

Egyptian Elections of 2011: Potential for the Islamization of Egypt



Jamiat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen

OVERVIEW

Political Islam is currently experiencing a resurgent and adaptive phase. Nowhere is this dynamic more prevalent or evident than in Egypt. It was in Egypt where the *Jamiat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen*¹ commonly known as the Muslim Brotherhood in western terminology took root in 1928 and has continued to spread its influence not only in Egypt but across the Islamic world. The U.S. supported government of current Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak claims that the Muslim Brotherhood is a radical Islamist organization, a threat to the security and integrity of Egypt, and has long endeavored to suppress and manipulate them. However, the widespread disaffection among the Egyptian population with the U.S. and the Mubarak regime's strong handed tactics in suppressing dissent has led to a steadily increasing wave of support for the Brotherhood. The Brotherhood, consistently consolidating its political gains over the past twenty years,

¹ Literally translated to "Society of Muslim Brothers"

and coming off a precedent setting election in 2005, may stand poised to seize the reins of power in Egypt in the Presidential elections of 2011. This paper employs the Lockwood Analytical Method to study the manner in which the United States, the Mubarak regime, and the Muslim Brotherhood may react in response to the elections of 2011.

DETERMINE THE PREDICTIVE ISSUE

What is the probable reaction of the United States, the Egyptian Government (National Democratic Party) and the Muslim Brotherhood to the elections of 2011?

SPECIFY THE ACTORS INVOLVED IN THE ISSUE

The intent of this analysis is to gauge the probable reaction of the main actors in this issue to the forthcoming Egyptian elections of 2011. Due to a variety of critical factors converging at the same time and place, the 2011 elections have the potential to be a watershed event in the modern history of Egypt and the region. The potential for the results of this election to have far reaching ramifications throughout the region and amongst the international community is immense.

Egypt is a critical nation in the Middle East and particularly in the Arab world. Over the past three decades, the United States has pinned its hopes on Egypt and the Mubarak government to ensure stability and peace in the region. In addition, the United States

Government feels that it has cultivated a reliable, though unsteady ally in the Mubarak regime. However, the steadily increasing popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood amongst both the Egyptian elite² and the lower classes, portends great challenges for the future of Mubarak's National Democratic Party. To further complicate matters and increase uncertainty, President Mubarak has announced that he will retire in 2011. The open secret in Egypt is that Mubarak's son, Gamal is being groomed to assume power in the 2011 elections.

The United States, who has supported Mubarak throughout his presidency, will no doubt observe the proceedings of the 2011 elections with great concern. The Brotherhood is by no means an organization that will be expected to continue the close relations with the United States that Mubarak has fostered and strengthened. Therefore, the reactions of the United States and Mubarak's government, along with that of the Brotherhood must be analyzed thoroughly in order to determine likely occurrences. The import of Egypt's disposition to the United States and the agenda of the government in power cannot be exaggerated. A radical change in Egypt will not only disrupt the balance of power in the region but also severely increase the security threat posed to Israel.

For the purposes of this analytical paper, the reactions of the United States, the Mubarak government, and the Muslim Brotherhood will be considered. Although Israel is a significant actor in the issue, it will be excluded from the principle analysis and relegated to a second tier actor. The decision to exclude Israel from active consideration has been made for the purpose of keeping the analytical outcome contrite and for the fact

² In 1987, the Brotherhood gained control of the Engineer's Syndicate, an organization of 200,000 engineering professionals and control of \$5 million worth of assets. This was the first of many conquests of professional organizations in Egypt.
Walsh, John; "Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood" *Harvard International Review*, Winter 2003; 24, 4; p32

that Israel is likely to take the lead of the United States in reaction to the domestic occurrences of Egypt.

IN DEPTH STUDY OF THE PERCEPTIONS OF EACH ACTOR

The principle benefactor of Egypt, the United States, has a significant financial and political investment in the nation. The government in power, headed by Hosni Mubarak and his National Democratic Party has for decades manipulated dissent at home and nurtured relations abroad. The wild card element, the continuing emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood, threatens to upset the balance that has been struck over the previous thirty years.

United States



Previous to the reign of Anwar Sadat as President of Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser gravitated Egypt away from the sphere of U.S. influence and into the Soviet realm³. This change in outlook came after Nasser perceived that he would garner greater benefits in collecting Soviet support in positioning Egypt as a bulwark against the American supported state of Israel. In addition to his pragmatic partnership with the Soviets as a nominal client, he also championed his notion of Arabism as a political identity⁴. Naturally, the disposition of Nasser and the direction he intended to take Egypt was disconcerting to the United States and U.S.-Egyptian relations did not flourish during this period. As Jeremy Sharp of the Congressional Research Service states in one of its recent reports for the U.S. Congress, “U.S.-Egyptian relations soured when Nasser turned to the Soviets and the Czechs in 1955 for military training and equipment...”⁵

When Nasser died in 1970, and Sadat took the reigns of power in Egypt, the dynamic between the U.S. and Egypt slowly began to change. The initial catalyst for this shift in dynamic was Sadat’s risky gambit in initiating the Yom Kippur war of 1973 against Israel. Egypt, although initially surprising the Israeli Defense Forces, plowed headlong into a humiliating defeat, which necessitated the intervention of the United Nations to halt the severity of the Egyptian thrashing in the Sinai. In the aftermath of the 1973 War, Sadat began to see the advantages of building a relationship with the United States and lessening ties with the Soviet Union. A month after the October 1973 War, the U.S.

³ Dunder, Jonathan; “Gamal Abdel Nasser Biography,” *The Free Information Society*; <http://www.freeinfosociety.com/site.php?postnum=801> accessed on 04/10/08

⁴ Osman, Tarek; “Nasser’s Complex Legacy,” *openDemocracy*; http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/conflicts/middle_east/gamal_abdel_nasser accessed on 04/12/08

⁵ Sharp, Jeremy M; “Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations,” CRS Report for Congress, *Congressional Research Service*; March 29, 2007

restored diplomatic relations with Egypt, after an eight year pause.⁶ Sadat's contemplation culminated in the severing of ties with the Soviet Union when he abrogated the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship in 1976.⁷

As the Sadat presidency progressed, the relationship between Egypt and the United States grew more intimate. A key indicator of American intent to foster better relations with Egypt was when U.S economic aid to Egypt was reinstated in 1975. The pinnacle of Sadat's reign, and the defining moment of his legacy came in March of 1979, when Sadat agreed to the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. The Israeli peace treaty transformed the view of Egypt as one of the leaders of the Muslim world in fostering a fiercely virulent stand against Israel to one of a pragmatic, civil nation interested in building peace and security through cooperation.

Needless to say, the Islamist backlash against Sadat's overtures to Israel was intense. As much goodwill and cooperation that Sadat had garnered with the United States and Israel he had espoused far more enmity and rage amongst his domestic Islamist populations. This Islamist fervor eventually led to Sadat's assassination at the hands of a radical offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, *al-Jihad*⁸ on October 6, 1981.

Although Sadat had been killed, by the time of his death the U.S. stance toward Egypt had been altered dramatically from where it had previously been just a decade prior. Now, not only was Egypt not sidling up to the Soviet through, but it was a nominal ally of the United States. Furthermore, Egypt had openly declared peace with the U.S.'s

⁶ Sharp p4

⁷ CNN Cold War Profile, "Anwar Sadat, Egyptian President," <http://edition.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/kbank/profiles/sadat/>

⁸ Scott, Rachel, "An Official Islamic Response to the Egyptian 'al-Jihad' Movement," *Journal of Political Ideologies*; 2003 vol. 8 issue 1, p39

staunchest ally in the region, Israel. American policy makers surely saw the course of Egypt as an opportunity not only to steel the region against Soviet intrusion, but also to use Egypt as a springboard to encourage further cooperation and acceptance of Israel. In light of the circumstances it became imperative to continue to court the successor to the Egyptian presidency, which turned out to be Sadat's Vice President, Hosni Mubarak.

In the twenty seven years of Mubarak's presidency, the United States has further enjoyed close ties with Egypt. Although inconsistently, Mubarak has over the years displayed his willingness to support the United States. In 1991, Egypt joined the Coalition in opposing Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. In recent years, Mubarak has assisted, although somewhat quietly, American efforts in the Global War on Terror. It is reported that Egypt is one of a select few "common destinations" of the American rendition program of terror suspects.⁹ In a 2008 visit to Egypt, U.S. President George W. Bush, addressing Egyptian President Mubarak, remarked on the import of Egypt's relationship with the United States, "Our friendship is strong. It is one of the main cornerstones our policy in the region."¹⁰

According to the CRS report, "U.S. policy on Egypt is aimed at maintaining regional stability, improving bilateral relations, continuing military cooperation, and sustaining the March 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty."¹¹ One aspect of U.S.-Egyptian cooperation that is now famous internationally, is the commencement of the 'Bright Star' joint

⁹ Byman, Daniel; testimony before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "Extraordinary Rendition, Extraterritorial Detention, and Treatment of Detainees." July 26, 2007.

¹⁰ U.S. White House, Press Release; Office of the Secretary, January 16, 2008.

¹¹ Sharp

military exercise that takes place every two years in Egypt¹². ‘Bright Star’ is the largest training exercise of its kind carried out by United States Central Command. As a result, of such bilateral relations, the United States has not balked at opening the financial spigot where Egypt is concerned. According to the CRS, “The United States has provided Egypt with an annual average of over \$2 billion economic and military foreign assistance since 1979.”¹³

Clearly, the United States values its close ties with Egypt. While perhaps not as accommodating as King Abdallah II of Jordan, Hosni Mubarak has been a valuable ally to the United States for over a quarter of a century. Due to the importance of Egypt as a strategic partner in the region, the United States will be keenly interested and concerned about the Egyptian elections in 2011.

¹² Jones, Paula; U.S. Dept. of State, International Information Programs, U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda, December 1999, “Preventing Conflict – Military Engagement in Peacetime.”
<http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/1299/ijpe/jones.htm> - accessed on 04/12/08

¹³ Sharp



Gamal Mubarak: Successor to the Presidency?

Government of Hosni Mubarak – National Democratic Party

Following the 1981 assassination of Anwar Sadat, then Vice President and former Air Force Secretary, Hosni Mubarak took the reigns of power in Egypt. Upon assuming his position, Mubarak also became the head of the dominant political party in Egypt, the National Democratic Party, which Sadat established in 1979. Fortunately for the United States but to the discontent of Islamists in Egypt and abroad, Mubarak has steered Egypt approximately on the same course as Sadat intended in regards to close relations with the U.S. and maintaining of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty. As such, the United States regards Mubarak as a key ally in the region and has showed great interest in supporting the Egyptian military. After the ransacking of Saddam Hussein's military in 1991, the Egyptian military has become the most potent Arab force in the region. Thus, Mubarak

cooperation in aligning Egypt with Israel and the United States is a key element in preserving peace in the region.

Throughout his presidency, Mubarak has continually exerted his control and influence on the National Democratic Party (NDP). The NDP is an extension of Mubarak's presidency and not the other way around as might be the case in a traditional western democracy. As Dunne writes, "In Egypt, the party belongs to the president, not vice versa."¹⁴ Thus, the legislators and parliamentarians of the NDP have always swayed to Mubarak's whim, whether it the issue has been regarding economic policy, freedom of the press, or constitutional reforms. Mubarak has used his far reaching power and influence to control the domestic political dynamic of Egypt throughout his presidency. Political dissent has not been tolerated except in the rare instances when the President has felt it is allowable. For example, it is illegal for Egyptian to conduct strikes or carry out protest.¹⁵ Violators of such laws or routinely detained or harassed by Egypt's notorious security organizations.

Egypt is reported to be one of the world's most heavily policed states, with its Interior Ministry, by some accounts, employing 1.4 million individuals.¹⁶ In this environment, it is easy to see why the Mubarak regime is criticized internationally and subject to growing resentment domestically. Although Mubarak has been elected to office in four separate elections, the validity of those elections are open to severe skepticism. Until the recent elections of 2005, under Egyptian constitutional law, no one was permitted to oppose the

¹⁴ Dunne, Michele; "Egypt's National Democratic Party: The Search for Legitimacy" Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 16, 2007; web commentary, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=19716&prog=zgp&proj=zme> accessed on 04/15/08

¹⁵ Associated Press, "Egypt's Police Battle Workers Amid Discontent" *USA Today*; News; World; 04/06/08

¹⁶ *The Economist*, "Bashing the Muslim Brothers" International; Egypt; 09/01/07, vol.384, iss. 8544; pg42

president. Regarding Egyptian politics, Slackman writes, “Politics and elections in Egypt are controlled by the government and the ruling party, and in the absence of any true opposition, the party’s candidate is certain to win.”¹⁷

Preceding the elections of 2005, the United States had been exerting continued pressure on the Mubarak government to allow greater democratic freedom in Egypt. Mubarak, realizing the need to placate his greatest benefactor, conceded and allowed limited reforms to the electoral system. 2005 was the first election in Mubarak’s presidency where he did not run unopposed. Although, Mubarak ensured that his reelection was practically guaranteed, this was cited as minimal progress towards democratic reform by outside observers.

However, the seminal event of the 2005 Egyptian elections was not that Hosni Mubarak ran with opposition candidates, it was the surprisingly strong showing of the Muslim Brotherhood in capturing approximately 20% of the seats in the assembly.¹⁸ Although the Brotherhood candidates were not allowed to run openly, as the Nasser’s 1954 ban on the Muslim Brotherhood forming a political party still remains to this day, their affiliated candidates ran as independents. The startling success of the Brotherhood highlighted their ability to engender support amongst the Egyptian populace and the significant dissatisfaction of the people with the government in power. Furthermore, the United States was alarmed enough to take pause in its demands for Mubarak to accept greater democratization in Egypt.

¹⁷ Slackman, Michael; “An Unanswered Question: Who Follows Mubarak?” *The New York Times*; World, Africa; 11/01/07

¹⁸ Brooke, Steve and Leiken, Robert S.; “The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood” *Foreign Affairs*; Mar/April 2007, vol 86, Iss. 2, pg 107

In the last few years following the 2005 elections, it appears that Mubarak has somewhat increased the intensity in which he pursues dissent, especially as far as the Brotherhood is concerned. In 2007, Mubarak unleashed a reinvigorated campaign to limit the growing influence of the Muslim Brotherhood. As a result of this government effort, forty top Brotherhood leaders have been brought to trial in military courts as well as “...bans for other leaders, confiscation of personal assets, and harassment of Brotherhood-affiliated schools, summer camps and clinics.”¹⁹

Aside from greater targeting of the Brotherhood, the government’s efforts against journalists have been heightened as well. In 2008, Ibrahim Issa, a prominent newspaper editor and critic of the Egyptian government, was sentenced to a six month prison term for writing articles questioning the health of Mubarak.²⁰ Issa is not the only journalist to have been imprisoned in this manner. In previous months, numerous Egyptian journalists have been arrested or imprisoned for either writing about Mubarak’s health or other subjects not flattering to the government. Issa’s wife, Amira Abdel Fattah, highlighted the level of disdain that the liberal educated classes are beginning to foster for the Mubarak government by stating, “When a government loses its credibility, it starts acting irrationally. It appears that’s what’s happening in the case of Egypt... . There are strikes almost every day. People are frustrated.”²¹ It appears that not only is the Mubarak government drawing the ire of the Islamist portion of the populace, but it has now started receiving heightened criticism and disdain from the educated and higher classes as well.

¹⁹ *The Economist*, “Bashing the Muslim Brothers” International; Egypt; 09/01/07, vol.384, iss. 8544; pg42

²⁰ Sandels, Alexandra, “Egyptian Editor’s Wife Attributes Press Crackdown to Government’s ‘Fading Legitimacy’ “ *World News Connection*; 03/31/08

²¹ Sandels

One should not assume that the Islamist sector of Egyptian society and that of the educated sector are mutually exclusive classes. There has been and seems to be increasing overlap between the two demographics. This is an area of significant concern for the NDP and Mubarak, for if the intellectuals and professionals in Egypt are united against the government along with the Islamists, then such a conglomerate would wield considerable political power.

It would seem that a critical element for the political future of Egypt and the NDP would be the disposition of the working class people. However, as far as the common man in Egypt is concerned, things under Mubarak have not been improving recently. Recent statistics indicate that nearly 40% of the Egyptian population at or below the poverty line of \$2 a day.²² In addition the prices of food and goods have been on the increase over the past year, a situation that will have a bearing on the lives of all but the wealthiest of Egyptians.

Another facet of the political dynamic that Mubarak and the NDP are no doubt concerned about is the extremely high level of disfavor shown by the populace of Egypt toward the United States. In 2002, a Zogby poll of Egyptians showed that 76% percent of respondents had a negative attitude toward the United States.²³ The same poll, conducted two years later, after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, showed a staggering 98% of Egyptians held a negative view of the United States.²⁴ Even by late 2006, a follow on Zogby poll found that unfavorable views of the United States had receded back only to their 2002

²² Associated Press, "Egypt's Police Battle Workers Amid Discontent" *USA Today*; News; World; 04/06/08

²³ Linzer, Dafna, "Polls Show Growing Arab Rancor at U.S." *Washington Post*, 07/23/04, pA26

²⁴ Linzer

levels at 76%.²⁵ Since Mubarak is widely recognized as having a close relationship with the United States, being associated too closely with the U.S. may hold political consequences for him or the NDP. This issue retains even more importance when one considers that the Brotherhood has been “harshly critical”²⁶ of the United States and if given an alternative, the Egyptian people may prefer a government with ideas more akin the Brotherhood than to Mubarak.

The elections held in April of 2008 are an indicator of the path that the NDP may choose to follow in order to maintain its power. Although the results of the 2008 election have not been fully tabulated as of this writing, it is immediately evident that the government has destroyed much of the progress that the Brotherhood made in 2005. In the recent elections, due to severe government restriction only 21 out of the approximately 5000 Brotherhood candidates for local council elections were allowed to be on the ballot.²⁷ In addition, more than 400 Brotherhood members were arrested in the months preceding the election. As a result, the Brotherhood boycotted the 2008 election and left the NDP to control the overwhelming majority of the council seats.

Considering the circumstances in Egypt, Mubarak and the NDP face a critical turning point in 2011. Since Mubarak has stated that he will not seek another term in 2011, the potential for a radical change in government exists. According to Sharp and the CRS report of 2007, “Many analysts assume that the next Egyptian president will have to be

²⁵ Zogby International, “Five Nation Survey of the Middle East” December 2006

²⁶ Brooke and Leiken, p110

²⁷ Putz, Ulrike; “Poor Turnout as Muslim Brotherhood Boycotts Egyptian Elections” *Spiegel Online*; 04/08/08, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,546148,00.html> accessed on 04/12/08

elected in a popular vote.”²⁸ If this were truly the case, it would cause serious concern for the NDP candidate because as Walsh states, “ In a completely free election, the Brotherhood would carry the country in a landslide.”²⁹ Although the likelihood of a true popular vote taking place in 2011 is not to be realistically expected, it cannot be ruled out altogether, especially if circumstances in Egypt undergo extreme political or economic change. In describing the potential political power of the Brotherhood at the ballot box, Egyptian political scientist Amr Hamzawy says, “Faced with ruling elites primarily interested in preserving their power and weak liberal opposition actors... the cause of political transformation in the region is best served by bringing in Islamist movements and their popular constituencies.”³⁰

Although Mubarak has not publicly stated it, the conventional wisdom is that his son, Gamal is being groomed for the position of president. There is concern that Mubarak will attempt to cede the position to his son through inheritance. However, based on the fact that the people of Egypt were allowed a nominal say in the 2005 election, this does not seem to be a palatable alternative to most Egyptians. Also Mubarak’s criticism of Syria’s Hafez al-Assad and his passing of power to his son, seems to portend that Mubarak may not lean towards an inherited power situation.³¹ There is a significant likelihood that the NDP may choose to nominate Gamal as its candidate for the elections of 2011. However the two key caveats to this scenario are that it is not guaranteed that Gamal will be able to secure the blessing of the NDP as its candidate, the chance exists that he may be usurped by another NDP member. The second concern is that if Mubarak is not involved in the

²⁸ Sharp, p7

²⁹ Walsh, p35

³⁰ Muravchik, Joshua; “Jihad or Ballot-Box?” *Wall Street Journal*; 12/13/05; pA12

³¹ Slackman

process, Gamal may not be able to manipulate and control the NDP as his father did. Mubarak's absence from the scene in 2011 cannot be dismissed as his health is reported to be deteriorating and the potential of assassination by radical Islamists is an ever present threat. Therefore, the uncertainty and gravity surrounding the 2011 elections is immense. The potential exists for these elections to bring about dramatic change in the political landscape of Egypt.

The Muslim Brotherhood



Today the Muslim Brotherhood has an international presence, existing in countries throughout the globe, from Europe, Asia, Africa, to the United States. Among analysts and scholars it is agreed that, “The Muslim Brotherhood is the world’s oldest, largest, and most influential Islamist organization.”³² Historically, the organization traces its roots back to Egypt, eighty years ago. Founded in 1928 by the Egyptian school teacher, Hassan

³² Brooke and Leiken, p107

al-Banna, the Muslim Brotherhood's objective since its inception has been to meld the tenets of Islam with political endeavors.

Adherents to the Sunni branch of Islam, the Brotherhood states that they possess "...the correct understanding of Islam as a comprehensive system that encompasses all aspects of life."³³ Furthermore, to the consternation of some Western observers, the Brotherhood makes no hesitation in defining its objective as the establishment of Islamic law, Shari'ah, to control society. The two key pillars of the Brotherhood as defined by the organization are...

"1.) The introduction of the Islamic Shari'ah as the basis controlling the affairs of state and society.

2.) Work to achieve unification among the Islamic countries and states, mainly among the Arab states, and liberating them from foreign imperialism."³⁴

Furthermore, the Brotherhood motto does not seem to Westerners as that of a moderate, democratic organization as they claim to be today. The Brotherhood motto is, "Allah is our objective. The Prophet is our leader. The Qur'an is our law. Jihad is our way. Dying in the name of Allah is our highest hope."³⁵ Despite its rhetoric highly steeped in fundamental Islamism, the Brotherhood today claims that its intent is to pursue political power through the democratic process. However, the early years of the Brotherhood's existence were times of turmoil and violence.

From 1928 to 1954, the Brotherhood struggled to gain a political foothold in Egypt. Throughout the decade of the 1930's, the Brotherhood concentrated its efforts heavily in

³³ Muslim Brotherhood website, "Establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood"
<http://www.ikhwanweb.com/Article.asp?ID=796&LevelID=1&SectionID=115> accessed on 04/14/08

³⁴ Muslim Brotherhood website, "The Principles of the Muslim Brotherhood"

³⁵ Vidino, Lorenzo; "The Muslim Brotherhood's Conquest of Europe" *The Middle East Quarterly*; winter 2005, vol. 12, no. 1

spreading its message and recruiting others to join the movement. However, by the 1940's as the political situation in Egypt became more hectic during the reign of King Farooq, members of the Brotherhood became embroiled in violent activity. In December of 1948, the police chief of Cairo as well as the Egyptian prime minister, Nuqrashi Pasha were assassinated by members of the Brotherhood. Despite al-Banna's denunciation of the assassinations, he himself was assassinated by government forces in 1949, presumably in retaliation for the death of the prime minister.³⁶

In October of 1954, a seminal event in the history of the Brotherhood occurred, the bungled assassination attempt on Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Nasser escaped the attempt on his life unscathed, but he then set into motion the long history of the Egyptian government's crackdown on the Brotherhood. In 1954 the brotherhood was banned as a political party in Egypt, a ban which still stands today. In addition, wide spread arrests and harassment of Brotherhood members was initiated as retaliation for the attempt on Nasser's life.

It was during the time period of the Nasser assassination attempt that one of the Brotherhood's most profound thinkers, Sayyid Qutb, refined his radical ideology.³⁷ As one of the many Brothers imprisoned and tortured in Nasser's jails, Qutb's ideology diverged from that of the Brotherhood's. While suffering abuse at the hands of fellow Muslims, Qutb concluded that these individuals, along with the government they represented, had lost their way with the true path of Islam and were in fact, "kafireen" or apostates.³⁸ In Qutb's interpretation of Islam, it was permissible to kill the apostate in

³⁶ Brooke and Leiken, p107

³⁷ Brooke and Leiken, p108

³⁸ Brooke and Leiken, p108

order to purify the state and bring about a true adherence to Islam and Allah. Qutb's legacy remains important to the world today because it served as the inspiration for violent jihadist offshoots of the Brotherhood, such as *al-Jihad*. In addition, one of Qutb's adherents would turn out to be the Egyptian physician Ayman al-Zawahiri, who together with Osama bin Laden has transformed Qutb's theories into violent action. It is due to individuals such as Qutb and Zawahiri, who branched off from the Brotherhood's message into their own extremist, radical path, that the Brotherhood today is stigmatized as akin to fostering violent radicalism.

The stigma that the Brotherhood fosters terrorism and violence is wide spread amongst the West. The *Economist* in a 2007 article writes, "Their enthusiasm for violent jihad and their constant framing of Islam as a faith threatened by vicious enemies have helped spawn more radical Islamist groups, from Hamas in Palestine to the suicidal mass-killing zealots in Iraq."³⁹ Brooke and Leiken write, "American commentators have called the Muslim Brothers 'radical Islamists' and a 'vital component of the enemy's assault force... deeply hostile to the United States.'⁴⁰ In a 2005 *Wall Street Journal* article, Muravchik writes, "Much that the Brotherhood has long stood for – a new caliphate, the inferiority of women, the absolutist claim that Islam is the answer not only to spiritual questions but also economic and political ones – is abhorrent."⁴¹ It is clearly evident that at least amongst Western journalists and scholars the belief is persistent that the core of the Brotherhood is centered on radical Islamism.

³⁹ *The Economist*, "Bashing the Muslim Brothers" International; Egypt; 09/01/07, vol.384, iss. 8544; pg42

⁴⁰ Brooke and Leiken, p107

⁴¹ Muravchik, Joshua; "Jihad or Ballot-Box?" *Wall Street Journal*; 12/13/05; pA12

In addition, the Egyptian government does not shy away from portraying the Brotherhood as a threat to security and stability either. Mubarak has claimed that the Brotherhood is “hiding behind religion to turn back the clock.”⁴² Abdel Moneim Said, head of the Al Ahram Center for Strategic Political Studies, and an institution that operates under the sanction of the Egyptian government states of the Brotherhood that, “It establishes a religious state,” and also that “Its an assassination to the civic state.”⁴³ Amr Moussa, a former Interior Minister in Mubarak’s government once said of the Brotherhood, “The Brotherhood is a greater threat to the safety of the state than the terrorists and the militant groups.”⁴⁴ Interestingly, although Moussa was bolstering the consistent government line that the Brotherhood is a looming threat, it is implicit in his statement that a distinction can be drawn between the Brotherhood and the radical militants or terrorist organizations. Even Mubarak himself has not stopped short of linking modern Middle Eastern terrorism to the Brotherhood. In a 1994 comment Mubarak said, “ The problem of Middle Eastern terrorism is a by-product of our own illegal Muslim Brotherhood.”⁴⁵ Clearly, one central tenet of the Egyptian government’s strategy to marginalize the Brotherhood is the campaign to portray them negatively in the international press, especially amongst the Western media.

The Brotherhood, for their part have over the past two to three decades undertaken an intensive campaign to make it clear to the world that they have not only renounced

⁴² *The Economist*

⁴³ Michael, Maggie; “Egypt’s Brotherhood Party Details Platform Akin to That of Iran” *Associated Press*, 10/11/07

⁴⁴ Walsh, p34

⁴⁵ Walsh, p35

violence⁴⁶ but openly embrace the idea of democratic principles. Brooke and Leiken write, “The Ikhwan followed the path of toleration and eventually came to find democracy compatible with its notion of slow Islamization.”⁴⁷ The intent of the Brotherhood to establish an Islamic state in Egypt and to unite the greater *umma* under the Caliphate is not denied, it is openly stated. However, the Brotherhood has made the strategic decision to pursue the path of change from within, through the democratic process, as opposed to openly opposing the Mubarak government in violent confrontation. “Its road to power is not revolutionary; it depends on winning hearts through gradual and peaceful Islamization.”⁴⁸

The main evolution of the Brotherhood’s campaign toward democratization has occurred under the Mubarak regime. After the assassination of Sadat, by radical elements with ties to the Brotherhood, the leaders of the Brotherhood realized that it would behoove them more to take on somewhat of a public relations campaign in order to show the Egyptian people that the Brotherhood is concerned about serving their interests. Walsh concisely sums up the Brotherhoods activities during the Mubarak regime in the following manner...

“Since Mubarak’s 1981 ascent to power, the Brotherhood has used a three-fold strategy to gain influence in the existing political framework. First, it sought to gain properly elected representation in the Egyptian parliament, largely through coalitions with other small opposition parties, Second, it has taken control of professional and student associations (the most prominent private organizations in the country), again through proper electoral process. Finally, it has established a network of social services in neighborhoods and villages.”⁴⁹

⁴⁶ Zambelis, Chris; “Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood: Political Islam Without al-Qaeda” *Terrorism Monitor*; Vol. V, Iss.22, 11/26/07, p6

⁴⁷ Brooke and Leiken p108

⁴⁸ Brooke and Leiken, p108

⁴⁹ Walsh p32

This campaign to demonstrate to the Egyptian people that the Brotherhood can provide better conditions than the government has over the decades been extremely effective. There is no more telling evidence than that election results of 2005. The fact that the Brotherhood did so impressive considering that they are still an illegal organization in Egypt and that many questions remain as to the validity of the actual voting, belies the incredible support amongst the general public that they wield.

Mohammed Mahdi Akef, the current leader of the Brotherhood and the 7th ‘General Leader’ of the organization, has been intent on guiding the Brotherhood on a course that trumpets freedom and democratic values. In a statement a few months prior to the 2005 election, Akef was quoted as saying, “For the Brotherhood, the issue of freedom is at the tope of our agenda now. Freedom is at the heart – it’s the principal part – of Islamic law.”⁵⁰ Never the less, Akef is still a committed Islamist at heart. In a 2005, statement, Akef said the following, “Western democracies have criticized all those who adopt a view different from that of the people of Zion about the myth of the Holocaust.”⁵¹ Statement like these and the tacit support of the Brotherhood for violence in Iraq by insurgents and Islamists against both U.S. soldiers and civilians gives pause to Western analysts how contemplate the true nature of the Brotherhood’s disposition to the West.

There is no doubt that Akef and the Brotherhood do not seek to establish intimate ties with the United State and other Western nations. However, the

⁵⁰ Murphy, Dan; “Egypt Keeps Muslim Brotherhood Boxed In” *Christian Science Monitor*; 06/07/05

⁵¹ BBC News, “Egyptian Islamists Deny Holocaust” *World*, 12/23/05; online at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4554986.stm ; accessed on 04/17/08

Brotherhood is not akin to groups such as al-Qaeda either. In fact, al-Qaeda's al-Zawahiri disparages the Brotherhood by claiming they "lure thousands of Muslim men into lines for elections... instead of into the lines of jihad."⁵² The renunciation of violence by the Brotherhood seems legitimate. For a casual observer of the subject, based on some of the negative accounts in the media, the tendency may exist for one to lump the Brotherhood into the same context as that of terrorist group. However, it is important to note that the Brotherhood is not listed as a terrorist organization by the U.S. State Department.⁵³

Therefore, heading into what by all indications could well be a seminal election in the history of Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood holds a unique place among political organizations in the world. Clearly the Brotherhood is an Islamist organization and they desire to institute Islamic principles in the function of government. However, unlike other Islamist organizations, the Brotherhood appears to have legitimately denounced violence and committed to the process of democratization. In addition, the Brotherhood cannot realistically be described as a terrorist organization. If they were to assume power in Egypt by legitimate means, they would truly be a legitimate government.

Thus the key question is if the Brotherhood does assume power in the 2011 elections, what will the response of the United States and the current Egyptian government of Hosni Mubarak be? The Brotherhood has demonstrated that its support amongst the Egyptian populace is widespread. The potential for the

⁵² Brooke and Leiken, p107

⁵³ United States Department of State, "Foreign Terrorist Organizations" Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, April 2008; online at: <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/08/103392.htm> accessed on 04/18/08

Brotherhood to sweep into power in a truly free election is significant. If such an event were to occur, the United States would in fact face a difficult dilemma. The U.S. has depended upon Egypt as an ally and stabilizing force in the region for decades. However, the Brotherhood cannot be relied upon in any way to continue a close relationship with the United States. In this context, the outcome of the 2011 elections may bring about immense change for Egypt and the region.

SPECIFY COURSES OF ACTION FOR EACH ACTOR

Three principle courses of action are being utilized for this analysis...

Accept Result (AR): All parties accept the outcome of the 2011 election and continue political relations. For example, the United States does not alter its political situation with the government of Egypt.

Dispute/Contest Outcome (DC): The outcome of the election is disputed. At least one of the parties radically alters its political stance in a hostile manner toward the elected government of Egypt. For example, if the Muslim Brotherhood instituted a widespread campaign of strikes, protest, and riots as a means of disputing the outcome

Withdraw from political process/cease relations (WC): The outcome of the elections is not only disputed but the dynamic of one actor's relationship is changed to such a degree that they withdraw from future relations or participation in the political process. This course of action incorporates the initiation of violence or military action. For example, if the United States ceased diplomatic relations with the government of Egypt.

DETERMINE MAJOR SCENARIOS

SCENARIO I: The NDP candidate, presumably Gamal Mubarak, wins the Presidential Election, but the NDP stifles opposition and the Brotherhood is severely prohibited from participating

SCENARIO II: The NDP candidate, presumably Gamal Mubarak, wins the Presidential Election, but the Brotherhood increases its share of representation in the parliament, a la 2005.

SCENARIO III: The Brotherhood candidate wins the Presidential election

CALCULATE THE NUMBER OF ALTERNATIVE FUTURES

The mathematical formula for determining the number of alternate futures is represented by $x^y = z$, where X is the number of courses of action for each party and Y is the number of actors.

In this case we have $3^3 = 27$. Therefore, this analysis will study 27 alternate futures.

<u>FUTURE</u>	<u>UNITED STATES</u>	<u>EGYPTIAN GOVT.</u>	<u>MB</u>
1	AR	AR	AR
2	AR	AR	DC
3	AR	DC	AR
4	AR	AR	WC
5	AR	WC	AR
6	AR	DC	DC
7	AR	WC	WC
8	AR	DC	WC
9	AR	WC	DC
10	DC	AR	AR
11	DC	AR	DC
12	DC	DC	AR
13	DC	AR	WC
14	DC	WC	AR
15	DC	DC	DC
16	DC	WC	WC
17	DC	DC	WC
18	DC	WC	DC
19	WC	AR	AR

20	WC	AR	DC
21	WC	DC	AR
22	WC	AR	WC
23	WC	WC	AR
24	WC	DC	DC
25	WC	WC	WC
26	WC	DC	WC
27	WC	WC	DC

PAIRWISE COMPARISON OF ALTERNATE FUTURES

SCENARIO I: NDP WINS IN CONSTRAINED ELECTION

<u>FUTURE</u>	<u>UNITED STATES</u>	<u>EGYPTIAN GOVT.</u>	<u>MB</u>	<u>VOTES</u>
1	AR	AR	AR	24
2	AR	AR	DC	26
3	AR	DC	AR	17
4	AR	AR	WC	24
5	AR	WC	AR	4
6	AR	DC	DC	19
7	AR	WC	WC	5
8	AR	DC	WC	13
9	AR	WC	DC	9
10	DC	AR	AR	21
11	DC	AR	DC	22
12	DC	DC	AR	15
13	DC	AR	WC	21
14	DC	WC	AR	5
15	DC	DC	DC	13
16	DC	WC	WC	2
17	DC	DC	WC	9
18	DC	WC	DC	3
19	WC	AR	AR	12
20	WC	AR	DC	13

21	WC	DC	AR	6
22	WC	AR	WC	15
23	WC	WC	AR	1
24	WC	DC	DC	2
25	WC	WC	WC	0
26	WC	DC	WC	1
27	WC	WC	DC	1

SCENARIO II: NDP WINS, MB INCREASES SHARE IN GOVERNMENT

<u>FUTURE</u>	<u>UNITED STATES</u>	<u>EGYPTIAN GOVT.</u>	<u>MB</u>	<u>VOTES</u>
1	AR	AR	AR	26
2	AR	AR	DC	25
3	AR	DC	AR	15
4	AR	AR	WC	24
5	AR	WC	AR	11
6	AR	DC	DC	18
7	AR	WC	WC	6
8	AR	DC	WC	17
9	AR	WC	DC	9
10	DC	AR	AR	22
11	DC	AR	DC	19
12	DC	DC	AR	15
13	DC	AR	WC	17
14	DC	WC	AR	7
15	DC	DC	DC	8
16	DC	WC	WC	2
17	DC	DC	WC	8
18	DC	WC	DC	4
19	WC	AR	AR	13
20	WC	AR	DC	14
21	WC	DC	AR	6
22	WC	AR	WC	15
23	WC	WC	AR	1

24	WC	DC	DC	1
25	WC	WC	WC	0
26	WC	DC	WC	1
27	WC	WC	DC	1

SCENARIO III: MD WINS ELECTION

<u>FUTURE</u>	<u>UNITED STATES</u>	<u>EGYPTIAN GOVT.</u>	<u>MB</u>	<u>VOTES</u>
1	AR	AR	AR	20
2	AR	AR	DC	17
3	AR	DC	AR	20
4	AR	AR	WC	0
5	AR	WC	AR	18
6	AR	DC	DC	11
7	AR	WC	WC	2
8	AR	DC	WC	3
9	AR	WC	DC	6
10	DC	AR	AR	24
11	DC	AR	DC	16
12	DC	DC	AR	26
13	DC	AR	WC	5
14	DC	WC	AR	21
15	DC	DC	DC	17
16	DC	WC	WC	8
17	DC	DC	WC	7
18	DC	WC	DC	14
19	WC	AR	AR	21
20	WC	AR	DC	10
21	WC	DC	AR	22
22	WC	AR	WC	2

23	WC	WC	AR	20
24	WC	DC	DC	14
25	WC	WC	WC	4
26	WC	DC	WC	5
27	WC	WC	DC	11

RANK ORDER ALTERNATIVE FUTURES

SCENARIO I:

<u>FUTURE</u>	<u>UNITED STATES</u>	<u>EGYPTIAN GOVT.</u>	<u>MB</u>	<u>VOTES</u>
2	AR	AR	DC	26
1	AR	AR	AR	24
4	AR	AR	WC	24
11	DC	AR	DC	22
10	DC	AR	AR	21
13	DC	AR	WC	21
6	AR	DC	DC	19
3	AR	DC	AR	17
12	DC	DC	AR	15
22	WC	AR	WC	15
8	AR	DC	WC	13
15	DC	DC	DC	13
20	WC	AR	DC	13
19	WC	AR	AR	12
9	AR	WC	DC	9
17	DC	DC	WC	9
21	WC	DC	AR	6
7	AR	WC	WC	5
14	DC	WC	AR	5
5	AR	WC	AR	4
18	DC	WC	DC	3

16	DC	WC	WC	2
24	WC	DC	DC	2
23	WC	WC	AR	1
26	WC	DC	WC	1
27	WC	WC	DC	1
25	WC	WC	WC	0

SCENARIO II:

<u>FUTURE</u>	<u>UNITED STATES</u>	<u>EGYPTIAN GOVT.</u>	<u>MB</u>	<u>VOTES</u>
1	AR	AR	AR	26
2	AR	AR	DC	25
4	AR	AR	WC	24
10	DC	AR	AR	22
11	DC	AR	DC	19
6	AR	DC	DC	18
8	AR	DC	WC	17
13	DC	AR	WC	17
3	AR	DC	AR	15
12	DC	DC	AR	15
22	WC	AR	WC	15
20	WC	AR	DC	14
19	WC	AR	AR	13
5	AR	WC	AR	11
9	AR	WC	DC	9
15	DC	DC	DC	8
17	DC	DC	WC	8
14	DC	WC	AR	7
7	AR	WC	WC	6
21	WC	DC	AR	6
18	DC	WC	DC	4
16	DC	WC	WC	2

23	WC	WC	AR	1
24	WC	DC	DC	1
26	WC	DC	WC	1
27	WC	WC	DC	1
25	WC	WC	WC	0

SCENARIO III:

<u>FUTURE</u>	<u>UNITED STATES</u>	<u>EGYPTIAN GOVT.</u>	<u>MB</u>	<u>VOTES</u>
12	DC	DC	AR	26
10	DC	AR	AR	24
21	WC	DC	AR	22
14	DC	WC	AR	21
19	WC	AR	AR	21
1	AR	AR	AR	20
3	AR	DC	AR	20
23	WC	WC	AR	20
5	AR	WC	AR	18
2	AR	AR	DC	17
15	DC	DC	DC	17
11	DC	AR	DC	16
18	DC	WC	DC	14
24	WC	DC	DC	14
6	AR	DC	DC	11
27	WC	WC	DC	11
20	WC	AR	DC	10
16	DC	WC	WC	8
17	DC	DC	WC	7
9	AR	WC	DC	6
13	DC	AR	WC	5

26	WC	DC	WC	5
25	WC	WC	WC	4
8	AR	DC	WC	3
7	AR	WC	WC	2
22	WC	AR	WC	2
4	AR	AR	WC	0

ANALYZE CONSEQUENCES OF ALTERNATE FUTURES

SCENARIO I: NDP WINS IN CONSTRAINED ELECTION

Future #2: (26 votes) The NDP after securing its grip on power, presumably with Gamal Mubarak as President, resumes its decades long rule in Egypt. The United States, gladly endorses the new (and Western friendly) government and seeks to maintain close relations. The Brotherhood, dismayed at the results, contests the elections.

The United States would welcome a smooth transition of power from the current Mubarak Presidency to the successor NDP candidate, most likely Mubarak's son, Gamal. The NDP would be keen to tout its commitment to democratic ideals and establish legitimacy for the new government as the duly elected representatives of Egypt. The Brotherhood, no doubt dismayed at the results of yet another election in which the government constrained the ability of the opposition to campaign, would engage in a campaign to dispute and de-legitimize the election. Brotherhood controlled professional syndicates would be encouraged to strike while Brotherhood influenced student groups would initiate protests. The resulting crackdowns and protest against dissent would further paint the NDP in a harsh light in the international arena and garner positive public relations for the Brotherhood. Ultimately, the Brotherhood would still remain a part of the political process, albeit a dissatisfied and increasingly boisterous element.

Future #1: (24 votes) The NDP and U.S. reactions, similar to Future #2, embrace the results of the elections. The Brotherhood, in a pragmatic attempt to bide their time until further political opportunity presents itself, commit to embracing the outcome of the elections and redouble their support for the democratic process.

The U.S. and NDP would eagerly point to the results of the election to assert that the democratic process reaffirmed the NDP control of government. The Brotherhood, choosing to ‘fight another day’ would begrudgingly concede to the outcome of the elections, however redouble their efforts to increase support amongst the populace of Egypt for further democratic reform in the hopes of increasing the likelihood of future electoral success. Ultimately the current status quo would be preserved for an indefinite period of time.

Future #4: (24 votes) U.S. and NDP reactions would be identical to Futures #1 and #2. The Brotherhood would radically alter its stance toward the political process, withdrawing from any future political involvement and vehemently refuse to accept the results of the election.

The Brotherhood, frustrated at their lack of progress in attempting to utilize the political process, and outraged at being thwarted by yet another constrained election, would cease any future attempts to involve itself in working under the constraints of the government. If the Brotherhood sensed weakness and uncertainty in the government due to the transition of the president and perceived popular support amongst the people, would call for an outright rejection of the electoral results. Although the likelihood of a coup is minimal, the possibility cannot be discounted that if the Brotherhood perceived sufficient support among the people and an opportunity presented by an uncertain transition to power, they would attempt to marshal the support of the people in order to obtain power. The probability of the Brotherhood resorting to violence is also low, but would depend on the egregiousness of the government’s attempt to marginalize the Brotherhoods’ electoral presence. Ultimately, in this future, the Brotherhood would radically alter its stance toward the government and if the sufficient opportunity presented itself, the Brotherhood would “put all its chips on the table.”

SCENARIO II: NDP MAINTAINS POWER, BROTHERHOOD INCREASES REPRESENTATION IN GOVERNMENT

Future #1: (26 votes): U.S warily praises the success of the democratic process, glad that NDP maintains power, but cautious of Brotherhood’s increased share. The

NDP continues to manage government and the Brotherhood accepts results with an eye to the future. All parties accept the results of the election.

The Brotherhood, though falling short of their ultimate goal in attaining power, is emboldened by its democratic success and recommits itself to working through the electoral process to achieve political results. The Brotherhood would also seek to make use of its increased representation in parliament to enact legislation in order to acquire greater political strength (i.e. repealing the law banning the Brotherhood as a political party). The NDP moves to consolidate its power in its most supportive groups, the military and government ministries. The United States, seeking to maintain its relationship with the NDP, continues to support the elected NDP president.

Future #2: (25 votes): The U.S. and NDP accept the results of the election. The Brotherhood, dismayed by not capturing the presidency, disputes the election by working countermand the government's rule (Less severe version of Scenario I, Future 2).

The Brotherhood would undertake a more vigorous campaign to appeal to the people of Egypt in order to draw contrasts between itself and the government. The Brotherhood would undertake a great public relations campaign in order to mold the populace for future elections. Strikes and protests among professional and student groups under Brotherhood influence will be likely.

Future #4: (24 votes): The U.S. and NDP accept the results of the election. The Brotherhood undertakes radical changes to its demeanor, withdrawing from the political process (Similar to Scenario I, Future 4).

The Brotherhood, if sensing an opportunity to act on indecisiveness, weakness, or uncertainty on behalf of the government, may attempt to gain power through eschewing the democratic process and undertaking radical means. If the transition of power is not smooth or if a 'power vacuum' in the government is perceived, the Brotherhood may resort to an aggressive, radical effort to seize power.

SCENARIO III: BROTHERHOOD WINS PRESIDENCY IN AN OPEN ELECTION

Future #12: (26 votes): United States is concerned with result, disapproves of election. The NDP disapproves of election. The Brotherhood supports results of election.

The United States, severely concerned with the rise to power of the Muslim Brotherhood threatens to cease diplomatic relations and aid to Egypt. The possibility for relations is still maintained in order to gauge the disposition of the new Islamist government. The NDP is relegated to an opposition party out of power. It employs its influence in the media and academic institutions to undertake a tremendous anti-Brotherhood propaganda campaign. The Brotherhood, upon seizing power, re-orient itself away from the West, especially the United States. However, the Brotherhood, based on pragmatic concerns, does not immediately disavow relations with the United States. Widespread domestic economic and civil reforms take place. Sharia law is instituted. The newly elected government of Egypt refuses to recognize the right of Israel to exist.

Future #10: (24 votes): U.S. disapproves of election, NDP and Muslim Brotherhood accepts results.

The U.S. has the same reaction as Future 12. However, the NDP, fearing the wrath of the people if they attempt to subvert the results of the election, announces that they will accept the rule of the newly elected government. The Brotherhood's reaction is identical to that of Future 12.

Future #21: (22 votes): U.S. radically alters its stance toward the government of Egypt, the NDP disputes the results of the election, and the Brotherhood accepts the results.

The United States immediately ceases diplomatic relations and cuts of aid to Egypt. The U.S. seeing the Brotherhood government as a threat to Israel attempts to marshal international support against the Brotherhood government. The NDP refuses to accept the newly elected government and undertakes a campaign of propaganda and protest. The Brotherhood reaction is identical to that of Futures #10 and #12.

DETERMINE FOCAL EVENTS FOR ALTERNATE FUTURTES

SCENARIO I: NDP WINS IN CONSTRAINED ELECTION

Future #2: (26 votes) The NDP after securing its grip on power, presumably with Gamal Mubarak as President, resumes its decades long rule in Egypt. The United States, gladly endorses the new (and Western friendly) government and seeks to maintain close relations. The Brotherhood, dismayed at the results, contests the elections.

FOCAL EVENT: The NDP indicates that it will not allow truly free elections in 2011

FOCAL EVENT: The Brotherhood continues to foment dissent amongst the Egyptian populace

FOCAL EVENT: The United States expresses support for the NDP

FOCAL EVENT: Gamal Mubarak becomes NDP candidate for President

Future #1: (24 votes) The NDP and U.S. reactions, similar to Future #2, embrace the results of the elections. The Brotherhood, in a pragmatic attempt to bide their time until further political opportunity presents itself, commit to embracing the outcome of the elections and redouble their support for the democratic process.

FOCAL EVENT: The NDP indicates that it will not allow truly free elections in 2011

FOCAL EVENT: The Brotherhood re-emphasizes its commitment to work with government and through the electoral process

FOCAL EVENT: The United States expresses support for the NDP

FOCAL EVENT: Gamal Mubarak becomes NDP candidate for President

Future #4: (24 votes) U.S. and NDP reactions would be identical to Futures #1 and #2. The Brotherhood would radically alter its stance toward the political process, withdrawing from any future political involvement and vehemently refuse to accept the results of the election.

FOCAL EVENT: The NDP indicates that it will not allow truly free elections in 2011

FOCAL EVENT: The United States expresses support for the NDP

FOCAL EVENT: The Brotherhood renounces the democratic process in Egypt

FOCAL EVENT: Economic conditions worsen in Egypt

FOCAL EVENT: Rivalries emerge in the post-Mubarak NDP power structure

SCENARIO II: NDP MAINTAINS POWER, BROTHERHOOD INCREASES REPRESENTATION IN GOVERNMENT

Future #1: (26 votes): U.S warily praises the success of the democratic process, glad that NDP maintains power, but cautious of Brotherhood's increased share. The NDP continues to manage government and the Brotherhood accepts results with an eye to the future. All parties accept the results of the election.

FOCAL EVENT: Government of Egypt announces candidates representing the Brotherhood will be allowed to run

FOCAL EVENT: The United States expresses support for the NDP

FOCAL EVENT: The Brotherhood re-emphasizes its commitment to work with government and through the electoral process

Future #2: (25 votes): The U.S. and NDP accept the results of the election. The Brotherhood, dismayed by not capturing the presidency, disputes the election by working countermand the government's rule (Less severe version of Scenario I, Future 1).

FOCAL EVENT: Government of Egypt announces candidates representing the Brotherhood will be allowed to run

FOCAL EVENT: The United States expresses support for the NDP

FOCAL EVENT: Brotherhood increases its ability to mount political activity

Future #4: (24 votes): The U.S. and NDP accept the results of the election. The Brotherhood undertakes radical changes to its demeanor, withdrawing from the political process (Similar to Scenario I, Future 4).

FOCAL EVENT: Government of Egypt announces candidates representing the Brotherhood will be allowed to run

FOCAL EVENT: The United States expresses support for the NDP

FOCAL EVENT: The Brotherhood renounces the democratic process in Egypt

FOCAL EVENT: Economic conditions worsen in Egypt

**SCENARIO III: BROTHERHOOD WINS PRESIDENCY IN AN OPEN
ELECTION**

Future #12: (26 votes): United States is concerned with result, disapproves of election. The NDP disapproves of election. The Brotherhood supports results of election.

FOCAL EVENT: Government announces totally free and fair elections

FOCAL EVENT: U.S. indicates disapproval of Brotherhood participation in elections

FOCAL EVENT: Economic conditions worsen in Egypt

FOCAL EVENT: The Brotherhood re-emphasizes its commitment to work with government and through the electoral process

Future #10: (24 votes): U.S. disapproves of election, NDP and Muslim Brotherhood accepts results.

FOCAL EVENT: Government announces totally free and fair elections

FOCAL EVENT: U.S. indicates disapproval of Brotherhood participation in elections

FOCAL EVENT: The Brotherhood re-emphasizes its commitment to work with government and through the electoral process

FOCAL EVENT: NDP agrees to abide by the will of the people

Future #21: (22 votes): U.S. radically alters its stance toward the government of Egypt, the NDP disputes the results of the election, and the Brotherhood accepts the results.

FOCAL EVENT: U.S. indicates immediate cessation of diplomatic relations if Brotherhood attains power

FOCAL EVENT: Government announces totally free and fair elections

FOCAL EVENT: The Brotherhood re-emphasizes its commitment to work with government and through the electoral process

FOCAL EVENT: NDP continues to generate propaganda adverse to the Brotherhood

INDICATORS FOR FOCAL EVENTS

FOCAL EVENT: The NDP indicates that it will not allow truly free elections in 2011

INDICATOR: Mubarak regime and NDP continue to harass Brotherhood members, including arrests and limiting of demonstrations

INDICATOR: Mubarak regime announces Brotherhood sponsored candidates will be barred from 2011 election

INDICATOR: Government repression of dissenting press continues at current levels or increases

FOCAL EVENT: The Brotherhood continues to foment dissent amongst the Egyptian populace

INDICATOR: Brotherhood increase its influence amongst professional and student syndicates

INDICATOR: Key Brotherhood leaders denounce government

INDICATOR: Continuation and increase in demonstrations and strikes

INDICATOR: Increase in support of the Brotherhood amongst Egypt's lower class majority

FOCAL EVENT: The United States expresses support for the NDP

INDICATOR: U.S. Administration makes statement in support of continuity in NDP hold on government power

INDICATOR: U.S. aid to Egypt increases

INDICATOR: U.S. State Department shows support for NDP in 2011 election

FOCAL EVENT: Gamal Mubarak becomes NDP candidate for President

INDICATOR: President Mubarak publicly announces his intention for Gamal to succeed him

INDICATOR: Gamal Mubarak continues to move up in the political hierarchy of the NDP

INDICATOR: NDP officially proclaims Gamal Mubarak as candidate for president

FOCAL EVENT: The Brotherhood re-emphasizes its commitment to work with government and through the electoral process

INDICATOR: Mohammed Mahdi Akef, leader of Brotherhood vows to abide by electoral results of 2011

INDICATOR: Brotherhood tones down its sharp criticism of the government

FOCAL EVENT: The Brotherhood renounces the democratic process in Egypt

INDICATOR: Key Brotherhood leaders decide that their support of democratic ideals is no longer productive and publicly announce their intention to no longer participate in the electoral process

INDICATOR: Brotherhood religious leaders issue *fatwa* denouncing participation in elections

FOCAL EVENT: Economic conditions worsen in Egypt

INDICATOR: Unemployment continues to rise in Egypt

INDICATOR: Cost of food and other goods continues to rise

INDICATOR: Inflation grows

FOCAL EVENT: Government of Egypt announces candidates representing the Brotherhood will be allowed to run

INDICATOR: Opposition candidates are permitted to be on the ballot

FOCAL EVENT: Brotherhood increases its ability to mount political activity

INDICATOR: Brotherhood representation increase among professional and student syndicates – more Brotherhood members elected to the heads of powerful syndicates

INDICATOR: Brotherhood makes inroads amongst military officers

INDICATOR: Opposition newspapers become more vocal and supportive of Brotherhood ideology

FOCAL EVENT: Government announces totally free and fair elections

INDICATOR: 1954 law banning the Brotherhood is repealed

INDICATOR: Government agrees to allow international observers to monitor electoral proceedings

FOCAL EVENT: NDP agrees to abide by the will of the people

INDICATOR: Government/NDP agrees to accept results of the election, regardless of the outcome

FOCAL EVENT: U.S. indicates immediate cessation of diplomatic relations if Brotherhood attains power

INDICATOR: U.S. commits to severing diplomatic relations with Egypt in the event of Brotherhood electoral victory

INDICATOR: Brotherhood placed on the U.S. State Department list of terrorist organizations

INDICATOR: U.S. aid to Egypt diminished/halted

FOCAL EVENT: NDP continues to generate propaganda adverse to the Brotherhood

INDICATOR: Journalists continue to be jailed for dissenting articles or reports

INDICATOR: Only government run newspapers/media outlets allowed to operate

INDICATOR: Government continues to paint adverse picture of Brotherhood to international community.

POTENTIAL FOR TRANSPOSITION BETWEEN ALTERNATE FUTURES

SCENARIO I:

In Scenario I, there is a potential for Future #2 to transpose into Future #4. The main element that would affect the outcome of this scenario would be the extent to which the government would work to repress the Brotherhood. If the repression is to such an extent that it infuriates the Islamists in the Brotherhood and motivates public sentiment towards the Brotherhood camp, but not extreme enough to smother out the political capacity of the Brotherhood, then the possibility will exist for the Brotherhood to attempt drastic action. The other main element affecting transposition in the scenario would be the footing of the new NDP government. If there is internal conflict amongst the elements of the NDP, perhaps a split amongst the traditional power base and that of the new hierarchy led by Gamal, an opportunity may present itself for the Brotherhood to exploit in an attempt to seize power. Finally, if the new power base of the NDP leads to disaffection among the military class, it may present significant political challenges to the new NDP government and potential opportunities for the Brotherhood

SCENARIO II:


The potential for transposition in this scenario exists from Future #1 to Future #2. The main element in this scenario would depend on the Brotherhood's perception of public support. If the Brotherhood felt that it had sufficient support amongst the populace to countermand the writ of the government, it would take such measures. For example, Future #1 could transpose to Future #2 if Gamal Mubarak won the Presidency but was an unpopular choice among the Egyptian people. If at the same time, the Brotherhood increased its share in parliament, they would attempt to undertake a campaign of dissent and opposition within a peaceful political framework but with a long term intent to weaken Gamal Mubarak's government.

SCENARIO III:

In Scenario III, there exists potential for Future #12 to transpose into Future #21. The crucial element that would cause this transposition would be the stance of the U.S. Administration in 2011 to the potential Brotherhood controlled government. If the Administration sensed that the Brotherhood government was not going to employ pragmatic steps in order to maintain the balance of power in the region and the peace with Israel, then the likelihood of the U.S. government taking immediate steps to sever relations with Egypt and cut off aid would be substantial. In such an instance, the United States would not seek to legitimize a government who threatened Israel. Thus not only would monetary aid and diplomatic relations be halted, but the United States would take

steps to isolate the Brotherhood government in the international arena as well.

CONCLUDING REMARKS



7th General Leader of the Brotherhood, Mohammed Mahdi Akef

Undoubtedly, Egypt is now and has been for the past three decades an anchor of American foreign policy in the Near East. The steps taken by Anwar Sadat and maintained by Hosni Mubarak cemented a stability in the region and a long term peace

with the United States most critical ally in the region, Israel. By all accounts, the United States is heavily invested in Egypt both financially and politically and any occurrence that may threaten the relationship between the United States and Egypt will be viewed with the utmost concern by American policymakers. The elections of 2011 hold the potential for such an occurrence.

The Muslim Brotherhood, having been formed in Egypt, is a major element in the politics of Egypt and the region and must be accounted for, regardless of their current outlawed status. The elections of 2005 serve to put the United States and the international community on notice that the Brotherhood has made immense inroads by utilizing the democratic process. The Brotherhood's influence among the people of Egypt shows no indication of waning, especially if worsening economic conditions and an uncertain change in political power cause a decline in the confidence of the government's ability to maintain control over the country.

Never the less, the likelihood of the Brotherhood sweeping into power in a free election or mounting a sudden coup to seize power is minimal. The Egyptian government possesses a stranglehold on the institutions of power in the country and enjoys widespread support amongst the military and government ministries. Although, public discontent with the government is high as is support for the Brotherhood, Hosni Mubarak has crafted an effective domestic structure to suppress opposition and keep the lion's share of political power close at hand. Thus, the likely outcome of the 2011 elections will be one in which Mubarak ensures that power is passed to his son, Gamal, in a nation wide election incorporating limited democratic openness but ensuring the desired NDP dominated result.

The Brotherhood no doubt intends to eventually gain power in Egypt. However, barring radical changes to the Egyptian political landscape, 2011 will be too soon for a sweeping Brotherhood victory. The Brotherhood projects its objectives for the long term and will surely look to build upon its past electoral success. Therefore, the Brotherhood will have accomplished a major strategic objective if it crafts a greater share of government representation for itself in the 2011 election. If it accomplishes this objective, it will be content to slowly operate within the democratic framework in Egypt, consistently whittling a greater political presence until the time arrives for them to take advantage of truly free and open election. Regardless of outcome, the Brotherhood's intent to establish *Sharia* in Egypt will not be deterred by the 2011 elections.

REFERNCES

Associated Press, “Egypt’s Police Battle Workers Amid Discontent” *USA Today*; News; World; 04/06/08

BBC News, “Egyptian Islamists Deny Holocaust” *World*, 12/23/05; online at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4554986.stm

Brooke, Steve and Leiken, Robert S.; “The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood” *Foreign Affairs*; Mar/April 2007, vol 86, Iss. 2

Byman, Daniel; testimony before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Extraordinary Rendition, Extraterritorial Detention, and Treatment of Detainees.” July 26, 2007

CNN Cold War Profile, “Anwar Sadat, Egyptian President,” <http://edition.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/kbank/profiles/sadat/>

Dunder, Jonathan; “Gamal Abdel Nasser Biography,” *The Free Information Society*; <http://www.freeinfosociety.com/site.php?postnum=801>

Dunne, Michele; “Egypt’s National Democratic Party: The Search for Legitimacy” *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, November 16, 2007; web commentary, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=19716&prog=zgp&proj=zme>

Jones, Paula; U.S. Dept. of State, International Information Programs, U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda, December 1999, "Preventing Conflict – Military Engagement in Peacetime."

Linzer, Dafna, "Polls Show Growing Arab Rancor at U.S." *Washington Post*, 07/23/04, pA26

Michael, Maggie; "Egypt's Brotherhood Party Details Platform Akin to That of Iran" *Associated Press*, 10/11/07

Muravchik, Joshua; "Jihad or Ballot-Box?" *Wall Street Journal*; 12/13/05; pA12

Murphy, Dan; "Egypt Keeps Muslim Brotherhood Boxed In" *Christian Science Monitor*; 06/07/05

Muslim Brotherhood website, "Establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood"
<http://www.ikhwanweb.com/Article.asp?ID=796&LevelID=1&SectionID=115>

Muslim Brotherhood website, "The Principles of the Muslim Brotherhood"

Osman, Tarek; "Nasser's Complex Legacy," *openDemocracy*;
http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/conflicts/middle_east/gamal_abdel_nasser

Putz, Ulrike; "Poor Turnout as Muslim Brotherhood Boycotts Egyptian Elections" *Spiegel Online*; 04/08/08,
<http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,546148,00.html>

Sandels, Alexandra, "Egyptian Editor's Wife Attributes Press Crackdown to Government's 'Fading Legitimacy'" *World News Connection*; 03/31/08

Scott, Rachel, "An Official Islamic Response to the Egyptian 'al-Jihad' Movement," *Journal of Political Ideologies*; 2003 vol. 8 issue 1

Sharp, Jeremy M; "Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations," CRS Report for Congress, *Congressional Research Service*; March 29, 2007

Slackman, Michael; "An Unanswered Question: Who Follows Mubarak?" *The New York Times*; World, Africa; 11/01/07

The Economist, "Bashing the Muslim Brothers" International; Egypt; 09/01/07, vol.384, iss. 8544; pg42

U.S. White House, Press Release; Office of the Secretary, January 16, 2008

Vidino, Lorenzo; “The Muslim Brotherhood’s Conquest of Europe” *The Middle East Quarterly*; winter 2005, vol. 12, no. 1

Walsh, John; “Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood” *Harvard International Review*, Winter 2003; 24, 4

Zambelis, Chris; “Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood: Political Islam Without al-Qaeda” *Terrorism Monitor*; Vol. V, Iss.22, 11/26/07

Zogby International, “Five Nation Survey of the Middle East” December 2006