians huge leverage over the Europeans politically.

Coupled with other trade, Russia is Germany's number one trade partner, the Europeans find their economy more and more inextricably linked to a healthy Russian economy and a friendly Russian leadership.

Russia often finds itself opposed, as in Kosovo, by not only the United States but also by America's European allies. If Russia can find the cracks in the Western alliance she can drive her economic wedge in deep. Russia will no longer be ignored on world issues and particularly those issues concerning nations and former Soviet republics on her borders. This is not to say Russia will not allow any of these nations to join NATO or the EU, only that Russia will demand a say as to who joins.

Russia has 5000 troops in Armenia where she helps run a nuclear reactor supplying electricity to the Armenians. Good relations with Georgia will alleviate logistical difficulties. Oil and natural gas passing through Georgian pipelines to the Black Sea undercuts Russian profits, however Russians own much of the pipeline and do receive some revenue. Even the five-day war in Georgia cost the Russians, with at least four aircraft shot down and numerous maintenance and logistical problems on top of the normal costs of such an operation.

Russia wants Saakashvili, the current president of Georgia, out. Saakashvili has been disrespectful to Russia, a great affront to her renewed national pride. Russia feels some revenge for humiliation of Kosovo. The bombing of Serbia and NATO occupation was accomplished against the will of Russia, as was Kosovo's declaration of independence and subsequent recognition by the West.

Russia is happy to see the US embroiled in Afghanistan; it is in Russia's interest both for the US to fight the Islamists and also to see US power tied up there. Russia is to help US logistics through Central Asia; also this gives them some leverage over the US.

When Russia senses weakness she is able to press forward, when there is strong opposition she weighs the costs and benefits of engaging in competition. If the opposition is too strong she will cooperate in order to gain what benefit she can.

What does Russia want? Respect, Russia wants to be treated as an equal by the United States. Russia also wants a strong economy. The Russians need the price of oil to be minimum of \$70 in order to make a profit. If she is not earning the revenues she needs through the sale of oil she may turn with renewed vigor to other avenues such as the sale of arms and technology to countries like Iran and Venezuela.

The European Union

Europe's strength is in the exercise of influence through consensus or Soft power. Europe does not have an Army. Individual states do but these are relatively small and or weak on their own. Europe may find itself reliant on Russian energy if alternatives are not pursued and kept open. A monopoly over European energy resources provides the Russians a powerful means of bending European policy to its will. Europe realizes the danger and will seek alternatives, a pipeline through Georgia would certainly help. On the other hand Some European countries namely Germany and Italy find Russia an excellent trading partner and feel closer economic ties will benefit all.

Europe Is strongly tied to the US and increasingly so, economically to Russia. Europe at times asserts its independence but is much too strongly tied to the US culturally, economically and militarily to abandon the Atlantic alliance. Georgia however is another matter. Europe is certainly not interested in armed conflict with the Russians. The Europeans place much of the blame on the Georgians for the war and on Saakashvili in particular. The Europeans insinuate Washington, under the Bush administration, may have encouraged the Georgians and are

therefore ultimately responsible for the crisis. The Europeans recognize the Russian argument that Abkhazia and South Ossetia have the same right to independence, as does Kosovo, and will not challenge Russia on this. With the new administration in Washington Europe will follow the lead of the US as long as this does not interfere with its trade interests with Russia. At that point divisions will be apparent, countries like Poland will remain close to the US while others such as Germany and Italy will seek their own course. For countries such as these, relations with Moscow are more important than those with Georgia. The Polish faction, with memories of the iron curtain not so far gone, find themselves too close for comfort to a militaristic Russia. The European Union will be more conciliatory to Russia than NATO. The EU is run by consensus and so German trade interests can trump Polish Russo-phobia. NATO, born to oppose the Soviet Union, will more naturally lean towards standing up to the Russians and therefore more likely to help the US help the Georgians.

Georgia

Georgia needs a powerful ally to stay afloat. Bad blood with Russia drives much of Georgia agenda. Georgia and Russia do share some economic ties and common security issues such as countering terrorism and fighting crime. The Georgian population is displeased, to say the least, with president Saakashvili. Georgia is likely to elect a new president soon.

Although Georgia wants to participate in Afghanistan, to prove its worth to NATO, it needs to rebuild its Army first. The Army may turn away from conventional war to UW and cyber war. The Georgian Army will almost certainly revamp its C2 structure. Georgia will likely ask the US for more military trainers rather than civilian contract instructors who the Georgians feel are not up to date in their knowledge. Georgia will push for membership in NATO, lacking that she will continue to align closely with the US.

She may also seek closer ties to Turkey. Turkey is Georgia's biggest trade partner. Although like Europe Turkey has developed strong economic ties with Russia, the two countries are also traditional enemies. Turkey as a NATO member can be an ally to help Georgia in its bid to join the alliance.

Georgia will also explore a regional alliance with Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkey and perhaps the Ukraine loosely based on the organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) or a Caucasus stability pact as advanced by the Turks. This is not easily done as these countries have issues of their own and among themselves, such as the Nagorno Karabak dispute between Azerbaijan and Armenia and the Armenian Turk history of violence dating to early 20th century.

The United States

The Media in general portrayed the U.S. trained and equipped Georgian army as having performed poorly. Why did it perform so poorly if that was the case? Was it failure on the battlefield (poor troop performance) failure of the command (poor command and control), was it taken by surprise (poor intelligence), a failure of national leadership (poor politics/diplomacy) or other causes? How well did the Russians perform? With those questions in mind, should the U.S. expend resources rebuilding and strengthening The Georgian Army. Is it in US interests to rearm the Georgians?

We must also take into account the global economy, and US economic strategy. Georgia has a portion of the BP owned pipeline that stretches from the Caspian Sea then most of the oil goes on to Europe. This pipeline cuts Russia out of the profit. The pipeline originates at the

world's third largest oil reserve and reduces the US and its European allies' reliance on Middle Eastern oil.

US does not want to see another war in the caucuses, this is not good for the flow of oil and thence the economy. The US wants to counter not only Russian but also Iranian influence in the caucuses and undercut Iranian oil revenue from the Caspian basin. The US is friendly with Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkey and Georgia and would like all these countries as allies. US would prefer to cooperate with Russia in the Caucasus and elsewhere, but will compete if necessary. The US wants to remain friendly with Russia in order to expand NATO and to maintain access to supply routes into northern Afghanistan.

If forced to compete with Russia in the Caucasus the US will enable Georgia militarily. This means not only rebuilding what was lost in the War, but also strengthening the Georgian armed forces. The US is very good at conducting after action reviews in order to identify problems and correct them. The number one problem the Georgians had was command and control. Early on the Georgians lost communications and were thus unable to conduct a coordinated defense. The US will look at revamping the Georgian command structure. The US would like the Russians to know it will be more costly to compete with rather than cooperate with the United States.

Georgia sees its future with the West in general and with the US in particular. Russia is presently antagonistic towards Georgia. Europe finds itself simultaneously attracted and repelled by the Russians and find the Georgian crisis an unwanted problem. The future of Georgia and how the other actors relate to that country rests largely in the hands of the United States. The US is in effect responsible for the well being of that Nation yet must ensure her own

national interests above all. An adversarial relationship with the Russians is not optimal for the US. For that reason this paper will analyze the possible future related to Georgia.

RESEARCH DESIGN

This study has been conducted using the Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP). The LAMP method is a process of applying multiple probability and Utility trees to a particular question. These are developed largely independently and then compared and contrasted. Perhaps the most important aspect of LAMP is the development of focal points and indicators. This is important because although analysts are interested in predicting the future, the Policy and decision makers, for whom the analyst works, are interested in influencing the future. Lamp shows how a decision made by the policy maker can (hopefully) lead to the desired future outcome.

12 Steps of LAMP

- 1 Determine the issue.
- 2 Specify actors. Must be keep to the most important or the possible scenarios can multiply to a point where the system becomes unusable
- 3 Study perceptions and intentions of each actor.
- 4 Specify courses of action for each actor.
- 5 Determine major scenarios.
- 6 Calculate the number of alternate futures.
- 7 Conduct pair-wise comparison of futures.
- 8 Rank order futures Most likely to least likely to happen.
- 9 Analyze consequences of futures.
- 10 Assess potential for transposition between futures. This is when several outcomes share common focal points and or indicators, which could lead to predicting the wrong outcome as events transpire.

11 Determine focal events for futures. What must happen in order for each outcome to occur.

12 Develop indicators for each focal event These show which focal event is about to happen.

The main disadvantage of LAMP is the danger of identifying too many possible outcomes thereby rendering the method unmanageable. Although the most to least likely futures are rank ordered, the probability for each future to occur is not calculated. To be effective, an accurate understanding of each actors perceptions is indispensable without which it is not possible to accurately determine the decisions an actor is likely to make.

Advantages include; it can be used for early warning of events about to occur, because the method identifies indicators. It is well suited for creating Intelligence estimates. Software is being developed for LAMP, this would be great and also allow analysts to include more actors with less worry about the number of potential outcomes being generated.

LAMP works well as a process for studying the actions of Russia, the US the EU and Georgia following the August war. Russian motive may seem cloaked yet indicators exist to determine the Russians perceptions. The EU is not guarded regarding its perceptions and the US has certain unchanging interests due to its place as dominant economic and geopolitical leader. With a new administration about to exercise control from the White House this study is timely in that there is opportunity as well as danger in the caucuses both economically as well as politically.

The inherent difficulties in predicting the behavior of members of other cultures are difficult to overcome. When those actors interact with one another, the difficulties expand exponentially. The Author has relied mainly on research to deduce the perception of the actors involved. Personal experience offsets to some extent the bias inherent to an American citizen, The Author has participated in joint operations with the Russian Army in Kosovo in 1999 and

2001 and with the Georgian Army in Iraq in 2006. Eight years of residence in Europe including Service in the French Army help with understanding European perceptions. Additionally, the Author interviewed US military personnel involved with training the Georgian army from 2003 up to and during the 2008 war. These experiences can in no way replace expertise in Russian or European politics. Certainly the Author continues to possess cultural biases and likely has not fairly portrayed all the perceptions of some actors. The Author of this study has to the best of his ability placed himself in the shoes of each actor

LAMP 4: SPECIFY COURSES OF ACTION FOR EACH ACTOR

Now that these four actors have been identified and their respective perceptions on the issue have been discussed, we will determine possible courses of action. First Georgia is the issue over which the other three states make courses of action. Russia and the European Union can choose to cooperate or to compete with the US. For its part Georgia can either continue to turn to the West as its vision of the future, it can submit itself to the Russians. There can be varying levels of competition and cooperation as well as different areas such as economic military and political in which to compete or cooperate. It is the courses of action of the United States that this paper is studying therefore the courses of action for the US will be treated as scenarios in the context of LAMP.

LAMP 5: DETERMINE THE MAJOR SCENARIOS

Regarding the Georgian crisis the possible scenarios reflect possible American policy. The first possibility is that the US continues to aid the Georgians at the same level with not

change. The next Scenario would have the US decreasing military support to Georgia. In the third possible scenario the US increases military aid to Georgia.

·Scenario I: Business as usual, the US stays the course

·Scenario II: The US decreases military assistance to Georgia

·Scenario III: The US increases military assistance to Georgia

Assumptions

1-Putin continues directly or indirectly as Russia's leader for the next 6 to 12 years. Medvedev is his man allowing Putin to exercise control as prime minister. Recent change in the Russian constitution making terms six years may allow Putin to continue in office through a second Medvedev term. Putin may well seek to place one of his people in the presidency following Medvedev. The Russian people are happy under Putin, as they have gained economic security. Putin has also returned a sense of national pride to Russia.

2-Although Putin will continue to modernize the Army it will be years before the tactical leadership and discipline rivals Western army standards.

3-The US will continue to seek alternatives to Mid-Eastern oil. The Caspian Basin will continue to be one of the alternatives to US exploits.

4-Georgian people will not abandon desire for independence and democracy.

5-European/Russian economic ties will not diminish. Europe will seek alternatives to Russian energy but will remain largely dependant for the foreseeable future. At the same time trade will continue at the same levels or increase.

6-The Global economy will recover from the current crisis.

LAMP 6: CALCULATE THE NUMBER OF ALTERNATIVE FUTURES

In order to calculate the total number of permutations of possible alternative futures for each scenario LAMP uses a basic equation, $X^Y=Z$. The number of courses of action for each actor is X. The number of actors is Y and Z is the number of alternative futures.

In this study there are three actors each with two courses of action, Russia, the EU, and Georgia. Russia and the EU share the same course of action where as Georgia has two distinct courses of action. Therefore the equation is $2^2=4$, reflecting Russia and the EU and $2^1=2$, reflecting Georgia. This gives $2^2 \times 2^1=8$, eight alternative futures that will then be applied to the three US courses of action or scenarios to be analyzed.

The first table illustrates the eight alternative future permutations. Russia and the EU can either cooperate, (CO), or Compete, (CM) with the United States. Georgia can either turn to the West meaning seek alliances with the United States and Europe, (TW), or turn East and submit to Russian dominance, (TE).

TABLE 1

Actor	Russia	EU	Georgia
ALT FUT 1	CO	CO	TE
ALT FUT 2	CO	CO	TW
ALT FUT 3	CO	CM	TE
ALT FUT 4	CO	CM	TW

ALT FUT 5	CM	CM	TE
ALT FUT 6	CM	CM	TW
ALT FUT 7	CM	CO	TE
ALT FUT 8	CM	CO	TW

CO=COOPERATE

CM=COMPETE

TW=TURN WEST

TE=TURN EAST

LAMP 7: PAIRWISE COMPARISON

Step seven in the LAMP model is pairwise comparison. Using table 1 above in each of the three scenarios, future 1 will be compared to all the possible futures below it and awarding a “vote” to the most likely outcome between future number 1 and each of the other futures. The same will be done with each possible future

Tables 2,3 and 4 contain the results of the pairwise comparisons for each scenario.

TABLE 2

Scenario I: Business as usual, the US stays the course				
Actor	Russia	EU	Georgia	VOTES
ALT FUT 1	CO	CO	TE	3
ALT FUT 2	CO	CO	TW	5

ALT FUT 3	CO	CM	TE	0
ALT FUT 4	CO	CM	TW	4
ALT FUT 5	CM	CM	TE	1
ALT FUT 6	CM	CM	TW	6
ALT FUT 7	CM	CO	TE	2
ALT FUT 8	CM	CO	TW	7

CO=COOPERATE

CM=COMPETE

TW=TURN WEST

TE=TURN EAST

TABLE 3

Scenario II: The US decreases military assistance to Georgia				
Actor	Russia	EU	Georgia	VOTES
ALT FUT 1	CO	CO	TE	1
ALT FUT 2	CO	CO	TW	6
ALT FUT 3	CO	CM	TE	0
ALT FUT 4	CO	CM	TW	4
ALT FUT 5	CM	CM	TE	2

ALT FUT 6	CM	CM	TW	5
ALT FUT 7	CM	CO	TE	3
ALT FUT 8	CM	CO	TW	7

CO=COOPERATE

CM=COMPETE

TW=TURN WEST

TE=TURN EAST

TABLE 4

Scenario III: The US increases military assistance to Georgia				
Actor	Russia	EU	Georgia	VOTES
ALT FUT 1	CO	CO	TE	3
ALT FUT 2	CO	CO	TW	4
ALT FUT 3	CO	CM	TE	0
ALT FUT 4	CO	CM	TW	4
ALT FUT 5	CM	CM	TE	1
ALT FUT 6	CM	CM	TW	6
ALT FUT 7	CM	CO	TE	3
ALT FUT 8	CM	CO	TW	7

CO=COOPERATE

CM=COMPETE

TW=TURN WEST

TE=TURN EAST

In the following section, the comparative courses of action for each scenario are rank ordered from most likely to least likely to occur.

LAMP 8: RANK ORDER THE ALTERNATIVE FUTURES

Tables 5,6 and 7 list, from most likely to least likely, the courses of action for Russia, the EU and Georgia relative to each of the three US courses of action (scenarios).

TABLE 5

Scenario I: Business as usual, the US stays the course				
Actor	Russia	EU	Georgia	VOTES
ALT FUT 8	CM	CO	TW	7
ALT FUT 6	CM	CM	TW	6
ALT FUT 2	CO	CO	TW	5
ALT FUT 4	CO	CM	TW	4
ALT FUT 1	CO	CO	TE	3
ALT FUT 7	CM	CO	TE	2
ALT FUT 5	CM	CM	TE	1
ALT FUT 3	CO	CM	TE	0

CO=COOPERATE

CM=COMPETE

TW=TURN WEST

TE=TURN EAST

TABLE 6

Scenario II: The US decreases military assistance to Georgia				
Actor	Russia	EU	Georgia	VOTES
ALT FUT 8	CM	CO	TW	7
ALT FUT 2	CO	CO	TW	6
ALT FUT 6	CM	CM	TW	5
ALT FUT 4	CO	CM	TW	4
ALT FUT 7	CM	CO	TE	3
ALT FUT 5	CM	CM	TE	2
ALT FUT 1	CO	CO	TE	1
ALT FUT 3	CO	CM	TE	0

CO=COOPERATE

CM=COMPETE

TW=TURN WEST

TE=TURN EAST

TABLE 7

Scenario III: The US increases military assistance to Georgia				
Actor	Russia	EU	Georgia	VOTES

ALT FUT 8	CM	CO	TW	7
ALT FUT 6	CM	CM	TW	6
ALT FUT 2	CO	CO	TW	4
ALT FUT 4	CO	CM	TW	4
ALT FUT 7	CM	CO	TE	3
ALT FUT 1	CO	CO	TE	3
ALT FUT 5	CM	CM	TE	1
ALT FUT 3	CO	CM	TE	0

CO=COOPERATE

CM=COMPETE

TW=TURN WEST

TE=TURN EAST

Analysis of the two most likely alternative futures from tables 5, 6 and 7 follows in the next section.

LAMP 9: ANALYZE CONSEQUENCES OF ALTERNATIVE FUTURES

In order to analyze the alternative futures, each is considered independently. The assumption is that a particular scenario occurs, the reaction or behavior of Russia, the EU and Georgia and the consequences there-of is discussed below.

Scenario I: Business as usual, the US stays the course

In scenario one, the United States makes no changes to its policy in Georgia. The US rebuilds the Georgian Army and continues to back Georgia's bid to join NATO. There are two

alternative futures that received six or more votes, meaning these were the most likely to occur given this scenario.

Alternative future 8: Russia competes with the US, Europe Cooperates with the US and Georgia continues to look to the West. In this alternative future the Obama administration chooses to continue the policy of the Bush administration towards Georgia. The Georgian Army is rebuilt. The US continues to back Georgia's bid to join NATO and Europe chooses to cooperate with the new administration.

The Georgians continue to seek NATO membership but necessarily scale back commitments to the War on Terror. Georgian troops are required to man fortified positions on the border with Russia and the breakaway regions. Border incidents are common, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, (OSCE), becomes increasingly obligated to commit observers to the region which furthers tensions between Brussels and Moscow.

The Russia feeling ignored, entrench itself in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, further distancing any chance of restoring the territorial integrity of Georgia. Russia attempts to block every effort to expand NATO and the EU into former Soviet Republics. Russia attempts to exert greater control over Caspian Sea resources, expands ties with Iran, increases tie to Armenia and works to manipulate Turkey with the goal of turning Ankara away from the western alliance. Moscow's intelligence service will be increasingly active in Tbilisi, both to observe US military training of the Georgian armed forces and to subvert the Georgian Government. Renewed fighting over the break away regions remains a constant threat.

Alternative future 6: Both Russia and Europe compete with the United States while Georgia continues to look to the West. In this alternative future the Obama administration

chooses to continue the policy of the Bush administration towards Georgia. The Georgian Army is rebuilt. The US continues to back Georgia's bid to join NATO however, Europe chooses to sacrifice Georgian membership for economic ties with Russia.

German interests drive the European decision. Europe makes some conciliatory statements in support of Georgia but no longer consider Georgia an applicant for membership in NATO. The OSCE eventually abandons its observation mission in Georgia. European nations invest in Russian pipelines and energy companies. Russia gains greater control over Europe's energy supply.

Russia exploits the opportunity to drive a wedge between the US and Europe. Russia entrenches itself in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but cooperates with Europe in other areas of EU expansion. Russia hints at the possibility of joining the EU. Not all of Europe would be pleased with closer tie to Moscow and a Pro US faction emerges led by Poland. The EU becomes increasingly ineffectual as a world leader as internal divisions make any consensual decisions virtually impossible. NATO unity eventually suffers, The United States find less support for operations in Afghanistan.

Scenario II: The US decreases military assistance to Georgia

In scenario two, the United States, due to economic challenges and new political dynamics, makes cuts to aid for Georgia.

Alternative future 8: Russia competes with the US, Europe Cooperates with the US and Georgia continues to look to the West. In this alternative future the Obama administration chooses to abandon the policy of the Bush administration towards Georgia. The US reduction in military assistance includes abandoning backing of Georgia's bid to enter NATO. Europe

follows Washington's lead in abandoning Georgian military aspirations. Both the US and Europe continue to invest economically in the South Caucasus in general and in the trans-Georgian Pipelines in particular.

Georgia rebuilds its military as best it can but lack of resources led to a steady decline in readiness. Georgia seeks out regional alliances but finds only lukewarm reception. Turkey, her largest trade partner, becomes evermore important to Georgian independence.

Moscow backs a war crimes commission aimed at indicting Saakashvili. Russia increases pressure on the Georgian Government and attempts to place a pro Moscow leader in Tbilisi. The Russians remain entrenched in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but hints at the possibility of restoring the territorial integrity of Georgia. The Russians become increasingly successful at blocking any effort to expand NATO and the EU into former Soviet Republics. Russia exerts greater control over Caspian Sea resources. Russia facilitates US logistical operations in Central Asia supporting the war in Afghanistan.

Alternative future 2: Both Russia and Europe cooperate with the United States while Georgia continues to look to the West. In this alternative future the Obama administration chooses to abandon the policy of the Bush administration towards Georgia. The US reduction in military assistance includes abandoning backing of Georgia's bid to enter NATO. Europe follows Washington's lead in abandoning Georgian military aspirations. Both the US and Europe continue to invest economically in the South Caucasus in general and in the trans-Georgian Pipelines in particular.

Feeling its concerns are being addressed by the West, Russia cooperates with the US and Europe through economic initiatives in Georgia. All parties hope for mutual benefit. The Georgian economy strengthens enabling acceptance to the EU. Georgian continues to cooperate

with NATO but never realizes membership. Russia facilitates US logistical operations in Central Asia supporting the war in Afghanistan, and is receptive to reunification talks between the breakaway regions and Tbilisi only after Saakashvili is replaced.

Scenario III: The US increases military assistance to Georgia

In scenario three, the United States decides to improve the effectiveness of the Georgian armed forces. This renewed commitment to the Georgian military aims not only to rebuild the Army but to substantially improve their capabilities as well. This is accompanied by a vigorous push for Georgian entrance to NATO or barring that to backing a regional defensive alliance.

Alternative future 8: Russia competes with the US, Europe Cooperates with the US and Georgia continues to look to the West. In this alternative future the Washington chooses to increase its commitment towards Georgia. The Georgian Army is not only rebuilt but also strengthened. The US continues to back Georgia's bid to join NATO and Europe chooses to cooperate with the new administration.

The Georgians continue to seek NATO membership and with US help reorganize the command and control structure of the armed forces. During the war with Russia, the Georgian command structure proved incapable of coordinating the defense of the country. This was partly due to the destruction of command and control facilities, partly to inadequate communications security allowing Russia to jam Georgia Transmissions and partly due to the Georgian leadership lack of knowledge. The first priority of the increase in US military aid will concentrate on creating an effective general staff perhaps modeled on the US aid to the Croatian General Staff. The second priority will be on increasing the effectiveness of Georgian Special Operations. In August the Special Operations troops were used first as a quick reaction force and then found themselves in an advisory role to the conventional units. The first problem is can be largely

solved though educating the Georgian command in the use of Spec Ops, for instance a more effective use would have been in an unconventional warfare mode, using raid and sabotage in the Russian rear. The problem of the Spec Ops taking on an Advisory role is again a problem of the Georgian command. The Spec Ops troops came across Georgian regulars wondering about the battlefield searching for their parent units. The Spec Ops guided the lost units to their parent organizations only to find the parent units had not receive instructions and did not know what actions to take. The Spec Ops troops took the Initiative and began directing many of these units. With a strengthened military the Georgian feel capable of continuing its support of NATO operations in Afghanistan as well as providing a now credible deterrence to another Russian Incursion. The US pressures the Georgians not to act militarily against the Breakaway regions as long as the Russians maintain a presence there.

Europe aids the US both through NATO and the OSCE. The OSCE beefs up the presence of observers along Georgia's borders while NATO joins the US military in retraining the Georgian General Staff.

The Russia feeling threatened, entrenches itself in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, further distancing any chance of restoring the territorial integrity of Georgia. Russia attempts to block every effort to expand NATO and the EU into former Soviet Republics. Russia feels it is losing control over Caspian Sea resources and so seeks investments in pipeline across its own territory and increasingly explores greater ties with Iran in order to counter US influence in the Caucasus. Moscow's intelligence service will be increasingly active in Tbilisi, both to observe US military training of the Georgian armed forces and to subvert the Georgian Government. Renewed fighting over the break away regions remains a constant threat, however, this danger is mainly in border skirmishes and less in full-scale war.

Alternative future 6: Both Russia and Europe compete with the United States while Georgia continues to look to the West. In this alternative future the Washington chooses to increase its commitment towards Georgia. The Georgian Army is not only rebuilt but also strengthened. The US continues to back Georgia's bid to join NATO but Europe chooses to sacrifice Georgian membership for economic ties with Russia.

As in Scenario I above German interests drive the European decision. European nations invest in Russian pipelines and energy companies. Although Russia holds much control over Europe's energy supply, Europe now has access to an alternative supply of energy from the Caspian Basin controlled by the US rather than by Russia.

Russia entrenches itself in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the borders become increasingly militarized. Russia attempts to block every effort to expand NATO and the EU into former Soviet Republics. Russia hints at the possibility of joining the EU in order to draw Europe away from the US. The EU becomes increasingly divided between pro and anti Moscow nations. NATO unity eventually suffers, with the anti-Moscow factions remaining supportive of policy. There is less support for operations in Afghanistan both from within NATO as well as from Russia.

LAMP 10: ASSESS THE POTENTIAL FOR TRANSPOSITION

It is possible one alternative future may change into another alternative future. This can come about due to the behavior of one of the actors. The following is a short analysis of the possibility that the most probable futures could transpose.

1. Perhaps the most unlikely but would have the most effect would be Georgia to turn East. In all three scenarios the lowest four scores were earned by Alternative future in which Georgia turns to Russia. This is because of the animosity between the two countries is such that this is only a very slight possibility. Should Tbilisi mend ties with Moscow, Russia may hope to benefit from US assistance to Georgia, future 1 or 3. This could create the possibility of an effective regional pact including Russia, Georgia the US and other Regional states. On the other hand Russia could try to cut the US out of the Caspian energy trade, future 5 or 7.
2. Next would be EU Cuts ties to Russia. This is unlikely as Russia and the EU are heavily economically intertwined. Should The EU decide Russian nationalism presents a clear threat the most powerful tool the EU can wield is financial. Russia needs Europe's Euros. To do this Europe will need alternative energy suppliers as well as trade markets to replace Russia. The obvious alternative energy supply is from the Caspian basin along routes circumventing Russian territory. This means in all cases the EU would cooperate with the US in hopes of benefiting from US exploitation of the Caspian reserves, future 6 is replaced by future 2 in scenarios I and III.
3. Russia turns west. Should Russia decide to irreversibly cast its lot with the west, the EU has no reason not to cooperate with the US. Alternate future 2 becomes most likely in all scenarios.

LAMP 11 & 12: DETERMINE FOCAL EVENTS AND INDICATORS

Scenario I: Business as usual, the US stays the course

In scenario one, the United States makes no changes to its policy in Georgia. The US rebuilds the Georgian Army and continues to back Georgia's bid to join NATO.

Alternative future 8: Russia competes with the US, Europe Cooperates with the US and Georgia continues to look to the West.

Event: Washington chooses to continue the policy of the Bush administration towards Georgia.

Indicators

- The Georgian Army is rebuilt.
- The US congress provides funding for military aid
- The US continues to back Georgia's bid to join NATO

Event: Georgia scales back commitment to War on Terror

Indicators

- Georgian troops are requiring to man fortified positions on the border with Russia and the breakaway regions.
- Border clashes are common.

Event: Tensions increase between Brussels and Moscow.

Indicators

- The OSCE becomes increasingly obligated to commit observers to the region.
- Russia attempts to block every effort to expand NATO and the EU.
- Russia attempts to exert greater control over Caspian Sea resources
- Russia extends ties with Iran.
- Russia increases ties to Armenia.

Alternative future 6: Both Russia and Europe compete with the United States while Georgia continues to look to the West.

Event: Washington chooses to continue the policy of the Bush administration towards Georgia.

Indicators

- The Georgian Army is rebuilt.
- The US congress provides funding for military aid
- The US continues to back Georgia's bid to join NATO

Event: Europe chooses to sacrifice Georgian membership for economic ties with Russia.

Indicators

- Europe no longer considers Georgia an applicant for membership in NATO
- The OSCE abandons its observation mission in Georgia.
- European nations invest in Russian pipelines and energy companies.

Event: Russia exploits the opportunity to drive a wedge between the US and Europe.

Indicators

- Russia entrenches itself in Abkhazia and South Ossetia
- Russia cooperates with Europe in other areas of EU expansion.
- Russia hints at the possibility of joining the EU.
- Quarrels arise between Poland and Germany.
- The United States finds less support for operations in Afghanistan.

Scenario II: The US decreases military assistance to Georgia

In scenario two, the United States, due to economic challenges and new political dynamics makes cuts to aid for Georgia. The US reduction in military assistance includes abandoning backing of Georgia's bid to enter NATO.

Alternative future 8: Russia competes with the US, Europe Cooperates with the US and Georgia continues to look to the West

Event: Washington chooses to abandon the policy of the Bush administration towards Georgia.

Indicators

- Congress declare inability to fund military mission to Georgia
- Europe no longer considers Georgia an applicant for membership in NATO

Event: Russia undermines Georgian government

Indicators

- Moscow backs a war crimes commission aimed at indicting Saakashvili.
- Russia increases pressure on the Georgian Government and attempts to place a pro Moscow leader in Tbilisi.
- The Russians remain entrenched in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but hints at the possibility of restoring the territorial integrity of Georgia.
- The Russians become increasingly successful at blocking any effort to expand NATO and the EU into former Soviet Republics.
- Russia exerts greater control over Caspian Sea resources.

Event: Georgia Seeks regional Allies.

Indicator

- Georgia increases diplomatic missions to Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey.
- Georgia attempt to build stronger economic ties with the same countries.

Alternative future 2: Both Russia and Europe cooperate with the United States while Georgia continues to look to the West.

Event: Washington chooses to abandon the policy of the Bush administration towards Georgia
Indicators

- Congress declare inability to fund military mission to Georgia
- Europe no longer considers Georgia an applicant for membership in NATO

Event: Russia cooperates with the US and Europe.

Indicators

- Russia agrees to economic cooperation in Georgia
- US Russia summit is held, Russian and US Presidents praise one another.
- Russia facilitates US logistical operations in Central Asia supporting the war in Afghanistan.

Scenario III: The US increases military assistance to Georgia

In scenario three, the United States decides to improve the effectiveness of the Georgian armed forces. This renewed commitment to the Georgian military aims not only to rebuild the Army but to substantially improve their capabilities as well. This is accompanied by a vigorous push for Georgian entrance to NATO or barring that to backing a regional defensive alliance.

Alternative future 8: Russia competes with the US, Europe Cooperates with the US and Georgia continues to look to the West.

Event: Washington chooses to increase its commitment towards Georgia.

Indicators

- The Georgian Army General Staff receives specialized training.

- The US congress provides funding for military aid
- The US continues to back Georgia's bid to join NATO

Event: Europe chooses to cooperate with the new administration in Washington.

Indicators

- The OSCE beefs up the presence of observers along Georgia's borders.
- NATO joins the US military in retraining the Georgian General Staff.

Event: Russia attempt to counter US influence in the Caucasus.

Indicators

- Russia attempts to block every effort to expand NATO and the EU.
- Russia seeks foreign investments in pipelines across its own territory.
- Russia explores greater ties with Iran.

Alternative future 6: Both Russia and Europe compete with the United States while Georgia continues to look to the West.

Event: Washington chooses to increase its commitment towards Georgia.

Indicators

- The Georgian Army General Staff receives specialized training.
- The US congress provides funding for military aid
- The US continues to back Georgia's bid to join NATO

Event: Europe chooses to sacrifice Georgian membership for economic ties with Russia.

Indicators

- Germany increasingly speaks for Europe.
- Europe no longer considers Georgia an applicant for membership in NATO.
- The OSCE abandons its observation mission in Georgia.
- European nations invest in Russian pipelines and energy companies.

Event: Russia exploits the opportunity to drive a wedge between the US and Europe.

Indicators

- Russia entrenches itself in Abkhazia and South Ossetia
- Russia cooperates with Europe in other areas of EU expansion.
- Russia hints at the possibility of joining the EU.
- Quarrels arise between Poland and Germany.
- The United States finds less support for operations in Afghanistan.

CONCLUSION

Although Barak Obama's election campaign promised change, US strategic interests remain constant. The art of Grand strategy is to get as many countries to share your interests as possible in order to form a block powerful enough to ensure those interests are achieved. Russia is at the moment uncooperative. It is in our interests to avoid a Russian monopoly on central Asian energy allowing them great leverage over our European allies. It is also in our interest to develop a pro-US block to simultaneously counter the Iranians and the Russians in the South Caucasus; this can potentially include Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkey and problematically Armenia and Northern Iraq. It is also in our interest to establish and maintain good relations with the Russians. A stable and friendly Russia would be a powerful ally.

The economic crunch will force the US government to prioritize expenditures. Rearing the Georgians should be a priority, albeit a discrete priority. Georgia has a portion of the BP

owned pipeline that stretches from the Caspian Sea to Turkey and from there most of the oil goes on to Europe. This pipeline cuts Russia out of the profit. The pipeline originates at the world's third largest oil reserve and reduces the US and its European allies reliance on Middle Eastern oil. Russia wants to be a world leader and energy resources are its greatest asset. Combining a hold on Europe's energy needs with trade ties, Russia has gained greater leverage over Europe than the threat of invasion or nuclear destruction ever gave.

Should the US increase military aid and thereby increase the effectiveness of the Georgian Army? The threat of all out war between Russia and the Western alliance is virtually nonexistent. Proxy wars, however, are a real threat and Georgia might well have been the first. True, Russia did not annex all of Georgia, only portions of it. The Russians were feared as supermen during the Soviet era and then were laughed at as an ill prepared drunken rabble under the Yeltsin regime. The Russians today are slowly improving their Army. It is certainly no match for the better trained, equipped and battle hardened Americans, yet they possess sufficient strength to steamroll the smaller armies of the Caucus nations. If the US wants to win the proxy wars that may be coming, it needs to train and equip its allies to defeat the Russian Army.

It may not be necessary to increase aid, rather increase the effectiveness of the aid. This could avoid the possibility of increasing tensions in the region while simultaneously strengthening the Georgians. It is unrealistic to expect the Georgians can ever stand toe to toe with the Russians. The training of the Georgian military should concentrate on Unconventional Warfare, small units able to infiltrate and strike the Russian rear. The Idea is to make potential Russian intervention in Georgia extremely painful. Any steps taken by the US in Georgia also affect other parts of the South Caucuses. Georgian pipelines are of little worth without access to Azerbaijan. Any US policy must be comprehensive towards all of the South Caucuses and must

also consider both Turkey and Iran. Turkey, a staunch US ally in the past, merits a closer look. Turkish influence in the Caucasus could prove a great asset to American policy in the region.

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Appendix A – Applying the Analytical Hierarchy Process to US Policy towards military aid to Georgia. (Rearming Georgia, Final Paper, American Military University, IN520 Analytic Methods, By Thomas Myers)

I. INTRODUCTION

One means of validating or applying a common sense check to any analysis is to apply a different research method to the same question and then compare the results. The Analytical Hierarchy Process is well suited to the study of the United States aid to Georgian. AHP is designed for making complex decisions. As such it compliments the Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction used in the body of the paper. Where LAMP looks at a number of outcomes and analyzes those outcomes based on the behavior of the multiple actors involved, in this analysis using AHP, the same question is looked at from the desired outcomes and which course of action is best for the US to achieve that outcome.

II. RESEARCH DESIGN

The Analytical Hierarchy Process is similar to step five in the Military decision making process (MDMP) which some readers may be familiar with. Step five in MDMP is comparison of courses of action. This is done after several COAs are developed and then individually analyzed. In order to compare courses of action, a list of criteria is made and each criteria is weighted as to its importance. Each COA is then compared and given a score relative to the other COAs. The Courses of Action are thus ranked highlighting the best decision.

First the question studied is framed as a goal. The Goal is then deconstructed into first general parts, which are termed criteria. The Criteria can be deconstructed into alternative levels or specific parts.

Weighting is then applied first to the General criteria, in effect prioritizing them.

This is then accomplished with the alternative levels. After weighting, scoring is conducted by comparing the best outcome for an alternative level in one COA to the same alternative level in other COAs. Adding the scores of the alternative levels gives an over all score for each criteria and an over all score for the goal or question studied.

This process works best when all or most information is available, even when some information is unavailable this process provides a means to lay out information critical to the decision in a logical manner. However, it is easy to ensure the COA desired to be chosen earns the best score by how/how much weight is given the criteria. This then is a problem with reliability, the ability not only to enter subjectivity into the process but also to give that subjectivity a qualitative appearance through the assignment of numbers.

In order to avoid such unreliability the Author made every effort to maintain objectivity through out the analysis. Readers will no doubt disagree with some of the judgments made by the Author. The Courses of action, criteria and relative importance assigned are drawn from the Authors analysis, and may not mirror official US policy.

III. ANALYSIS

The purpose of this study is to determine the consequences of US policy and Military aid to Georgia with the goal of determining the best course of action to pursue. The three Courses of Action analyzed here using the AHP are the same as the three Scenarios discussed in the LAMP paper above.

a. Course of Action

-Scenario I: COA 1: Business as usual, the US stays the course, (STC)

-Scenario II: COA 2: The US decreases military assistance to Georgia, (DMA)

.Scenario III: COA 3: The US increases military assistance to Georgia, (IMA)

b. Criteria

The Criteria used are Economic benefits and National Security benefits to US policy towards military aid to Georgia.

c. Alternative level

The alternative levels for Economic benefits are:

-US Access to Caspian Oil: in order to reduce dependence on mid eastern oil at the same time developing the infrastructure of the Caspian Basin Energy through investment by the private sector.

-Enables the European Economy: in order to maintain a strong economy independent not overly reliant on Russian resources and markets.

-Enables a Strong Russian Economy: to avoid the chaos of the late 80s early 90s, a sound economy is vital to stability in Russia, a prosperous nation has less need for military adventures.

-Closes the non-integrated GAP: integrating as many nations as possible into the global economy from which all benefit, nations become interdependent and thus less likely to resolve conflicts militarily, (Barnett, 2004).

The alternative levels for National security benefits are:

-Access to Central Asian supply routes to Afghanistan: Necessary to the US War effort in Afghanistan. Without this supply route the US is reliant on supplies transported from Pakistan.

-Maintaining strong European alliance: This refers to both official alliances such as NATO as well as informal historical relationships. The political, economic and Military strength of Europe multiples US power. It also provides legitimacy to US action in that actions are multilateral.

-Restoration of US Moral Authority: Stated objective of the Obama election campaign, presumably this will be administration policy.

-Spread Democracy: Although a Bush administration policy, the spread of American ideals of freedom and democracy are necessary to winning war of ideas against autocracy and terrorism

TABLE 1

Level 0 (Goal)	Identify Best US COA towards Republic of Georgia							
Level 1 Criteria	Economic				National Security			
Level 2 Alternative Level	Caspian Oil	European Economy	Russian Economy	Closing the GAP	Supply Routes	European Alliance	Moral Authority	Spread Democracy

d. Weighting

Economics and National security are weighted equally, that is, they are considered equally important to US national interests.

Under each Criteria the alternative level of specific criteria are weighted such that the lower the number the more important the criteria. One is better than two, two is better than three and three is better than four.

Economics

- 1 US Access to Caspian Oil
- 2 Enable European Economy
- 3 Strong Russian Economy
- 4 Closing the non-integrated GAP

National security

- 1.5 Access to Central Asian supply routes to Afghanistan
- 1.5 Maintaining strong European alliance
- 3 Restoration of US Moral Authority
- 4 Spread Democracy

e. Comparison of Courses of Action

TABLE 2

WEIGHT	COAs			NOTES
	1 STC	2 DMA	3 IMA	
				Economics
1	2	3	1	US Access to Caspian Oil
2	1	3	2	Enable European Economy
3	2	1	3	Strong Russian economy
4	2	3	1	Closing the non-integrated GAP
	1 STC	2 DMA	3 IMA	National Security
1	1.5	1.5	3	Access to Central Asian supply routes to Afghanistan
2	1	2.5	2.5	Maintaining strong European alliance
3.5	1	3	2	Restoration of US Moral Authority
3.5	1	3	2	Spread Democracy

The comparison of alternative levels for Economic benefits:

US Access to Caspian Oil: Under COA 1, Stay The Course, the US continues to have access to Caspian Oil if the US decreases aid to Georgia it loses influence, another country

will fill the gap gaining greater influence in the region and thus control over Caspian oil therefore COA 1 is better than COA 2. If US increases military aid to Georgia its influence increases and presumably gains more control over Caspian oil, therefore under COA 3 access is much better than COA 2 and better than COA 1.

Enable European Economy: COA 1 is much better than COA 2 because COA 2 will essentially cede control of Georgian pipelines, Russia being most likely to gain control as Russian energy companies are already heavily invested in the pipeline. Unless routes through Armenia and Turkey become well established this amounts to a Russian monopoly of Caspian oil. That means Europe has fewer alternatives and becomes more reliant on Russia for her energy supply. An increase in military aid, COA 3, is better than COA 2 because the US maintains influence over the energy supply but this may cause the Russians to act more aggressively causing disruptions in the market as so COA3 is not as good as COA 1.

Strong Russian Economy: COA 1 is not as good as COA 2 because With a decrease in US influence in Georgia Russia may gain greater control over Georgia's pipelines and the Russia economy will benefit from a greater ability to control prices. COA 2 is much better than COA 3 because increased US presence in Georgia not only causes a loss of Russia control of oil profits but also will push Russia to increase military spending and resources in the region. COA 1 is also better than COA 3 because Russia does not lose whatever benefits it currently gains.

Closing the non-integrated GAP: COA 1 is better than COA 2 because abandoning military aid to Georgia amounts to abandoning the integration of Georgia into the Western economy. COA 2 is much better than COA 3 because increasing military aid commits the US to integrating Georgia to its sphere of influence. This show of commitment to integrating Georgia also accounts for COA 1 scoring better than COA 3.

The comparison of alternative levels for National security benefits:

Access to Central Asian supply routes to Afghanistan: In the current state of affairs Russia has not impeded US access to Central Asian supply routes so there is no change under COA 1. If the US decreases military aid to Georgia, Russia would have no reason to impede US access so there would be no change. Therefore COA 1 and COA 2 are deemed equal. COA 2 is better than COA 3 because an increase in military aid could provoke the Russians into impeding US access as retribution or an attempt to coerce the US to reverse its policy. COA 1 is also better than COA 3 for the same reason.

Maintaining strong European alliance: COA 1 is better than COA 2 because a decrease in military aid to Georgia can be seen by the Europeans as a US desire to withdraw from foreign commitments. Europe may then strike out increasingly on its own course. COA 1 is also better than COA 3 because an increase in military aid to Georgia may be seen by some European countries as continued US militarism likely to exacerbate tensions with

Russia, while other European nations will welcome the US commitment as protector from Russian aggression. The result will be a split within Europe both in the EU and in NATO rendering both less effective. COA 3 is equal to COA 2 because both courses of action reduce US influence in Europe and weaken the alliance.

Restoration of US Moral Authority: COA 1 is much better than COA 2 because abandoning Georgia will be seen as US pragmatic interests trumping American ideals of freedom. COA 3 is better than COA 2 for the same reason but not as good as COA 1 because an increase in US aid to Georgia may be seen as an increase in US militarism and thus undermine the US moral authority.

Spread Democracy: COA 1 is much better than COA 2 because abandoning military aid to Georgia amounts to abandoning US influence in Georgia therefore COA 2 does not support the spread of democracy. COA 3 is better than COA 2 for the same reason but not as good as COA 1 because an increase in US aid to Georgia may be seen as an increase in US militarism and thus undermine the US ideological argument for democracy.

TABLE 3

WEIGHT	COAs			NOTES
	1 STC	2 DMA	3 IMA	
				Economics
1	2	3	1	US Access to Caspian Oil
2	2	6	4	Enable European Economy
3	6	3	9	Strong Russian economy
4	8	12	4	Closing the non-integrated GAP
Total	18	24	18	
	1 STC	2 DMA	3 IMA	National Security
1	1.5	1.5	3	Access to Central Asian supply routes to Afghanistan
2	2	5	5	Maintaining strong European alliance
3.5	3.5	10.5	7	Restoration of US Moral Authority
3.5	3.5	10.5	7	Spread Democracy
Total	10.5	27.5	22	
Overall total	28.5	51.5	40	

IV. SUMMARY

Rank order of Courses of Action

First with 28.5 total points stay the course emerges as clearly the best course of action.

Next with 40 points increasing military aid to Georgia is the second best course of action.

Finally decreasing military aid to Georgia is the least desirable course of action receiving 51.5 points.

V. CONCLUSION (COMPARISON TO LAMP Analysis)

Comparing the LAMP analysis with the AHP analysis we find first that LAMP provides a greater overview of the Question in that it discusses the perceptions of the various actors equally. AHP on the other hand is much more focused on the perceptions of one actor for which a goal or decision is being sought. In both Studies an Increase in US military aid is deemed likely to increase tensions with Russia. A decrease in aid may decrease tension also but is harmful to US economic interests. Both an Increase and a Decrease in aid to Georgia has the potential of harming the US European relations as well. Maintaining the present level of commitment in Georgia has the greatest potential for benefit to the US. Georgian interests do not figure prominently in the AHP study, in the LAMP study, Georgia has little effect on events unless it were to shift radically and unlikely towards the Russians.

Both Russia and the US have bigger fish to fry than the Republic of Georgia. The Georgian question is however a small piece of the bigger puzzle of US/Russian relations.

US policy towards Georgia, will affect not only relations with Russia, but some could conceivably argue have a more important effect on US relations with Europe.