

The Adaptability of the FARC and ELN and the Prediction of their Future Actions

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Introduction

Colombia is Latin America's oldest democracy yet the nation has faced continual violence and a guerrilla war that has made the nation weak and fragmented. This violent foundation of the Colombian state made it open to a new wave of political ideologies in the 20th century. The movement of Marxism-Leninism spread across Latin America, especially among the intellectuals, peasants, and priests in Colombia. The purpose of this research is to provide an analysis of the two main guerrilla factions in the country – the FARC and the ELN – and predict the future of these groups. Studying the history of these organizations and their adaptability within the Colombian context provides insight into the emergence of guerrilla warfare and the problems for the state.

Colombia has been in social and political turmoil since independence. Like most Latin American countries, Colombia developed a political system based on an oligarchy between the political and landed elite with the working poor and peasantry at the bottom. As Colombia began interacting with international markets and businesses it produced economic growth and prosperity for the elite while leaving the impoverished and marginalized populace open to the spread of revolutionary political ideologies.

The FARC and ELN emerged as the masses at the bottom of the social strata were alienated by the ruling elite and their political system. While Colombia is a popularly elected democracy there was little participation or reward for those outside of the two party Liberals and Conservatives. With the spread of revolutionary ideals across Latin America due to the success of the Cuban revolution, the FARC and ELN found within Colombia the political and social context necessary to employ revolutionary strategies that continue today.

Looking at these two revolutionary groups, their emergences, capacities for change and durability provide insights on revolutionary groups and their survival. The FARC and ELN have faced incredible odds due to the rejection of the local people, lack of external support, or weak organizations in general. But these two organizations have been able to strengthen, adapt and expand even as public support has waned. They have survived with little or no external support and they have learned to become self-sufficient over time. Not only are these groups a model for the study of modern revolutionary movements but of prevention of revolutionaries and counterinsurgency tactics as well. Very few revolutionary movements in history have been able to achieve the level of success and adaptability of these two organizations over nearly half a century.

In the process of studying these groups the political environment of Colombia and the 20th century are also of great importance. The movement of Marxism throughout the world created hope for a utopian ideal which spoke to the disenfranchised and sparked the belief that the revolution was possible. The workers of the world only needed a cohesive leadership structure. In Colombia, the revolution was based on land redistribution and an equitable sharing of wealth. These ideals, coupled with the lack of social change in Colombia, have led to a long standing revolutionary climate.

Beginning in Chapter One, the study looks at the emergence of Marxism as a political ideology in the late 1800s. By 1917, Lenin interpreted Marxism to create what would be the first socialist country, Russia, after the Bolshevik Revolution. The chapter then moves on to Stalinism and the spread of socialist ideology all over the world. After an overview of Stalin and Mao, the chapter takes up the Soviet and Mao influence in

Latin America and the Cuban revolution. This moves the work through the influence of the Cuban revolution and the emergence of revolutionary ideology in Colombia.

Chapter Two focuses on the FARC and the origins of the revolutionary group. Using liberalism as the theoretical approach and through rational choice modeling the work will test hypotheses using a matrix diagram. The purpose of the chapter is to show the adaptability of the FARC as an explanation for their survival and ability to compete with the Colombian government. This also explains the ideology that formed the FARC and how that ideology has changed with the evolution of the revolutionary group. This research and framework will be the basis for the next chapter on the ELN as well.

Chapter Three discusses the ELN and its origins as a revolutionary movement. This chapter also uses liberalism as its theoretical approach with the testing of hypotheses completed through rational choice modeling and a matrix diagram. The purpose of this chapter is to show the origins and ideology of the ELN and how that ideology changed as the political and social dynamic changed in Colombia. The ELN's adaptability for survival and its ability to stay a strong revolutionary group is also discussed. This leads into the final chapter on predicting the future of these groups.

Chapter Four is a LAMP (Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction) study conducted on both the FARC and ELN using the actions of the government as a backdrop. Beginning with the political history of the government, the chapter explains how the government acts in Colombia and its motivations. By utilizing the liberalism theoretical approach that acknowledges the importance of non-state actors, the LAMP study focuses on the FARC and ELN actions and predicts the future actions and behaviors of these groups vis-à-vis actions by the state of Colombia. The study will

outline the scenarios possible and provide a prediction of how the FARC and ELN will act based on past behaviors.

This thesis sets out to present a chronological and historical analysis of the FARC and ELN and their effectiveness as revolutionary organizations. Through this process, the political and ideological events during the life spans of these groups will be considered and used to predict their possible futures. One cannot discuss two revolutionary actions in Colombia without considering the FARC and ELN. By studying the emergence and adaptability of both guerrilla groups, insights are to be gained in understanding the role of the revolutionaries in the Latin American social and political climate. It is the intent of this research to add to the literature on Colombia revolutionaries and through the use of new methods, offer new insights to the conflict in Colombia.

Chapter 1

Marxist Roots of the FARC and ELN

Introduction:

In post World War II Latin America, Marxist-inspired insurgency groups formed in response to the unequal distribution of land ownership and wealth, and ongoing state-sponsored violence. This chapter forms the background necessary to trace the Marxist influence from the 1800s through Lenin, Stalin, and Mao, as applicable to Latin America, particularly in Colombia's FARC and ELN. Karl Marx planted the seeds of revolution in his creation of a comprehensive social and political philosophy that would become known as classical Marxism. While the creation of what became Marxism was the result of many philosophers, Marx was the dominating philosophy from which the political form of communism from Lenin, Stalin, and Mao was created. Marxism was never applied during his lifetime, but Marx's writings became the root system for the practical applications of communism by nations and revolutionaries throughout the world. These communist/socialist ideologies were similar in that they stemmed from Marx's ideas of class struggle and class equity. With Marxism providing the philosophical side of the Communist movement, Lenin and Stalin interpreted Marx's ideology through the application of his principles and ideals in Russia. While the actual result of the Soviet experience was far from what Marx had hoped for or predicted the Russian Revolution became the springboard for the expansion of communist and socialist ideologies around the globe, where they were employed especially in the Third World. Once communism reached China and Latin America, revolutionary movements began that are still active today.

Marxism:

Marx's social and political philosophy was a grand narrative, a critique of modern capitalism in European industrial society. One looking at Karl Marx and his work must understand that "Marx was not an academic writer but a humanist in the Renaissance sense of the term: his mind was concerned with the totality of human affairs, and his vision of social liberation embraced as an interdependent whole, all of the major problems with which humanity is faced."¹ This explains how the writings of Marx were more romantic and less practical, where his works tended to follow general ideas rather than practical means for attaining social and political goals. Upon his position of editor at *Rheinische Zeitung* Marx focused on political abuses and socio-economic inequality.² He decried the monopolization of wealth and property, declaring the poor "the elemental class of human society."³ The works of Marx follow "three fields of speculation – basic philosophic anthropology, socialist doctrine, and economic analysis – and point to three corresponding sources in German dialectics, French socialist thought, and British political economy."⁴ Marx was introduced to Hegelianism which "was the interpretation of history as a progressive rationalization of the world in accordance with the ineluctable laws of the spirit; the chief purpose of philosophical thought was to observe this evolution, in which empirical reality was seen gradually to conform to universal reason."⁵ On Hegel's "idea" of the state, Marx turned this into the "reality" of the "crass pursuit of self-interest and slavish service to aristocratic and bourgeois interests" by the Prussian

¹ Kolakowski, Leszek. 2005. Main Currents of Marxism: The Founders The Golden Age The Breakdown. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 8.

² Ritzer, George. Ed. 2000. The Blackwell Companion to Major Social Theorists. Malden: Blackwell Publishers. 107.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Kolakowski, Leszek. 2005. Main Currents of Marxism 9.

⁵ Ibid 80.

bureaucracy officials.⁶ Marx took from Hegel the notion of history unfolding, but rather than by “laws of the spirit” the unfolding was a function of historically material processes. Marx’s criticism of religion is evident in his *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right* on man and religion as they pertain to politics:

Man is the world of man, the state, and society. This state, this society produce religion’s inverted attitude to the world, because they are an inverted world themselves. Religion is ... the imaginary realization of human being, because human being possesses no true reality. Thus the struggle against religion is indirectly the struggle against that world whose spiritual aroma is religion ... Religion is the opium of the people. The real happiness of the people requires the abolition of religion, which is their illusory happiness. In demanding that they give up illusions about their condition, we demand that they give up a condition that requires illusion ... Once the holy form of human self-alienation has been unmasked, the first task of philosophy, in the service of history, is to unmask self-alienation in its unholy forms. The criticism of heaven is thus transformed into criticism of earth, the criticism of religion into the criticism of law, and the criticism of theology into the criticism of politics.⁷

Marx looked at the state of Germany for example and discussed its liberation, “[w]e must make the actual oppression even more oppressive by making people conscious of it, and the insult even more insulting by publicizing it ... We must force these petrified relationships to dance by playing their own tune to them. To give people

⁶ Ritzer, George. Ed. 2000. The Blackwell Companion 107.

⁷ Kolakowski, Leszek. 2005. Main Currents of Marxism 106.

courage, we must teach them to be alarmed by themselves.”⁸ For Marx, it was necessary for the oppressed classes to be relieved of their religion as an opiate, which kept them from acting on their collective alienation. Marx explains how the “social revolution can only be carried out by a class whose particular interests coincide with that of all society, and whose claims represent universal needs.”⁹ With that, Marx portrays the liberation of the proletariat and its abolition as a separate class resulting in the subsequent destruction of class distinctions by abolishing private property.¹⁰ Marx first discussed socialism but not as a substitution of one political life by another but as the “abolition of politics altogether.”¹¹ Marx looked at socialism as the “full emancipation of the individual by the destruction of the web of mystification which turned community life into a world of estrangement presided over by an alienated bureaucracy.”¹² According to Marx capitalism separates the individual from their means of production, concentrates production and its means in the hands of capitalists, and achieves cooperative activity through coercion.¹³ This unrestrained pursuit of self-interest generates tension between the individual activity and cooperation.¹⁴ These ideas make the assumption that there can be a perfect union between collective and individual interests and that a society where all sources of conflict, aggression, and evil have been removed was thinkable and historically eminent.¹⁵ Marx held that the bourgeois “freedom dissolves feudal ties and extends formal rights, but neither sustains community nor provides adequate

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid 107.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid 108.

¹³ Ritzer, George. Ed. 2000. The Blackwell Companion 115.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Kolakowski, Leszek. 2005. Main Currents of Marxism 108.

opportunities for those below the middle class.”¹⁶ Marx intended a ‘practical philosophy’ over the ‘contemplative’ attitudes of his predecessors and peers “The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it”¹⁷

Marx believed that the primary source of social conflict lies within the division of labor and the resulting class antagonisms.¹⁸ Since this division of labor is the primary cause of social inequality and private property, the chief goal of communism is to abolish the division of labor and allow men to take part in all types of work and thus achieve all-around development.¹⁹ Leveling social divisions by abolishing property ownership and class distinctions promotes the conditions for revolution. “First, the state of servitude must become intolerable and the masses must be deprived of possessions totally opposed to the existing order.”²⁰ “Second, technical development must have reached an advanced stage: communism in a premature state would only be generalized poverty.”²¹

Communism must also occur on the global stage where each country is economically interdependent on each other, which is brought about by simultaneous revolution in the most dominant and advanced countries.²² While “previous revolutions have altered the division of labor and distribution of social activity,” communism as a revolution will abolish labor and class divisions in the human race.²³ Thus it will “bring about a universal transformation in the terms of production and exchange.”²⁴ Marx’s materialist analyses stress class struggles over the forms of property and his focus was on the social

¹⁶ Ritzer, George. Ed. 2000. The Blackwell Companion 108.

¹⁷ Kolakowski, Leszek. 2005. Main Currents of Marxism 118.

¹⁸ Ibid 130.

¹⁹ Ibid 131.

²⁰ Kolakowski, Leszek. 2005. Main Currents of Marxism 131.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid 132.

²⁴ Ibid.

relationships associated with material factors rather than material conditions “*per se*.”²⁵ Materialism, according to Marx, points to productive forces as the “ultimate causal agent” of major change but class struggle is the immediate “motor.”²⁶ Marxist ideas of historical materialism give rise to class antagonism; against which Marx encourages the proletariat to resist but Marx also realized that as production yields surpluses capable of freeing a significant portion of the populace from labor a fundamental “class split” arises into the “ruling classes” and “direct producers.”²⁷ This “split” is the foundation for “class struggle” which creates new class structures and reshapes social life.²⁸ The problem is that complex splits between fragments in single classes and cross-class alliances through legal “orders” and status groups causes “internecine” conflict.²⁹ For that reason Marx’s portrayal of extremely fragmented class relations through ethnic, racial, gender, religious, and other socio-cultural divisions hinder class struggles.³⁰ While it was not until years after Marx that Latin America adopted his revolutionary ideology, there are distinct class fragmentations in the region that epitomize the problems Marx saw in class struggles.

In 1847-48, Marx and Engels³¹ were asked to join a League of Communist bodies from many European nations.³² On the advice of Marx and Engels the name was changed to *The Communist League* and coined the motto ‘Proletarians of all countries, unite!’³³ It was at this time that the league created the ‘Principles of Communism.’³⁴

²⁵ Ritzer, George. Ed. 2000. The Blackwell Companion 119.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid 117.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Frederick Engels was part of the young –Hegelian movement of the 1840’s and after critically addressing the political economy, became a communist. Marx followed this path and Engels became a lifelong collaborator to Marx and contributed substantially to Marx’s thought (Ritzer 109).

³² Kolakowski, Leszek. 2005. Main Currents of Marxism 186.

³³ Ibid 187.

These principles “dealt with capitalist exploitation and the inevitability of crises and described the future society based on community of goods, political democracy, equal wages, and planned industrial production” and also explained the necessity of simultaneous revolution in civilized countries.³⁵ In 1848, the first *Manifesto of the Communist Party* was published where relationships “between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, between the communists and the proletariat, and between communism and existing socialist doctrines” are dealt with.³⁶ The *Communist Manifesto* makes the call for global communism in a proletarian “conquest of political power” through the abolition of private property and social classes.³⁷ The *Manifesto* also anticipated critiques of communism with these rebuttals³⁸ [in italics, added]:

1. The abolition of private property will lead to general idleness and the collapse of production. *But private property does not exist today for the masses, yet society exists and maintains itself.*
2. Communism is the denial of individuality. *Yes-of such individuals as are enabled by the system to use their own property as an instrument for the enslavement of others.*
3. Communism destroys the family. *It destroys the bourgeois family, based on property-ownership on the one hand and on prostitution and hypocrisy on the other. Big business has destroyed the family life of the proletariat.*
4. Communism is against nationality. *But the working man has no fatherland, so how can he be deprived of one? In any case the world market is effacing*

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid 188.

³⁸ Ibid 189.

national differences, and the victory of the proletariat will intensify this process. When the exploitation of man by man is abolished we shall also see an end of exploitation, oppression, and enmity among nations. National oppression is the outcome of social oppression.

5. Communism seeks to destroy the eternal truths and sublime ideas of religion, ethics, and philosophy. *But all the ideas bequeathed by history are absolute only in so far as exploitation and oppression have persisted despite all changes in political systems. The spiritual output of mankind is as changeable as the conditions of human existence; ideas are permanent in so far as particular relations have hitherto been permanent. Communism overthrows 'eternal' ideas by destroying the class system which, by existing from time immemorial, gave them the appearance of eternity.*³⁹

Marxism focused on the domain of social philosophy and while Marxism was being used as an ideology for a political movement, the philosophy required interpretation and specification which caused tensions and contradictions within Marxism previously unnoticed.⁴⁰ Even more difficult was the application of Marx's prophecies concerning the nature of communism.⁴¹ Since Marx explained that "socialism deposes objective economic laws and enables men to control the conditions of their lives, it is easy to infer that a socialist society can do anything it likes" and thus Marx's dream of unity could "take the form of a despotic party oligarchy."⁴² Marx asserted that the "first phase of communist society would carry the defects of capitalism's limited economic and cultural

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid 341.

⁴¹ Ibid 342.

⁴² Ibid.

development.”⁴³ He contended that the “first step in the revolution ... is to raise the proletariat to the position of ruling class to win the battle for democracy.”⁴⁴ However, Marx realized that in this first phase the “state can be nothing but *the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat*” and that the political wing of the proletariat would “expropriate the bourgeoisie and centralize primary means of production and infrastructure.”⁴⁵ On another occasion Marx used the term ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ and never explained what it meant but he “had in mind the class content of the power system and not, as Lenin did, the liquidation of democratic institutions.”⁴⁶ The implication of the first phase was a total centralization of power which would employ “despotic” force to implement its modernization plan.⁴⁷ According to Marx, the communist state authorities had to monopolize power and ignore calls for “freedom for the communities” or “self government” in order to create productive and socio-cultural infrastructure for a break with bourgeois society.⁴⁸ “The Leninist-Stalinist version of Marxism was no more than a version, i.e. one attempt to put into practice the ideas that Marx expressed in a philosophical form without any clear principles of political interpretation.”⁴⁹

Leninism:

By the 1890’s Marxism came into public debate in Russia but was used mainly to denounce capitalism and its effects, and to support Russia choosing a path of its own.⁵⁰ It was through the October Revolution that Lenin’s presence and activity in forming the Bolshevik Party was an indispensable condition of the revolution’s outbreak and

⁴³ Ritzer, George. Ed. 2000. The Blackwell Companion 130.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid 130-131.

⁴⁶ Kolakowski, Leszek. 2005. Main Currents of Marxism 343.

⁴⁷ Ritzer, George. Ed. 2000. The Blackwell Companion 131.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Kolakowski, Leszek. 2005. Main Currents of Marxism 343.

⁵⁰ Ibid 640.

success.⁵¹ Leninism has been disputed as a variant of Marxism; some see Leninism as “a ‘revisionist’ ideology in relation to the Marxist tradition,” and others see it as a “faithful application of the general principles of Marxism to a new political situation.”⁵² Lenin looked only at the singular aim of the revolution “and the meaning of all human affairs, ideas, institutions, and values resided exclusively in their bearing on the class struggle.”⁵³ While Marx and Engels supported these ideas, their focus was much broader than the Lenin focus: “Is this good or bad for the revolution?”⁵⁴

There are three specific points that call into question the fidelity of Lenin to the Marxist tradition.⁵⁵ First, Lenin “advocated an alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry as the basic strategies for the ‘bourgeois revolution,’ while his opponents contended that an alliance with the bourgeoisie would be more in accordance with the doctrine in this case.”⁵⁶ “Secondly, Lenin was the first to see the national question as a powerful reservoir of energy that social democrats could and should use to further their cause, instead of merely an awkward hindrance.”⁵⁷ Third, Lenin created his own organizational rules and his own version of the party attitude towards resistance by the workers.⁵⁸ As critical as his opponents were about these policies they were necessary to the success of the Bolshevik revolution.⁵⁹

Lenin’s ideas of the party were considered despotic and are considered by some historians as the beginning of the entire “hierarchical, totalitarian structure in which the

⁵¹ Ibid 641.

⁵² Ibid 661.

⁵³ Ibid 662.

⁵⁴ Ibid 663.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid 664.

socialist system was subsequently embodied.”⁶⁰ Lenin was accused of elitism; he desired to substitute a revolutionary organization for the working class and that the power should reside with the intelligentsia rather than proletariat.⁶¹ It was understood that socialism’s theoretical foundations had to be laid by intellectuals and it was also accepted that the workers’ party differed from the working class since nothing in the writings of Marx showed the two as one and the same.⁶² To Lenin, the working class movement in the true sense of the term was a movement of the right ideology, not a movement of workers.⁶³ While it was important for Lenin to have as many workers in the party as possible, he looked at the party as an entity where the distinction of intellectuals and workers disappeared if provided with the correct theoretical consciousness.⁶⁴ The “consciousness of the proletariat” would be embodied despite what the general proletariat thought of the party.⁶⁵ Hence, it was the premise of Lenin that “requires us to believe that the interests and aims of the social class, the proletariat, can and indeed must be determined without that class having any say in the matter.”⁶⁶ This hegemonic idea developed into an authoritative party role, which was a “despotism” based on the idea that the “party always knows better the interests, needs, and even desires” of the community than do the “backward people” themselves.⁶⁷ “In this way Lenin laid the foundation of what was to become the Communist Party—a party distinguished by ideological unity, efficiency, a hierarchic and centralized structure, and the conviction that it represents the interest of

⁶⁰ Ibid 667.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid 668.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid 669.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

the proletariat whatever the proletariat itself may think.”⁶⁸ This party deems its own interests to be that of the working class and of “universal progress” due to its “scientific knowledge” that entitles it to ignore the “actual wishes and aspirations of the people it appointed itself to represent.”⁶⁹

Lenin was the first and only important social democrat in Europe to invoke the idea that the proletariat would militarily overthrow the government to turn the war from imperialist to civil.⁷⁰ Lenin believed that the Russian Revolution would spark an international or at least a European revolution based on the “rising tide of revolution and the outbreaks in Bavaria, Hungary, and Estonia, but also on Lenin’s conviction that the European war could only be stopped by overthrowing capitalism.”⁷¹ When it became clear that the greater European proletariat would not follow Lenin or “would fail trying” and that the end of the war could be brought about by alternative means there was the question of what the party was to do with their new found power.⁷² Thus began the dispute with Stalin and Trotsky over socialism in one state and “whether the building of socialism in Russia should be subordinated to the cause of the world revolution or vice versa.”⁷³ It is evident however, that after Russia’s Revolution Lenin’s attention was dedicated to policy as the head of state and not the leader of a world-wide revolution.⁷⁴

While the Russian Revolution was a communist revolution in the sense that it transferred

⁶⁸ Ibid 673.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid 732.

⁷¹ Ibid 737-738.

⁷² Ibid 738.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid 739.

power to the Communist Party, it did not follow the Marxist predictions for the downfall of capitalist society.⁷⁵

Stalinism:

This brings the final phase of communism in Russia to the forefront since the era of Stalin was significant in the international scene with both the expansion of Soviet influence and the onset of the Cold War. The rule of Stalin was horrific but largely accidental in its application.⁷⁶ For many communists, the emergence of Stalinism occurred as a result of the circumstances of the era, such as the cultural and industrial backwardness in Russia, the failure of an anticipated European revolution, external threats to Russia, and the political exhaustion of the Soviet state after the revolution, rather than the despotism of Stalin himself.⁷⁷ Many observers see the Soviet system under Stalin as the continuation of Marxism and Leninism, which can be best described by an “all-powerful authority competent to declare at any given moment what Marxism was and what it was not.”⁷⁸ Marxism meant nothing more or less than what Stalin currently pronounced and unlike Lenin, the regime of Stalin was unique in that it became an international phenomenon.⁷⁹ Stalin used pieces of work from Marx, Engels, and Lenin to support his ideology, which seemed to change frequently. Upon Stalin’s rise to power it became clear that the Russians needed to set forth a socialist transformation in their own country first before they could inspire revolutions around the world.⁸⁰ This was very similar to the circumstances Lenin found after the revolution when he realized his efforts

⁷⁵ Ibid 741.

⁷⁶ Ibid 789.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Ibid 791.

⁷⁹ Ibid 792.

⁸⁰ Ibid 806.

had to be directed to head the state. Essentially, Marxism under Stalin differed from Leninism by adding the two main tenants: 1) socialism could be built in one country alone and 2) “that the class struggle must become fiercer as the building of socialism progressed.”⁸¹ These tenants were unique in that Stalin was the first to realize the importance of Soviet support for communism around the world rather than waiting for world support of communism. Stalin’s ideology made exportation of Marxist-inspired revolutionary ideas possible.

Stalinism subsequently began spreading throughout the international communist movement and revolutionary groups began forming in Europe.⁸² These international ties were fueled in the Second Communist International when Lenin stated that colonial and backward countries needed communists to enter into alliances with national revolutionary movements, yet remain separate and keep the bourgeoisie from controlling the revolutionary movement.⁸³ This would support a Soviet republic from the outset and under the Soviet leadership, these backward countries would not have to go through a capitalist phase.⁸⁴ A document called the *Twenty-One Conditions* was also created to make joining communist parties adhere to the forms of Leninist organization of the movement.⁸⁵ These conditions stated that communist parties must subordinate their propaganda activities to the decisions of the Communist International (Comintern), the Communist Press was under party control, and the ‘sections’ must combat reformists by removing reformists and centralists from workers’ parties.⁸⁶ Within their country’s armed

⁸¹ Ibid 867.

⁸² Ibid 871-872.

⁸³ Ibid 872.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Ibid 873.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

forces, the ‘sections’ must carry out systematic propaganda.⁸⁷ “They must combat pacifism, support colonial liberation movements, be active in workers’ organizations and especially trade unions, and make efforts to win peasant support.”⁸⁸ In Parliament communist agents must make the revolutionary propaganda their primary concern and “parties must be centralized to the maximum, observe iron discipline, and periodically purge their ranks of petty-bourgeois elements.”⁸⁹ All parties had to unquestioningly support Soviet republics, their programs had to be endorsed by a congress of the Comintern or its Executive Committee, and such decisions were binding on all sections.⁹⁰ Finally, all parties must call themselves communist and those in countries where they can operate openly must also maintain clandestine organizations for actions at the ‘decisive moment.’⁹¹ This document underpinned international support for the movement of communism from Soviet Russia to Europe and beyond.

Third World:

By the end of the Second World War, Marxism-Leninism became the ideology of the Soviet state which meant little more than Stalin’s version of the two with the characteristic feature of “the interests of the governing stratum of a totalitarian state” and “its combination of extreme rigidity and extreme flexibility.”⁹² After Stalin, the ‘New Left’ could be characterized by European and North American student organizations that believed that the concept of a society ready for revolution is a “bourgeois deceit and that any properly organized group can make a revolution” and bring social change to any

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Ibid 881.

country.⁹³ For the ‘New Left’ the ideology reverted to classical Marxism and renewed attacks on the imperialism of the West, the arms race, and colonialism.⁹⁴ “The revolution must be worldwide, total, absolute, unlimited, and all embracing.”⁹⁵ For the New Left, the working class could not be relied on since they had been co-opted by the bourgeoisie under what Marx would call “false consciousness.” Finally, the patterns for total revolution were to be found in the Third World where the heroes of the New Left were Asian and Latin American revolutionaries.⁹⁶ Due to imperialism, colonialism, poverty, and oppression the Third World Marxian ideology resonated with the social and political struggles of the area.

Shortly after World War II, Maoism began influencing the communists of Latin America and in many respects transported ideologies. Traditional communist parties borrowed Maoist ideology due to the movement of Chinese “franchises” into Latin America and the idea of a prolonged revolution.⁹⁷ Another reason for the movement of Maoism into the region was as a result of the appeal to those of the Far Left that were disillusioned by the pro-Soviet Communist Parties such as “Castroism.”⁹⁸ The guerrilla warfare of the Chinese Maoists became the guidebook for Ernest “Che” Guevara and Fidel Castro in Cuba. Even though the revolution in Cuba did not begin as a communist revolution, by 1961 Cuba was firmly a socialist country.⁹⁹ It would be the Castro shift to Soviet socialist ideology that would eventually force Guevara to leave Cuba and spread his own revolutionary ideology.

⁹³ Ibid 1178.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Ibid 1179.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Alexander, Robert J. 1999. International Maoism in the Developing World. Westport: Praeger. 41.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid 42.

The 1960's brought acute global problems into view that needed to be solved on a widespread basis: over-population, environmental pollution, and the poverty, backwardness, and economic failures of the Third World.¹⁰⁰ These structural deformities gave rise to guerilla movements throughout Latin America. But the many failures of Latin American movements paralleled the failures of Lenin in his experience with the Bolshevik Revolution. Guerrilla movements that failed in Latin America were attributed not to the "objective and subjective" conditions that were central to early Marxists but a failure of organization and an inability to "act intelligently and cohesively in mobilizing the population" for the struggle.¹⁰¹ This thinking directly parallels the problems Lenin faced in the Russian Revolution and as a result Latin American guerrilla activity is simply a "latter-day, rurally oriented union of Leninist theory and praxis."¹⁰² The emphasis on intelligent organization proposed by Lenin fueled the debate between the followers of Che Guevara and Mao.¹⁰³ Che developed his revolutionary ideology from the Mao example of prolonged revolution but he would later diverge into his own revolutionary ideology. Despite differences, both schools of thought believed that the "masses are there, waiting to be mobilized" and revolutionaries simply have to "push the right buttons" to create a revolution.¹⁰⁴ Upon the rise of the New Left in the Third World, two new major Communist forces would come in the form of Maoism in China and its influence on Guevara and Castro in revolutionary Cuba.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid 1180.

¹⁰¹ Wickham-Crowley, Timothy P. 1991. *Exploring Revolution: Essays on Latin American Insurgency and Revolutionary Theory*. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, Inc. 5.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid 6.

At the beginning of Castro's rise to power, support for the region was coming from both the Chinese and the Soviets.¹⁰⁵ Since Castro's emergence was based on the use of guerrilla warfare, Maoist support seemed evident.¹⁰⁶ However, shortly after the Cuban missile crisis Castro had developed a deep dependency on the political, military, diplomatic, and economic aid from the Soviet Union due to the conflict with the United States.¹⁰⁷ By 1966, Castro publicly split from the Chinese over their refusal to aid Cuba and through 1968, Castro began rallying revolutionary parties in the Third World organizing a rough equivalent to the Comintern.¹⁰⁸ It would be the reliance of Castro on the Soviets and his shift in ideology that drove Che to create his own revolutionary ideology.

In Latin America the Cuban Revolution set the model for revolutionary groups in the Third World.¹⁰⁹ Guevara had synthesized the lessons of the Cuban Revolution into three principles: "1) popular forces can win a war against the army; 2) it is not necessary to wait until all the conditions for revolution exist; the insurrection can create them; 3) in underdeveloped America the countryside is the basic area for armed fighting."¹¹⁰ Throughout his works Guevara explained how the necessary elements for revolution existed across Latin America including poverty, oppression, and class conflict.¹¹¹ Bypassing the possibilities for peaceful insurrection, Guevara declared that the subjective conditions to the belief in revolution and the will to revolt could be created by the

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid 43.

¹⁰⁹ Wright, Thomas C. 2000. Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution. Praeger Security International. Internet. Available from: <http://psi.praeger.com.ezproxy.apus.edu/doc.aspx?d=/books/question/b78112/b78112-sect24.xml> 1.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid 2.

“insurreccional foco.”¹¹² As Guevara set his guerrilla ideals into motion, many revolutionary groups throughout Latin America began taking up arms. Colombia was not exempt from the spread of revolutionary uprisings.

Colombia:

In “The Possibility of Nonviolent Revolution” an 1872 essay by Marx, he asserted that the proletariat can attain goals by peaceful means but for most countries this is not the case and the “lever of our revolution must be force.”¹¹³ This is more applicable to Colombia than any other country today. In 1917 the Bolshevik Revolution engineered by Lenin was watched closely in Colombia.¹¹⁴ By 1924 a Marxist study group which called itself a “Communist Party” was formed with the help of Vicente Staviskya, a Russian immigrant, and were related to the Liberal Party, which by 1926 became the Revolutionary Socialist Party (PSR) of the Third Communist International.¹¹⁵ After divided by ideology, the PSR became the Communist Party of Colombia (PCC), a pro-Soviet party with the intention of improving workers’ rights and organizing “peasant leagues” in rural areas and “popular fronts” in urban areas.¹¹⁶ PCC members watched the Castro takeover of Cuba and the division that was caused by the USSR-China split over Maoism.¹¹⁷ This disrupted the unity of the PCC and it divided into various factions following different ideologies of the time.¹¹⁸ As a result of the “Sino-Soviet crisis” two

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Brittain, James J. 2005. The FARC-EP in Colombia A Revolutionary Exception in an Age of Imperialist Expansion. *Monthly Review*. (September). Internet. Available from: <http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.apus.edu/ehost/pdf?vid=4&hid=108&sid=de2d9d2d-80a6-4b2b-bb78-0e26c4201452%40sessionmgr103>. 21.

¹¹⁴ Osterling, George P. 1989. *Democracy in Colombia: Clientelist Politics and Guerrilla Warfare*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.185.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Ibid 186.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

leading divisions emerged from the PCC: the pro-Moscow or mainstream PCC and the pro-Peking Marxist-Leninist Communist Party (PCML).¹¹⁹ It was the radical, militant members of the PCML that split into the Marxist “Southern Block” in the late 1940’s which became the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (FARC) less than fifteen years later.¹²⁰

During the time of the Cuban Revolution, Colombia was in an era known as *La Violencia*. This era is important because of the changes in Colombia during and after the period due to the loss of over 200,000 lives in 15 to 20 years.¹²¹ This era can be broken into four periods. The first period was the 1948 assassination of Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, leader of the Liberal Party, and the subsequent galvanizing moment of political tension.¹²² The second period was marked by the quick spread of guerrilla warfare throughout the country as revolutionary groups armed themselves against partisan attack.¹²³ To make matters worse the conservative controlled government used the national police and the Army for partisan ends that further mobilized the liberal peasantry.¹²⁴ It was at this point General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla overthrew the government and installed a military dictatorship to regain control of the country.¹²⁵ In the third period of *La Violencia*, this dictatorship started to see a downward trend as progress stalled, corruption increased, pockets of violence were met with repression, and guerrilla warfare

¹¹⁹ Ibid 187.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Wickham-Crowley, Timothy P. 1992. *Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative Study of Insurgencies and Regimes Since 1956*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 17.

¹²² Rempe, Dennis. 2002. *Implementing Plan Colombia The Past as a Prologue? A History of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in Colombia 1958-66*. Strategic Studies Institute. 3.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

began to spread again.¹²⁶ The fourth period of *La Violencia* saw the first split National Front government (a two-party 4-year alternating power system) which, with the help of the United States, instituted the best counter guerrilla operations in the Western Hemisphere.¹²⁷ This marked the end of *La Violencia* but with the Cold War in full swing the Marxist/Stalinist/Soviet inspired FARC and Castro/Che Guevara-inspired ELN represented a new era in Colombian revolutionaries.

The new era of Colombia and its revolutionary groups went into full swing in the 1960's during a time when communism was fully operable in Russia and China. During this time the first nuclei of the FARC formed which followed a Soviet-communist ideology.¹²⁸ The ELN, which followed a Che Guevara type of communist ideology, built their support among the marginalized *campesinos* due to the failure of agrarian reforms and the political exclusion imposed by the bi-party system of the National Front.¹²⁹ Shortly after the Cuban Revolution, the Movimiento Obrero-Estudiantil-Campesino (MOEC) was formed using Fidelista teachings by setting up a guerrilla "*foco*" in Vichada, Colombia.¹³⁰ There is no doubt that the MOEC was the ideological and organizational base for the ELN.¹³¹ A number of Latin American radicals made the trip to Cuba which became a revolutionary "Mecca" where revolutionaries were spiritually prepared and militarily trained for the struggle.¹³² This was especially effective when groups of revolutionaries such as the ELN went to train together and return to follow

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Ibid 4.

¹²⁸ Palacios, Marco. 2002. Understanding Colombia: History and Background. Aspen Institute. Internet. Available from: <http://www.ciaonet.org.ezproxy.apus.edu/wps/pam04/index.html>. 19.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Wickham-Crowley, Timothy P. 1992. Guerrillas and Revolution 40.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Ibid 31.

“The Cuban Road.”¹³³ Like many revolutionary groups of the era, the FARC and ELN had similar goals even though their means differed greatly.

Aside from some middle class leaders and a priest who joined the ELN, both the FARC and ELN have remained isolated from the urban social currents of Colombia and have been apart from the political leadership.¹³⁴ Due to the lack of “stable and systematic alliances with the urban sectors of the trade unions or university fronts” the guerrillas have been politically weak on the national scale.¹³⁵ On the local scale the guerrillas have been able to form networks of supporters and sympathizers.¹³⁶ For the FARC, their agrarian tradition and ties to the Communist Party are a testament to their pro-Soviet/Stalinist ideals but their rural origins puts them closer to “*secular caciquismo*” and clientelism.¹³⁷ The FARC has survived the years due to the Leninist “Democratic Centralism” inherited from the Communist Party that keeps the unity of command even though the combatants are scattered over a fragmented geography.¹³⁸ The ELN has adopted a more federation approach.¹³⁹ For the FARC the focus is on a clear chain of command that requires cohesion where the ELN leaders in their respective fronts have more autonomy. It is the organization, culture, and behavior of these two organizations that make them so unique.

Having traced the Marxist inspired trajectories of the Colombian FARC and ELN from classical Marxism through the model Latin American Marxist revolutionaries, Che Guevara and Fidel Castro, the focus now turns to an analysis of the development of the

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Palacios, Marco. 2002. Understanding Colombia 19.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

FARC (Chapter Two) and the ELN (Chapter Three). Marxism is at the core of both organizations but their differing ideologies and revolutionary styles created very different outcomes for these organizations. After the Cold War and the fall of Marxist communist ideologies around the world in the late twentieth century, both of these groups were faced with the question of viability. The problems of adaptation in the post-Cold War era produced very different outcomes for the FARC and ELN as they exist today.

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Chapter 2

The FARC's Adaptability

Introduction:

The history of Colombia has been fraught with violent conflict and an unstable political system. The peasants in the country have been impoverished, marginalized, and oppressed by the military and the government to the point that they have banded together to defend themselves against their enemies. The galvanizing point for revolution was reached during the period of La Violencia, when in 1947 Manuel Marulanda Velez began the nucleus of liberal guerrilla units that would become the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia).¹⁴⁰ This occurred as communism was fully operable world wide as the Chinese revolution emerged and the Soviet Union was a global superpower.¹⁴¹ The Cuban Revolution served as a great inspiration to the FARC because the war was based on land reform and re-distribution of wealth.¹⁴² It was at this point the FARC was founded in 1966 within the peasantry to create a parallel state that could provide basic services to the rural areas where the Colombian government has been failing. The FARC was founded upon pro-Soviet communist principles and slowly expanded into new territories as their ranks swelled with those that had lost faith in the Colombian state. Areas of quasi independence were soon under the influence of the Colombian Communist Party and bases of “peasant republics” were created.¹⁴³ As the

¹⁴⁰ Rochlin, James F. 2003. Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America. Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers. 96.

¹⁴¹ Ibid 97.

¹⁴² Ibid 98.

¹⁴³ Wickham-Crowley, Timothy P. 1991. Exploring Revolution: Essays on Latin American Insurgency and Revolutionary Theory. Armonk: M. E. Sharpe. 135.

organization grew it was forced to change in many ways to survive at a time when the government and military were determined to eradicate the group and its followers. These changes within the FARC and its structure allowed it to grow in size and strength that would be able to create a power struggle with the government for the rural areas and the people residing in them.

As the FARC gained strength in numbers while increasing control of land and resources, their ability to branch out into illicit commerce and trade created a state within a state. The FARC has succeeded where many failed in the sense of survival because of this ability to adapt and change. Due to flexibility in their structure, political, and economic ties the organization has been able to thrive over the years where hundreds of other guerrilla groups have dwindled away. But along with adaptation the group has also changed its goals. After gaining strength in numbers and land their ability to wage war against the national government has increased and they have been able to create partnerships with other criminal and political entities that have expanded the reach of the organization.¹⁴⁴ As a result of their flexibility the group has become increasingly independent despite some support derived from the communist nations during the Cold War. The FARC has separated its cause from the international Communist movement and forced the world to treat it as an independent entity.¹⁴⁵ Also, since the Cold War illicit crop production has become an increasing part of the funding and capabilities of the regional guerrilla groups thus furthering their independence.

Together with the U.S. government, the Colombian government has fostered an extensive effort to contain and eradicate the FARC insurgency, of which Plan Colombia

¹⁴⁴ Ortiz, Ramon D. 2002. Insurgent Strategies in the Post-Cold War: The Case of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 01 (April): 137.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid 130-131.

is the latest incarnation. The U.S. involvement fighting the FARC has foreign policy implications for the region which makes the study of the organization an imperative. By looking into the history of the organization and its structure, the adaptive strategies can be analyzed. By understanding these fundamentals of the organization there is a better understanding of the FARC and how to use that knowledge against the organization for the purpose of negotiations and possible eradication. For the purpose of this chapter the focus will be on the organizational structure of the FARC and how it has changed since the Cold War. More specifically the chapter will look at how the organization has adapted its structure to survive and thrive in Colombia.

Literature Review:

The following works represent an important portion of the literature on the FARC and their evolution in Colombia over the years. The literature demonstrates the history of the FARC and their growth as a guerrilla group. The literature will show the changes in the operations of the FARC over the years and their ability to adapt and survive where other groups have been dissolved.

In *Colombia: A Brutal History* Geoff Simons gives a thorough history of the violence from the historical roots to modern times in Colombia as a result of government and non-governmental actors. Simons positions the emergence of the FARC in the struggle for the state to become stable and secure after La Violencia from 1948 to 1965.¹⁴⁶ The guerrilla group expanded and gained in stature during the early years,¹⁴⁷ while it played a role in subversion as the government was preoccupied with cartels and

¹⁴⁶ Simons, Geoff. 2004. *Colombia: A Brutal History*. London: SAQI. 35-43.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid 46-52.

the war on drugs.¹⁴⁸ At this point the FARC and their actions were described in the context of the beginning of the Ernesto Samper administration and how the group used kidnapping and military action to influence political actions.¹⁴⁹ The work moves to 1996-97 where the government was dealing with the onset of a full guerrilla war and the ties between the illicit drug trade and the guerrillas.¹⁵⁰ Throughout these years in Colombia the U.S. had tremendous influence in the military and political aspects of Colombia's wars and the author shows how even with the help of the U.S. the multi-front battle was becoming too much for the Colombian government to handle.¹⁵¹ The next portion of the Colombian timeline is represented by the Pastrana administration (1998-2001) and the beginnings of the long attempts to negotiate peace with the FARC.¹⁵² This period really marked a turning point where the guerrilla groups demanded recognition as political entities within the country and the government was forced to negotiate. These peace talks with the Pastrana administration and the U.S. involvement brought on by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 are detailed, as are the subsequent changes in U.S.-Colombia relations.¹⁵³ While this work gives some great insight to the history of the conflict in Colombia it is a broad look at all of the conflicting groups and focuses on the Colombian and U.S. governments.

The following three works establish the effect of the Cold War and its end to the revolutionaries in Colombia. In *Insurgent Strategies in the Post-Cold War: The Case of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia* Roman D. Ortiz discusses the adaptation of

¹⁴⁸ Ibid 75-89.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid 91-113.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid 114.

¹⁵¹ Ibid 169-181.

¹⁵² Ibid 182.

¹⁵³ Ibid 282.

the guerrillas in Colombia to begin a new style of armed conflict.¹⁵⁴ The work begins with a look at the insurgent groups as they developed during the Cold War.¹⁵⁵ The ineffectiveness of the groups during these years and their strong ideological foundations necessitated the evolution of the FARC movement with their political ideology into a position as an alternate public manager.¹⁵⁶ Ortiz looks at the growth and expansion of the FARC and discusses their split from the Communist party thus giving the organization a unique identity.¹⁵⁷ At this point the FARC changed their model of military action and their increased capabilities as they were able to increase their arsenal to sizes unseen in guerrilla groups and increase the income of the organization to hundreds of millions of dollars.¹⁵⁸ Finally Ortiz covers the current problems the large organization is now facing and their emerging vulnerabilities.¹⁵⁹ This work provides an in depth look at the changes in the ideology of the group and their emergence as a military force in Colombia.

In the article *Why the end of the Cold War doesn't matter: the U.S. war of terror in Colombia* Doug Stokes discusses U.S. involvement in the region and the Cold War style of intervention that came to Colombia as a result.¹⁶⁰ Stokes establishes the links between the guerrillas and the illicit drug trade after the Cold War and how these organizations support the illicit activities.¹⁶¹ The author concludes with a look at how the new U.S. war on terror has produced a dual purpose battle in Colombia where fighting

¹⁵⁴ Ortiz, Ramon D. 2002. *Insurgent Strategies* 127.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid* 128.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid* 129-131.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid* 134.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid* 136-138.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid* 140.

¹⁶⁰ Stokes, Doug. 2003. *Why the end of the Cold War doesn't matter: The US war of terror in Colombia. Review of International Studies 29: 569-571.*

¹⁶¹ *Ibid* 578.

the illicit drug trade has become a tactic in counterinsurgency.¹⁶² While the work focuses on U.S.-Colombian relations it also explains the past and current methods to combat both fronts of the guerrilla war and the drug war at the same time.

A Shift in the Paradigm of Violence: Non-Governmental Terrorism in Latin America since the Cold War by Andreas Feldmann demonstrates how terrorism is currently used by guerrilla groups to exert their force on governments.¹⁶³ The work focuses on terrorism alone and thus the acts are subject to the authors' interpretation of terrorism. While the study looks at Latin America as a whole the author points out that the FARC repeatedly uses terrorist actions in their overall strategy to their advantage.¹⁶⁴ Feldmann outlines the use of bombings and massacres by the FARC as a method of control and fear of the populace in Colombia.¹⁶⁵ The use of this work is to explain the evolution of the groups from military actions to terrorist actions since the Cold War.

The next four works focus on the increasing criminality of the armed rebel groups in Colombia and their ability to combat the government and military. In *The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Illicit Drug Trade* by Ricardo Vargas, the author attempts to explain how the cartels have become anti-guerrilla yet since the farmers of coca plants are in guerrilla areas they have been assumed to be one and the same.¹⁶⁶ The dynamic between the farmers, the guerrillas, the cartels, and the military are as a result of these intertwining operations.¹⁶⁷ In *The role of the state in the*

¹⁶² Ibid 581.

¹⁶³ Feldmann, Andreas. 2005. A Shift in the Paradigm of Violence: Non-Governmental Terrorism in Latin America since the end of the Cold War. *Revista de Ciencia Política* 25: 11.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid 28.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid 29-30.

¹⁶⁶ Vargas, Ricardo. 1999. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Illicit Drug Trade. *Transnational Insitute* (June). Internet. Available from http://www.tni.org/detail_page.phtml?page=archives_vargas_farc; Accessed 14 November 2008. 4.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid 5-7.

international illicit drug trade: the case of Colombia and external intervention, Julius Walker explains the roles the guerrilla forces play in this dynamic and their actions in the country.¹⁶⁸ It is imperative to understand how these organizations are operating in this new climate to compare their more ideological beginnings. That brings up the next work *Criminal Rebels? A Discussion of War and Criminality from the Colombian Experience* by Francisco Gutierrez Sanin discusses the beginnings of the guerrilla organizations in Colombia and how they turned to criminal activities for profit.¹⁶⁹ The author breaks down the beginning activities of the FARC and how the new enterprises of drugs, kidnapping, and extortion have turned the organization into a thriving money-maker.¹⁷⁰ The author concludes the study by applying ten tenants of being a member of the guerrilla organizations and how these apply to the debate of whether these groups are rebels or criminals.¹⁷¹ Finally, *Colombian Army Adaptation to FARC Insurgency* by Thomas Marks describes the beginning of the FARC as a military force, it's dynamic as a rebel group, and how it was able to combat the military as it expanded in operational capability and scope.¹⁷² At this point the military and police response to combating the FARC is discussed but more importantly the adaptation of the FARC in their action to thwart military and police attempts to recapture guerrilla zones.¹⁷³ While the military or police portions of the work are not needed for this study, his work provides invaluable information on how the FARC had developed financially, operationally, and militarily.

¹⁶⁸ Walker, Julius. 2002. The role of the state in the international illicit drugs trade: the case of Colombia and external intervention. Global Politics Network Internet. Available from <http://www.globalpolitics.net>; accessed 14 November 2008. 10.

¹⁶⁹ Sanin, Francisco Gutierrez. 2003. Criminal Rebels? A discussion of war and criminality From the Colombian experience. Crisis States Programme. (April): London. 7-10.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid 10.

¹⁷¹ Ibid 11.

¹⁷² Marks, Thomas. 2002. Colombian Army Adaptation to FARC Insurgency. Strategic Studies Institute (January). 1-9.

¹⁷³ Ibid 9-21.

In *Non-State Actors in Colombia: Threats to the State and the Hemisphere* Max G. Manwaring describes the war in Colombia being fought on three fronts. Manwaring breaks down and discusses each of the three groups and focuses on how the FARC has taken control of rural land and populations, along with the linking factors within these groups that make them so difficult to combat.¹⁷⁴ This research is useful looking at the goals and objectives of the FARC and how their growth is possible with the factors competing against the organization.

In the final work *A Subnational Study of Insurgency: FARC Violence in the 1990's* Jennifer S. Holmes, Sheila Amin Gutierrez de Pineres, and Kevin M. Curtin use the scientific method to test theories of insurgencies.¹⁷⁵ Using a Poisson model the authors look to examine traditional factors purported to explain insurgencies and then “extend the analysis to reveal the role of coordination and contagion using spatial econometric techniques.”¹⁷⁶ The study begins with the origins and growth of the FARC and all of the contributing factors to the insurgency.¹⁷⁷ Through a subnational level analysis the increase in violence with the advent of the drug trade is discussed while looking at the underlying factors that continue to support the explanation of violence within the country.¹⁷⁸ The study concludes with the preliminary spatial analysis that tests the hypotheses against the fixed factors of the insurgency thus determining the insignificant effects of the drug trade against the violent actions of the FARC.¹⁷⁹ The scientific methods used in this study test the factors contributing to the FARC violence

¹⁷⁴ Manwaring, Max G. 2002. *Non-State Actors in Colombia: Threats to the State and to the Hemisphere*. *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 01 (August): 71-73.

¹⁷⁵ Holmes, Jennifer S., Sheila Amin Gutierrez de Pineres, and Kevin M. Curtin. 2007. *A Subnational Study of Insurgency: FARC Violence in the 1990's*. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*. (March): 1.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid 2-12.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid 12.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid 17.

and through this it is easier to understand the guerrilla group and their actions. The literature collected all has points interlinking with the questions to be evaluated in this study but are lacking in answering the specific research question.

Looking at the individual studies above there is a useful amount of information concerning the changes within the FARC as an organization and the variables surrounding those changes. The links that are missing are the bureaucratic structure and organizational culture of the FARC and how these two features have changed, as well as the major factors that produced these changes. Many of the studies above look at the end of the Cold War and its effects on the FARC and the beginnings of the drug trade and its effects. But missing is how these factors as well as changes in the populace, government, and militaries have all culminated to affect the FARC and their structure and culture collectively. While all of these works attempt to single out factors affecting all of the competing groups in Colombia, this chapter is going to focus on how these factors affected one group, the FARC.

Methodology:

To explain the factors involved and their effect on the FARC the chapter will use liberalism as the theoretical approach. The FARC is a non-state actor and has proven to have both military and economic strengths that make it a formidable opponent to the state. It is also important to understand that the actions of the state directly affect the FARC as an organization and its culture. Taking that into account the focus on the state, the populace, the military, and the other organizations competing for power all play into the liberal cobweb approach to social science theory. This will be a more effective approach for explaining the independent variables such as the international drug trade,

the actions of the state and the end of the Cold War affect the organization where in the above literature the focus looks at the FARC as an independent variable and how it affects the state. Since the changes within the FARC as an organization is the focus of the study all of the surrounding factors of the government, military, populace, and competing organizations will all be treated as independent variables.

Through rational choice models this chapter proposes competing hypotheses which will individually be major contributing variables to the organizational and structural changes to the FARC. Hypothesis 1: *The changes to the organizational culture and bureaucratic structure of the FARC are a direct result of the end of the Cold War.* Since the Cold War ended it is possible that the FARC has changed its identity and structure to turn the organization into a successful offensive operation that is completely self-sufficient. This is important to this study since many other cases of insurgencies immediately failed after the end of the Cold War. Hypothesis 2: *The FARC adapts itself to the policies of the government.* It is an interesting dynamic where the government can change its mind on military action or inaction and whether or not to participate in peace talks. As a result the years of FARC actions appear to have a direct correlation with the government and military actions in regard to the FARC. Hypothesis 3: *The FARC changed its organizational culture and behavior to take advantage of the drug trade.* The advent of the drug trade in Colombia and its affect on the FARC has been widely debated. This study will look at this variable and discuss what effect it has had on the organization if any.

Through the analysis of these hypotheses using liberalism as the theoretical approach the goal will be to understand the importance of the independent variables on

the FARC. By treating the FARC as the dependent variable this chapter will look at the Cold War, the State, and the drug trade. The goal is to show what affect these variables have on the FARC individually and then show the links between the independent variables. This analysis will show the most definitive variables contributing to the organizations structural and cultural changes over time and how effective these changes were in the survival of the organization.

As a result of the readings it is realistic to say that the organizational behavior, structure and culture of the FARC changed over time. The variables will be considered to determine the time and severity of the changes. For some of the organizational adaptations outlined in the hypotheses the change was gradual and took place over periods of time where in other cases the changes were dramatic and fast. Pursuant to the literature, part of this research will be conducted to determine why some instances or variables caused immediate change where as the impact of other variables caused a more gradual change over time. Since the focus of the research is based on one organization the changes will be measured by the independent variables and how their increase or decrease of influence on the FARC caused or did not cause change to the organization.

The importance of this research lies in the organizational changes created by internal and external factors to the FARC. For the sake of eradication of the group or to provide for an advantage in negotiations, understanding the effects these variables have on the group may prove insightful. It is likely that through understanding how independent variables affect the organization these independent variables could be manipulated to direct or control the organizational changes of the FARC in the future.

To help the discussion of the variables in the study some secondary sources will be used that focus on the data side of the hypothesis testing. Three of the secondary sources used for the study focus on statistical, geographical, and operational data. In *System of Violence*, the work covers the gender and demographic composition of the FARC, the state making capabilities of the organization, and the economic and military assets of the organization.¹⁸⁰ This data provides changes in these elements of the organization from the mid-60's to the late-90's.¹⁸¹ A more recent version of the statistical and geographic data set comes from *Conflict, Decentralization, and Local Governance in Colombia, 1974-2004* by Fabio Sanchez. This covers the geographic and operational capabilities of the FARC over the thirty year window and how that has changed over time.¹⁸² Finally *Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its Implications for Regional Stability* by Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk also covers the economic and geographic expansion of the FARC and looks at the involvement of the illicit drug trade and arms trade with the organization.¹⁸³ These secondary sources represent the statistical compilations of the activity of Colombian guerrilla groups and the geographic expansion of FARC operations over the years. Since these sources encompass all guerrilla activity they will only be used for their limited portions that focus on the FARC alone and any data that is compared to past and present FARC operational abilities.

¹⁸⁰ Richani, Nazih. 2002. Systems of Violence The Political Economy of War and Peace In Colombia. Albany: State University of New York. 60-81.

¹⁸¹ Ibid 60.

¹⁸² Sanchez, Fabio and Maria del Mar Palau. 2006. Conflict, Decentralization and Local Governance in Colombia, 1974-2004. CEDE. (May): 7-9.

¹⁸³ Rabasa, Angel and Peter Chalk. 2001. Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and its Implications for Regional Stability. Santa Monica: RAND. 23-51.

For the analysis portion of this research, the data and competing hypotheses will be constructed into a matrix diagram to analyze the “diagnosticity” of the data and its effect on the hypotheses. The study will be completed with an analysis of the sensitivity of the data to each hypothesis. The analysis will consist of an explanation of each hypothesis and all of the factors that are consistent and inconsistent with each hypothesis. Through a systematic approach each of the factors will be described in detail and the effect of each factor will be explained. The end of each section will include a summation of whether the hypothesis is consistent with the data or if the data produced inconclusive results. The section will finish with a matrix diagram focusing on the major themes of evidence as compared to each hypothesis. The data will be coded as consistent (C), inconsistent (I), and not applicable (N/A). The diagram will be discussed as the evidence is weighed for diagnosticity, which will lead to the conclusions. Aside from limitations, the biases involved in the study arise in looking at the competing hypotheses where the subject (FARC) is discussed based on the presumed actions the organization will take in each hypothetical scenario. While this is counteracted by the data and actions known and documented about the group there is still some question of certainty when estimating how the organization reacted to specific variables. For the purpose of this research it will be assumed that the organizational actions are true to the studies used in the analysis.

The limitations result from missing first hand information from the guerrillas and the civilians involved or directly affected by the guerrillas. Most of the works used in this particular research were conducted by military sources, government and non-governmental organizations. While some of the works incorporate data collected from former guerrillas and civilians in the region, this data is very limited. There are new

works coming out of the region from “inside” sources however, they have yet to be translated and are beyond the limitations of this paper.

First Hypothesis and Analysis:

The changes to the organizational culture and bureaucratic structure of the FARC are a direct result of the end of the Cold War. Since the 1959 Cuban Revolution until a 1992 truce in El Salvador the armed groups of Latin America were founded on a revolutionary doctrine based on Marxist-Leninist ideology and a military strategy combining guerrilla and terrorist activities.¹⁸⁴ The Cuban revolution inspired these rebel groups that revolution was possible but one difference for the FARC is their long and endogenous process of accumulating peasants for armed resistance.¹⁸⁵ Since its beginnings as a self-defense peasantry organization the FARC reached a point of radicalization and became close to the pro-Soviet Communist Party.¹⁸⁶ Within these communist ideologies there was little room for the armed groups to adapt to a changing environment, and militarily they relied on the support of Communist states for logistical needs.¹⁸⁷ As a result of the alienation of the public the Marxist-Leninist group formed a military organization to achieve “armed colonization” and took an approach to dominate “human terrain” much like the strategy of the Viet Cong.¹⁸⁸ The FARC broke from these limitations and with considerably flexible politics, military sophistication, and increasing logistic autonomy the organization increased its chances for survival.¹⁸⁹ After adopting a less rigid political ideology, the FARC heightened its complaint that the government is

¹⁸⁴ Ortiz, Ramon D. 2002. *Insurgent Strategies* 128.

¹⁸⁵ Sanin, Francisco Gutierrez. 2003. *Criminal Rebels?* 5.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁷ Ortiz, Ramon D. 2002. *Insurgent Strategies* 130.

¹⁸⁸ Manwaring, Max G. 2002. *Non-State Actors in Colombia* 71.

¹⁸⁹ Ortiz, Ramon D. 2002. *Insurgent Strategies* 130.

incompetent in dealing with social inequality, crime, and deficient public services and presenting the organization as a “good alternative.”¹⁹⁰ As a result, the FARC expanded its administrative capacity and its ability to provide services such as health care, education, and public order.¹⁹¹ While this type of parallel state creation is common for guerrilla groups the FARC achieved a balance by “sidelining any dogma that promises the achievement of some utopia, and giving way to a purely pragmatic strategy for gaining power.”¹⁹² Through this change the insurgents have overcome the arising crisis from the collapse of the Soviet Bloc and have created an ideology that is simply more efficient thus increasing the political appeal of their message.¹⁹³ Since the foundations of the FARC were created during the period of La Violencia (1948-1965) and its organization focused on armed insurrection, the organization was “defined by a pragmatic ideological evolution and complex relationships with the Communist Party.”¹⁹⁴ While the FARC did follow Marxist rhetoric in its analytical texts its publicly stated political aims sought support from the rural community at the cost of distancing themselves from communist orthodoxy.¹⁹⁵ The awkward relationship with the communist parties of Colombia led to the rise of a communist leader of the FARC, Jacobo Arenas, and as a result, communist leaders stated that the leadership of the FARC followed the party line in public statements.¹⁹⁶ By this time however, the leadership of the FARC was not in line with the communist orthodoxy, the Colombian communist party preferred not to link itself to the

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁹¹ Ibid 131.

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid 132.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

FARC because it did not have complete control, and the proximity to the FARC could affect the communists in the legal political arena.¹⁹⁷

In the mid 80's the FARC joined the electoral alliance Union Patriótica (UP) and appeared to be bolstering their relationship with the Communist party but their continued military actions created a division so the organizations kept their distance and looked at the situation as two independent groups that shared some political ideology.¹⁹⁸ By this time the FARC considered itself an armed guerrilla organization that “opens its doors to all political, philosophical, religious, and ideological tendencies, and which brings together people with the common ideal of liberating this country.”¹⁹⁹ The final division of the FARC with the Communist party occurred with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the death of Jacobo Arenas in 1990.²⁰⁰ As a result of these occurrences, the FARC no longer had the leadership of an ideologue with a vision close to communist orthodoxy and with the loss of control of the FARC by the Communist party.²⁰¹ The organization was able to offer a light ideological payload and an advance toward a highly pragmatic program.²⁰² The collapse of the Soviet Union also discredited the guerrillas' ideology and as a result the dialogue with the leftist intellectuals in urban centers was severed limiting their mobility within cities.²⁰³

After the end of the Cold War officials expected guerrillas to face a diminished capacity however, the degree of financial autonomy reached when looking at external support and the effect of anti-drug policies on the peasantry offered unexpected bases of

¹⁹⁷ Ibid 133.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid 134.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰⁰ Ibid 135.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² Ibid.

²⁰³ Richani, Nazih. 2002. Systems of Violence 65.

support and political legitimacy to the guerrillas.²⁰⁴ For studies looking at violence in the form of terrorism, the end of the Cold War as a positive effect in diminishing terrorism proved overly simplistic.²⁰⁵ While in many countries there appeared to be a decline on non-governmental terrorism between 1968 and 1992; in Colombia the trend proved unequivocal where between 1993 and 1999 the country accounted for more than fifty percent of the total incidents in the region.²⁰⁶

As a result of the peasant and self-defense foundations of the FARC it appears that the organization was very different from the common communist revolutionaries in Latin America. With no evidence to conclude that the bureaucratic structure changed outside of the militaristic foundations of the organization the data suggests the end of the Cold War had no effect. Aside from the change in leadership to Jacobo Arenas to a more ideologically open leadership there is no evidence to suggest that at any time the structure of the organization changed. While some of the data collected points to the end of the Cold War as a turning point in the organizational culture as a political ideological group the majority of the data suggests that the FARC split from these lines before the end of the Cold War. Since its foundations were based on land reform and the peasantry, the data suggests that the FARC alignment with the Communist ideology was a beneficial alignment and as soon as that benefit no longer existed, there was no need to keep the FARC attached to a rigid ideology. Since the FARC preferred armed movement to political movements the data suggests that the military drive of the organization alienated the group from the other ideological organizations and thus was forced to develop its own

²⁰⁴ Begerquist, Charles., Ricardo Penaranda, and Gonzal Sanchez G. 2001. Violence in Colombia 1990-2000 Waging War and Negotiating Peace. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc. 31-32.

²⁰⁵ Feldmann, Andreas. 2005. A Shift in the Paradigm of Violence 13.

²⁰⁶ Ibid 15.

ideology and organizational culture. The data does suggest that with end of the Cold War the FARC made the final split from exclusive communist ideology by accepting members of all ideologies, religions, and social classes in public statements, but the roots of this had existed in the group since its beginning. All of the data seems to bring inconsistency to the hypothesis and the information looked at suggests that the organizational culture change of the FARC was not a result of the end of the Cold War.

Second Hypothesis and Analysis:

The FARC adapts itself to the policies of the government. Since its beginnings the FARC developed as a defensive organization that was militarily weak and had no offensive capabilities.²⁰⁷ By the mid 60's President Guillermo Leon Valencia transferred judicial and other powers to the military and "suspect" civilians were tried in secret hearing, with their legal and political rights suspended.²⁰⁸ In spite of this by the 1970's the FARC was expanding and was adjudicating legal disputes, overseeing public works and carrying out police functions.²⁰⁹ By the mid 1980's the "long lasting social and political exclusion, an uneven distribution of wealth, corruption, and a culture of impunity" all played roles in the expansion of the guerrilla groups.²¹⁰ Colombia has been notoriously weak and has low defense spending with only 3.1% of GDP spent on the military in 1998.²¹¹ Homicides, used as an indicator of weak governmental control, are associated with high levels of FARC violence and higher levels of state repression are associated to higher levels of insurgent violence.²¹²

²⁰⁷ Simons, Geoff. 2004. Colombia: A Brutal History 43.

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

²⁰⁹ Ibid 44.

²¹⁰ Feldmann, Andreas. 2005. A Shift in the Paradigm of Violence 24.

²¹¹ Holmes, Pineres, Curtin. 2007. A Subnational Study of Insurgency 7.

²¹² Ibid 16.

When President Cesar Gaviria declared a state of emergency in 1992 the government cracked down by banning ransom payments or protection payments and seized land and bank accounts associated with guerrilla money laundering.²¹³ Within three days, three of the top commanders of the Colombian armed forces resigned leading to speculation that the new crack down generated only further dissent and turmoil.²¹⁴ With the onset of presidential and congressional elections in 1994 the FARC stepped up their kidnapping and terrorist acts to affect the elections and while Rafael Pardo the Colombian defense minister tried to downplay the actions, around 70 percent of the electorate would not vote.²¹⁵ This is important due to the higher electoral participation and mayoral support having a negative effect on FARC armed activity.²¹⁶ The higher electoral participation and government support indicate the legitimacy of local government and to an extent hamper the illegal activities of armed groups.²¹⁷

Over the next few years corruption in the political system began receiving attention as a survey by *Semana* magazine indicated that corruption cost Colombia \$40,000 a day in public funds.²¹⁸ By 1996 Colombia was in pieces. As the guerrilla war raged on, President Samper was absolved by congress on corruption charges and the military and guerrillas were fighting a tit for tat battle.²¹⁹ By late 1996 the FARC and other guerrilla groups tried to take control of major cities and towns by burning trucks, creating physical obstructions and creating roadblocks, which affected food prices that rose by 10 percent, with the impacts reaching the Caribbean coast and northern

²¹³ Simons, Geoff. 2004. Colombia: A Brutal History 75-76.

²¹⁴ Ibid 76.

²¹⁵ Ibid 90-91.

²¹⁶ Sanchez, Fabio and Maria del Mar Palau. 2006. Conflict, Decentralization and Local Governance in Colombia, 1974-2004. CEDE. (May): 22.

²¹⁷ Ibid.

²¹⁸ Simons, Geoff. 2004. Colombia: A Brutal History 96.

²¹⁹ Ibid 110-113.

provinces.²²⁰ Samper tried to bring the FARC to negotiations and ended up publicly stating that the government was willing to concede to demilitarized zones to begin talks.²²¹ With that the FARC “acknowledged the offer as ‘a substantial’ first step” but many other conditions would also have to be met.²²²

In the late 1990’s the FARC demanded a demilitarized zone and while this was conceded by President Andres Pastrana it has done little to curb FARC actions as now the organization has earned recognition for its sovereign power and affirmation of the FARC as a parallel state.²²³ By 1998 as the FARC descended on its newly acquired demilitarized zone five mayors were fired for embezzlement, helping to end corruption.²²⁴ A local priest declared the last five months as a “paradise of peace.”²²⁵ The FARC was “showing the government we can run our own state.”²²⁶ Since that time FARC and government actions against one another have increased while the attempts at peaceful resolution have dissolved.²²⁷ By the end of 1999 President Pastrana and the U.S. were under criticism for allowing priorities to get sidelined while continuing the war effectively even though the government was preparing for peace negotiations.²²⁸ Upon the kidnapping of Senator Jorge Gechem Turbay, President Pastrana halted all peace talks with the FARC and began “Operation Death,” a full scale military war on the FARC.²²⁹ With no breaks in the carnage and increased U.S. support, President Alvaro Uribe was elected and after 9/11

²²⁰ Ibid 115.

²²¹ Ibid 130.

²²² Ibid.

²²³ Ortiz, Ramon D. 2002. *Insurgent Strategies* 136.

²²⁴ Simons, Geoff. 2004. *Colombia: A Brutal History* 201.

²²⁵ Ibid.

²²⁶ Ibid.

²²⁷ Ibid 248.

²²⁸ Ibid.

²²⁹ Ibid 305.

Colombia's "George W. Bush" was warned with a prophecy of "Blood, blood, and more blood;" "maybe even some gringo blood."²³⁰

The data all seems to support the hypothesis. The overall actions of the government in terms of repression and violence in turn seem to provoke more actions from the FARC. Yet according to some examples in the data there were instances where the government was attempting peace negotiations or was committing to peace negotiations while the FARC was not. The difficulty here is the limited information. While on one hand the government claims it has stopped all military actions there is no guarantee as in the case of the FARC. The majority of the data coincides with the idea that as the government has increased its actions the FARC in turn increases theirs. The other problem with looking at this data specifically is trying to ignore the paramilitary and cartel effects on the situation. What might be considered an act of violence toward the government may in fact not be as a result of government action but their failure to fight the paramilitaries and it is possibilities like this that make the cause-effect data unclear. In some cases it seems clear that actions by the government dictate the frequency or severity of FARC actions however, the other variables of narcos and paramilitaries make the overall picture less than definitive.

Final Hypothesis and Analysis:

The FARC changed its organizational culture and behavior to take advantage of the drug trade. Over the last few decades the FARC has evolved from a small peasant organization to an organization of unprecedented military strength as a result of the illicit drug trade.²³¹ There is little evidence to support the idea that the FARC is directly

²³⁰ Ibid 314-315.

²³¹ Vargas, Ricardo. 1999. *The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia* 1.

involved in coca growing or refining but since their areas of control reside in main coca cultivation areas the FARC does tax the various stages of production and export.²³² The FARC did not become a major actor through mobilization of an alienated base; they became major actors through the power that came from the cultivation of drugs by a marginalized population.²³³ While illicit crop cultivation and protection was originally forbidden by the FARC, the movement of paramilitaries into the area to support the now dominant economic activity forced the FARC to protect and support coca cultivation in order to keep their social base from working with their political enemies.²³⁴

In the early 80's the FARC reached an impasse where no matter how much the ideological message changed there was no increased support for the organization and though the negative aspects of involvement in the drug trade were known the payoff was too great.²³⁵ The FARC went from ten fronts to twenty-six during the first three years of the 1980's in large part as a result of their now stable and lucrative sources of financing through the illicit drug tax system.²³⁶ This involvement between the FARC and the drug cartels has also helped in a unique framework where the FARC is not only acquiring income but also the connections to the international black market for arms since it is closely related to the drug market.²³⁷ This connection has created instances of drugs for guns swaps and has bolstered the FARC logistical framework through building arms supply sources in neighboring countries.²³⁸ The FARC established a stable economic base for the *colonos* (colonizing migrants) and small peasants by regulating market prices,

²³² Walker, Julius. 2002. The role of the state 11.

²³³ Marks, Thomas. 2002. Colombian Army Adaptation 3.

²³⁴ Rabasa, Angel and Peter Chalk. 2001. Colombian Labyrinth 26.

²³⁵ Walker, Julius. 2002. The role of the state 7.

²³⁶ Sanchez, Fabio and Maria del Mar Palau. 2006. Conflict 7-8.

²³⁷ Ortiz, Ramon D. 2002. Insurgent Strategies 138.

²³⁸ Ibid.

providing financial and technical assistance, and protection.²³⁹ This forces the narcotraffickers to pay the peasants and wage laborers “*raspachines*” the market price of coca leaves and labor.²⁴⁰ The FARC “made it possible for the sustenance economy to incorporate into the international markets with minimum “structural adjustment.””²⁴¹ As a result of this policy of protection and regulation between peasants, narcotraffickers, and merchant intermediaries the FARC has faced the changing dynamics of the armed conflict among guerrillas, the state, and organized crime.²⁴²

The FARC was able to use the illicit drug platform to increase its state-making capabilities as well and through a tax of 7 to 10 percent per kilo of coca paste the group had an estimated income of \$60 to \$100 million a year by the early 1990’s.²⁴³ This additional income not only assisted in the expansion of the FARC militarily but also in its ability to provide expansions in commerce, providing means of transportation, adjudicating and arbitrating social and personal conflicts, constructing landing strips, providing health and education services, and essential public services.²⁴⁴ As of 2000, of the 61 FARC fronts, 32 are linked to the drug trade through income or protection.²⁴⁵ Some analysts believe that it would be prudent to assume a substantial part of their income is in a reserve for combat escalation, but even without that, the development of these incomes have “broadened the range of strategic options available to the guerrillas.”²⁴⁶ Analysts look to the strategic objective of the FARC to consolidate its coca growing regions to build up their military capabilities and to push into other regions

²³⁹ Richani, Nazih. 2002. Systems of Violence 70.

²⁴⁰ Ibid.

²⁴¹ Ibid 71.

²⁴² Ibid 72.

²⁴³ Ibid 75.

²⁴⁴ Ibid 78.

²⁴⁵ Rabasa, Angel and Peter Chalk. 2001. Colombian Labyrinth 32.

²⁴⁶ Ibid 33.

where its establishment of seven new fronts near Bogotá provides a new source of income from the cultivation of poppy fields on the eastern side of the Andes.²⁴⁷ As early as the mid 1990's the FARC could take on the military in a pitched battle and prevail.²⁴⁸ It is important to note that in 1999 the FARC cooperated in a \$6 million dollar UN project to convert coca plantations to legal alternatives.²⁴⁹ While it is true that fronts of the FARC are involved in taxation of the illicit drug trade the organization has minimal connections to the cultivation, refinement, and transshipment to the U.S.²⁵⁰

According to the data, the conclusion can be drawn that the organizational behavior and culture were changed with the involvement of the FARC in illicit crop production. With increased funding the operational military functions were better supplied and more expansive giving the FARC access to areas they were unable to infiltrate before. The FARC was also able to present more of a challenge to the military like never before thus changing their behavior as an organization. Along with the increased military capacity the data shows that with the income from the drug trade the FARC adapted to run their own state more effectively and provide more services to their base. Perhaps the greatest organizational change emerged within the culture of the FARC where, originally working with drugs was not considered a supportive action to the groups' political goals, yet the organization was forced to adapt to the threat of losing their marginalized masses to competing groups. The data provided indicates that the

²⁴⁷ Ibid 40.

²⁴⁸ Green, John W. 2005. Guerrillas, Soldiers, Paramilitaries, Assassins, Narcos, and Gringos: The Unhappy Prospects for Peace and Democracy in Colombia. Latin American Research Review. (June): 40. 145.

²⁴⁹ Stokes, Doug. 2003. Why the end of the Cold War doesn't matter 579.

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

organizational changes to the FARC are linked to their entrance into the protection and taxation of illicit crops.

Matrix Diagram and Analysis:

Evidence	Hypothesis 1	Hypothesis 2	Hypothesis 3
Corruption in the government	N/A	I	N/A
Broad government suppression	N/A	C	N/A
People supporting the government	N/A	I	N/A
Weak government	N/A	C	N/A
Loss of international support	I	N/A	N/A
Breaking from Communist ideologies	C	N/A	N/A
Losing support from the public base	I	N/A	N/A
Changing leadership	I	N/A	N/A
Increased income	I	N/A	C
Increased ability to build and support a parallel state	I	N/A	C
Increased size and capabilities of military	I	N/A	C
Movement into international criminal activity	I	N/A	C

With the completion of the matrix diagram the evidence for each hypothesis is demonstrated. This supplements the above discussion of each hypothesis and the data collected. For the sake of brevity the major points of evidence are broken into four major themes and the conclusions drawn on their consistency or inconsistency when compared to the hypothesis. The first hypothesis citing the end of the Cold War as the main factor in the FARC change of structure and culture was proved inconsistent. While the end of

the Cold War did help push the change in ideology in different directions none of the evidence compiled in the rest of the data supported the hypothesis. The second hypothesis looking at government actions as the main factor in FARC change results were similar. While there was some correlation between a weak government and broad suppression to the behavioral changes of the FARC, there was a lack of examples to permanently link the data to the hypothesis. For the other factors there was inconsistent data on whether the corruption of the government or public support would change FARC behaviors. The final hypothesis looks at the involvement of the FARC in illicit drug trade. This change in the organizational culture and behavior of the group was conclusively supported by all of the categories looked at in this research. According to the data, with increased income the group was able to change its military tactics due to greater numbers and better, more abundant equipment. The data also supported that FARC was able to provide better services on a greater scale in their function as a parallel state. Their change in organizational culture was also supported by the data since the founding of the FARC's interest in the illicit drug trade was as a result of the changing economic situation with their marginalized base. That coupled with the FARC desire to ensure the loyalty of their base in competition with their political enemies was all supported by the data.

Conclusion:


The survival of the FARC in Colombia has depended on the organization's ability to adapt to its surroundings through cultural, behavioral, and structural changes. In this research the attempt was made to compile data for three possible contributing factors of the end of the Cold War, the state, and the onset of the illicit drug trade. While there are inconclusive results for the actions of the end of the Cold War and the state, the research

supports the attempt to explain the organizational changes of the FARC resulting from the illicit drug trade. This chapter analyzed the FARC as the dependent variable with the end of the Cold War, the state, the illicit drug trade as independent variables. For each of the factors, there would be a benefit to looking at each of the independent variables as major themes for the purpose of a more in-depth study. There is also the rise of U.S. involvement and paramilitaries which could also be looked at as variables in the attempt to explain the FARC organizational changes.


From here the next chapter will focus on the ELN as the organizations ability to adapt is analyzed. The ELN will be analyzed using the same techniques and theoretical guidelines to support the comparison of the two groups in following chapters. This leads to the LAMP analysis (Chapter 4) to predict the future behaviors of the FARC and ELN. In addition to the LAMP study chapter 4 will update the current situation of the FARC thanks to the publication of a new document. This will demonstrate the continual adaptability of the FARC in more recent situations. The next chapter will illuminate both the similarities and differences in the adaptation of the ELN with the intent on exploring these factors in the LAMP study (Chapter 4).

Appendix 1: Evolution of FARC Actions


1985



1990



2000



(Sanchez and Palau 2006, 8)

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Chapter 3

The ELN's Adaptability

Introduction:

From independence until the present day Colombia has been characterized by constant warfare and a fragmented political climate due to unequal land distribution, poverty, and oppression. Many revolutionary arms of rural and urban Latin America have used the Cuban revolution and the ideology of Che Guevara and Castro as their example to follow; the ELN (Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional) was one of these organizations. The ELN has remained as a small but persistent guerrilla group in Colombia since the 1960's. Based on the Cuban revolution a workers', students' and peasants' movement Movimiento Obrero Estudiantil Campesino (MOEC) was started in 1961 in rural Colombia.²⁵¹ By 1964 the MOEC had divided into factions and one group in particular, led by Fabio Vasquez, went to Havana for training and returned to Colombia to establish the ELN.²⁵² Due to their Havana ties, the ELN tried adhere to the "foquista ideology as propounded in the works of Che Guevara."²⁵³ Along with the 'Che' ideology the group took on a Robin Hood persona by "stealing from the rich to give to the poor" and followed a Christian moral ideology.²⁵⁴ One of the ELN's most influential members, priest Camilo Torres, committed the group to implement a moral component in its revolutionary actions.²⁵⁵ This style of conflicting ideology has caused quandary between the teachings of "Clausewitz and Guevara, on one hand, and the Christian view of murder

²⁵¹ Pearce, Jenny. 1990. Colombia: Inside the Labyrinth. New York: Monthly Review Press 165.

²⁵² Ibid.

²⁵³ Rochlin, James F. 2003. Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America. Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers 102.

²⁵⁴ Ibid 103.

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

as the ultimate sin, on the other.”²⁵⁶ Through their mix of Christianity and political realism the ELN focused on gaining support from the campesinos with their argument that the state is an enemy to the people.²⁵⁷ The ELN mixture of moral and intellectual ideology gained support from the “middle-class students and professionals alienated by the exclusionary politics of the National Front” since even moderate leftist behavior was not tolerated.²⁵⁸ This unique set of ideologies created an identity for the ELN and its members but also caused many internal problems within the organization. The ELN has been considered a marginal player in the Colombian conflict; however, it has been the organizations ability to adapt and change its culture, ideology, and behavior that has made the ELN a persistent guerrilla organization.

The ELN as a guerrilla organization has had to adapt to the changing social and political climate but their refusal to change in other areas has been the reason the organization has limited membership and success. The ELN was faced with a difficult start as the organization’s leaders were killed or exiled on more than one occasion causing their near demise at the hands of the Colombian Army in the 1970’s. Re-emergence after these hardships required major changes in the leadership, ideology, and actions of the revolutionary group. This also included changes in the ELN’s financial expansion into new criminal enterprises. Thus changes were imperative not only for the survival of the remaining members, but they also increased the organization’s strengths and effectiveness in the 1980’s to the present. Among these changes, the ELN was forced to expand their economic opportunities and their modes of operation in order to survive. While in some cases the organization benefited from increased income and expanded

²⁵⁶ Ibid.

²⁵⁷ Ibid.

²⁵⁸ Ibid.

territorial control, they were forced to stray from their core ideology, making their appeal to the people less desirable. As one of the longest running revolutionary organizations, the ELN has proven their ability to adapt and increase their effectiveness even after its assistance from Cuba had dwindled after the end of the Cold War. It has only been in the last decade that the ELN has proven itself a strong adversary for the Colombian government.

As the ELN has strengthened it has become a more effective federation of fighters to improve their bargaining position with the government. With other organizations having taken precedence at the negotiation tables, the ELN has a renewed sense of purpose and some new forms of income to help their negotiating positions. In spite of the difficulties within the organization the ELN has been able to adapt its behavior, structure, and ideology to make it one of the only surviving revolutionary groups in Colombia. Since their re-emergence as a strong fighting force, the Colombian government cannot afford to ignore the ELN any longer. It is important to understand how this force was able to return from almost complete annihilation to an effective guerrilla organization. By analyzing these changes and capabilities this analysis will shed light on government mistakes in stopping the organization and give insight to future negotiations. Due to the implications for U.S. and Colombian relations, studying the ELN is imperative if there is ever to be peace in the region.

Literature Review:

The main research for this document pertains to the revolutionary groups in Latin America and Colombia specifically. The literature provides information on the creation of the ELN and their long history. The works will demonstrate the mistakes the ELN

made in their early years as well as their ability to adapt and return as an effective force a decade later. This research also provides insight on the structure, organization, and behavior of the ELN and how these have changed over time. Each author adds information on the origins, ideology, economic changes, and actions of the ELN.

In *Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America* James F Rochlin discusses the revolutionary groups of Peru, Colombia, and Mexico. Rochlin begins with the four most powerful guerrilla movements, one of which is the ELN.²⁵⁹ The work gives a brief history of Colombia from independence to the era of *La Violencia* when the ELN began.²⁶⁰ Rochlin then focuses on the ELN and their origins as a unique mix of Christianity and political realism.²⁶¹ The work gives a timeline for the organization and their actions from their creation in the 1960's and their decimation in the 1970's to their re-emergence in the 1980's.²⁶² Rochlin points out the regions of operation for the ELN and the strategy behind their choices for areas of operation and recruitment.²⁶³ This work is thorough in the explanations of the ELN's birth and movement into their modern version.

In the following two works, the focus is on the history of Colombia and its wars. In *Colombia: A Brutal History* by Geoff Simons, the author focuses on the social and political history of Colombia from the pre-colonial era to post-9/11. The work touches briefly on the formation of the ELN but the focus is on the actions of the ELN and their interaction with the government.²⁶⁴ Simons explains the terrorist actions, kidnappings, and negotiations with the Colombian government over the course of multiple

²⁵⁹ Ibid 1.

²⁶⁰ Ibid 87-102.

²⁶¹ Ibid 102-103.

²⁶² Ibid 103-104.

²⁶³ Ibid 104-106.

²⁶⁴ Simons, Geoff. 2004. *Colombia: A Brutal History*. London: SAQI 90, 144-145.

administrations.²⁶⁵ While this work provides little in the way of a thorough study on the ELN it does provide a timeline throughout the life of the organization accounting for their actions during these periods. In *The Colombian Civil War*, Bert Ruiz focuses on both the actions of the ELN and their combatants. The ELN portion of the book begins with the U.S. and Colombian government working toward peace agreements.²⁶⁶ The work explains the force the ELN has at its disposal and the mentality of the leadership at the time.²⁶⁷ Ruiz covers a series of talks between the Pastrana administration and the ELN and explains the ideological makeup of the ELN and its leaders.²⁶⁸ The work goes back in time to the era of the Cuban Revolution and the beginnings of what would become the ELN.²⁶⁹ Camilo Torres is discussed in-depth since this Catholic priest was considered one of the “best and brightest minds in Colombia” and went on to join the ELN.²⁷⁰ Ruiz then looks at the ties between the ELN and Cuba and explains the founding Marxist ideology of the organization.²⁷¹ The end of the work returns to the failure of the talks between the ELN and Pastrana administration where Pablo Beltran, an ELN leader, proclaimed “our fight will grow, and we will not disarm.”²⁷² This work gives a better view into the leadership of the ELN and how its organization operates.

The following two briefs focus exclusively on the ELN. In *Colombia: Moving Forward with the ELN?* This International Crisis Group paper focuses on the modern ELN and their capabilities. This brief begins with the military capabilities of the

²⁶⁵ Ibid 156-267.

²⁶⁶ Ruiz, Bert. 2001. *The Colombian Civil War*. Jefferson: McFarland & Company Inc. Publishers. 86.

²⁶⁷ Ibid 87.

²⁶⁸ Ibid 89-91.

²⁶⁹ Ibid 109-112.

²⁷⁰ Ibid 112-116.

²⁷¹ Ibid 119-129.

²⁷² Ibid 245-248.

organization and their interaction with other armed groups.²⁷³ The political and social bases are discussed as the ELN has a very diverse membership.²⁷⁴ Economics and finances are the last topic of the section focusing on the ELN, which gives a look at their evolution of money-making activities since the 1980's.²⁷⁵ The next section of the brief considers the recent talks with the government and their interaction with organizations in Cuba and Mexico.²⁷⁶ This section also looks at the negotiations between the ELN and the Uribe administration, as well as the involvement of the international community.²⁷⁷ The brief ends with the participation of peace organizations in the negotiating process and these highlight the difficulties facing the government and populace in ending ELN hostilities.²⁷⁸ The brief offers some insight to the governmental and non-governmental roles in negotiations, but the focus is too narrow in time and scope.

In *Colombia: Prospects for Peace with the ELN* the International Crisis Group offers a much broad and in-depth study of the ELN and their actions. The report begins with an overview of the successes and failures of negotiations with the ELN and “evaluates the prospects for the constructive advancement and conclusion of peace negotiations.”²⁷⁹ The history of the ELN is discussed in detail as the report moves from the founding of the organization through the decline of the 1970's.²⁸⁰ The report then briefly looks at the re-emergence of the organization in the 1980's and the changes within

²⁷³ International Crisis Group. 2007. Colombia: Moving Forward with the ELN? Latin America Briefing No16. (October): Internet. Available from:

http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/latin_america/b16_colombia_eln.pdf 2-6.

²⁷⁴ Ibid 6-7.

²⁷⁵ Ibid 7-8.

²⁷⁶ Ibid 8-12.

²⁷⁷ Ibid 12.

²⁷⁸ Ibid 13-17.

²⁷⁹ International Crisis Group. 2002. Colombia: Prospects for Peace with the ELN. ICG Latin America Report No2. (October): Internet. Available from:

http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/report_archive/A400790_04102002.pdf 1-4.

²⁸⁰ Ibid 5-6.

the organization and in negotiations with the government.²⁸¹ The next section of the report is a detailed timeline of the interactions of the ELN and the government during the Pastrana administration.²⁸² The details of the Pastrana administration transitions the paper into the Uribe administration and how negotiations can commence based on the lessons learned from the past.²⁸³ The report finishes with a detailed set of negotiating actions the government needs to follow in order to get the ELN into peace talks because “without peace, the fight against drugs will never be won and the fight against poverty will never succeed.”²⁸⁴ This paper is thorough in its discussion of negotiations between the ELN and the government but barely discusses the changes in behavior and ideology that have made the ELN of today so durable.

Moving into the economics side of the ELN conflict the next three works consider the actions of the ELN and their economic strategies. In *Systems of Violence: The Political Economy of War and Peace in Colombia*, Nazih Richani offers a quantitative study on the ELN. After a brief history of the ELN, Richani studies the class and gender composition of the organization.²⁸⁵ The author then focuses on the extortion portion of the ELN income and their capabilities as fighters within areas of geographic control.²⁸⁶ Even though the work is limited to economic, geographic, and statistical data the work is very thorough in these details of the ELN. In *Criminal Rebels? A Discussion of War and Criminality from the Colombian Experience*, Francisco Gutierrez Sanin focuses on quantitative data on the FARC and ELN actions in Colombia. Sanin tests the research of

²⁸¹ Ibid 7-8.

²⁸² Ibid 11-20.

²⁸³ Ibid 20-23.

²⁸⁴ Ibid 23-26.

²⁸⁵ Richani, Nazih. 2002. Systems of Violence The Political Economy of War and Peace In Colombia. Albany: State University of New York. 81-85.

²⁸⁶ Ibid 85-91.

economic causes of civil war as stated by Paul Collier.²⁸⁷ Sanin tests Collier's "criminal rebels" thesis against his own data of the ELN and analyzes organizational behavior.²⁸⁸ The author explains his points of critique when comparing the ELN to Collier's ideas and gives a thorough accounting of the ELN actions and their income from those actions.²⁸⁹ After analyzing the data, Sanin refutes the assumptions made by Collier in his "criminal rebels" thesis and states his conclusions for the opportunities and motivations of the organization.²⁹⁰ The author does a good job of using data to explain the actions of the ELN but the document treats the ELN like a secondary player since the FARC has more data to its credit for the purpose of this study. The final work, *Parasites and Predators: Guerrillas and the Insurrection Economy of Colombia* by Alfredo Rangel Suarez looks at "Colombia's guerrilla groups (and) places them among the most outstanding examples ... of successfully self-financed insurgent groups."²⁹¹ Suarez begins with an overview of the insurgent groups in Colombia and gives a general picture of their behavior.²⁹² The work describes the guerrilla economy as it exists by "how it relates to the territory and the people it controls, as well as by the state's governing capability."²⁹³ Suarez breaks this into income, extortion, kidnapping, drug trade, and cattle theft and gives incomes and percentages the ELN derives from these activities.²⁹⁴ The expenses and investments of

²⁸⁷ Sanin, Francisco Gutierrez. 2003. Criminal Rebels? A Discussion of War and Criminality from the Colombian experience. *Crisis States Programme*. (April): Internet. Available from: <http://www.crisisstates.com/download/wp/WP27FG.pdf> 1.

²⁸⁸ Ibid 2-5.

²⁸⁹ Ibid 6-13.

²⁹⁰ Ibid 14-22.

²⁹¹ Suarez, Alfredo Rangel. 2000. Parasites and Predators: Guerrillas and the Insurrection Economy of Colombia. *Journal of International Affairs*. (Spring): 53 no.2 577-578.

²⁹² Ibid 580-581.

²⁹³ Ibid 582-585.

²⁹⁴ Ibid 585-595.

the guerrillas are also discussed before Suarez completes the work with a look at the overall microeconomic effect of the guerrilla economies in Colombia.²⁹⁵

Two papers focus on the Colombian conflict orientation. In *Colombia-Thinking Clearly about the Conflict*, Philip McLean studies the type of conflict in Colombia between all of the major players.²⁹⁶ The author breaks down the individual groups and considers the ELN as the only group that could fall under the title of “a classic guerrilla war.”²⁹⁷ McLean looks at the actions of the guerrillas and compares them to their stated purpose and summarizes peace talks between the guerrillas and the government.²⁹⁸ In *Conflict, Decentralization, and Local Governance in Colombia, 1974-2004*, Fabio Sanchez and Maria del mar Palau the work discuss the contributing factors to the geographical expansion of the armed factions in Colombia.²⁹⁹ After a brief overview of the Colombian conflict the work focuses on each of the individual groups including the ELN.³⁰⁰ The look at the ELN provides factors that have contributed to the organizations survival and geographic expansion.³⁰¹ Sanchez and Palau show the factors that government decentralization reforms play in the expansion of the armed groups in Colombia through testing the variables in econometric models and a contiguous matrix.³⁰² This means that the work can “analyze the contagious effects of illegal armed activity in one municipality or another ... (and) the influence of independent variables ...

²⁹⁵ Ibid 596-601.

²⁹⁶ McLean, Phillip. 2002. *Colombia-Thinking Clearly about the Conflict*. Center for Strategic and International Studies. (October): Internet. Available from: http://www.csis.org/index.php?option=com_csis_pubs&task=view&id=729 1.

²⁹⁷ Ibid 3.

²⁹⁸ Ibid 7-10.

²⁹⁹ Sanchez, Fabio and Maria del Mar Palau. 2006. *Conflict, Decentralization and Local Governance in Colombia, 1974-2004*. CEDE. (May): Internt. Available from: <http://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/002180.html> 1.

³⁰⁰ Ibid 9.

³⁰¹ Ibid 10-11.

³⁰² Ibid 12-18.

on local dependant variables.”³⁰³ The study breaks the data into time periods and groups which gives data sets for illegal actions and graphs representing the change in probability of actions for each group.³⁰⁴ Finally, the work provides similar data sets and graphs for the effect of the conflict on the local governments.³⁰⁵ This work is very specific to the actions of the organizations in relation to the independent variables tested and their affect on their geographical region. This work is well planned but is limited to decentralization factors and political implications.

The final work, *War and Drugs in Colombia* by the International Crisis Group rounds out the literature as it focuses on the drug trade in Colombia. Since the ELN had a rigid ideology the organization resisted the drug trade for a long time.³⁰⁶ However, this organizational/ideological change has been particularly interesting with the ELN.³⁰⁷ Even though their role is marginal in the drug trade the ELN is still an important actor in the region’s drug trade.³⁰⁸ The work discusses the unexpected partnership and expected conflict that has risen between the ELN and the FARC and the changes that have given the ELN strength in drug producing regions.³⁰⁹ The paper concludes with the current attempts to curtail the drug trade in Colombia and the future options available to the country to control and possibly end the drug war.³¹⁰

This literature helps in understanding how the ELN has changed and adapted over the years to be the second-largest and important revolutionary group in Colombia. None

³⁰³ Ibid 18-20.

³⁰⁴ Ibid 21-26.

³⁰⁵ Ibid 26-32.

³⁰⁶ International Crisis Group. 2005. *War and Drugs in Colombia*. Latin America Report No11. (January): Internet. Available from:

http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/latin_america/11_war_and_drugs_in_colombia.pdf 17-18.

³⁰⁷ Ibid 18.

³⁰⁸ Ibid.

³⁰⁹ Ibid 19-20.

³¹⁰ Ibid 21-34.

of the authors give a clear overview of the ELN exclusively and many cover all of the illegal armed groups in Colombia. While many works look at single factors of change the purpose of this chapter is to apply the individual factors to the ELN.

Methodology:

To explain the multiple factors involved and their effect on the ELN this research will use liberalism as the theoretical approach. The ELN is a non-state actor that has proven to have both military and economic strengths that make it a formidable opponent to the state. It is also important to understand that the actions of the state directly affect the ELN as an organization and its culture. This study takes into account the focus on the state, the populace, the military, and the other organizations competing for power all play into the liberal cobweb approach to social science theory. This will be a more effective approach for explaining how the independent variables such as the international drug trade, the actions of the state, and the near annihilation in the 1970's affect the organization. In the above literature, the focus is on the ELN as in independent variable and how it affects the state. Through the liberalist approach the ELN will be the focus of the study as the dependent variable and the state will be considered one of the independent variables. Since the changes within the ELN as an organization is the focus of the study all of the surrounding factors of the government, military, populace, and competing organizations will all be treated as independent variables.

Through rational choice models the study will propose competing hypotheses which will individually be major contributing variables to the organizational and structural changes to the ELN. Hypothesis 1: *The changes to the organizational culture and structure of the ELN are a direct result of their near annihilation in the 1970's.* The

ELN was ideologically strong during their creation but their military, organization, and leadership were weak, which combined with attacks from the government and competing organizations led to the near demise of the ELN. A Catholic-Marxist mix of ideologies could be the main deterrent for popular support, due to the contradiction as murder being an unforgivable sin in Catholicism, in the rural communities the ELN controls. It stands to reason that the ELN has purposely changed their ideology and behavior to garner support within the regions they control. It is possible that this single era of rebuilding between the 1970's and 1980's is responsible for the strong leadership, military, and structure that the ELN seems to have today. Hypothesis 2: *Through organizational changes the ELN was more successful at procuring funding and expanding influence.* It is understood that the conflicting ideology between Marxism and Catholicism has dictated some of the actions of the ELN. In order to survive the ELN has de-emphasized their ideology to support greater financial gains and geographic expansion. Hypothesis 3: *The ELN is reactive to the government and populace and changes the frequency, severity, and type of attacks accordingly.* The second largest guerrilla group in Colombia is not happy with the government treating the ELN as second-place or unimportant. The behavior of the government and populace toward the ELN could directly change the behavior and actions of the organization. If the governments' presence is strong or weak in an area it could explain the severity, frequency, and type of actions carried out by the ELN.

Through the analysis of these hypotheses using liberalism as the theoretical approach the goal will be to understand the importance of the variables on the ELN. By treating the ELN as the dependent variable the study will look at the near destruction of the ELN and their ideology, their economic capabilities, populace and the state. The goal

is to show what affect these variables have on the ELN individually and then show the links between the independent variables. This analysis will show the most definitive variables contributing to the organization's structural, cultural, and behavioral changes over time and how effective these changes were in the survival of the organization. As a result of the readings it is realistic to say that the organizational behavior, structure and culture of the ELN changed over time. The variables will be looked at to determine the time and severity of the changes. Some of the organizational changes outlined in the hypotheses were gradual and took place over periods of time where in other cases the changes were dramatic and fast. In looking at the literature part of the research will be conducted to determine why some instances or variables caused immediate change where as the impact of other variables caused a more gradual change over time. Since the focus of this chapter is based on one organization the changes will be measured by the independent variables in the research and how their increase or decrease of influence on the ELN caused or did not cause change to the organization.

The significance of this study lies in the organizational changes created by internal and external factors to the ELN. Whether the goal is to eradicate the group or to provide for an advantage in negotiations, understanding the effects these variables have on the ELN is important. By understanding how independent variables affect the organization, these independent variables could be manipulated to direct or control the organizational changes of the ELN in the future. This study will also show just how strong the organization is and where its greatest weaknesses lie.

There will be two secondary sources to support the data side of the hypothesis testing. These studies focus on statistical, geographical, and operational data. In

Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and its Implications for Regional Stability by Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk gives a detailed account of the ELN, its geographic expansion, and involvement in the drug trade.³¹¹ The work also covers the political, economic, and social complications in Colombia as they are affected by organizations like the ELN.³¹² Focusing on illicit activities is *Guns, Drugs, and Development in Colombia* by Jennifer S. Holmes, Sheila Amin Gutierrez de Pineres and Kevin M. Curtin. The main portions of the book to be used are the sections of guerrilla violence hypothesis testing and resulting data.³¹³ The section on illicit crops and their effect on the Colombian economy will also be used.³¹⁴

For the analysis portion of the study, the data and competing hypotheses are constructed into a matrix diagram to analyze the “diagnosticity” of the data and its effect on the hypotheses. The study will be completed with an analysis of the sensitivity of the data to each hypothesis. The analysis will consist of an explanation of each hypothesis and all of the factors that are consistent and inconsistent with each hypothesis. Through a systematic approach each of the factors will be described in detail and the effect of each factor will be explained. The end of each section will include a summation of whether the hypothesis is consistent with the data or if the data produced inconclusive results. The section will finish with a matrix diagram focusing on the major themes of evidence as compared to each hypothesis. The data will be coded as consistent (C), inconsistent (I), and not applicable (N/A). The diagram will be discussed as the evidence is weighed for

³¹¹ Rabasa, Angel and Peter Chalk. 2001. *Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and its Implications for Regional Stability*. Santa Monica: RAND. 23-52.

³¹² Ibid 61-84.

³¹³ Holmes, Jennifer S., Shiela Amin Gutierrez de Pineres, and Kevin M. Curtin. 2008. *Guns, Drugs, and Development in Colombia*. Austin: University of Texas Press. 73-101.

³¹⁴ Ibid 103-160.

diagnosticity, which will lead to the conclusions. Aside from limitations, the biases involved in the study, arise in looking at the competing hypotheses where the subject (ELN) is discussed based on the presumed actions the organization will take in each hypothetical scenario. While this is counteracted by the data and actions known and documented about the group there is still some question of certainty when estimating how the organization reacted to specific variables. For the purpose of the study it will be assumed that the organizational actions are true to the studies used in the analysis.

The limitations of the study result from missing first hand information from the guerrillas and the civilians involved or directly affected by the guerrillas. Most of the works used in this particular study were conducted by military sources, government and non-governmental organizations. While some of the works incorporate data collected from former guerrillas and civilians in the region this data is very limited. There is also a lack of information due to the relative size of the organization compared to other illegal groups in the region. There are new works coming out of the region from “inside” sources however they have yet to be translated and are beyond the limitations of this paper.

First Hypothesis and Analysis:

The changes to the organizational culture and structure of the ELN are a direct result of their near annihilation in the 1970's. In 1962 a group of sixteen Colombian students visited Cuba on scholarship at the time of the Cuban Missile crisis.³¹⁵ There would be around sixty students to travel to Cuba by the end of 1962.³¹⁶ The students asked for military training to transplant the Che Guevara “foquista” to Colombia to target

³¹⁵ Holmes, Jennifer S. 2008. Guns, Drugs, and Development 50.

³¹⁶ International Crisis Group. 2002. Colombia: Prospects for Peace 5.

“militant petroleum workers and peasant land colonizers.”³¹⁷ The Santander area was chosen for the ELN camp because the region had experienced a communist uprising in 1929 and the formation of a liberal guerrilla force during *La Violencia*, the area had a history of armed opposition.³¹⁸ The area was also known for the Industrial University and the Port of Barrancabermeja on the Magdalena River; the former provided left-wing student agitators and the latter provided radicalized trade unionists.³¹⁹ These target groups were successful operating among angry petroleum workers and peasants.³²⁰ As a result of these ties, the leaders of the ELN trace back to the 1929 uprising and unions of Barrancabermeja.³²¹ In spite of initial success the ELN soon began a string of problems that lasted through the 1970’s.³²² Considerable infighting began in the group.³²³ This infighting resulted from the diversity of the members with no strong leadership and purges under the accusation of treason.

The ELN ideology supported nationalism and “popular democracy” with aversion to foreign investment.³²⁴ As declared by the ELN the aim is to “take power and establish a democratic and popular movement capable of liberating Colombia from the international monopolies and the *crillo* oligarchy.”³²⁵ The ELN proposed equality, “full democratic liberties to the popular sectors,” giving women their legitimate rights, and “assuring respect for human dignity and the free development of all Colombians.”³²⁶ By focusing on the energy sector of Colombia the ELN has distinguished itself from the

³¹⁷ Holmes, Jennifer S. 2008. *Guns, Drugs, and Development* 50.

³¹⁸ International Crisis Group. 2002. *Colombia: Prospects for Peace* 5.

³¹⁹ *Ibid.*

³²⁰ Holmes, Jennifer S. 2008. *Guns, Drugs, and Development* 50.

³²¹ International Crisis Group. 2002. *Colombia: Prospects for Peace* 5.

³²² Rochlin, James F. 2003. *Vanguard Revolutionaries* 103.

³²³ *Ibid.*

³²⁴ International Crisis Group. 2002. *Colombia: Prospects for Peace* 6.

³²⁵ *Ibid.*

³²⁶ *Ibid.*

other organizations in the region.³²⁷ During the tension period between Moscow and Cuba over revolutionary ideology, the ELN became favored by Havana and adopted the Castroite revolutionary ideology.³²⁸ While this ideology worked for the ELN at the time they were on a path to great difficulty.

After their first actions in Simacota the ELN gained attention from clergymen, most notably Camilo Torres.³²⁹ Torres tried to organize his own movement called the United Front and failed.³³⁰ His decision to join the ELN forever changed the organization and Colombia by uniting this Marxist ideology with Christian morality.³³¹ Torrez was able to bring new membership to the ELN with his call of “popular unity.”³³² Even after the death of Torrez his charisma and commitment turned him into a martyr for the organization.³³³ By the 1970’s the first generation of ELN leaders died in combat, were exiled, or executed by their own men for treason.³³⁴ Information provided by deserters of the organization “enabled the army to kill and capture most of the ELN leadership” during this time.³³⁵ The ELN had a habit of purging their ranks and making the organization naturally weak as a result.³³⁶ This purging weakened the organization to the point that the remaining leaders focused on military action and the application of the *foquismo* doctrine.³³⁷ However, this focus would only last for a few years before more problems rose for the ELN’s survival. By the 1970’s the ELN was further weakened by

³²⁷ Ibid.

³²⁸ Rabasa, Angel and Peter Chalk. 2001. Colombian Labyrinth 30.

³²⁹ International Crisis Group. 2002. Colombia: Prospects for Peace 6.

³³⁰ Ibid.

³³¹ Ibid.

³³² Harper, Liz. 2002. Colombia’s Civil War: National Liberation Army (ELN). Online News Hour. Internet. Available from: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/latin_america/colombia/players_eln_2.

³³³ International Crisis Group. 2002. Colombia: Prospects for Peace 6.

³³⁴ Ibid.

³³⁵ Rabasa, Angel and Peter Chalk. 2001. Colombian Labyrinth 34.

³³⁶ Sanin, Francisco Gutierrez. 2003. Criminal Rebels? 6.

³³⁷ International Crisis Group. 2002. Colombia: Prospects for Peace 6.

continued desertion and infighting that caused an abandonment of the *foquista* philosophy and retraction from political work to focus all of their attention on the militaristic side of the ELN.³³⁸ In 1977-78 the ELN suffered more losses at the hands of the military and through desertion to the point the ELN was no more than thirty people.³³⁹ This near-demise ignited a serious rethinking of the ELN's goals and strategy that marked an era of reorientation and soul-searching for the organization.³⁴⁰ This marked the end of the old ELN and its ideology and made way for the rebirth of the organization in culture and structure.

By the 1980's the ELN began its resurgence due to three main factors: 1) "The ELN was able to strengthen its links with existing social movements and trade unions;"³⁴¹ 2) "alongside its increasingly decentralized individual guerrilla fronts a more complex organizational structure was put into place, composed of the National Congress, the High Command, the National Directorate, and the National General Staff;"³⁴² 3) "the development of the oilfields in areas where the ELN enjoyed relative strength, provided unexpected financial windfalls through extortion of domestic and international oil companies."³⁴³ The first national conference held by the ELN dictated the division and expansion of its two fronts.³⁴⁴ Their strategy included a multi-class recruitment directive that would bring unity to the Catholics, students, and middle-class professionals.³⁴⁵ The addition of Manuel Perez included key military strategies and ideologies to the ELN.³⁴⁶

³³⁸ Rochlin, James F. 2003. Vanguard Revolutionaries 104.

³³⁹ Ibid.

³⁴⁰ Ibid.

³⁴¹ International Crisis Group. 2002. *Colombia: Prospects for Peace* 7.

³⁴² Ibid.

³⁴³ Ibid.

³⁴⁴ Ibid.

³⁴⁵ Rochlin, James F. 2003. Vanguard Revolutionaries 104.

³⁴⁶ Ruiz, Bert. 2001. The Colombian Civil War 116.

Perez brought the various factions of the ELN together and developed new forms of income for the ELN through extortion of oil companies as their primary source.³⁴⁷ The ELN works through a federation of units and in some cases pays their men as professional revolutionaries.³⁴⁸ These changes in their structure were but a portion of the organizational change coming to the ELN.

During this time of structural change the ideology and goals of the ELN went through gradual changes as well. In practice, the ELN “original aim of “national liberation” was replaced by an “emphasis on the control and exercise of power at the regional level ... which has been denominated by some as a kind of armed local co-government.”³⁴⁹ These developments have earned the ELN the reputation of being the most politically developed guerrilla movement in Colombia.³⁵⁰ The ELN moved to maximize its power through its Christian-Marxist ideology and refrained from politics stating that it would “ultimately mean the corruption and ideological sellout of the group.”³⁵¹ In its second international conference in 1989 the ELN still supported the movement toward a socialist Colombia which has not changed since the 70’s.³⁵² The ELN leader Nicholas Rodriguez Bautista (“Gabino”) called the “socialist system ... an extremely young project” and proclaimed the ELN to become a successful “pioneer” of the revolution.³⁵³ Another point that has not changed in the life of the ELN is their continued support from Havana even though it has become minimal recently.³⁵⁴

However, it has been the ability of the ELN to remain financially independent from

³⁴⁷ Rabasa, Angel and Peter Chalk. 2001. *Colombian Labyrinth* 31.

³⁴⁸ Sanin, Francisco Gutierrez. 2003. *Criminal Rebels?* 6.

³⁴⁹ International Crisis Group. 2002. *Colombia: Prospects for Peace* 7.

³⁵⁰ Rochlin, James F. 2003. *Vanguard Revolutionaries* 122.

³⁵¹ *Ibid.*

³⁵² International Crisis Group. 2002. *Colombia: Prospects for Peace* 7.

³⁵³ Rochlin, James F. 2003. *Vanguard Revolutionaries* 122.

³⁵⁴ McLean, Phillip. 2002. *Colombia-Thinking Clearly* 3.

external sources that has left them unhurt by the end of the Cold War.³⁵⁵ These ideological consistencies and changes were the backbone of the renewed ELN.

These facts definitively support the hypothesis that the ELN changed its culture and structure in response to their near-demise. The organization could not have survived without changing their ideology, structure, and behavior. The end of the old leadership and the changing environment for the ELN forced the group to restructure and broaden their appeal. In many ways the data that supports this hypothesis appears to be the only reason the organization survived. Without the drastic changes the ELN would have died out in the late 1970's. As much as these factors support the hypothesis it is important to note other factors that created change within the ELN.

In the 1990's changes to the international community forced the ELN to alter its culture and structure for survival again. "The capitalist restructuring demanded by neoliberalism through global institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF" became points of threat to the ideology of the ELN.³⁵⁶ For Perez the onset of this global reality would bring human rights violations, and a concentration of wealth that would further embed economic misery in the region.³⁵⁷ The ELN rose as "moral and ethical combatants poised against the threat of creeping neoliberalism" and pledged their fight against this emerging economic order imposed on the world via the "North American "monocultural parameter.""³⁵⁸ This brought the ELN view of economic redistribution back to the forefront since they see the revolutionary actions in Colombia a result of economic

³⁵⁵ Rochlin, James F. 2003. Vanguard Revolutionaries 122.

³⁵⁶ Ibid 123.

³⁵⁷ Ibid.

³⁵⁸ Ibid.

“misery and exploitation.”³⁵⁹ The 1990’s also brought a change in the ELN view on foreign investment stating that they simply want a better deal for Colombia from transnational corporations (TNCs).³⁶⁰ This improved deal has to include a larger profit share and the “human, material, scientific, and technological infrastructure” support Colombia needs to end its dependence.³⁶¹ These changes to their organization are a direct result of the changing in global economics and politics. While these points do not support the hypothesis they do outline other shifts in environment that have forced the organization to change and adapt.

Second Hypothesis and Analysis:

Through organizational changes the ELN was more successful at procuring funding and expanding influence. An insurgencies support base is directly related to the support of the regions and people they control.³⁶² During their rise in the 1960’s the ELN survived from contributions from the peasants, theft of local payrolls and bank raids.³⁶³ The major income breakdown for the ELN is 60 percent extortion, 28 percent from kidnapping, 6 percent from the drug trade, and 4 percent from cattle theft.³⁶⁴ Since the 1970’s confrontations between the ELN and the Colombian army produced such disastrous results that the ELN has avoided military confrontations and has pursued an “economic strategy.”³⁶⁵ The ELN “developed an organizational structure capable of collecting and investing the enormous economic resources that would allow the

³⁵⁹ Ibid.

³⁶⁰ Ibid.

³⁶¹ Ibid.

³⁶² Suarez, Alfredo Rangel. 2000. Parasites and Predators 582.

³⁶³ Sanchez, Fabio and Maria del Mar Palau. 2006. Conflict, Decentralization 10.

³⁶⁴ Suarez, Alfredo Rangel. 2000. Parasites and Predators 585.

³⁶⁵ Rabasa, Angel and Peter Chalk. 2001. Colombian Labyrinth 45.

movement to recover and expand.”³⁶⁶ A major reason for the growth of the ELN arose in the 1980’s with the building of the Cano-Limon-Covenas oil pipeline, which became a nationalist issue and source of funding for the ELN.³⁶⁷ Oil production in Arauca has earned the ELN an exceptional source of rent from petroleum companies.³⁶⁸ The northeast front covers an area that the center of the country needs for transit and communication via railroads and roads and the corporations pay the ELN for protection of mining and transit.³⁶⁹ Along with the Barrancabermeja region, the ELN moved into the Carmen and San Vicente coal regions, northern Antioquia, and southern Cauca which has strategic highways and agricultural production.³⁷⁰ This expansion of the 80’s also included the Norte de Santander region and Uraba, a banana-producing area.³⁷¹ The ELN controls a number of corporations and invests both domestically and in foreign markets.³⁷² This Gabino extortion expansion plan of in the 1980’s was the linchpin to the growth and sustainability of the ELN. This expansion of extortion, upon the emergence of both international and national companies in the region for natural resources, has given the ELN a unique form of income. During the early years of the organization it fought the movement of foreign companies into the region but with the income the ELN has derived from those sources it is now their largest form of income. The processes of globalization and foreign direct investment now add more chances for income than any other avenue outside of kidnapping.

³⁶⁶ Sanchez, Fabio and Maria del Mar Palau. 2006. Conflict, Decentralization 10.

³⁶⁷ McLean, Phillip. 2002. Colombia-Thinking Clearly 3.

³⁶⁸ Richani, Nazih. 2002. Systems of Violence 86.

³⁶⁹ Ibid.

³⁷⁰ Rochlin, James F. 2003. Vanguard Revolutionaries 104.

³⁷¹ Ibid.

³⁷² Richani, Nazih. 2002. Systems of Violence 86.

The ELN has greatly expanded its income through the use of kidnapping. In Colombia the ELN is responsible for more than twice the number of kidnappings than other armed groups.³⁷³ This technological advances in kidnapping developed by the ELN has caused the socioeconomic status of the victims to drop and it has been transformed a near-perfect, automated operation that is highly profitable.³⁷⁴ The ELN has specialists who select the victim, study their financial situation for the purpose of ransom amount and ability to pay, study their security, study their routines, plan the capture and captivity, and negotiate the ransom.³⁷⁵ This operation has become technologically advanced due to increasing financial stability for the ELN.³⁷⁶ Through the use of computer technology the processes has been greatly streamlined and while this is not the newest form of income for the ELN it has definitely expanded since the 1980's. The final change for the economy of the ELN came in the form of the drug trade.

For a time the ELN refused to participate in the drug trade since the Catholic and Christian members and leaders objected to the trade on moral grounds.³⁷⁷ With the death of Perez in 1998, his successor, Gabino has allowed more participation in the drug trade.³⁷⁸ While ELN participation in the drug trade is less than other armed organizations their fronts can be seen in almost every opium/poppy region.³⁷⁹ In looking at the relationship between the ELN and drug producing areas is complex.³⁸⁰ The ELN is active in almost ten regions, five of which are coca producing areas.³⁸¹ In some areas the ELN

³⁷³ Suarez, Alfredo Rangel. 2000. Parasites and Predators 592.

³⁷⁴ Ibid.

³⁷⁵ Ibid.

³⁷⁶ Ibid.

³⁷⁷ Harper, Liz. 2002. Colombia's Civil War 2.

³⁷⁸ Ibid 3.

³⁷⁹ International Crisis Group. 2005. War and Drugs in Colombia 18.

³⁸⁰ Ibid.

³⁸¹ Ibid.

would not tax the farmers for illicit crop production but would allow chosen drug dealers into the area to buy.³⁸² In other areas such as the Magdalena River, Bolivar, and Serrania de San Lucas, the ELN taxed the cultivation of coca.³⁸³ Some areas, which the ELN was contesting with the FARC, led to an order to peasants to eliminate crops being promoted by the FARC.³⁸⁴ This increased pressure of paramilitary presence in areas shared with the FARC has hindered the ability of the ELN to gain substantial amounts of drug revenue.³⁸⁵ There is more recent evidence that shows the ELN income from drug trafficking has increased and in some regions the organization is involved in the whole chain of production.³⁸⁶

The evidence supports the hypothesis that changes in the procurement of funds for the organization have enabled their survival. Economic diversity and expansion has been a major adjustment to the ELN and its ability to survive. While the major component of ELN finances come from extortion and increased kidnappings, it is not possible to discount their involvement in the drug trade. The decision in the 1980's by Gabino to extort natural resource companies and their transit was and is the most significant economic change the ELN has made to the organization. While the drug trade income is still relatively small it has been an important addition to the ELN since it allows them to control regions that would otherwise be taken over by the FARC or paramilitaries.

Final Hypothesis and Analysis:

The ELN is reactive to the government and populace and changes the frequency, severity, and type of attacks accordingly. The military capabilities of the ELN have

³⁸² Ibid.

³⁸³ Ibid.

³⁸⁴ Ibid.

³⁸⁵ Ibid.

³⁸⁶ Ibid.

waned due to many factors.³⁸⁷ Some analysts see the reduction as a conscious movement into a political strategy while others contend that the increased mobility of government forces factor in.³⁸⁸ There is the expected correlation between “state presence and political development, both judicial efficiency and electoral participation have a negative effect on ELN activity.”³⁸⁹ As stated this is expected since the stronger and better the government presence is the less the ELN attacks. With the death of Manuel Perez Martinez the ELN leader Nicholas Rodriguez declared: “On Father Perez’s grave, the ELN swears it will never abandon the oppressed and exploited. It will never give up the revolution.”³⁹⁰ Five days before the death of Perez the ELN agreed to peace talks with the government but withdrew calling the government “opportunistic” due to up-coming elections.³⁹¹ By July 1998 the government met the ELN for peace talks in Germany and Pastrana offered a withdrawal of troops and to create a prisoner exchange program.³⁹² The ELN agreed to free congressmen and mayors and called for a unilateral halt of hostilities while negotiating “a national convention to introduce wide-ranging political reforms, (and) the creation of a constituent assembly.”³⁹³ Subsequent talks with the government included Francisco Galan and Felipe Torres, two ELN leaders, who were temporarily released from jail to join in the talks, and coupled with upcoming negotiations between the government and FARC, incentive to “agree a favorable accommodation with the government.”³⁹⁴

³⁸⁷ International Crisis Group. 2007. Colombia: Moving Forward 2.

³⁸⁸ Ibid.

³⁸⁹ Sanchez, Fabio and Maria del Mar Palau. 2006. Conflict, Decentralization 22.

³⁹⁰ Simons, Geoff. 2004. Colombia: A Brutal History 178.

³⁹¹ Ibid.

³⁹² Ibid 188-189.

³⁹³ Ibid 189.

³⁹⁴ Ibid.

The ELN was annoyed with the governments hard-line toward their negotiations while giving concessions to the FARC.³⁹⁵ As a result of this insult, the ELN intended to begin a “bold new guerrilla campaign designed to enhance the bargaining power” of the organization.³⁹⁶ This new campaign was designed to prove the ELN was a worthy military force by hijacking an Avianca plane and taking 41 passengers as hostages.³⁹⁷ Pastrana immediately called the action a “blatant terrorist act” and refused any political demands of the ELN; essentially the plan backfired.³⁹⁸ By 1999 the political tide shifted out of Pastrana’s favor as “14 of the country’s 30 generals and 200 officers all opposed to the government’s moves to negotiate peace with the rebel groups.”³⁹⁹ Within four days the ELN kidnapped a mass of 100 people at a Cali church.⁴⁰⁰ Negative public outcry and an immediate military response prompted the ELN to release 30 hostages in return for 48 hours of no troop movements from the government.⁴⁰¹ Upon public outcry the ELN begged for forgiveness from the Catholic community while secretly were soliciting ransoms for the wealthy church-goers, but made it clear they “had to finance a war.”⁴⁰² The ELN ended the debacle by giving 33 hostages over to an international commission in mid-June 1999.⁴⁰³

By April of 2000 the government was finally willing to cede a zone to the ELN; however, negative public sentiment and a paralyzing wave of roadblocks throughout the

³⁹⁵ Ruiz, Bert. 2001. The Colombian Civil War 87.

³⁹⁶ Ibid.

³⁹⁷ Ibid 88.

³⁹⁸ Ibid 89.

³⁹⁹ Simons, Geoff. 2004. Colombia: A Brutal History 202.

⁴⁰⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁰¹ Ibid.

⁴⁰² Ruiz, Bert. 2001. The Colombian Civil War 91.

⁴⁰³ Simons, Geoff. 2004. Colombia: A Brutal History 202.

country caused the government to rescind the offer.⁴⁰⁴ This retraction caused the ELN to unleash a wave of “sensational sabotage and kidnappings.”⁴⁰⁵ In December of 2000 the ELN released 45 captive officers as a show of goodwill for both Christmas and for prospective peace talks.⁴⁰⁶ These actions all follow the ELN “broad strategy of attracting the attention of the government and the global media through non-murderous extravaganzas.”⁴⁰⁷ This characteristic of avoiding carnage has been effective at getting the attention of the state and increases their willingness to engage the ELN in peace talks.⁴⁰⁸ This example also presented itself when the Pastrana administration’s management and sale of the ISAGEN a state power generator, ISA a power grid company, Carbocol the regions coal producer, as mandated by the IMF was protested by the ELN.⁴⁰⁹ The ELN wanted to gain Pastrana’s attention and blew up 22 electricity producing sites.⁴¹⁰ ELN leader Gabino stated the “the popular revolution has the responsibility of protesting how the government is managing policy-making” and that the “Pastrana clan has always benefited with privatizations, as well as Colombia’s oligarchy. We want that to stop.”⁴¹¹ However, in 2001 the ELN was losing its negotiation for a cease-fire zone and in a fit of frustration unleashed attacks that summer in which civilians were slaughtered.⁴¹² This ended the ELN talks for their own zone.

⁴⁰⁴ Rochlin, James F. 2003. Vanguard Revolutionaries 127.

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁶ Simons, Geoff. 2004. Colombia: A Brutal History 267.

⁴⁰⁷ Rochlin, James F. 2003. Vanguard Revolutionaries 126.

⁴⁰⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁹ Ruiz, Bert. 2001. The Colombian Civil War 245.

⁴¹⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹¹ Ibid 246.

⁴¹² Rochlin, James F. 2003. Vanguard Revolutionaries 128.

By 2001 the effectiveness of the paramilitaries caused the ELN bargaining position to become increasingly weaker.⁴¹³ Even with their diminished position the ELN scheduled peace talks in 2002 and observers did not foresee an agreeable outcome nor did they believe the ELN would honor a holiday truce.⁴¹⁴ With only 22 active fronts in 2006 the ELN has decreased its military actions from 195 a year to 19.⁴¹⁵ Army offensives resulting in demobilizations and captures have hindered the ability of the ELN. The ELN has survived in many regions due to their mobility but the importance of their presence has been reduced.⁴¹⁶ While the ELN and the Uribe administration have tried peace talks both in Mexico and Cuba there seems to be no end in sight.⁴¹⁷ The ELN has noted three issues in particular that have led to the failure of negotiations: 1) “the government’s persistent denial that an internal conflict existed;” 2) “its bias in favor of the paramilitaries;” and 3) “it’s reluctance to resolve the humanitarian crisis.”⁴¹⁸ The ceasefire bottleneck remains the principal problem as the ELN sees their mobility as their only defense against the other armed groups.⁴¹⁹ This also causes issues of concentrating fighters which would not only expose the ELN strengths and weaknesses to the government (thus losing negotiating power) and it would be “military suicide” if negotiations ended.⁴²⁰

The data supports the assertion that the government’s actions directly affect the frequency and severity of ELN actions. Where the data deviate are when looking at the actions themselves. The ELN has always supported minimal or no innocent deaths as a

⁴¹³ Simons, Geoff. 2004. Colombia: A Brutal History 286.

⁴¹⁴ Ibid 295.

⁴¹⁵ International Crisis Group. 2007. Colombia: Moving Forward 2.

⁴¹⁶ Ibid.

⁴¹⁷ Ibid 10.

⁴¹⁸ Ibid.

⁴¹⁹ Ibid 12.

⁴²⁰ Ibid.

result of their actions. While this is not true in all cases, the few outliers containing civilian deaths are the exception, not the rule of the ELN. The data are not supportive of the ELN rhetoric of minimal fatalities because this has not always been the case, but compared to the other armed groups of the country, the ELN is the least murderous of the bunch. In concluding the data the hypothesis is not supported that the ELN changes the type of military based on the government actions. Their actions follow the same lines regardless of the specific motivations, although there are exceptions. But in many cases of ELN and government negotiations the ELN has used their small number of innocent killings as a point of leverage against the government and each time this is violated the ELN loses negotiating power. The ELN does not change its actions or severity based on public sentiment. While the leadership has asked the public for forgiveness in certain cases it has not changed or deterred ELN operations.

Matrix Diagram and Analysis:

Evidence	Hypothesis 1	Hypothesis 2	Hypothesis 3
Change in ideology	C	C	I
Change in leadership	C	C	N/A
Diversity in membership	C	N/A	N/A
Rise of new international political and economic policies	C	C	N/A
Economic expansion	N/A	C	N/A
Involvement in drug trade	N/A	C	N/A
Acceptance of foreign investment	N/A	C	C
Technological advancements	N/A	C	N/A
Government actions dictate frequency and severity of attacks	N/A	N/A	C
Government actions dictate type of attacks	N/A	N/A	I
Popular sentiment dictates frequency and severity of attacks	N/A	N/A	I
Popular sentiment dictates type of attacks	N/A	N/A	I

The matrix diagrams the evidence for each hypothesis, supplementing the discussion of hypotheses and the data collected. The major points of evidence are broken into four major themes of change, new international orders, government, and public and the conclusions drawn on their consistency or inconsistency when compared to the

hypothesis. These themes emerge in the hypothesis analysis portion of the work. In the first hypothesis the change in ideology overlapped multiple areas. Their change in ideology ensured their survival and opened new forms of economic gain throughout the life of the organization. It never changed its tactics in attacking the government or negotiating peace. The change in leadership of the organization played a large role in changing the organizations structure and changes to the geographic utilization of their areas on control for economic gain. Diversity in membership seemed to be the cause of many changes within the organization as it expanded and created a hybrid force that was truly unique to revolutionary movements in many ways. The rise of neoliberal capitalism and the IMF was originally an area the ELN refused to allow in their sector but as its inevitability became apparent the ELN used it to their economic advantage and changed their culture to fit the new economic order. In the second hypothesis the economic expansion of the ELN in the 1980's is supported as one of the most important points of organizational change. The involvement in the drug trade is a direct result of the economic factor in that some areas of control require the ELN to participate to fight other armed groups and a change in later ideology also supported this economic venture. Acceptance to foreign investment opened new opportunities for the ELN financially through extortion but it also changed the interaction between the ELN and the government. The data shows that during time of privatization and foreign sale of resources are the times the ELN was most active in terrorist attacks in these areas. Technological advancements made the ELN proficient kidnappers in Colombia. The data shows these advancements made the kidnapping processes systematic and much more profitable. While in the third hypothesis, the data did support the assertion that

government actions dictated the severity and frequency of attacks perpetrated by the ELN, the data also showed that their actions followed the same minimal casualty or no casualty type of action. Based on that, the data did not support the hypothesis looking at the change in type of actions. In both cases of public sentiment the data shows that while apologetic on occasion the ELN does not change its frequency, severity, or types of attacks.


Conclusion:

The ELN has depended on their ability to change their organizational culture, structure, and behavior for survival. This chapter highlights the major factors contributing to these changes through the near demise, expansion of funding and influence in a new economic order, and through the actions of the government and populace. The data supported the hypothesis of annihilation, funding, and influence. This showed that the near-decimation of the ELN changed their ideology, structure, and leadership. The data also demonstrated that the expansion of funding opportunities and influence played integral roles in the survival and changes in the organizational behavior and structure. When considering the final hypothesis the data supports the change in frequency and severity of ELN attacks based on the actions of the government but the types of actions were not changed, and the popular view changed nothing.


Having studied the FARC and ELN changes, the next chapter is a LAMP (Lockwood Analytical Method of Prediction) analysis of the FARC and ELN. The next chapter pulls together the individual studies of the FARC and ELN for the purpose of predicting their futures in Colombia.

Appendix 1: Evolution of ELN Actions


1985



1990



2000



(Sanchez and Palau 2006, 11)

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Chapter 4 The Future of the FARC and ELN

Introduction:

For a nation with abundant natural resources and large area, Colombia is the second oldest democracy in Latin America, yet remains one of the most unstable democracies, with a long legacy of violence. The violence has stemmed from political divisions which fall along economic structural inequalities, giving rise to such guerrilla groups as the FARC and ELN, which offer redress of social ills. Although the international community has tried to help the government of Colombia, its socio-economic problems are considered of their own making and thus must be handled by the Colombian government via military, police, or diplomacy. These problems have become international issues as globalization has made Colombia a major trading partner of the U.S. and other countries, and has also opened up for foreign direct investment. Unfortunately, this international assistance will all be brought to an end if the government cannot regain and maintain control of the insurgent forces within the country.

This chapter will begin with a brief history of Colombia and its democratically elected government for context. Next, the chapter discusses each actor and their roots and ideologies, how these groups interact with each other, and with the Colombian government. Research earlier in this thesis focused on the ELN and FARC individually. With the addition of the government the study will show the likely futures of these actors. This will be followed by the “pairwise comparison” and an explanation of the findings.⁴²¹

⁴²¹ Lockwood Johnathan S. and Kathleen O’Brien Lockwood. 1994. The Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP). MBS: American Military University 28-29.

The research will then explain focal events and indicators that will present themselves in the event the futures predicted become reality.

Predictive Issue:

Within the range of adaptations probable, what are the most likely predictions for future FARC and ELN behavior?

Actors:

The purpose of this chapter is to fill some of the gaps in the prediction theories surrounding the future of Colombia in its battle against insurgencies. This question involves an evaluation of the three major actors in the battle between the insurgencies and the state. This study focuses on the FARC and ELN with the state as a constant and all of the choices and interactions therein. These two actors and their options are considered under the scenarios of Colombian state involvement. Colombia's state options include taking a neutral stance, a containment stance, or a "victory" stance in its battle with the FARC and ELN.

Colombia

When looking at the history of the Colombian state it is important to focus on the political divisions within the country. As noted in previous chapters the FARC and ELN are militant, radical wings of political arms. Since independence in the 1830's from Gran Colombia⁴²² the Liberal and Conservative parties that would determine or influence every aspect of politics, nation building, and Colombian society.⁴²³ With their roots in the Wars of Independence the two parties were comprised of land owners and merchants who had a

⁴²² CIA. 2009. World Factbook Colombia. Central Intelligence Agency. (April). Internet: Available from: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/co.html> 1.

⁴²³ Tuft, Eva Irene. 1997. Democracy and Violence: The Colombian Paradox. Chr.Michelsen Institute Report Series. Internet. Available from: http://bora.cmi.no/dspace/bitstream/10202/307/1/R%201997.%201.%20Eva%20I.%20Tuft-07092007_1.pdf 29.

“considerable degree of autonomy” and could mobilize their supporters for elections and civil conflicts.⁴²⁴ This bipartisan system led to the elites using it as a framework “to channel, promote, and protect their interests.”⁴²⁵ Elite interests became indistinguishable from party ideology and this coupled with the hereditary nature of the political factions led to a polarized Colombia where party affiliation became the main social cleavage in the country.⁴²⁶ This violence occurred as a result of competition for state power and distribution of resources.⁴²⁷ In the early Colombian republic one of the most important and often only sources of wealth was the “ability to award contracts, control political and public service appointments, and make policy decisions related to the economy.”⁴²⁸ This was because the “state budget was the only industry in a country without industries” and this lack of a private sector meant that the government had the only opportunities for advancement.⁴²⁹

The political parties were “subcultures” and operated on “attack and revenge” systems since the membership was passed on from generation to generation.⁴³⁰ However, the minority party was never excluded from participation in the government and a system of elite pacts was used as a “mechanism for accommodation, power sharing, mediation, and resolving conflict.”⁴³¹ Elite pacts were ways of sharing power and making sure that no significant political faction was left out so that a “political truce” or gradual exchange of power between parties could happen without instigating violence.⁴³² This was the basis

⁴²⁴ Ibid.

⁴²⁵ Ibid 30.

⁴²⁶ Ibid.

⁴²⁷ Ibid 31.

⁴²⁸ Ibid.

⁴²⁹ Ibid.

⁴³⁰ Ibid 32.

⁴³¹ Ibid 33-34.

⁴³² Ibid 33.

for the *clientelismo*, or clientelist, form of government that came to define Colombian politics.

In previous chapters clientelist politics are discussed regarding the FARC and ELN, but in this chapter the explanation leads to the modern state of Colombian politics. *Clientelismo* is a reward system “in the form of patronage, in exchange for support.”⁴³³ This reward could mean government contracts, licenses, positions in local or regional government, or even as giving a title of public land to private interest.⁴³⁴ This clientelism occurred between the Liberals and Conservatives (state representatives) and elite groups and between the elites of the parties and their supporters.⁴³⁵ For peasants this form of patronage could mean “relief from military conscription for a son to effective police protection from belligerent neighbors to a favorable resolution of legal disputes.”⁴³⁶ For landowners this could mean “access to government jobs, advanced education for children, a favorable decision on the location of a road or any of a hundred other political or legal favors.”⁴³⁷ This system unified parties from the top elites through the bottom of society and “replaced the state as a source of identity.”⁴³⁸ Clientelism was critical in the polarization of the country and the polarization of the two parties.⁴³⁹ Now that the foundations of Colombian political polarization are clear it is important to recap the era of *La Violencia*.

The next major event in the history of Colombia was an era known as *La Violencia*. This era is important due to the changes in Colombia during and after the

⁴³³ Ibid 34.

⁴³⁴ Ibid.

⁴³⁵ Ibid 35.

⁴³⁶ Ibid.

⁴³⁷ Ibid.

⁴³⁸ Ibid 36.

⁴³⁹ Ibid.

period between 1940 and 1960. Two distinct levels of conflict started in this era and at first look, this was the same type conflict as in the past between the Liberal and Conservative parties.⁴⁴⁰ During this period the “old bipartisan hegemony” conflicted with the new political ideologies that fell “outside of the traditional political order.”⁴⁴¹ The origins of these new political groups formed as a result of the political and social changes that spread throughout Latin America in the 20th century that were discussed in the first chapter. These groups were categorized as “silent revolutions” and while their political and social divisions were previously discussed it is helpful to recall the changes facilitates by this period. First were the influx of foreign investment, economic growth due to exports, industrial and manufacturing growth, and the role of the state becoming a supporting rather than driving force.⁴⁴² Rapid growth in the population included massive migration from agricultural lands to industrial urban centers.⁴⁴³ The expansion and growth of this era created almost no downward distribution of wealth and the “majority of Colombians experienced either a stagnation or relative decline in their standard of living.”⁴⁴⁴ This created a period where government income increased some four hundred percent yet the social expenditures in the country were stagnant.⁴⁴⁵ These conditions coupled with the general increase in education of the public and relative loss of influence of the Catholic Church, set the stage for “silent revolutions.”⁴⁴⁶ The formation of new political groups added new powers and opportunities and new “loads to the political

⁴⁴⁰ Ibid 38.

⁴⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴⁴² Ibid 40.

⁴⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁶ Ibid 41.

system.”⁴⁴⁷ The expansion of these groups allowed them to channel and satisfy the demands of their constituents thus beating out the traditional parties and eroding the clientelist system.⁴⁴⁸ This led to immediate attempts by both the Conservatives and Liberals to integrate these new parties into their bipartisan system, for example, the Liberals integrating the labor unions and interest groups from the urbanization of the work force.⁴⁴⁹ These issues of political and social divisions led to the rise of a new political leader that would change the face of Colombian politics.

Jorge Eliecer Gaitan was the face of the “reformist wing of the Liberal party” by focusing his efforts on uniting the politically marginalized people against the “oligarchy, the real country against the political country, ceaselessly attacking the corruption and bankruptcy of the old system.”⁴⁵⁰ Gaitan mobilized the populace by *Gaitanismo* where the traditional Liberal-Conservative divisions were invited to realign themselves to transform the traditional system into “a new class oriented axis of political confrontation.”⁴⁵¹ To the oligarchy, “*Gaitanismo* equaled a revolution which threatened the foundation of their interests” and so these traditional parties tried to continue their previous path of integrating the new political forces into their pre-existing vertical party divisions.⁴⁵² It was this attempt to change the face of Colombian politics that appealed to so many and brought the full weight of the hardliner Conservatives to bear on Gaitan. It would mark the beginning of *La Violencia*.

⁴⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁰ Ibid 44.

⁴⁵¹ Ibid.

⁴⁵² Ibid.

La Violencia can be broken into four periods. The first was the galvanizing moment of political tension, the assassination of Gaitan on April 9, 1948.⁴⁵³ This led to the *Bogotazo* which was a spontaneous riot that began the “multifaceted insurrection” reflecting “the demands of the new challengers.”⁴⁵⁴ The traditional party leaders acted quickly to stop the violence but as Conservative violence increased the Liberals withdrew from the political alignments and the killing escalated.⁴⁵⁵

The second period of *La Violencia* was marked by the quick spread of guerrilla warfare throughout the country as guerrilla groups armed themselves against partisan attack.⁴⁵⁶ To make matters worse the Conservative controlled government used the National Police and the Army for partisan ends that further mobilized the Liberal peasantry.⁴⁵⁷ This use of police and military in “scorched-earth” tactics and terror would mark itself in the minds of Colombian society.⁴⁵⁸ In 1952 the guerrillas met with the Liberal leadership and gave them the ultimatum of either leading the revolt or the guerrillas would.⁴⁵⁹ The Liberal response was a public parting from the guerrilla organizations and the people they represented.⁴⁶⁰ This growing independence of the guerrilla groups and the inability of the Liberal elite to control them led to “an irreversible social and political crisis.”⁴⁶¹ The final break between the Liberals and the guerrillas came with the increasing radicalism of the guerrillas and their announcement that the Llanos region of Colombia was to be an autonomous area under a popular

⁴⁵³ Rempe, Dennis. 2002. Implementing Plan Colombia The Past as a Prologue? A History of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in Colombia 1958-66. Strategic Studies Institute. 3.

⁴⁵⁴ Tuft, Eva Irene. 1997. *Democracy and Violence* 45.

⁴⁵⁵ *Ibid* 46.

⁴⁵⁶ Rempe, Dennis. 2002. Implementing Plan Colombia 3.

⁴⁵⁷ *Ibid*.

⁴⁵⁸ Tuft, Eva Irene. 1997. *Democracy and Violence* 47.

⁴⁵⁹ *Ibid* 48.

⁴⁶⁰ *Ibid*.

⁴⁶¹ *Ibid* 49.

democracy.⁴⁶² Land reform would be “land for the people who work it” which directly affected the Liberal land owners.⁴⁶³ It was at this point General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla overthrew the government in a military coup at the behest of the political parties.⁴⁶⁴ The Conservative and Liberal moderates “essentially thrust” Pinillas into power while the two parties “worked out a new governing pact.”⁴⁶⁵ The General preferred a civilian solution to the problem and preferred the past military stance of not getting politically involved since he believed that “we the military do not have sufficient capacity to govern the country.”⁴⁶⁶

In the third period of *La Violencia* progress stalled, corruption increased, pockets of violence were met with repression, and guerrilla warfare began to spread again.⁴⁶⁷ Rojas Pinilla alienated the business men through his economic policies and in incidents where students were fired upon and crowded churches were tear-gassed he alienated the Catholic Church.⁴⁶⁸ The Rojas Pinilla blend of populism with corporatism alienated the military and “threatened the institutional unity,” and finally he was unable to demobilize the guerrillas or bring alliances together with new movements like the trade unions.⁴⁶⁹

The fourth period of *La Violencia* saw the creation National Front government (a two-party 4-year alternating power system).⁴⁷⁰ Due to the threats to the traditional parties the Liberals and Conservatives created the National Front to combat the rise of new political challengers and the attempt by Rojas Pinilla to unite the people in a *Gaitanista*

⁴⁶² Ibid.

⁴⁶³ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁴ Rempe, Dennis. 2002. Implementing Plan Colombia 3.

⁴⁶⁵ Tuft, Eva Irene. 1997. *Democracy and Violence* 49.

⁴⁶⁶ Ibid 50.

⁴⁶⁷ Rempe, Dennis. 2002. Implementing Plan Colombia 3.

⁴⁶⁸ Tuft, Eva Irene. 1997. *Democracy and Violence* 51.

⁴⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁰ Rempe, Dennis. 2002. Implementing Plan Colombia 4.

fashion.⁴⁷¹ Through a series of constitutional amendments the Liberals and Conservatives reached agreements to ensure neither party was excluded or repressed by the other.⁴⁷²

This legitimized inter-elite arrangements and along with a 4-year alternating presidency, each party was given half of the legislative seats regardless of their number of votes.⁴⁷³

All cabinet positions, Supreme Court appointments, public service appointments, governorships, and mayoralties “were made on the basis of parity between the two parties,” and “ordinary legislation required a two-thirds majority vote to be ratified.”⁴⁷⁴

The National Front also marked the first time the military became involved in political negotiations; the removal of Pinillas in 1957 began the transition of the military government back into civilian control.⁴⁷⁵ The military was given three concessions upon

its return to civilian control.⁴⁷⁶ First, the excesses and/or failings were placed at the feet of Pinillas exclusively.⁴⁷⁷ Second the “professionalization” of the military in their

national security role was redefined.⁴⁷⁸ They were given modern equipment, professional training abroad, a large budget increase and complete autonomy over these resources.⁴⁷⁹

Third, the military was given the role of advisor to public order and security decision-making.⁴⁸⁰ The final portion of the National Front system dealt with the emergence of

new political participants and restrictions.⁴⁸¹ These four restrictions were 1) none of the new political entities were involved in the National Front system; 2) all parties other than

⁴⁷¹ Tuft, Eva Irene. 1997. *Democracy and Violence* 53.

⁴⁷² *Ibid.*

⁴⁷³ *Ibid* 54.

⁴⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷⁶ *Ibid* 55.

⁴⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸¹ *Ibid* 56.

Liberals and Conservatives were excluded from the electoral process; 3) there were no provisions for the expansion of political participation in the National Front agreement; 4) the agreement was purely political and addressed no social or historical issues.⁴⁸² This power sharing program was the source of diminishing party loyalty, which eroded the political relationship of the state and the people even further.⁴⁸³

The National Front was effective as a power sharing and control mechanism for the Liberal and Conservative parties but the system further repressed new political entities in Colombia and strengthened the resolve of the guerrillas. The Colombian crisis is a result of political violence that goes almost completely uncontrolled by the state.⁴⁸⁴ There are four main elements in the Colombian crisis.⁴⁸⁵ First, forty years after the National Front the Liberals and Conservatives still run the political scene.⁴⁸⁶ The system is closed to any other potential participants, membership of the traditional parties has become extremely narrow, where the system is fragmented beyond the control of any actor, the democratic institutions have neither been a channel for concerns of the public nor a mechanism for broad debate, and these institutions cannot mediate or resolve conflict.⁴⁸⁷ Second, the expanding poverty gap, despite economic growth, has increased social protest and given rise to new organizations that “are creating politics without the government or the guerrillas.”⁴⁸⁸ Third, all social conflict resolution has been militarized due to the dependence of the elite on military support to stop new political opposition.⁴⁸⁹ The military has gained influence in “defining the ideological rationale and implementing

⁴⁸² Ibid.

⁴⁸³ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁴ Ibid 58.

⁴⁸⁵ Ibid 59.

⁴⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁹ Ibid.

policy related to public order, social conflict, and the ongoing war with the various guerrilla groups.”⁴⁹⁰ Fourth, the justice system is breaking down since the system has been politicized through state repression, agents responsible for human rights violations have absolute impunity, and the system cannot effectively deal with escalating crime.⁴⁹¹ These problems have permeated the political climate in Colombia to the point where most of the social conflict can be traced to these core issues.

Colombia has become a tangled web of groups that have evolved into part of the culture where each fight for individual ideals rather than the common good.⁴⁹² The desire for power and easy wealth has tainted the vision of these groups and their self-serving behavior has produced the “Loop Effect” that the country is currently entangled in.⁴⁹³ The social condition of Colombia has been as a result of uneven wealth distribution, the inability to meet human needs, lack of free speech, weak ethics, poor leadership, mishandling of the country and resources, and electorate indifference.⁴⁹⁴ The political forces in Colombia obtain their profits and power from the chaotic state of the country.⁴⁹⁵ This produced new ideological leaders in Colombia that followed the tradition of Gaitan. Gaitan was followed by Luis Carlos Galan Sarimento the founder of the New Liberalism political party, supported the extradition of criminals to the U.S., and was killed for his efforts in 1989.⁴⁹⁶ Guillermo Cano Isaza was a defender of free speech and human rights and his protest of violence, rights violations, authoritarianism, and corruption led to his

⁴⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁹¹ Ibid.

⁴⁹² Zambrano, Jair Cortazar and Lynn L. Adams. 2008. Colombia: Indications of a Never-Ending Conflict in Relation to the Adams Revolutionary Model. Utah Valley University. Internet: Available from: http://law.creighton.edu/wernerInstitute/complexityconference/speaker_materials/Table%20Topic%20Paper%20Presentations/Colombia%20-%20Lynn%20Adams%20&%20Jair%20Cortazar.pdf 13.

⁴⁹³ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁵ Ibid 14.

⁴⁹⁶ Ibid 12.

assassination in 1986.⁴⁹⁷ Jamie Garzon was a journalist, comedian, and political satirist but his human rights activism led to his assassination in 1999.⁴⁹⁸ Throughout the 90's over 250,000 Colombians were killed in social conflict.⁴⁹⁹ In 2006 the National University of Colombia's faculty was threatened due to their scholarly approaches to the Colombian social and political situation and their research of certain topics.⁵⁰⁰ Ideologues and their families are often kidnapped or assassinated; Senator Ingrid Betancourt is an example of this.⁵⁰¹ She demanded a change in all aspects of the system including society, rebels, politics, and government and was kidnapped by the FARC in response to her efforts to change the old ways.⁵⁰² The efforts of Uribe Velez who is the president elect from 2006 to 2010 started the improvement of Colombia.⁵⁰³ It will be the actions and improvements of the Uribe administration that will support the scenario portion of the work.

While violence in Colombia has been historic, it has not been until recently that the conflict spillover into neighboring nations has created a new set of problems for the Colombian government. These extenuating circumstances beyond the state of Colombia warrant far more discussion than can be included here. However, this chapter focuses on the Colombian state and their effect on FARC and ELN actions. The short-term and long-term goals of each group are considered next, followed by the goals of the government, which are discussed in relation to the scenarios that will come later in the study.

⁴⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁸ Ibid 13.

⁴⁹⁹ Ibid 12.

⁵⁰⁰ Ibid.

⁵⁰¹ Ibid.

⁵⁰² Ibid.

⁵⁰³ Ibid 14.

The FARC

To date there have been numerous political guerrilla groups in Colombia but the most commonly known which still present a threat to the Colombian government is the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia). This group adopted a revolutionary doctrine based on Marxist-Leninist ideology and a military strategy following other guerrilla and terrorist activities.⁵⁰⁴ The ideological discourse these groups pursued in the decision making process “diminished their intellectual flexibility in developing strategies and their ability to adapt to the political and social environment.”⁵⁰⁵ This deeply imbedded doctrine forced the group to “adopt political and military behavior that on many occasions was not suited to the real conditions in which the struggle was to take place.”⁵⁰⁶ The evolution of the FARC began with the shift from the Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy to a less rigid “Bolivarian” ideological path.⁵⁰⁷

This new ideological vision combines nationalist with left-wing ideas and sidelines ultimate ideological goals for the establishment of a socialist model.⁵⁰⁸ This has evolved into competition with the state through heightened critique of government incompetence when dealing with social inequality, crime, and deficient public services.⁵⁰⁹ The FARC has presented themselves as a credible alternative for “good government.”⁵¹⁰ The FARC has gone from “criticizing the legitimacy of the origin of the state to questioning its functional legitimacy.”⁵¹¹ The group has since pushed to gain a share of

⁵⁰⁴ Ortiz, Roman D. 2002. “Insurgent Strategies in the Post-Cold War: The Case of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 25 128.

⁵⁰⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁷ Ibid 130.

⁵⁰⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁹ Ibid.

⁵¹⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹¹ Ibid.

power within the state at the municipal level so as to be visible in an administrative capacity.⁵¹² The guerrillas have also increased their ability to provide public services such as health, education, and public order.⁵¹³ New governmental forms of the FARC were derived from a narrow set of ideologies that clashed with the culture of the population and as a result diminished the group's operational flexibility as well as their lobby for support from local social coalitions. What makes this group unique is their pragmatic strategy for gaining power.⁵¹⁴ This difference has been crucial to the survival of the FARC where their support within the rural areas remains strong from those who have been neglected by the government.

In 2008 the FARC was dealt two difficult blows to its leadership. Founder Pedro Marin died in May and the earlier death of second-in-command Raul Reyes in a bombing raid in Ecuador in March, after which the new leader Alfonso Cano (Guillermo Saenz) rose to power.⁵¹⁵ The Colombian military continued its strategy of military neutralization through "deepening internal fissures and splintering the organization" leaving the FARC no choice but to surrender, be captured, or die.⁵¹⁶ But the government failed to remember that the organization is still a durable political-military force with an ideology that contains remnants of Marxism-Leninism.⁵¹⁷ The government estimates that there are around 7,000 to 10,000 troops left and while the numbers vary due to the replenishment capabilities of the FARC, the government has been particularly effective in using FARC

⁵¹² Ibid 131.

⁵¹³ Ibid.

⁵¹⁴ Ibid.

⁵¹⁵ International Crisis Group. 2009. Ending Colombia's FARC Conflict: Dealing the Right Card. Latin America Report No 30. (March): Internet. Available from: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6016> 1.

This work is the most current publication on the FARC and was published while this paper was in process.

⁵¹⁶ Ibid.

⁵¹⁷ Ibid 1-2.

defectors to hunt-down and infiltrate remaining FARC units.⁵¹⁸ This increase in fighting has decimated the FARC ranks at 10,806 killed and 26,648 captured all between 2003 and 2009 to make matters worse individual demobilization has also been a problem where 11,615 fighters left the FARC.⁵¹⁹

The FARC has continued its assertion that their struggle is legitimate but there is a lack of education among its recruits.⁵²⁰ The fighters are simply told the state elites are responsible for their hardships which leave the majority of fighters unaware of the political and military structures and objectives of the FARC.⁵²¹ This lack of political savvy and waning morale coupled with unrelenting military pressure has created a “culture of distrust” leading the FARC to desperate child recruitment to replenish its forces.⁵²² These problems have added further strain to the rural fronts where the FARC has retreated to the high ground border regions of Venezuela, Panama, Ecuador, and Brazil.⁵²³ These units have merged with stronger “inter-fronts” and have reduced their unit size to avoid air attacks and increase their ability to use hit-and-run methods of attack with “triads” (three-man cells).⁵²⁴ This has hindered the ability of the FARC to launch offensives but that has not reduced their capacity to take over new territory in these deeper rural areas.⁵²⁵

On the urban fronts the FARC still could gain strength against the government since the security policy of the government is supported in these areas and an increase in

⁵¹⁸ Ibid 7.

⁵¹⁹ Ibid.

⁵²⁰ Ibid 9.

⁵²¹ Ibid.

⁵²² Ibid.

⁵²³ Ibid 10.

⁵²⁴ Ibid.

⁵²⁵ Ibid.

attacks would discredit this policy.⁵²⁶ A new goal of the FARC is to gain attention through assassinations, sabotage, and recruitment of students.⁵²⁷ Several attacks have already taken place in the cities of Bogotá, Cali, Buenaventura and Neiva.⁵²⁸ The FARC has shown resolve in these areas.⁵²⁹ While kidnapping and extortion remain important sources of income the FARC has changed its methods by keeping kidnapped victims in various places and by demanding smaller ransoms.⁵³⁰ Illicit activities remain at the top of the list for income and the FARC has responded to the government offensive by strengthening its units in coca producing areas.⁵³¹

The FARC's goals for the short term include the property acquisition in drug cultivating regions and domination of communication across Colombia. In 1999, the Colombian government conceded a piece of land the size of Switzerland to become a demilitarized zone after which military and police withdrew from the area.⁵³² Over three years the FARC used this area near the heart of the country to increase their effective presence in the areas around the zone thus expanding the territory they controlled and ensuring southern lines of communication.⁵³³ They were able to use the area to hide and manage their inventory of hostages, accelerate their terrorist training, and manufacture bombs and mines.⁵³⁴ The FARC is trying to consolidate its control of coca-growing regions in the south and east thus allowing them to expand their operations and gain

⁵²⁶ Ibid 11.

⁵²⁷ Ibid.

⁵²⁸ Ibid 12.

⁵²⁹ Ibid.

⁵³⁰ Ibid.

⁵³¹ Ibid.

⁵³² Demarest, Geoffrey, 2003. Mapping Colombia: The Correlation Between Land Data and Strategy. Strategic Studies Institute. 16.

⁵³³ Ibid.

⁵³⁴ Ibid.

military capabilities.⁵³⁵ Subsequently, new goals include extending their theatre of operations to envelope the entire country and the FARC's goal is to be accomplished through the control of corridors to the coastal, border, and mountain regions of Colombia.⁵³⁶ The FARC and ELN in separate actions both plan to isolate Bogotá and other major cities by cutting communications between the cities and the rest of the country.⁵³⁷ Finally through networking in the urban areas the FARC plan a large-scale attack that will result in a general uprising.⁵³⁸ However, these goals have taken a back seat to the more important goals of leadership replacement and survival since 2008.

A pressing issue is the effect of the military on the ability of the FARC to continue to support their base. FARC support has been reduced to almost nothing in rural communities and their support nationally and internationally has been greatly diminished.⁵³⁹ The ability of the FARC to mobilize populations against the government has diminished since they have been unable to protect those involved from reprisals of security forces and new armed organizations.⁵⁴⁰ The rural communities have also taken advantage of the weakened state of the FARC to combat the extortion and recruitment tactics of the group.⁵⁴¹ This all hinges on the upcoming 2010 elections in Colombia when the new leader Cano hopes that the FARC will be able to re-structure the political side of the FARC.⁵⁴² The FARC is infiltrating the left-wing and government opposition through

⁵³⁵ Rabasa, Angel and Peter Chalk. 2001. *Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and its Implications for Regional Stability*. Santa Monica: RAND. 39.

⁵³⁶ *Ibid* 40.

⁵³⁷ *Ibid*.

⁵³⁸ *Ibid*.

⁵³⁹ International Crisis Group. 2009. *Ending Colombia's FARC Conflict* 15.

⁵⁴⁰ *Ibid*.

⁵⁴¹ *Ibid* 17.

⁵⁴² *Ibid*.

universities and protests which are strengthening links with urban militias.⁵⁴³ This has led to a return to their Bolivarian interpretation and continuing their anti-imperialist ideals with a focus on uniting Latin America.⁵⁴⁴ Since the 2002 shock of being placed on the European and Canadian terrorist lists, the FARC has shifted some of its focus to regaining international support and while this has been met with limited success the FARC has increased its prisoners-for-hostages swaps with the government.⁵⁴⁵ This, coupled with the FARC request to increase the involvement of the international community has not only improved their international image but has proven their ability to act with political cohesion.⁵⁴⁶

The ELN

The Marxist based ELN by comparison however, has never strayed from their rigid communist ideology. A smaller group, numbering around 3,500, the ELN believes in removing the current government and replacing it with a socialist system.⁵⁴⁷ Heavily inspired by the Cuban Revolution, the group evolved from urban radicals (MOEC Movement for Workers, Students, and Peasants), who were inspired by Castro and Che Guevara in their call for the removal of all Latin American governments.⁵⁴⁸ At this time, another group, the United Front for Revolutionary Action (FUAR) solicited Castro for financial support and the FUAR would eventually become part of the ELN.⁵⁴⁹ Soon peasants and farmers supported the group for protection from the right-wing paramilitaries and even radical Roman Catholic priests joined the movement due to its

⁵⁴³ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁵ Ibid 18-19.

⁵⁴⁶ Ibid 19.

⁵⁴⁷ Harper, Liz. 2002. Colombia's Civil War: National Liberation Army (ELN). Online News Hour. Internet. Available from: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/latin_america/colombia/players_eln 1.

⁵⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁹ Ibid 2.

call for “popular unity” against a government that neglects its poor.⁵⁵⁰ The ELN has also shown that for the right reasons it will ally itself with other guerrilla groups like the FARC, as they did in the 1990’s for the “Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Coordination.”⁵⁵¹ For most of their existence the ELN has followed a strict separation from the drug trade, freedom of religion, and a separation from Maoist communist ideology.⁵⁵² Foundational differences aside, the ELN and FARC have disparate goals for the short term, yet have similar long-term goals.

The ELN avoids direct military confrontation and uses an “economic strategy” consisting of attacks on the power grid and communications, including “armed propaganda,” kidnappings, and airplane hijackings.⁵⁵³ This strategy has been as a result of the smaller size of the ELN and their lack of military strength. Currently, the FARC and ELN both have a similar long-term goal, which includes but is not limited to complete destruction of the state as it exists, while the ELN still has the short-term goal of negotiating its own demilitarized zone.⁵⁵⁴ Although the breakdown of talks for this demilitarized zone ended with the Pastrana administration the ELN is an effective force involved in kidnappings, hijackings, extortion, and the drug trade.⁵⁵⁵ Under the Uribe administration the ELN shifted strategies by presenting their political demands to parliament, giving the government hope to see the rebels “reconcile their revolutionary demands with Uribe’s mandate to strengthen the state, enhance citizen security and

⁵⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵⁵² Ibid 3.

⁵⁵³ Rabasa, Angel and Peter Chalk. 2001. Colombian Labyrinth 45.

⁵⁵⁴ Ibid 46.

⁵⁵⁵ International Crisis Group. 2002. Colombia: Prospects for Peace with the ELN. ICG Latin America Report No2. (October): Internet. Available from: http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/report_archive/A400790_04102002.pdf 20.

combat poverty.”⁵⁵⁶ It is important to note that the ELN has the unique “capacity for reflection and political assessment” that is more developed than the other armed groups.⁵⁵⁷ This has impressed a more pragmatic approach for ELN leadership and the general shift in thought is that there is more to be gained from negotiations than armed conflict.⁵⁵⁸

The Uribe administration’s rounds of peace negotiations showed a similar fate to those of the Pastrana administration. One of the focus points of the ELN negotiations has been the humanitarian crisis and while the government refused to focus on this issue they demanded that the ELN cease all hostilities and criminal acts to participate in negotiations.⁵⁵⁹ With the advent of the Cuban rounds in 2007 the ELN and government could not even agree on whether to discuss the ceasefire or agenda first.⁵⁶⁰ Upon the agreement for the government to release ELN prisoners, the ELN was prepared to release all hostages and stop kidnapping.⁵⁶¹ However, when talks resumed in June the government demanded the ELN identify its combatants and move them to a “special zone.”⁵⁶² The government then accused the ELN of changing its requests every time the negotiations seemed to be nearing an end.⁵⁶³ The main points of argument for the ELN are legitimate in that they fear the government will use the identification and concentration of their troops to wipe the organization out. On the other hand, the

⁵⁵⁶ Ibid 21.

⁵⁵⁷ Ibid 23.

⁵⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁵⁹ International Crisis Group. 2007. Colombia: Moving Forward with the ELN? Latin America Briefing No16. (October): Internet. Available from: http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/latin_america/b16_colombia_eln.pdf 10.

⁵⁶⁰ Ibid 11.

⁵⁶¹ Ibid.

⁵⁶² Ibid.

⁵⁶³ Ibid.

government feels that the ELN will continue their illegal acts if the government cannot identify and locate ELN combatants.

There is a level of uncertainty when looking at the preferred outcome and goals of the ELN under the current negotiations. As an armed group the goals of the ELN are relatively unchanged from the goals the group set out to achieve in its founding. With the new negotiations it is unclear as to whether the ELN has the desire to become a legitimate political party or build on its base and represent its goals through legal channels.⁵⁶⁴ The most challenging aspect of this transition is the ELN's desire to retain its structure.⁵⁶⁵ Two points of difficulty seem to be that those close to ELN leadership are of the opinion that the group does not desire to create a political party, and the FARC seems to be thwarting efforts of the ELN and the government to reach peace agreements.⁵⁶⁶ The ELN and FARC goals and recent actions against the backdrop of the political climate in Colombia and the actions of the government are the subjects of the following methodology and analyses.

Methodology

To explain the factors involved and their effect on the FARC and ELN future actions, this research uses liberalism as the theoretical approach which allows for the actions of non-state actors. The FARC and ELN are non-state actors and in this work have proven to have both military and economic strengths that make them formidable opponents to the state. It is also important to understand that the actions of the state directly affect the FARC and ELN future actions and adaptations. The focus on the state competing for power and control of the country plays into the liberal cobweb approach to

⁵⁶⁴ Ibid 16.

⁵⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶⁶ Ibid.

social science theory. This is an effective approach for explaining how the independent variables such as the actions of the state affect the organizations where in the literature review the focus looks at the FARC and ELN as independent variables and how they affect the state. Through the liberalist approach the FARC and ELN is the focus of the study as the dependent variables and the state will be considered the independent variable. Since the future actions and changes within the FARC and ELN are focus of this study, the government and its actions will be treated as the independent variable within each scenario.

This study will be using the Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction as its methodology. The LAMP technique is the sum of the possible interactions between the FARC, ELN, and the state.⁵⁶⁷ This technique looks at the probability of an alternate future in relation to all possible futures.⁵⁶⁸ Using this method will improve the organization of available information based on the perceptions of the actors and make predictions on which alternate future is likely at a point in time.⁵⁶⁹ The LAMP method is broken into twelve steps : 1) “Determine the issue for which you are trying to predict the most likely future;” 2) “Specify the national “actors” involved;” 3) “Perform an in-depth study of how each national actor perceives the issue in question;” 4) “Specify all possible courses of action for each actor;” 5) “Determine the major scenarios within which you will compare the alternate futures;” 6) “Calculate the total number of permutations of possible “alternate futures” for each scenario;” 7) “Perform a “pairwise comparison” of all alternate futures to determine their relative probability;” 8) “Rank the alternate futures for each scenario from highest relative probability to the lowest based on the number of

⁵⁶⁷ Lockwood Johnathan S. The Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP) 25.

⁵⁶⁸ Ibid 26.

⁵⁶⁹ Ibid 27.

votes received.” 9) “Assuming that each future occurs, analyze each alternate future in terms of its consequences for the issue in question;” 10) “State the potential of a given alternate future to “transpose” into another alternate future;” 11) “Determine the “focal events” that must occur in our present in order to bring about a given alternate future;” 12) “Develop indicators for the focal events.”⁵⁷⁰ Since only the past is fixed and since the analyst cannot know how the future focal events of the study will change, the LAMP method is a qualitative method of study where the outcomes can always be revoted and all of the possibilities are analyzed, not just probable ones.⁵⁷¹

Courses of Action

These are the four courses of action that are available to the FARC and ELN based on past and current behaviors.

Continue Fighting: (CONT) The option remains for each of the actors to continue the violence both against each other and against the state. This means the FARC can continue fighting the government and/or other illegal armed groups (ELN). The ELN can continue fighting against the government or illegal armed groups (FARC).

Negotiate Peace: (NEGO) Each of the armed groups has the chance to negotiate peace with the government or with each other.

Withdrawal: (WITH) It is possible for each of the actors to disarm and/or withdraw from the fighting altogether.

Form Alliances: (ALLI) The FARC and ELN have worked together in the past and if faced with destruction, they may join forces.

⁵⁷⁰ Ibid 27-28.

⁵⁷¹ Ibid 91-93.

Both the FARC and ELN have shown their desire to continue fighting against the government. Even with the recent offensives of the government the FARC and ELN have moved toward more remote areas and strengthened their forces in areas from where they derive income, such as drug producing areas. Another similarity is the international legitimacy desired by both organizations. Since the FARC and ELN were placed on international terrorist lists there has been a movement in both groups to return to their political ideological roots and expand their recruitment to bring in students and ideologues. Neither the FARC nor the ELN have shown any desire to become legitimate political parties and while it could happen there are no indications that these groups will change their positions.

The government continues to look to negotiations to end the violence of the FARC and ELN. In both cases their histories of adaptation and survival have shown that they are not going away by themselves and government eradication is unlikely. The only way the Colombian government will end the violence is through negotiations. The FARC has shown their desire for international legitimacy and control of territory as important goals in negotiations. For the ELN their goals are more political seeking an international platform for their political movement and by bringing their issues with the government to international attention. The ELN has been trying to get the government to take them seriously since the Colombian government has ignored them in discussions with the FARC. For the FARC their actions seem to be interfering with government negotiations with the ELN and the state has accused the FARC of tampering with ELN/government negotiations. In the current situation it appears the government or the FARC or ELN can initiate negotiations. Under the scenario of government withdrawal, the FARC and ELN

can negotiate with each other. In the face of fighting until a winner emerges, the two organizations have the option of negotiating a truce among themselves.

The only way the FARC or ELN would withdraw from the conflict is if it was the only option left to them. Due to the recent loss of support facing the FARC and ELN this has not changed their position. The FARC and ELN have only attained limited support from the general populations and since much of the support is forced it is easy to see why the organizations have not been swayed by public opinion. Much like the discussion of the Marxist-Leninist ideology before, the FARC and ELN feel they are the best option for the people and their best hope for prosperity even if the people themselves do not agree. The public appears to be siding with the government and with the government's recent advances the FARC and ELN have lost most of their ability to provide for their base, which has directly affected their support from local communities. However, the groups are still intent on fighting for the cause even if the general public is no longer interested.

As this support dwindles, it is possible for the FARC and ELN to join forces to increase their effectiveness against the government. In the past these alliances have been very short lived and have only occurred between one or two fronts of both the FARC and ELN. Differences in ideology and economic activities were the major points of disagreement. In addition to these differences, with the current fighting between the organizations for control over common drug producing areas, the relations between them have soured. But the FARC and ELN have also shown no limitations to their adaptability in the face of annihilation. Because of this resolve if either force is facing destruction in a region there is a good chance the two will join forces for the sake of survival.

Scenarios

1. The Colombian government adopts a stance of neutrality in Colombia. They withdraw from the conflict.
2. Colombia follows a containment strategy in Colombia. They commit enough forces to contain the conflict to Colombia and restrict the spread of violence within the country and out.
3. Colombia employs a “victory” strategy in Colombia. They commit significant military forces and funding in an all out offensive against the FARC and ELN to achieve a permanent end to the conflict.

The government has gained public support with the Uribe administration. The hard-line against the FARC and ELN has shown success in fighting the groups and when coupled with the economic improvements in Colombia in the last few years the government has a better standing with the people. It is this support that will keep the government from withdrawing from the conflict. The advances made against the FARC and ELN have been significant and the government does not want to lose the favor of its people. This moves to the issue of containment since 2008 saw serious international problems as the FARC and ELN have shown their ability to move across borders into neighboring countries. The Colombian government cannot continue a program that follows guerrillas into neighboring countries without that country's support since this will cause an international incident. The government has to look at containing the violence to Colombia. While the role of the international community is beyond the scope of this work, the assumption is that the Colombian government could take on this containment strategy by itself. If the Colombian government continues its current strategy it would

follow a complete victory method of dealing with the FARC and ELN. The government has seen few limitations in recent years in their attempts to eradicate the FARC and ELN forcefully. While the methods have worked the reality is that total eradication has been and will be impossible without negotiations and the support of the international community.

In moving on to the scenarios this research will use a “pairwise comparison” to determine the most likely alternate futures for each scenario. Since the discussion of the adaptations of the FARC and ELN were analyzed in chapters two and three the focus will now be on the prediction of the futures of these groups, with the top five outcomes of each scenario discussed.

Alternate Futures Calculations:

$X^y = Z$ X= courses of action (4) y= national actors (2) Z= 16 alternate futures

Scenario 1: 120 votes

Scenario 2: 120 votes

Scenario 3: 120 votes

Table 1:

Possible Future #	FARC	ELN	Remarks
1	CONT	CONT	This is the FARC and ELN desired position
2	CONT	NEGO	Recently this is a common occurrence
3	CONT	WITH	
4	CONT	ALLI	
5	NEGO	CONT	
6	NEGO	NEGO	This has been a common scenario historically
7	NEGO	WITH	
8	NEGO	ALLI	
9	WITH	CONT	
10	WITH	NEGO	
11	WITH	WITH	
12	WITH	ALLI	
13	ALLI	CONT	
14	ALLI	NEGO	
15	ALLI	WITH	
16	ALLI	ALLI	This has happened and failed in the past

CONT: Each group continues fighting.

NEGO: Each group negotiates with the government or each other.

WITH: Each group withdraws.

ALLI: ELN and FARC try to form alliance.

Table 2:

Scenario 1: The Colombian government withdraws from fighting.

Possible Future #	FARC	ELN	Votes
1	CONT	CONT	15
2	CONT	NEGO	14
4	CONT	ALLI	13
3	CONT	WITH	12
6	NEGO	NEGO	10
5	NEGO	CONT	9
13	ALLI	CONT	9
8	NEGO	ALLI	8
14	ALLI	NEGO	8
7	NEGO	WITH	6
16	ALLI	ALLI	6
9	WITH	CONT	4
15	ALLI	WITH	3
10	WITH	NEGO	2
12	WITH	ALLI	1
11	WITH	WITH	0
Total:			120

Alternate Futures:

SCENARIO 1: Colombian government withdraws.

Future # 1 The FARC and ELN continue fighting. (15 votes)

This is the most likely outcome in this scenario due to the fact that government withdrawal will remove all restraint from the guerrillas. History has proven that when the government is on the offensive, the guerrillas have larger losses inflicted on them than they can inflict on the government.⁵⁷² There are also the points discussed in previous chapters where the FARC and ELN are focused on the fight with or without the support of the masses and for these groups they have continually expressed their refusal to become legitimate political parties and disarm. Under President Pastrana's administration

⁵⁷² Restrepo, Jorge, Michael Spagat and Juan F. Vargas. 2003. The Dynamics of the Colombian Civil Conflict: A New Data Set. *Center for Economic Policy Research No 4108*. (November). Internet: Available from: www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP4108.asp 19.

the government essentially withdrew from the *zona de despeje*, an area conceded to the FARC during peace talks, in return for their promise to disarm.⁵⁷³ The FARC used this area to traffic arms, money, supplies, troops, and drugs to their other fronts.⁵⁷⁴ They also launched attacks against the government from this region and held prisoners and hostages there.⁵⁷⁵ Since this is the outcome of government withdrawal on a small scale there is no evidence to suggest this will not happen on a large scale. It is because of this track record the first four of five top alternate futures indicate the FARC will follow the same lines. For the ELN their attempts to retain a ZOE (zone of encounter) during peace talks proved less successful than the FARC since the government was soured by the FARC exploitation of the agreement.⁵⁷⁶ Based on history it is hard to see how the ELN will react upon government withdrawal but their historical tenacity and desire to continue fighting makes the case for this alternate future.

Future # 2 The ELN will try and negotiate with the powers left in the conflict. (14 votes)

While negotiating with the government will no longer be necessary in this scenario the ELN will have to work out deals with the FARC over contested regions. Since the FARC is a larger and stronger military force, the ELN will try to negotiate its survival and control of their portions of the country. In the last few years the ELN has shown their resistance to the expansion of the FARC into their territory in areas like Arauca and Norte de Santander where the two groups have engaged in armed conflict.⁵⁷⁷ Based on occurrences like these it would be the ELN to start negotiations with their competitors

⁵⁷³ Rabasa, Angel and Peter Chalk. 2001. Colombian Labyrinth 43.

⁵⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁶ International Crisis Group. 2002. Colombia: Prospects for Peace with the ELN 16.

⁵⁷⁷ Ibid.

since they are the smaller force. Without pressure from other sources the FARC could focus its efforts on taking ELN territory and in doing so, the ELN would not be able to sustain a prolonged conflict leading them to negotiate.

Future # 4 The ELN would align itself with the FARC. (13 votes)

While this is unlikely due to the core differences in ideology the two groups are fighting for the same general goals. With the government no longer in the picture the ELN may look to align itself with the FARC rather than risk fighting and losing the battle. The ELN has shown in the past their willingness to join other revolutionary movements including the FARC. For a time, the two partnered up with other smaller revolutionary groups in the late 1980's creating the National Guerrilla Coordinating Instance (CNG).⁵⁷⁸ Later the ELN formed the Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Coordinating Group but the ideological differences were too great and the organization fell apart.⁵⁷⁹ The FARC and ELN do have similarities in their interests and goals but historically seem to only tolerate each other.⁵⁸⁰ The FARC recognizes the ELN as a revolutionary force but the relationship is complex since in some areas the ELN inhabit some higher regions with the FARC and even work together in regions where the ELN has the weaker position.⁵⁸¹ It has only been the movement of the FARC into the Venezuelan border regions that has caused armed conflict between the groups.⁵⁸² The withdrawal of the government could relieve some of the tension that is between these groups since they would no longer fight over peace negotiations in which one group is participating while the other is not. Since there have

⁵⁷⁸ Ibid 7.

⁵⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁰ International Crisis Group. 2007. Colombia: Moving Forward with the ELN? 4.

⁵⁸¹ Ibid 5.

⁵⁸² Ibid.

been instances of ELN frustration during government and FARC talks and FARC frustration during ELN and government talks this point of friction would be removed.

Future # 3 The ELN would withdraw from the conflict based on the withdrawal of the government. (12 votes)

This is a relatively remote option, since the ELN has proven to be very resilient. The ELN has shown its desire to establish a socialist government both in its ideology and in its attempts to join revolutionary groups together. This alternate future would suggest that the ELN would see the FARC as the leading force and with the government gone, realize that its ability to compete for control is nonexistent. Based on the strength and size of the FARC over the ELN they would have no choice but to be annihilated by the FARC or disarm and withdraw.

Future # 6 The FARC and ELN would negotiate for control of the country. (10 votes)

This is a remote possibility due to the power vacuum left with the withdrawal of the government. Neither organization is prepared to, or capable of, taking over the country. There is a possibility that the two organizations would come to an agreement eventually but their focus would be expanding as fast as possible to gain the upper hand, power and control. Both would expand rapidly and since their concentrations of military strength are in different regions there would be bursts of armed conflict throughout important economic regions. Since the ideologies of the FARC and ELN differ so much there would never be a consensus but probably a division of land and control. This is all assuming that the two organizations will not decide to declare all out war in a winner-

take-all conflict. This moves into the second scenario where the government focuses on containment.

Focal Events:

SCENARIO 1: Colombian government withdraws.

Future # 1 The FARC and ELN continue fighting. (15 votes)

FOCAL EVENT- Colombian government loss of popular support from the populace

FOCAL EVENT- Government would lose territory to the FARC and ELN on a large scale

FOCAL EVENT- Government loss of personnel to great to continue fighting

FOCAL EVENT- The FARC and ELN begin major offensives in urban areas and government strongholds

Future # 2 The ELN will try and negotiate with the powers left in the conflict. (14 votes)

FOCAL EVENT- Colombian government loss of popular support from the populace

FOCAL EVENT- Government would lose territory to the FARC and ELN on a large scale

FOCAL EVENT- Government loss of personnel to great to continue fighting

FOCAL EVENT- ELN forces lose the battle for the support of the populace to the FARC

Future # 4 The ELN would align itself with the FARC. (13 votes)

FOCAL EVENT- Colombian government loss of popular support from the populace

FOCAL EVENT- Government would lose territory to the FARC and ELN on a large scale

FOCAL EVENT- Government loss of personnel to great to continue fighting

FOCAL EVENT- ELN forces are too weak to fight the FARC

Future # 3 The ELN would withdraw from the conflict based on the withdrawal of the government. (12 votes)

FOCAL EVENT- Colombian government loss of popular support from the populace

FOCAL EVENT- Government would lose territory to the FARC and ELN on a large scale

FOCAL EVENT- Government loss of personnel to great to continue fighting

FOCAL EVENT- Left to the FARC and ELN the ELN forces are too weak and fail to gain public support

Future # 6 The FARC and ELN would negotiate for control of the country. (10 votes)

FOCAL EVENT- Colombian government loss of popular support from the populace

FOCAL EVENT- Government would lose territory to the FARC and ELN on a large scale

FOCAL EVENT- Government loss of personnel to great to continue fighting

FOCAL EVENT- FARC and ELN gain sufficient support and strength and divide the country rather than continue fighting

Indicators:

FOCAL EVENT- Colombian government loss of popular support from the populace

KEY INDICATOR- Refusal to enter into elections, protesting, and rioting by the public at large

KEY INDICATOR- The humanitarian status of government actions would worsen since in the past as people are killed by the government their support moves to the revolutionaries

KEY INDICATOR- Overall repression of the populace by the government socially and politically

KEY INDICATOR- Increase in jailed or “disappeared” opponents of the government

KEY INDICATOR- Number of refugees and displaced people increases greatly

FOCAL EVENT- Government would lose territory to the FARC and ELN on a large scale

KEY INDICATOR- Government negotiations lead to large demilitarized zones for the FARC and ELN

KEY INDICATOR- Military and police forces are forced out of regions when faced with large columns of FARC and ELN combatants

KEY INDICATOR- Government supply and communication lines are cut by the FARC and ELN isolating government forces and cities

FOCAL EVENT- Government loss of personnel to great to continue fighting

KEY INDICATOR- Assassinations of government officials increase sharply

KEY INDICATOR- Government forces suffer major defeats on fronts controlled by the FARC and ELN

FOCAL EVENT- The FARC and ELN begin major offensives in urban areas and government strongholds

KEY INDICATOR- College campuses begin forming radical political groups that carry out terrorist actions

KEY INDICATOR- FARC and ELN fronts begin isolating cities from government communications, supplies, and control

KEY INDICATOR- Workers strikes and protests against the government by unions and students increase in frequency and violence

KEY INDICATORS- The government is no longer able to protect the citizens and declare martial law

FOCAL EVENT- ELN forces loses the battle for the support of the populace to the FARC

KEY INDICATOR- Public support favors the FARC and their fronts through taxes and recruitment

KEY INDICATOR- The ELN continues to push a socialist/communist ideology on the areas it controls, pushing the peasantry away

KEY INDICATOR- The ELN is unable to provide public works and support to local populations

FOCAL EVENT- ELN forces are too weak to fight the FARC

KEY INDICATOR- The ELN will withdraw from areas where control is contested with the FARC

KEY INDICATOR- The ELN will not be able to recruit new combatants

KEY INDICATOR- The FARC is able to take over vast drug producing areas and increase their size and strength faster than the ELN

FOCAL EVENT- FARC and ELN gain sufficient support and strength and divide the country rather than continue fighting

KEY INDICATOR- The FARC and ELN will have successes in gaining public support after the government withdraws

KEY INDICATOR- Both groups will move to take over major income producing areas increasing their ability to support their ranks financially

KEY INDICATOR- The FARC and ELN will begin working together in contested areas or divide the fronts among each other

KEY INDICATOR- Hostilities between the groups will cease

Transposition:

SCENARIO 1: Colombian government withdraws.

When looking at future # 1 of both the FARC and ELN continuing to fight this future could easily transpose into future # 2, 3, 4, and 6. It seems impossible for future # 1 to not take place to some degree. It would be this initial fighting that would determine transposition into other futures if the groups expand militarily and economically at similar rates then the conflict could be sustained by both sides. If the FARC grew larger and stronger than the ELN, which has been the case historically, then the ELN would be faced with negotiation or withdrawal which would transpose future # 1 into future # 2, 3, or 4. It would be the FARC and ELN adherence to political and ideological goals on top of FARC's larger and stronger force that would mean the military end to the ELN. If the ELN is pushed into a corner, it could be flexible on goals and ideology, as in the past, to survive by aligning themselves with the FARC. Finally the transposition from future #1 could lead to future # 6 since the buildup of forces and territory could lead to negotiations

by both groups who see each other as legitimate and no longer needing to continue the conflict with a government out of the picture.

Table 3:

Scenario 2: The Colombian government imposes a containment strategy.

Possible Future #	FARC	ELN	Votes
1	CONT	CONT	14
16	ALLI	ALLI	14
2	CONT	NEGO	13
4	CONT	ALLI	11
5	NEGO	CONT	11
6	NEGO	NEGO	10
13	ALLI	CONT	10
8	NEGO	ALLI	8
14	ALLI	NEGO	8
7	NEGO	WITH	6
3	CONT	WITH	5
9	WITH	CONT	4
15	ALLI	WITH	3
10	WITH	NEGO	2
12	WITH	ALLI	1
11	WITH	WITH	0
Total:			120

Alternate Futures:

Scenario 2: The Colombian government imposes a containment strategy.

Future # 1 The FARC and ELN continue fighting the government. (14 votes)

With the government following a containment strategy the FARC and ELN would not be deterred from fighting. As the FARC and ELN see their abilities to retreat, resupply, and train across the Colombian border in the remote areas of neighboring countries, the hostilities will increase. The FARC and ELN will fight to take over all of the area and supplies of opposing groups including the government to continue their fight. The FARC and ELN are dependent on their use of the borders and international corridors for many

reasons. Drugs and guns routinely cross the border of Colombia and neighboring countries as a result of the ineffective Colombian border patrols and the corrupt and compliant local officials in neighboring countries.⁵⁸³ While the extent of the FARC and ELN in the trafficking portion of narcotics is not clear, it is understood that the corridors where most of the shipments of drugs and guns in and out of Colombia are controlled by the FARC and ELN. The FARC in particular found a sympathetic ear in Hugo Chavez the president of neighboring Venezuela.⁵⁸⁴ This is problematic due to the need for international support for Colombia to have an effective containment strategy. The main point of the containment strategy will keep the domestic fight from becoming an international one. Without the ability to resupply or cross borders freely the abilities of the FARC and ELN will be reduced.

Future # 16 The containment of the country would lead the FARC and ELN to positions of ineffectiveness and will group together. (14 votes)

With the supply lines for drugs and weapons cut off, the FARC will have some difficulty drawing new income but have significant stores of weapons and money. For the ELN, their primary forms of income in kidnapping and extortion will be untouched by the containment strategy but their resources of weapons and men are small. The two organizations will find that their ideological differences will fall secondary to their desire to continue the fight. By this point the increased people and supplies from the FARC coupled with the local income opportunities of the ELN will make the two forces far more effective as a singular force.

⁵⁸³ International Crisis Group. 2003. Colombia and its Neighbors: The Tentacles of Instability. Latin America No 3. (April): Internet. Available from:

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1534&l=1> 3.

⁵⁸⁴ Ibid 5.

Future # 2 The FARC will continue to fight while the ELN negotiates. (13 votes)

Alternate future four is similar in that the FARC will continue to fight while the ELN will form an alliance with the FARC. These two alternatives fit well together since they both hinge of the position of the ELN if their corridors to other countries are cut off. It is understood that the ELN is a smaller and weaker force and with the containment policy of the government the ELN will be limited in its economic options and its supply options. In regions where the FARC is stronger the ELN uses the FARC forces as a shield for protection as in the Cesar and Magdalena highlands.⁵⁸⁵ While both groups have established bases in the Venezuelan states of Apure and Bolivar, the ELN presence is stronger and more vital to their operations.⁵⁸⁶ For the ELN their struggle has been more political than military and their organization both avoids direct military confrontations and has asked its militants at conferences to focus their efforts on a broader social movement more “in tune” with other Latin American movements.⁵⁸⁷ Based on their flexibility in working with other revolutionary movements and their need for the border regions the ELN will need to negotiate to be able to survive. As the weaker force, if the ELN is cut off from their greatest areas of strength in the Venezuelan corridor, the ELN will be forced to seek protection from the FARC through government negotiations or by forming an alliance with the FARC.

Future # 4 The FARC continues to fight while the ELN aligns with the FARC. (11 votes)

In this future the ELN is the smaller and weaker force, and with the containment strategy of the government the ELN will not survive alone. Negotiations may not be an option if

⁵⁸⁵ International Crisis Group. 2007. Colombia: Moving Forward with the ELN? 5.

⁵⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁷ Ibid 6.

the ELN has no strength or income left with which to negotiate. This future sees the ELN as too weak to resist advancement of the FARC into their territory and is forced with the choice of military defeat or cooperation with the FARC and concession of their fighting forces and fronts to FARC control. In some of the higher regions of the country and the areas where drug production has expanded into ELN territory this problem has already began. This reduced ability to fight and collect income coupled with their aversion to direct confrontation would lead the ELN to form an alliance.

Future # 5 The FARC will negotiate and the ELN will continue fighting. (11 votes)

This is the most remote possibility when looking at the outcomes for the top five alternate futures. This future assumes that the FARC, since the majority of their income is drug related, will face a force and supply payment that they can no longer afford thus diminishing the size and strength of the FARC. Unlike the ELN the FARC has been known for direct confrontations with the military, which actions require funding and supplies.⁵⁸⁸ FARC support is also at a serious low in recent times and with the people refusing to pay extortion or “taxes” to the FARC the organization may have trouble finding enough income.⁵⁸⁹ With the FARC losing sources of support and income the fighters will defect to the government making matters worse as the FARC position weakens. Perhaps the FARC may see the negotiating table as a way to minimize defection while maximizing what little bargaining power they have left. This event would be different for the ELN since their ability to derive income from local companies and resources and kidnapping has not changed with the containment policy. This will become

⁵⁸⁸ International Crisis Group. 2009. Ending Colombia’s FARC Conflict 3.

⁵⁸⁹ Ibid 5.

an opportunity for the ELN to expand their territory and absorb deserting FARC militants to increase their military capabilities.

Focal Events:

Scenario 2: The Colombian government imposes a containment strategy.

Future # 1 The FARC and ELN continue fighting the government. (14 votes)

FOCAL EVENT- Colombia gains the help of Panama, Venezuela, Peru, Brazil, and Ecuador to contain the guerrillas

FOCAL EVENT- Neighboring countries are too weak and corrupt to help the Colombian government

FOCAL EVENT- The FARC and ELN appeal to the international community for support against the government

FOCAL EVENT- The FARC and ELN form offensives against the government in border regions

Future # 16 The containment of the country would lead the FARC and ELN to positions of ineffectiveness and will group together. (14 votes)

FOCAL EVENT- Neighboring countries strengthen their border security and remove the corrupt officials from the area

FOCAL EVENT- Leaders in Latin America publicly denounce the legitimacy of the FARC and ELN

FOCAL EVENT- Neighboring countries engage the guerrillas with the Colombian government

Future # 2 The FARC will continue to fight while the ELN negotiates. (13 votes)

FOCAL EVENT- Neighboring countries strengthen their border security and remove the corrupt officials from the area

FOCAL EVENT- Leaders in Latin America publicly denounce the legitimacy of the FARC and ELN

FOCAL EVENT- Neighboring countries engage the guerrillas with the Colombian government

FOCAL EVENT- The ELN is unable to gain public support or funding and is forced into a corner

Future # 4 The FARC continues to fight while the ELN aligns with the FARC. (11 votes).

FOCAL EVENT- Neighboring countries strengthen their border security and remove the corrupt officials from the area

FOCAL EVENT- Leaders in Latin America publicly denounce the legitimacy of the FARC and ELN

FOCAL EVENT- Neighboring countries engage the guerrillas with the Colombian government

FOCAL EVENT- The ELN is unable to gain public support or funding and is forced into a corner

Future # 5 The FARC will negotiate and the ELN will continue fighting. (11 votes)

FOCAL EVENT- Neighboring countries strengthen their border security and remove the corrupt officials from the area

FOCAL EVENT- Leaders in Latin America publicly denounce the legitimacy of the FARC and ELN

FOCAL EVENT- Neighboring countries engage the guerrillas with the Colombian government

FOCAL EVENT- The FARC is unable to gain funding and supplies and their larger force weakens quickly

Indicators:

FOCAL EVENT- Colombia gains the help of Panama, Venezuela, Peru, Brazil, and Ecuador to contain the guerrillas

KEY INDICATOR- Organization of American States (OAS) work to make agreements between Colombia and its neighbors to combat the guerrillas

KEY INDICATOR- International states and organizations support the cooperation between the nations publicly

KEY INDICATOR- Colombia begins working to support neighboring countries militaries

FOCAL EVENT- Neighboring countries are too weak and corrupt to help the Colombian government

KEY INDICATOR- Borders are controlled on the Colombian side but not on neighboring nation's sides

KEY INDICATOR- Guerrilla support and camps in bordering countries are able to stage offensives on government forces from inside and outside of Colombia

KEY INDICATOR- The movement of drugs, guns, and chemicals in the border regions of neighboring countries increases as Colombia's borders are closed tighter

KEY INDICATOR- Guerrilla forces are uncontested or easily defeat government forces in the border regions of Colombia's neighbors

FOCAL EVENT- The FARC and ELN appeal to the international community for support against the government

KEY INDICATOR- FARC and ELN forces try to make deals with governments not heavily aligned with Colombia

KEY INDICATOR- Kidnap victims will all be released unconditionally

KEY INDICATOR- The FARC and ELN will work with humanitarian organizations

FOCAL EVENT- The FARC and ELN form offensives against the government in border regions

KEY INDICATOR- The FARC and ELN will move out of the urban areas and into the border areas with difficult terrain

KEY INDICATOR- Indigenous people of border regions will move out of the region and/or report increases in attacks

KEY INDICATOR- Reports of fighting spilling over into neighboring countries will increase

FOCAL EVENT- Neighboring countries strengthen their border security and remove the corrupt officials from the area

KEY INDICATOR- Neighboring countries will build up their military presence at the Colombian border

KEY INDICATOR- Officials will be increasingly jailed and tried on corruption charges

KEY INDICATOR- Drug, weapons, and chemical seizures along the border will increase

KEY INDICATOR- Reporting on displaced persons and refugees will increase in border regions

FOCAL EVENT- Leaders in Latin America publicly denounce the legitimacy of the FARC and ELN

KEY INDICATOR- Leaders will denounce the human rights violations of the FARC and ELN and their refusal to allow humanitarian groups to work in regions under their control

KEY INDICATOR- This has already begun as of 2008 where President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, President Rafael Correa of Ecuador, and Fidel Castro of Cuba called for the FARC to release all hostages unconditionally.⁵⁹⁰

FOCAL EVENT- Neighboring countries engage the guerrillas with the Colombian government

KEY INDICATOR- FARC and ELN actions will slow or become nonexistent at the border areas

KEY INDICATOR- FARC and ELN actions will increase frequency and severity in urban areas

KEY INDICATOR- Neighboring countries to Colombia will face an increase in jailed guerrillas and trials

FOCAL EVENT- The ELN is unable to gain public support or funding and is forced into a corner

KEY INDICATOR- FARC combatant ranks will grow quickly

KEY INDICATOR- The local populations will fight the ELN and refuse to give them money or support

KEY INDICATOR- The ELN and FARC will stop fighting each other and the ELN will attempt to hold a conference with FARC leaders

KEY INDICATOR- ELN proposes peace negotiations to the government before their negotiating position is too weak

FOCAL EVENT- The FARC is unable to gain funding and supplies and their larger force weakens quickly

⁵⁹⁰ Ibid 18.

KEY INDICATOR- Combatants desert their fronts or defect to the government

KEY INDICATOR- FARC units retreat from government controlled areas

KEY INDICATOR- Local populations report more activity relating to taxes and theft of supplies from towns by the FARC

Transposition:

Scenario 2: The Colombian government imposes a containment strategy.

When looking at futures # 1 and # 16 the FARC and ELN will continue fighting and while that has been a historical guarantee there is uncertainty when looking at how these organizations supply themselves. If the FARC loses its main source of income and the ELN is faced with waning supplies and troops then they should easily move into the realm of alliances future # 16. In many regions the two organizations have a symbiotic relationship and there is nothing to suggest that if the advantages of one group compliment the other they will not join forces. When looking to alternate futures # 2 and # 4 the FARC continuing to fight is held constant but the position of the ELN will change based on the actions of the FARC. If the FARC sees this as an opportunity to go to war with the ELN to take their territory, supplies, and forms of income the ELN may not be able to stop this incursion and thus negotiate with the government future # 2. It is also possible that they will make the move to align themselves with the FARC, future # 4, since the relations of the two groups have soured when the ELN tried to negotiate with the government alone. Alternate future # 5 would transpose from future # 1 as a result of the FARC being economically decimated by the loss of the drug and trafficking income and their ability to fight gone, thus they would negotiate but only as a last option when fighting and surviving are no longer possible.

Table 4:

Scenario 3: The Colombian government employs a “victory” strategy.

Possible Future #	FARC	ELN	Votes
6	NEGO	NEGO	14
16	ALLI	ALLI	14
8	NEGO	ALLI	13
14	ALLI	NEGO	11
7	NEGO	WITH	11
4	CONT	ALLI	10
5	NEGO	CONT	9
15	ALLI	WITH	8
2	CONT	NEGO	7
13	ALLI	CONT	7
3	CONT	WITH	5
10	WITH	NEGO	4
9	WITH	CONT	3
12	WITH	ALLI	3
11	WITH	WITH	1
1	CONT	CONT	0
Total:			120

Alternate Futures:

Scenario 3: The Colombian government employs a “victory” strategy.

Future # 6 The FARC and ELN both negotiate with the government. (14 votes)

With the government employing a constant barrage of troops and munitions on the guerrillas and their fronts, the ability of the guerrillas to fight will be eroded. This scenario has similarities to the current tactics of the Uribe administration. Looking at how the past few years have changed the dynamic between the government and the guerrillas provides valuable insight to this scenario and its alternate futures. In alternate future # 6 the FARC and ELN will negotiate with the government. Under the current Uribe administration’s offensive against the FARC, the organization has never before faced such a magnitude of force. Several FARC units have been wiped out, morale is falling

and soldiers are deserting their units, commanders have been killed or deserted, and three of the top FARC leaders have died or were killed.⁵⁹¹ This all came at a time when public opinion was at a high in government favor and at a low for the FARC.⁵⁹² This has effectively left the FARC fragmented. While the organization has adapted to the new situation, the objective for Uribe's administration was to force the FARC into peace talks. This future looks to the administration to continue its onslaught and drive the FARC to the point where they have no option but to negotiate, by which time the organization will be so weak it will have little to offer beyond disarming.

Meanwhile, the Uribe administration saw the ELN as a low priority in peace negotiations.⁵⁹³ After multiple rounds of peace talks the absence of mutual trust and the harder-line nature of the government demands produced little in the way of progress.⁵⁹⁴ With this rigid attitude the ELN cannot afford to take on the government as directly as the FARC has. Once the government shifts its focus off the FARC and toward a more complete strategy for fighting both groups the ELN will be in grave danger. Since the organization is smaller and less militant than the FARC their ability to recover from direct armed actions with the government is also smaller. With the government following this system of eradication on the FARC and ELN they will have no choice but to negotiate or die fighting.

Future # 16 The FARC and ELN form alliances with each other. (14 votes)

As noted before, in the history of these groups they have formed alliances when needed.

Due to the recent offensive of the Uribe administration the ELN and FARC are

⁵⁹¹ Ibid 5.

⁵⁹² Ibid.

⁵⁹³ International Crisis Group. 2007. Colombia: Moving Forward with the ELN? 8.

⁵⁹⁴ Ibid 12.

cooperating more than ever. After the death of one of the FARC's founding leaders the ELN called for an alliance between the two groups but divisions in regions where the groups have traditionally fought resisted this measure.⁵⁹⁵ For most other regions the FARC has helped weaker ELN units and the stronger ELN units have helped the FARC.⁵⁹⁶ The main differences are the ELN establishing a social base and limited involvement in the drug trade while the FARC's focus is on imposing its presence locally and heavy reliance on the drug trade, have hindered alliances between the two.⁵⁹⁷ The FARC and ELN will have no choice but to form alliances as the government continues to press the groups closer together. Since the regions traditionally controlled by the FARC and ELN have been geographically close the movement of the government to drive these forces closer together will force a bond of survival. This will give the organizations better defenses against government attacks and better positioning in future negotiations.

Future # 8 The FARC negotiates with the government while the ELN tries to form alliances with the FARC. (13 votes)

The FARC will negotiate while the ELN form alliances and in future # 14 the ELN will negotiate while the FARC form alliances. This future outcome is close due to the nature of these organizations when one tries to negotiate with the government and the other is left out of the process. The FARC negotiating is higher in probability due to the track record of the groups. The FARC has shown repeatedly that they are willing to negotiate with the government without the ELN. At the same time it has always been the ELN that has instigated talks and attempts at alliances between the organizations. Based on historical patterns, the FARC will enter negotiations to stall or gain a respite from

⁵⁹⁵ International Crisis Group. 2009. Ending Colombia's FARC Conflict 13.

⁵⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁹⁷ Ibid.

government attacks while the ELN, feeling ignored will try and support its ranks with the help of the FARC.

Future # 14 The FARC calls for an alliance while the ELN negotiates with the government. (11 votes)

While it is less likely that the FARC would call for an alliance as the ELN negotiated with the government, the change in the FARC abilities due to the government offensives could change their thinking. In this future the FARC have no power left for peace talks and through aligning themselves with the ELN they gain some of the political legitimacy they have lost adding new combatants to their ranks. For the ELN their preferred forum has always been political and if there is something to be gained they will negotiate with the government without the FARC.

Future # 7 The FARC negotiates with the government while the ELN withdraws from the conflict. (11 votes)

The ELN has avoided direct confrontations with the government and since that has been their mode of operation they are a militarily weaker force than the FARC. This future assumes that the ELN will be faced with destruction from both sides, the government on one and the FARC on the other. With the pressing of these two offensively capable groups the ELN will be forced to withdraw from the conflict. That withdrawal, coupled with government offensives on FARC fronts, forces the FARC into negotiations with the government but give them more power at the negotiating table since they are the only revolutionary group left to deal with. Looking for resolution the government and FARC have a good chance of ending the conflict in this scenario.

Focal Events:

Scenario 3: The Colombian government employs a “victory” strategy.

Future # 6 The FARC and ELN both negotiate with the government. (14 votes)

FOCAL EVENT- Government approval is at an all time high while guerrilla support is falling rapidly

FOCAL EVENT- The general populace fights the FARC and ELN with the government and refuses to allow the guerrillas sanctuary

FOCAL EVENT- The FARC and ELN are forced from their territories and suffer heavy losses in fighting with the government

FOCAL EVENT- The FARC and ELN are listed as terrorist organizations by the international community thus removing the legitimacy of the fight

FOCAL EVENT- The FARC and ELN reach out to the international community to make their fight legitimate and force the government into negotiations through international pressure

Future # 16 The FARC and ELN form alliances with each other. (14 votes)

FOCAL EVENT- Peace negotiations fail between the government and the FARC and ELN

FOCAL EVENT- Government approval is at an all time high while guerrilla support is falling rapidly

FOCAL EVENT- The general populace fights the FARC and ELN with the government and refuses to allow the guerrillas sanctuary

FOCAL EVENT- The FARC and ELN are forced from their territories and suffer heavy losses in fighting with the government

FOCAL EVENT- The FARC and ELN are listed as terrorist organizations by the international community thus removing the legitimacy of the fight

Future # 8 The FARC negotiates with the government while the ELN tries to form alliances with the FARC. (13 votes)

FOCAL EVENT- Peace negotiations fail between the government and the FARC and ELN

FOCAL EVENT- Government approval is at an all time high while guerrilla support is falling rapidly

FOCAL EVENT- The general populace fights the FARC and ELN with the government and refuses to allow the guerrillas sanctuary

FOCAL EVENT- The FARC and ELN are forced from their territories and suffer heavy losses in fighting with the government

FOCAL EVENT- The FARC and ELN are listed as terrorist organizations by the international community thus removing the legitimacy of the fight

FOCAL EVENT- The FARC tries to negotiate while they have some power left in the negotiations and the ELN will be excluded making them push for an alliance with the FARC

Future # 14 The FARC calls for an alliance while the ELN negotiates with the government. (11 votes)

FOCAL EVENT- Peace negotiations fail between the government and the FARC and ELN

FOCAL EVENT- Government approval is at an all time high while guerrilla support is falling rapidly

FOCAL EVENT- The general populace fights the FARC and ELN with the government and refuses to allow the guerrillas sanctuary

FOCAL EVENT- The FARC and ELN are forced from their territories and suffer heavy losses in fighting with the government

FOCAL EVENT- The FARC and ELN are listed as terrorist organizations by the international community thus removing the legitimacy of the fight

FOCAL EVENT- The government starts negotiations with the ELN while excluding the FARC and the FARC calls for an alliance against the government

Future # 7 The FARC negotiates with the government while the ELN withdraws from the conflict. (11 votes)

FOCAL EVENT- Peace negotiations fail between the government and the FARC and ELN

FOCAL EVENT- Government approval is at an all time high while guerrilla support is falling rapidly

FOCAL EVENT- The general populace fights the FARC and ELN with the government and refuses to allow the guerrillas sanctuary

FOCAL EVENT- The FARC and ELN are forced from their territories and suffer heavy losses in fighting with the government

FOCAL EVENT- The FARC and ELN are listed as terrorist organizations by the international community thus removing the legitimacy of the fight

FOCAL EVENT- The government offensive is too great and the ELN troops are decimated or desert their fronts

Indicators:

FOCAL EVENT- Peace negotiations fail between the government and the FARC and ELN

KEY INDICATORS- Talks stall for day and months at a time calling for the addition of international arbitrators to get the talks out of a stalemate

KEY INDICATORS- Benchmark agreements throughout negotiations are not honored by the government or the guerrillas

KEY INDICATOR- The hostilities by the guerrillas and government do not stop for the negotiations

FOCAL EVENT- Government approval is at an all time high while guerrilla support is falling rapidly

KEY INDICATOR- Public demonstrations show support for the government

KEY INDICATOR- Public demonstrations are against the guerrillas

KEY INDICATOR- The general public turns out in large numbers for government events, like voting

KEY INDICATOR- The free media supports the government

KEY INDICATOR- Humanitarian issues are positive and government suppression or disappearances are no longer a factor

FOCAL EVENT- The general populace fights the FARC and ELN with the government and refuses to allow the guerrillas sanctuary

KEY INDICATOR- The FARC and ELN are refused taxes and supplies from the fronts they control

KEY INDICATOR- The public informs on the guerrillas to the government

KEY INDICATOR- The public refuses to join the guerrillas groups and fights forced recruitment

FOCAL EVENT- The FARC and ELN are forced from their territories and suffer heavy losses in fighting with the government

KEY INDICATOR- Forced recruitment of peasantry into combat ranks

KEY INDICATOR- Actions against the guerrillas move into higher and more remote parts of the country as the guerrillas retreat

KEY INDICATOR- The government has more and more combatants from the FARC and ELN defect and inform on the organizations

FOCAL EVENT- The FARC and ELN are listed as terrorist organizations by the international community thus removing the legitimacy of the fight

KEY INDICATOR- International terrorist organization lists are formed in each country and international organization containing the FARC and ELN

KEY INDICATOR- The Colombian government outlines the actions of the FARC and ELN as terrorist actions to international organizations

KEY INDICATOR- The international community denounces the actions of the FARC and ELN as no longer in the interest of the people and therefore terrorist, not revolutionary

FOCAL EVENT- The FARC and ELN reach out to the international community to make their fight legitimate and force the government into negotiations through international pressure

KEY INDICATOR- The FARC and ELN will request the involvement of humanitarian and non-government organizations involvement in negotiations

KEY INDICATOR- Both groups will offer to release all hostages unconditionally

KEY INDICATOR- Both organizations will stress the political goals of their organizations on the international stage

KEY INDICATOR- Both organizations will try to improve their human rights records

FOCAL EVENT- The FARC tries to negotiate while they have some power left in the negotiations and the ELN will be excluded making them push for an alliance with the FARC

KEY INDICATOR- The FARC will try to negotiate with the government quickly using everything they have as leverage

KEY INDICATOR- The ELN will realize their weak position and lack of government attention in negotiations through increased actions and attacks

KEY INDICATOR- The ELN will call for a conference with the FARC leadership

KEY INDICATOR- The ELN will stop fighting FARC fronts in contested areas

FOCAL EVENT- The government starts negotiations with the ELN while excluding the FARC and the FARC calls for an alliance against the government

KEY INDICATOR- The government will convince the ELN to enter negotiations without the FARC

KEY INDICATOR- The FARC will attempt to interfere with the negotiations between the government and the ELN

KEY INDICATOR- The FARC will contact the ELN leadership for a conference

KEY INDICATOR- The FARC will stop fighting ELN fronts in contested areas

Transposition:

Scenario 3: The Colombian government employs a “victory” strategy.

It would be very similar to past patterns of government negotiations with the guerrillas, future # 6, to see the failure of talks with both the FARC and ELN transpose into the two forming alliances future # 16. Trying to negotiate with the government and failing to come to an agreement would be similar to the history of the guerrilla groups’ talks with the government, future # 6. With the government resuming an offensive after talks, the FARC and ELN would begin the immediate forming of alliances for survival. When looking at the other futures # 8 and # 14 the transposition would be the government negotiating talks with only the FARC or the ELN. While the government negotiates with the FARC, the ELN will see forming an alliance with the FARC as a necessity both for a

better position in negotiations and for a stronger united front against a government offensive. The transposition into the future where the ELN negotiates while the FARC moves to form an alliance (future # 14) will be as a result of the FARC trying to end ELN talks with the government and strengthen their position in vital regions where the ELN is strong. In the last future # 7 the ELN negotiations fail and the ELN is forced to withdraw or be annihilated, or the negotiations are a success and the ELN withdraws as part of the agreement. Any of these future scenarios can transpose into each other since it has been shown in the past that when the guerrillas are facing continuous armed action from the government they will eventually begin to negotiate. Knowing this, it is simply a matter of how the negotiations go with each group that will determine the transposition into alternate futures.

Conclusion

This LAMP study set out to predict the future actions of the FARC and ELN based on the actions of the Colombian government. The study was able to identify the most likely future actions for both the FARC and ELN and through the scenarios; the most likely government actions were also analyzed. Through the discussion of the transpositions, focal points, and indicators, this work will help mark the progression of the future actions of these groups. This study set out to complete the work on the FARC and ELN and achieved a thorough grasp of how these organizations will behave in the future.

The LAMP study indicates that the third scenario with the negotiation between the government and guerrillas is the most likely. If this path is continued after the 2010 elections this is the most likely future. In this research the Marxist-Leninist ideology

takes a back seat to survival for the FARC and ELN. The more these organizations adapt to survive the more their ideology changes. On one hand, if the two groups had followed their ideologies closer to the letter they may have developed a much stronger social base. On the other hand, rigid ideologies would have led to the defeat of the FARC and ELN long ago.

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Conclusion

This research focuses on the Colombian revolutionary armed groups of the FARC and ELN. This work followed the emergence of Marxism and the communist movement through history, its applications in Russia and China, and its profound effect on the revolutionary movements in Latin America, particularly the FARC and ELN in Colombia. In studying the formation of these revolutionary groups, their origins and adaptability are as important as their futures. As this research provides the histories, structures, and adaptations of these groups, the end result is a better understanding of the actors in the Colombian conflict and a consideration of the best possible resolutions to this conflict. The matrices on the FARC and the ELN demonstrate that their Marxist ideologies are subordinated to the economic realities of survival. Further, based on this LAMP study, and based on the current status of the FARC and ELN, I have argued that the most likely outcomes are a negotiated end to the conflict, where the FARC and the ELN are compelled to the bargaining table.

Looking at the evolution of the FARC and ELN, the irony of their actions has become evident. Marx's utopian project united the workers of the world under a revolutionary strategy and hope that social equality was attainable. Unfortunately, this ideal fell far short in application. Lenin and Stalin found the dark reality of absolute power that comes with the communist ideology and eventually the systems became a victim of global isolation and destruction within. While the revolutionary path nevertheless seemed plausible to Third World revolutionaries, adaptation necessarily kept the movements alive. The FARC and ELN ultimately became players in the global capitalist system their movements sought to critique and wanted to destroy. Now their

economic livelihoods depend on the capitalist system and their ideologies take a back seat to the material conditions of survival.

The FARC and ELN continually maintain and promote their position as the resistance in Colombia against elite exploitation and structural inequalities. While the Colombian government and the elite have tried to improve their image with the public, there are still those who believe that the guerrillas have their best interests at heart. The only constant in all of these scenarios and conflicts over the years in Colombia is that the peasantry and agrarian areas of the country are faced with the violent realities of the conflict between the government and the guerrillas. The tragic reality is that for the people philosophically moved to join the FARC and ELN in support of the revolutionary cause now see these groups as mere parallel versions of a corrupt government that delivers the rhetoric of equality but not the social remedies. In this way, the FARC and the ELN are seen as poor alternatives to the state and have lost significant popular support. Finally, the necessity of survival has altered the ideologies of the FARC and ELN to the point where the world sees them as little more than terrorist organizations who exploit the people they claim to be fighting for. But that does not seem to deter the revolutionary fighters that believe in their cause.

The research follows the path of resolution to the conflict through understanding the FARC and ELN. The only way to strengthen the relationship between the Colombian government and its people is through control of the state and social redress of inequalities for the masses impoverished. That can never happen with two armed revolutionary groups within its borders. The basic goal is to end the conflict, which will also enrich the scholarship on revolutionary groups for the purpose of better understanding how to

prevent and or deal with them. As seen in this research, the reality of a resolution can be attained if the parties involved in the negotiations hold up their end of the agreement. By looking at the adaptations of the FARC and ELN, this research was able to provide possible alternatives to the futures of the FARC and ELN, in the hopes of working toward a viable resolution to the Colombian conflict. This research also helps advance the understanding of Marxist revolutionary movements in general and how the ideas of an important nineteenth century philosopher continues to impact the contemporary world.