

Master or Servant: Pakistan's Options in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas

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The Global War on Terror (GWOT) began on September 11, 2001 with four commercial passenger planes and 19 terrorist hijackers. American intelligence quickly determined that the source for the men and means of the attack originated in Afghanistan, with an organization known as Al-Qaeda, or "The Base" in Arabic. Al-Qaeda, and its leader Osama bin Laden, were protected by a group of religious extremists known as the Taliban, who governed Afghanistan under a strict Islamic set of laws known as "sharia". Where at one time the United States provided funds and arms to the Taliban, in the wake of 9/11, the US wasted no time responding to the attack and by using clandestine, special operations teams and infantry forces, quickly smashed the Taliban and sent them, routed and fleeing, into mountainous eastern Afghanistan, towards Pakistan.

In the aftermath of the terrorist strike on the US, the government of Pakistan was given a choice: either support the US and the GWOT or be counted amongst its enemies. The leader of Pakistan, General Pervez Musharraf, chose to support the US and sent Pakistani military forces toward its western border with Afghanistan in order to block fleeing Taliban between the US and Pakistani forces.

It was later determined that the Pakistani military utterly failed in its task and

allowed many Taliban and high-ranking Al-Qaeda (AQ) members to escape into Pakistan's Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (see Appendix B), where they remain to this day. Though ostensibly part of Pakistan, the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) are largely governed by Pashtun tribesmen, many of whom sympathize with the Taliban. Even though many Taliban have since been killed by US and Pakistani forces, the Taliban have used the FATA as a staging and operations base for attacks within Afghanistan and have grown stronger, recruiting more and more people to their cause. The resurgent Taliban in the FATA have become so strong that it has repeatedly defeated Pakistani military forces and has begun to undermine the stability and authority of the Pakistani government.

In regards to the resurgent Taliban in the FATA, the government finds itself in a dilemma. The United States is quickly tiring of providing money and intelligence to Pakistan, with little to show for it. The Taliban however are regularly attacking Pakistani Army and Frontier Corps forces sent after them, capturing personnel and overwhelming army forts, while gaining the support of the Pakistani populace. The Pakistani government is truly between a rock (the United States) and a hard place (the Taliban in the FATA).

This Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction will **predict the Pakistani government's most likely response to the resurgence of the Taliban in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas**. First, the current body of predictive scholarly, journalistic, and policy-related literature will be examined in a literature review. The goal of the literature review will be to provide a general critique of the overall literature, as well as to identify gaps in that knowledge. Next, the three "actors" in the LAMP study -- the

United States, Pakistan, and the Taliban -- will be examined, their motivations described, and an in-depth study of how each actor perceives the situation will be explored. Then, after a brief explanation of the LAMP method, a predictive study will be conducted in order to determine Pakistan's most likely response, compete with alternate outcomes depending on the scenario. Lastly, there will be conclusion comments and ways to expand the study beyond the LAMP method.

Literature Review

Predictive literature directly pertaining to the research question is rare as the research topic is literally taken from today's headlines. As such, only a few scholarly journals have attempted to study the question, but the ones that have are of excellent value, both for the insight they bring to the discussion as well as the high journalistic standard they hold. The four journals include three in the traditional print media format and one in the 21st century electronic-only format. They are *Foreign Affairs*, *Jane's Terrorism and Security Monitor*, *The Economist*, and Strategic Forecasting Inc, more commonly known as Stratfor.

Anatol Lievin, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, writes insightfully in *Foreign Affairs* during 2002 of the difficulties President Musharraf would have with his increasingly pro-Taliban populace if he continued to support the US GWOT. Lievin proposed that the support for the Taliban was restricted to the Pashtun minority that makes up approximately ten percent of the population. Lievin also pointed out that the Pashtun minority resided largely within the North and East of Pakistan, specifically in the FATA. Describing the military as "Pakistan's only effective,

modern institution, and the backbone of the Pakistani state” (*Foreign Affairs*, Jan/Feb 2002), he recognized that the military has in the past supported the Taliban because a pro-Pakistan Taliban government in Afghanistan provided Pakistan a secure border. This allowed the Pakistani military to devote its military resources to protecting its border with arch-rival India. In addition, historically, the Taliban have produced Islamic extremists to fight against India within the disputed Kashmir territory, a territory with which Pakistan is obsessed.

Lievin writes as an expert on the topic, bringing together Pakistani history and culture to explain its acceptance of, even loyalty to, the Taliban. His writing provides a greater insight into the Pakistani mindset as it pertains to the Taliban.

Barnett Rubin (2007), also writing for *Foreign Affairs*, states that the victory for the US forces in Afghanistan during 2001, “merely pushed the core leadership of AQ and the Taliban out of Afghanistan and into Pakistan, with no strategy for consolidating this apparent tactical advantage” (*Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2007). Rubin argues that the Pakistani intelligence apparatus, the Inter-Services Intelligence or ISI, contributes to the recovery and growth of the Taliban and AQ in FATA. Rubin argues that the Pakistani leadership must be taken to task for secretly supporting the Taliban and barring any change in that behavior, Pakistan should not “continue to benefit from US military assistance and international aid” (*Foreign Affairs*, Jan/Feb 2007).

Jeremy Binnie (2008) of *Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor* writes that the US has proof that the ISI has on several occasions provided intelligence and logistical help to the Taliban. Binnie states that the FATA continues to provide “Afghan, Arab, Central Asian, Kashmiri, and Western jihadists with sanctuary and training grounds”

(*Jane's Terrorism and Security Monitor*, Jan 2008). He continues by saying that although the Taliban forces in FATA are too weak to take over Pakistan, they are certainly destabilizing it.

An unattributed author writes in the January 5 issue of *The Economist* (2008) that the Taliban in FATA are protected by fellow Pashtun tribesmen and flush with funds reaped from the lucrative Afghan drug trade, have become a powerful disruptive force in Pakistan. So capable in fact have the Taliban become that they often defeat the half-hearted attempts by the Pakistani military to confront them.

In the February 2 edition of *The Economist* (2008), another unattributed author writes that the “Pakistani Taliban” have merged under the Taliban leader of Waziristan, Baitullah Mehsud, and have become “well-financed, organized and motivated” (*The Economist*, 2 Feb 2008). The government of Pakistan on the other hand “failed to take swift and decisive action against the Taliban” (*The Economist*, 2 Feb 2008) in FATA, which allowed them to muster their strength.

George Friedman (2008), founder, chief intelligence officer and CEO of Stratfor, argues that “the endgame of the US-jihadist war always had to be played out in Pakistan” (Stratfor 2008) and recognizes that, at one time, it was advantageous to Pakistan to support the Taliban in order to have a friendly western border. He argues that President Musharraf took just enough action against the Taliban to “keep the Americans at bay, not enough to force his Islamist enemies to take effective action against him” (Stratfor 2008). Friedman argues, and defends well the point that, the US wants only to maintain the status quo in Pakistan, because that is the best the US can get. That means a strong military government in charge of Pakistan and a real effort by the Pakistani military to

contain and weaken the Taliban in FATA.

In addition to scholarly and predictive sources, a wide body of news articles will be examined and researched for insightful predictions and ideas that pertain to the research question. As the inspiration for research question is taken from current headlines, news articles and sources are valuable to the research and are utilized in full. The news sources used in this study include the following: Christian Science Monitor, Reuters, CQ Congressional Testimony, Long War Journal (online), The Kuwait Times, BBC Monitoring, Newsweek (online), Agence France Presse, Pakistan Times, Business Recorder, The Globe and Mail (Canada), and United Press International.

Furthermore, a number of non-fiction books on various aspects of the topic will be examined and used for the LAMP study. The works fall into two general categories, though some titles could be counted in both categories. The two categories are those books that pertain to the Taliban and those books that pertain to Pakistan. All of the books studied are those that include cultural and historical details so as to understand both the Taliban and Pakistan, in order to predict their decisions and actions more accurately.

Amanda Rorabeck offers in *Pakistan in a Nutshell* (2002) a clear description of the history of the FATA, as well as the Pashtun tribesmen who reside there. Rorabeck also describes that code of honor that the Pashtuns live by, called “pashtunwali”. The nature of pashtunwali is critical to understanding the support the Taliban receive in the Pashtun-dominated FATA. Rorabeck also describes the historic connections between the mujahideen (who later became the Taliban) and the government of Pakistan. Rorabeck later describes the difficult position the government of Pakistan finds itself in during the

GWOT. The book is valuable providing clear, concise descriptions of this LAMP study's three actors, but is limited, in turn, by the somewhat superficial descriptions it contains. In an effort to be clear, Rorabeck skims the surface of some details that require further explanation and examination.

Christophe Jaffrelot (2002) shares in *A History of Pakistan and its Origins* a highly detailed picture of a country that grapples with its own identity. Jaffrelot relates how the considerable autonomy the FATA has been given in terms of governance has provided the resurgent Taliban an excellent staging ground and many jihad-minded Pashtun reinforcements. The work also describes President Musharraf's efforts to reduce Taliban influence in the FATA and the effect that has had in terms of an increase in the volume of terrorist attacks within Pakistan proper. The book is detailed and thorough, if a bit dry.

Reporter Mary Ann Weaver writes in *Pakistan: In the Shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan* (2002) of her personal experiences with Pakistani leaders and decision makers. She describes the role the ISI has played within the Pakistani government, as well as during the US-backed Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union. Weaver's work is interesting in that it provides a "ground truth" that many scholars lack.

The previous three works related mostly to the history and culture of Pakistan, with an eye specifically on Pakistan's relations with the Taliban and the Pashtuns living in the FATA. The following three works describe the history and mindset of those that would eventually become the Taliban.

Robert Kaplan relates in *Soldiers of God* (2001) his experiences traveling and living with the Taliban prior to the 9/11 attacks. It is valuable because Kaplan provides a

look at the Taliban and mujahideen culture (as well as the Pashtun culture) that is not biased by the knee-jerk demonization of the Taliban that seems automatic in current descriptions. Kaplan's view provides the reader with a better understanding of the Taliban's mindset, making their choices and actions more predictable.

Ahmad Rashid writes in *Taliban* (2002) the authoritative history of the Taliban, of its humble beginnings through its rise to power within Afghanistan up to the year 2000. Rashid details the "Kalashnikov Culture" of the Taliban and the Pashtun in the FATA. Rashid's work provides an excellent insight into the Taliban, making a student of the movement's nature more able to predict their decisions and actions.

Michael Griffin offers a similar, though less definitive, history of the Taliban in *Reaping the Whirlwind* (2001). Griffin is thorough and meticulous in his research and *Reaping the Whirlwind* provides that reader with a detailed history of the Taliban in Afghanistan.

The last book chosen for the LAMP project is Steve Coll's *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001* (2004). Coll details, through interviews with knowledgeable personnel and open sources, the tangled history of US support to the Taliban via the Pakistani ISI. It is valuable to this research specifically because as it describes Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) involvement in supporting the Taliban, the reader gains deeper understanding of its' proxy, the ISI. The relationship between the Taliban and the ISI in the aftermath of the original Afghan war is critical to understanding their current relationship. Coll's effort is the definitive work on the subject and is outstanding.

With an understanding of the actors, their motivations, and their perspective that

numerous books and articles provide, predictive efforts can be more accurate. The three major actors -- the United States, Pakistan, and the Taliban -- will be examined in turn in order to prepare properly for the predictive portion of the LAMP study.

Actors & Perceptions

Pakistan: Tip-Toeing Through a Minefield

The primary motivation of Pakistan is security. However, where the US believes that prosecution of the GWOT will bring it some measure of lasting security, Pakistan finds itself in a position where the pursuit of US security may lead to Pakistani insecurity. The Pakistani government must walk a very fine line in the GWOT between rooting out harmful anti-government Islamic extremism and useful anti-India Islamic extremism. To find out how Pakistan defines security one only has to look to the east, toward India.

India is Pakistan's arch-rival (some would say arch-enemy) and has been since India's Muslim minority broke away from India and created Pakistan during 1955. Since that time, Pakistan has fought and lost a war against India and has sustained a constant low-level guerilla campaign in the contentious province of Kashmir for decades, mostly with the help of anti-India Islamic extremist fighters. The rise of militant Islam in Pakistan and the historically close relationship with the Pakistani military and intelligence services "has directly resulted from the army's past practice of employing Islamist militant actors to pursue its domestic and foreign policy agenda" (Stratfor 2007). Furthermore, the constant low-level conflict with India has made the military the only political body in Pakistan strong enough and organized enough upon which to base a coherent state.

During the mujihadeen's Afghan jihad, the CIA, through its proxy the ISI, supported the jihadists with hundreds of millions of dollars of arms and financial support. Due to that support, the fledgling Taliban became a proxy of the ISI. When the Soviets were defeated and left Afghanistan, the CIA support to the mujahideen completely stopped. Pakistan did not have that option as the two countries shared a border. Instead of abandoning the fledgling Taliban, the Pakistani's made a friend of them. That friendship allowed Pakistan to do two things: gain access to skilled Islamic extremists to fight as its proxy in the disputed Kashmir and to move its military strength to its eastern border in order to defend against India. With a friendly pro-Pakistan Taliban government in Afghanistan, Pakistan did not have to worry about its western border.

The attacks on 9/11 and the US GWOT changed all that. Nevertheless, Pakistan seeks a different path to its "Taliban problem" than simply exterminating Islamic extremists it was once allied with and that it finds useful. In the words of President Pervez Musharraf, "we have taken a holistic approach of the whole situation and have developed strategies to deal it on the basis of military, political, and social aspects" (*Balochistan Times*, 28 Jan 2008). One of those strategies is negotiation. In the recent past, Pakistan has negotiated ceasefire agreements with Taliban leaders in the South Waziristan section of the FATA. Even though the Taliban promptly broke their word, the Pakistani politicians and citizenry still seek negotiation for a lasting non-aggression with the Taliban in FATA.

On the other hand, in the wake of the extremist take-over of the Red Mosque which is situated in the heart of the country's capital Islamabad, and the steady increase of terrorist bombings in major Pakistani cities, there are those within the government and

military who now perceive the Taliban as dangerous extremists who must be fought and eliminated. The problem is that the military and the Frontier Corps elements that operate in the FATA are not up to the task. They have been repeatedly and soundly defeated by the battle-hardened Taliban fighters and without US assistance in terms of intelligence and ordinance, the Pakistani military will continue to lose. The problem is that too much US support further incites the citizenry's ire and considering the instability that already exists in the Pakistani government, that is a non-starter. The Pakistan government must decide exactly what kind of relationship it intends to have with the Taliban. Either it recognizes the Taliban as a threat and attempts to master that threat or it negotiates and attempts to mollify the threat, thereby becoming its' servant.

Like the US, time is of the essence for Pakistan as well. Its Musharraf-led, nominally pro-GWOT government is being democratically supplanted by a civilian-led, GWOT-resistant government that while not anti-American, is certainly more so than Musharraf's. The time during which the Pakistani government can take military action against the Taliban is decreasing and soon it may lose the option of military strikes in the FATA. The problem, at least from a US perspective, is that most Pakistani's seem to prefer it that way.

The United States: Infinite Justice or Imperial Hubris?

Like Pakistan, the prime motivation for the United States, above all, is security. The events of 9/11 shocked the nation to such a degree as to remind the populace how vulnerable a free and open society can be. The response of the US government's GWOT was multi-faceted, but the following will concentrate on two of the nation's primary goals

because they pertain directly to this LAMP study.

One of the GWOT's primary intentions is the elimination of anti-US terrorist safe havens wherever they are found. The invasion of Afghanistan, code-named Operation Enduring Freedom (and originally, poorly named Operation Infinite Justice) was intended to eliminate the safe haven for Islamic extremists that the Taliban provided. It appeared, initially, that the United States had been successful. Almost seven years later, it can be said that the US simply moved the Taliban safe haven east into Pakistan and the FATA. The Pashtun tribesmen have historically been supportive of the Taliban and their ultra-rigid interpretation of Islam and in the FATA, the Taliban found not only a safe haven, but an area in which their strict sharia doctrine can grow. In 2001, the United States failed to eliminate the terrorist safe haven in Afghanistan; the US does not intend to repeat that costly mistake in Pakistan.

The second primary goal of the United States is the complete destruction of "Al-Qaeda Prime", that group of individuals -- including Osama bin Laden -- that founded AQ and provide the financial, strategic, and spiritual backbone of the movement. After America's (and Pakistan's) failure at Tora Bora, AQ Prime regrouped in the FATA and experts maintain that members of AQ Prime still operate within its boundaries. The United States made a catastrophic error in allowing AQ and Taliban fighters to escape into the FATA. It is an error that the US will not allow to continue.

To eliminate the growing threats in the FATA, the United States requires the help of Pakistan. The US cannot take measures against the Taliban within Pakistani sovereign territory without inciting further anger in the Muslim population toward the United States. In fact, so delicate is the political situation in Pakistan that any overt US action in

the FATA could lead to the toppling of the current military government.

Pakistan's natural political tendency is to leave the FATA and the extremists therein alone. The US requires Pakistan to work against that natural tendency. To do so, the United States has provided Pakistan with literally over a billion dollars of aid. Even though the US has received little for its vast investment into Pakistan's coffers, a delegation of powerful US Senators has "demanded of the Bush administration to increase financial assistance to enhance Pakistan's capacity to fight the war on terror" (*Business Recorder*, 20 Feb 2008). Additionally, the US, Pakistan, and Afghanistan have established special coordination centers in order to "share intelligence, ensure that all [parties] have a common operational picture of the area, coordinate operations that might be occurring on both sides of the border at the same time, and [settle] conflicts when necessary" (*Boston Globe*, 25 Feb 2008).

The US is doing everything in its considerable power -- bar invading Pakistani sovereign territory -- to motivate the Pakistani's into assisting in the GWOT. Yet, the US is under great pressure. With a presidential election looming during November 2008 and the ever-evolving changes in the Pakistani government after the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, time is growing short for the US and it will not be long before it sees its options narrow even further.

The Taliban: Relentless Jihad

The Taliban began as one of many religious fundamentalist groups fighting the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. With the assistance of the ISI and the CIA, the Taliban became the governing force in Afghanistan after the Soviets left. They were

successful because they were relentless in their efforts to take control of the whole of Afghanistan, pausing for only temporary ceasefires with local warlords. After rearming and regrouping, the Taliban would break the ceasefire and their military push would begin anew. Eventually, they controlled almost the entire country of Afghanistan. Then, the American's came, with their money and their weapons; this time not to support the Taliban, but to break them. And break them they did, forcing their flight to western Pakistan and the FATA. There, protected and hidden by the Pashtun and with funds gained from the lucrative Afghanistani drug trade, they have regrouped and become strong, attacking within Afghanistan and Pakistan alike. To American eyes, these events are separate, different battles -- first against the Russians, then warlords, and later against the US. To the Taliban, there is only one unceasing conflict in the name of Allah and Islam: a relentless jihad.

Historically, the Taliban have resisted all efforts by outside parties to moderate their strict ethos. Government under the Taliban in Afghanistan and other controlled-territories, while initially offering and providing a degree of social justice the people could rely on, eventually imposed the full weight of an ultra-conservative pashtunwali-inspired form of Islamic law called "sharia". Sharia prescribes harsh punishments like stoning for adultery, amputation for theft, and death for murder or homosexuality. The Taliban also banned nearly every form of entertainment. Singing, dancing, watching movies or television, sports, celebrating traditional holidays -- all are forbidden under sharia because those activities "strain the mind and hamper the study of Islam" (Rashid 2001, 115). The Taliban also repress the rights of women in the most draconian way, keeping them uneducated and illiterate, homebound slaves in the male-dominated society.

The sharia law of the Taliban blends conveniently with the code of ethics the Pashtun tribesmen follow in the FATA, called *pashtunwali*. Both involve strict punishments for breaking Islamic or local laws. Both value the idea of blood feuds, that is, a dishonor or crime perpetrated on one person by another can escalate over time and eventually erupt into a tribe on tribe vendetta. Though *pashtunwali* attempts to decrease the tendency for retribution and prefers "the payment of blood-money for the crime of murder and restitution in the case of theft" (Griffin 58), penalties under Taliban sharia differ slightly and more often involve the infliction of an identical harm in a traditional "eye-for-an-eye" manner. However, in regards to the US and Pakistani attacks on Taliban and Taliban-allied Pashtun in the FATA, there is no disagreement. As Binnie writes in *Jane's Terrorism and Security Monitor*, "military action [in FATA] does little more than infuriate the fiercely independent locals and empower the military clerics who are steadily expanding their influence" (Binnie, Jan 2008).

As Pakistan has increased its efforts in the FATA, Taliban attacks throughout Pakistan have soared. According to testimony by Michael McConnell, US Director of National Intelligence (DNI), "a total of over 1300 people were killed in Pakistan in 2007" from Taliban attacks on military and civilian targets. The Taliban takeover of the Red Mosque, as well as the suicide bombings in Islamabad, Bannu, Peshwar, and other cities have made the majority of Pakistani citizens eager to negotiate a ceasefire.

A negotiated ceasefire with the Taliban in FATA has been tried before during 2005 in South Waziristan. It did not last. The Taliban spent the time rearming, and there is some indication that they used the time to shift their FATA-front to the north where the government is weaker. That organizational behavior is consistent with how the Taliban

negotiates a "ceasefire". The peace only lasts as long as it takes to rearm.

Once a client of the Pakistani government and the ISI, the Taliban eventually evolved into a peer government in Afghanistan. Since fleeing into the FATA, the Taliban have developed into an asymmetric, guerilla threat to the government, one that the Pakistani military is not at all equipped to deal with using the tools it has at its disposal. History has shown, since the formation of the Taliban that the organization "refuses to accept any compromise or political system except their own" (Rashid 94). There is only the jihad and spreading Islam and sharia law by force. Negotiation is only a useful stalling tactic. According to one Taliban expert, "They are totally against democracy and the ballot. They will decide everything under the Holy Koran or with the bullet" (*The New Yorker*, 28 Jan 2008).

Research Design

Developed by Dr. Jonathon S. Lockwood during the early 1990's, the Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction or LAMP is a "hybrid" method of predictive analysis. The LAMP is called a hybrid method because, according to Dr. Lockwood, "it borrowed its elements from other analytical and planning methodologies, but combined them in a unique way to produce a different approach to the problem of predictive analysis" (Lockwood 4). The LAMP method "assumes that the future is really nothing more than the sum total of all possible interactions of 'free will,' both on an individual as well as on an international scale" (Lockwood 25). Therefore, an understanding of historical, cultural, and social forces that affect actors within the study are fundamental and key to

accurately predicting decisions and actions. The likelihood of any single prediction in LAMP is relative only to the likelihood of other predictions within the same scenario.

There are 12 steps to the LAMP method. They are described as follows:

1. Determine the issue for which you are trying to predict the most likely future.
2. Specify the national “actors” involved.
3. Perform an in-depth study of how each actor perceives the issue in question.
4. Specify all possible courses of actions for each actor.
5. Determine the major scenarios within which one will compare the alternate futures.
6. Calculate the total number of permutations of possible “alternate futures” for each scenario.
7. Perform a “pairwise comparison” of all alternate futures to determine their relative probability.
8. Rank the alternate futures for each scenario from highest relative possibility to lowest based on the number of “votes” received.
9. Assuming that each future occurs, analyze each alternate future in terms of consequences for the issue in question.
10. State the potential of a given alternate future to “transpose” into another alternate future.
11. Determine the “focal events” that must occur in the present in order to bring about a given alternate future.
12. Develop indicators for the focal events.

The LAMP method is especially useful in this case because it relies on qualitative source information and not quantitative sources, as the study's topic is literally found on the front pages of newspapers worldwide. Data for the LAMP study is gathered from historical and cultural references, as well as by understanding current trends and following current events and as the topic has not been studied in depth by academia before, sometimes the best place to find information is from news and current events resources.

That said, the limitation of the LAMP method is that it does not include much quantitative data. Traditionally, intelligence analysts have found, and delivered, predictions that provide the percentage chance of an event occurring, and often, decision-makers have found comfort in the odds. The LAMP method offers no such succor and instead includes discussion of focal events that may allow the decision-maker to understand along what path an event may be unfolding.

Additionally, as the LAMP relies upon qualitative sources like books and articles, an astute student of intelligence analysis must be hyper-aware of the original writer's bias. If the analyst does not take care to avoid it, bias within the source information can influence the analyst and thus, influence the predictive outcome. In the case of the LAMP method (and other analytic methodologies as well), the intelligence analyst must at all times be cognizant of possible bias corrupting his efforts.

Lastly, the LAMP method is meant to be applied towards predicting the actions of a few actors. In a scenario that contains many actors with a large number of options available to each actor, it can quickly overwhelm an analyst using the LAMP method. The reason for that is because each possible permutation of future events must be

examined carefully and fully, and with a large number of actors and options, the amount of analysis necessary quickly becomes too cumbersome without the support of computers. LAMP is best used with a few actors who limit their options to their few, best alternatives and in this study, that is the case.

Calculating the Number of Alternative Futures

In LAMP, the total number of permutations of possible "alternative futures" for each of the three scenarios must be calculated. According to Lockwood "the general formula for computing the number of alternative futures is: $X \text{ to the } Y = Z$ " (Lockwood 1993, p.38). The variable X equals the number of courses of action available to each actor, where Y is equal to the total number of national actors. The variable Z is equal to the total number of alternate futures to be compared in each scenario.

In regards to Pakistan's most likely choice in dealing with the Taliban in the FATA, since there are three national actors (Pakistan, the United States, and the Taliban) each of whom have three possible courses of action, the alternative futures in each scenario work out as follows:

1. *The United States Greatly Increases Support to the GWOT.* Based on the number of national actors and the options available to each one, there are 3^3 , or 27 possible futures that can occur in this scenario.
2. *US Support to the GWOT Remains at Current Levels.* Based on the number of national actors and the options available to each one, there are 3^3 , or 27 possible futures that can occur in this scenario.

3. *The United States Greatly Decreases Support to the GWOT.* Based on the number of national actors and the options available to each one, there are 3³, or 27 possible futures that can occur in this scenario.

Case Study, Analysis, and Findings

Predicting Pakistan's Most Likely Response: Three Scenarios

The three scenarios that encompass the range of Pakistan's choices are dominated by the actions of United States and its Global War on Terror. The manner in which Pakistan addresses the issue of the resurgent Taliban in FATA is based on the influence, support, and desire of its' wealthy benefactor, the United States. The United States' escalation or de-escalation of the GWOT directly contributes to how Pakistan responds to the Taliban. US actions, in turn, may be decided by which presidential candidate wins its November 2008 election. Each scenario is outlined below.

Scenario I: The United States Greatly Increases Support to the GWOT

In this scenario, the US increases the resources and the scope of the GWOT, especially as it pertains to the FATA and the Taliban therein. The term "support to the GWOT" entails overt and covert military support in terms in troop presence, logistical support, precision-guided munitions, intelligence sharing, and joint operations with the Pakistani military. It also entails direct financial support and economic incentives to the state of Pakistan, as well as the right to purchase advanced technologies and weapon systems from the United States. Lastly, it also entails the US using its considerable power to leverage Pakistani government leaders into following the will of the United

States. In addition, this scenario also presumes to a degree that the government of Pakistan is predisposed toward escalating offensive operations against the Taliban in the FATA. Pakistan could reach that decision as a reaction to terrorist attacks in major cities or the degree to which the Taliban's Islamic extremism becomes a clear and present danger to the continued existence to the Pakistani state. It should be noted as well that this scenario becomes more likely if during the upcoming US presidential elections in November 2008, a right-leaning, pro-GWOT president is elected. Generally, in Scenario I, as the US trends toward more aggressive actions, that tends to keep Pakistan's aggression from trending downward toward negotiation. The Taliban is largely reactionary to Pakistani efforts and is unlikely to seek a lasting peace in the face of operations against it, though they make seek negotiations for their own strategic reasons.

Scenario II: US Support to the GWOT Remains at Current Levels

This scenario is one in which the United States maintains current GWOT support levels. It entails the same amount of financial support to the Pakistani government as the US currently provides, as well as the current levels of military support. Occasional guided munitions attacks and intelligence on Taliban targets provided to the Pakistani military are the US limits in this scenario. The US continues to encourage Pakistan to fight the Taliban in FATA, but does not offer anything above and beyond what the US has already offered to convince them. In this scenario, Pakistan is more open to negotiations with the Taliban, as it is reluctant to fight them in the treacherous terrain of the FATA with an inferior and reluctant military. Furthermore, Pakistani leaders are not willing to antagonize the Taliban for fear of terrorist attacks on themselves and their

populace in general. The Taliban, not seeking to further escalate Pakistani efforts against them, recognize an opportunity to negotiate a safe haven in a country friendly to their beliefs that will harbor them from the wrath of the United States. It should be noted as well that this scenario becomes more likely if during the upcoming US presidential elections in November 2008, a centrist, Iraq-focused president is elected. Generally, in Scenario II, as the US cannot offer more to Pakistan than it already has, Pakistan's natural inclination toward negotiation with the Taliban gains momentum and in this scenario, a negotiated peace between Pakistan and the Taliban becomes possible. The Taliban is open to Pakistani efforts if they can convince Pakistan to leave them be and to ensure that the US will not have free reign to pursue them in the FATA. However, the Taliban make take a more aggressive posture if they see an opening to create or deepen a rift between the government of Pakistan and its western benefactor.

Scenario III: The United States Greatly Decreases Support to the GWOT

In this scenario, United States decreases the resources and the scope GWOT. It entails the significantly less financial support to the Pakistani government as the US currently provides, as well as a decrease in military support. Few guided munitions attacks and less frequent intelligence on Taliban targets provided to the Pakistani military are the US limits in this scenario. The US encourages Pakistan to fight the Taliban in FATA less strongly as well as takes away the financial and military incentive to do so. In this scenario, Pakistan finds itself alone and unsupported by the US and therefore actively seeks negotiations with the Taliban, as it does not want to fight them in the treacherous terrain of the FATA with an inferior and resistant military. Furthermore, Pakistani

leaders fear that if they antagonize the Taliban, the Taliban will use their ascendant strength to create havoc within major population centers in an effort to totally destabilize the state. The Taliban, recognizing that Pakistan no longer has the support of its powerful benefactor, may recognize an opportunity to negotiate a safe haven in the FATA to make up for the one they lost in Afghanistan. On the other hand, the Taliban may use the opportunity to destabilize Pakistan entirely, thereby gaining some of the valuable resources of the state. It should be noted as well that this scenario becomes more likely if during the upcoming US presidential elections in November 2008, a left-leaning, anti-GWOT president is elected. Generally, in Scenario III, Pakistan pursues a peaceful settlement with the Taliban and the Taliban is likely to oblige. The United States, for its part, decreases its offensive operations against the Taliban and comes to believe that a more peaceful resolution to the situation is in its own best interest. However remote the possibility that US would follow Pakistan's lead and seek to negotiate with the Taliban, the possibility does exist and must be examined.

Table One

Scenario I: United States Greatly Increases Support to the GWOT

Possible Future Number	United States	Pakistan	Taliban	Number of Votes
1	AG	AG	AG	25
2	AG	AG	SO	24
3	AG	AG	PX	22
4	AG	SO	AG	24
5	AG	SO	SO	23
6	AG	SO	PX	24
7	AG	PX	AG	19
8	AG	PX	SO	18
9	AG	PX	PX	20
10	SO	AG	AG	15
11	SO	AG	SO	14
12	SO	AG	PX	9
13	SO	SO	AG	13
14	SO	SO	SO	12
15	SO	SO	PX	17
16	SO	PX	AG	10
17	SO	PX	SO	17
18	SO	PX	PX	11
19	PX	AG	AG	3
20	PX	AG	SO	0
21	PX	AG	PX	1
22	PX	SO	AG	4
23	PX	SO	SO	3
24	PX	SO	PX	2
25	PX	PX	AG	6
26	PX	PX	SO	5
27	PX	PX	PX	7

AG = Significant increase in offensive operations and significant decrease in negotiations and diplomatic efforts

SO = Maintains offensive operations and negotiation efforts at current levels

PX = Significant decrease in offensive operations and significant increase in negotiations and diplomatic efforts

Predicting Pakistan's Most Likely Response: Scenario I
US Greatly Increases Support to the GWOT

The following discussion addresses the five alternative futures predicted as most likely to occur in the event that the United States greatly increases its support to the GWOT. They are as follows.

1. *Alternative Future #1: All Actors Increase Offensive Operations.* In this alternative future, Pakistan and the United States have come to mutual agreement that the Taliban in the FATA is a major threat. Pakistan openly seeks US support for military operations therein, and the US obliges. With a robust US presence to the west and a reinforced and well-supported Pakistani military actively pursuing them, the Taliban has nowhere to flee. For their part, the Taliban recognize this as a fight to the death, and expand their jihad to include the current government of Pakistan. In response, they unleash their worst within Pakistani population centers, using suicide bombers and random, but well organized attacks on government offices and targeted killings of influential government personnel. The Taliban's effort in this scenario is twofold. First, fight the US and Pakistani military. Hostages are beheaded on video and sent to major news outlets. Non-combatants hurt or killed by Pakistani and US efforts are shown to major media outlets in an effort to wage a pro-Taliban propaganda war. Two, the Taliban makes every effort to divide the Pakistani government from the will of the populace in an attempt to break the current government's popular support. In this scenario, the United States and Pakistan are absolutely intent on, one, destroying Taliban extremists and two, insuring that they cannot find a safe place to regroup and reform. This scenario cannot last indefinitely and continues until one of the actors breaks. *Alternative Future #2* is one of the possible future states of this scenario.

2. *Alternative Future #2: Pakistan and the US Increase Offensive Operations, Taliban Maintains Efforts at Current Levels.* In this scenario, Pakistan and the US increase the tempo of operations against the Taliban while the Taliban maintains current operational level while seeking negotiations or a ceasefire with the Pakistani government. This scenario can arise after Alternative Future #1 as a result of continued Pakistani/US military operations where the warfighting ability of the Taliban is beginning to diminish. Presumably unable to flee, the Taliban would seek a ceasefire in order to reorganize, strategize, and reposition forces to their best advantage as they have done repeatedly in the past. If the Pakistani government is reaching the limit of its warfighting ability, this scenario could transpose into Alternative Future #6, or directly to Alternative Future #9. If Pakistan becomes open to negotiation with the Taliban even with the considerable support of the United States on its side, that suggests that Pakistan is reaching a critical level militarily and/or socially within its society. If the Taliban believe that is the case, this scenario may transposition into Alternative Future #4 or Alternative Future #7.

3. *Alternative Future #4: The US Increases Offensive Operations, Pakistan Maintains Efforts at Current Levels, the Taliban Increases Offensive Operations.* This Alternative Future can arise in many ways and have multiple causes. The most likely cause of this future is that Pakistan begins to wilt militarily (less likely with US support) or socially (more likely given the historical closeness between Pakistan and the Taliban) and cannot sustain operations against the hardened Taliban fighters. It can also arise if the Taliban increases attacks on Pakistani targets in an effort to create or increase the divide between Pakistan and the US. This scenario could develop into Alternative Future #9, but that bodes ill for Pakistan because if this scenario developed due to Pakistani

weakness, then the Taliban have demonstrated to those within Pakistan as well as jihadists everywhere, that they are stronger than the state. If that is the case, jihadists will flood into Pakistan seeking training and jihad and Pakistan is in for a rough time.

4. *Alternative Future #6: The US Increases Offensive Operations, Pakistan Maintains Efforts at Current Levels, the Taliban Seek Negotiations.* This Alternative Future can develop if Pakistani and US efforts severely weaken the Taliban's ability to make war. The Taliban are unlikely to seek negotiations in response to continued Pakistani military efforts against them especially if the United States demonstrates a willingness and ability to increase the GWOT on the Taliban in FATA. If this scenario develops, then the Taliban is looking to escape, within Pakistani society or within other countries. This situation can develop as a result of Alternative Future #1 and can become Alternative Future #9.

5. *Alternative Future #5: The US Increases Offensive Operations, Pakistan and the Taliban Seek Negotiations.* This Alternative Future can develop from mutual weakness between Pakistan and the Taliban from Alternative Future #1 or a mutual understanding that they can coexist if the US stops antagonizing them. However, if during negotiations one or the other or both of the negotiating actors determines that their opponent is weak and unable to resist military, this future can develop may different way, generally with an increase in hostilities. Furthermore, the US may leverage Pakistan or antagonize the Taliban enough to negate the possibility of negotiations between the two. Therefore, this future is volatile (given the position of the 400 pound gorilla in the room -- the US) and may transpose into Alternate Futures #1 through #8.

Table Two

Scenario II: United States Support to the GWOT Remains at Current Levels

Possible Future Number	United States	Pakistan	Taliban	Number of Votes
1	AG	AG	AG	20
2	AG	AG	SO	14
3	AG	AG	PX	14
4	AG	SO	AG	17
5	AG	SO	SO	22
6	AG	SO	PX	17
7	AG	PX	AG	12
8	AG	PX	SO	20
9	AG	PX	PX	23
10	SO	AG	AG	15
11	SO	AG	SO	14
12	SO	AG	PX	8
13	SO	SO	AG	20
14	SO	SO	SO	25
15	SO	SO	PX	18
16	SO	PX	AG	8
17	SO	PX	SO	19
18	SO	PX	PX	25
19	PX	AG	AG	3
20	PX	AG	SO	0
21	PX	AG	PX	1
22	PX	SO	AG	6
23	PX	SO	SO	4
24	PX	SO	PX	6
25	PX	PX	AG	3
26	PX	PX	SO	8
27	PX	PX	PX	9

AG = Significant increase in offensive operations and significant decrease in negotiations and diplomatic efforts

SO = Maintains offensive operations and negotiation efforts at current levels

PX = Significant decrease in offensive operations and significant increase in negotiations and diplomatic efforts

Predicting Pakistan's Most Likely Response: Scenario II
US Support to the GWOT Remains at Current Levels

The five Alternative Futures that received the most pairwise votes in this scenario are as follows. Number five below is the most likely Alternative Future between the three alternatives that received 20 votes as determined by a second pairwise vote series.

1. Alternative Future #18: *The US Maintains Efforts at Current Levels, Pakistan and the Taliban Seek Negotiations.* Understanding that they must deal with the Taliban in the FATA, that their military is inferior to the hardened jihadists, and reminding the Taliban of their past financial and military support, Pakistan seeks negotiations for a ceasefire or peace agreement with the Taliban. The Taliban are open to this idea, at least temporarily, as it allows them a place to regroup, train, and grow. Depending on the state of US efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan, Europe, and Asia, the US may reluctantly be open to this option if they believe that it gives them two things. One, if the US believes that negotiations give them the ability to monitor dangerous extremists all in one place and two, if the negotiations allow them the discovery of the location of AQ Prime. Barring those two things (especially the latter), the US is unlikely to support a lasting peace between Pakistan and the Taliban in FATA because in that case, the Taliban remain a destabilizing presence in Afghanistan. In order to thwart negotiations, the US may leverage Pakistan or antagonize the Taliban enough to ruin that possibility. If so, this Alternative Future can instead develop into Alternative Futures #10 through #17.

2. Alternative Future #14: *All Actors Maintain Efforts at Current Levels.* This is a "status quo" future and the one that, as of this writing, is in effect. All parties maintain some offensive operations, but lack either the will (Pakistan, Taliban) or the ability (the United States) to escalate offensive operations. This future is a temporary one that can

develop many different ways. Assuming that the US is tied down with other operations throughout the world, it cannot increase offensive operations. Therefore, Pakistan and the Taliban will only take offensive operations and make conciliatory efforts toward one another to increase their respective positions at the bargaining table. As such, this Alternative Future can become Alternative Futures #10, #11, #13, #15, #17, or #18 depending on the outcome of the positioning and squabbles of the Pakistani government and the Taliban as they seek better positions at the bargaining table.

3. *Alternative Future #9: The US Increases Offensive Operations, Pakistan and the Taliban Seek Negotiations.* This Alternative Future is similar to Alternative Future #18 except that in the future, the United States increases offensive operations against the Taliban in the FATA regardless of Pakistan's wishes. If this future manifests, it suggests that the US may have actionable intelligence as to the location of AQ Prime and is willing to sustain significant blowback from Pakistan if the US actions are discovered. If that is the case and the US actions come to light, it pushes Pakistani and Taliban intentions closer together and creates distance between Pakistan and the US. Alternately, the US increases offensive operations in order to antagonize the Taliban and ruin any Pakistani negotiation efforts.

4. *Alternative Future #5: The US Increases Offensive Operations, Pakistan and the Taliban Maintain Efforts at Current Levels.* In this Alternative Future, the US increases its operational tempo, while Pakistan and the Taliban maintain their efforts at current levels. If the Taliban are significantly weakened in this scenario, there is a possibility of this future to become Alternative Future #3 or #6. On the other hand, if Pakistan finds itself repeatedly beaten and depleted by the Taliban, there is a possibility of this future

developing into Alternative Future #7 or #8. This future is inherently transitory as none of the actors can maintain their efforts indefinitely.

5. Alternative Future #8: *The US Increases Offensive Operations, Pakistan Seeks Negotiations, the Taliban Maintain Efforts at Current Levels.* Reluctant to be the battleground between the US and the Taliban and in spite of US demands, Pakistan elects to seek a ceasefire with the Taliban. However, as the tempo of US operations against the Taliban increase, the Taliban feel forced to maintain at least current efforts vis-à-vis Pakistan and the US. This possible serves to create a wedge between them, and Pakistan demands the US slow its offensive operations tempo. If that is the case, this future can develop into Alternative Future #17 or even #18.

Table Three

Scenario II: United States Greatly Decreases Support to the GWOT

Possible Future Number	United States	Pakistan	Taliban	Number of Votes
1	AG	AG	AG	6
2	AG	AG	SO	2
3	AG	AG	PX	0
4	AG	SO	AG	5
5	AG	SO	SO	10
6	AG	SO	PX	10
7	AG	PX	AG	11
8	AG	PX	SO	14
9	AG	PX	PX	13
10	SO	AG	AG	9
11	SO	AG	SO	7
12	SO	AG	PX	6
13	SO	SO	AG	20
14	SO	SO	SO	19
15	SO	SO	PX	18
16	SO	PX	AG	22
17	SO	PX	SO	25
18	SO	PX	PX	26
19	PX	AG	AG	6
20	PX	AG	SO	4
21	PX	AG	PX	2
22	PX	SO	AG	17
23	PX	SO	SO	17
24	PX	SO	PX	15
25	PX	PX	AG	19
26	PX	PX	SO	23
27	PX	PX	PX	24

AG = Significant increase in offensive operations and significant decrease in negotiations and diplomatic efforts

SO = A balance between offensive operations and negotiation efforts

PX = Significant decrease in offensive operations and significant increase in negotiations and diplomatic efforts

Predicting Pakistan's Most Likely Response: Scenario III
US Greatly Decreases Support to the GWOT

The following discussion addresses the five alternative futures predicted as most likely to occur in the event that the United States decreases GWOT support levels. They are as follows.

1. Alternative Future #18: *The US Maintains Efforts at Current Levels, Pakistan and the Taliban Seek Negotiations.* This future is similar to Scenario II #18 although in this future, the US is less likely to undermine Pakistani negotiations with the Taliban because the general trend in Scenario III is a decrease in hostilities. Nevertheless, US actions vis-à-vis the Taliban remain at current levels unless negotiations between Pakistan and the Taliban are successful. In that case, this scenario may lead to Alternative Future #27, wherein the US halts strikes against the Taliban entirely because Pakistan forces it to. Unmolested, the FATA eventually becomes a haven for jihadists and Islamic extremists from all over the world. In time, those "traveling militants" return to their home countries to conduct terrorist attacks on their native soil. Pakistan may not be the recipient of attacks itself, but it would be indirectly responsible for terrorist attacks on other countries, as it provides safe haven to jihadists from all over the world.

2. Alternative Future #17: *The US Maintains Efforts at Current Levels, Pakistan Seeks Negotiations, the Taliban Maintains Efforts at Current Levels.* In this scenario, with the Pakistani state eager for negotiations, the Taliban take the opportunity to drive a wedge between Pakistan and the US by continuing suicide and other terrorist attacks in Pakistani population centers. The Taliban continues efforts until Pakistan forces the US to change its offensive posture to a less active level. If that is the case, this future may become Alternative Future #26 (less likely) or #27 (more likely). On the other hand, if

the Taliban believe that the Pakistan cannot resist it and is unlikely to receive significant support from the US, this future may further develop into Alternative Future #16.

3. *Alternative Future #27: All Actors Decrease Offensive Operations.* This scenario is achieved if and when all actors run out of steam and are unable to finish one another off or mutually come to believe that a negotiated truce is in their best interest. For Pakistan, assuming that the Taliban does not continue aggression against the state, this is an agreeable, if short term, solution. It may cause the government headaches later, but if the Taliban was particularly destructive, peace under any circumstances may be a welcome respite. For the Taliban, this is only a temporary pause. Their jihad cannot rest and whether it expresses itself by increased offensive operations in Afghanistan or a concerted effort to make western Pakistan a Taliban-controlled Pashtun state, the need to conduct jihad would inevitably manifest in some way. After a time, as the Taliban imperative to conduct jihad manifests, this scenario becomes Alternative Future #26. For the United States, this scenario is a loss. The Taliban is allowed an opportunity to reorganize in a safe haven while AQ Prime roams free to plot future terrorist attacks. This is among the worst-case scenarios for the United States.

4. *Alternative Future #26: Pakistan and the US Seek Negotiations, the Taliban Maintains Efforts at Current Levels.* This future could develop if Pakistan is truly beaten and the US cuts off support. Both parties would seek a peaceful resolution, Pakistan to preserve its internal stability, the US to keep all Islamic extremists and terrorists in one place. The Taliban could maintain current operations in order to demonstrate their willingness and ability to continue fighting as well as to give them the upper hand in any negotiations. This future can also result as a continuation of Alternate Future #17, if

Taliban attacks on Pakistan force it to confront the United States and demand it cease offensive operations against the Taliban in FATA.

5. Alternative Future #16: *The US Maintains Efforts at Current Levels, Pakistan Seeks Negotiations, the Taliban Increases Offensive Operations.* This is the worst-case scenario for Pakistan as it represents almost total powerlessness to two aggressive actors within its own sovereign territory. A beaten Pakistan, whether its military fails or from popular demand, pleads with the Taliban to negotiate a ceasefire and/or a non-aggression pact. The Taliban, its strength in ascendance and flush with recruits and funds attracted by its victory over the Pakistani state, continues its attacks in order to force the government of Pakistan to demand the United States to cease or significantly decrease its offensive operations in FATA. At this point, United States recognizes that Pakistan does not have the will or ability to resist the Taliban and takes it upon itself to fight the Taliban in FATA. Without support however, the US' ability to fight will steadily decrease until it does not have the necessary resources to devote to fighting the Taliban. This future can develop into Alternative Future #25, wherein the Taliban is victorious having defeated both its host country as well as the most powerful nation on earth.

Conclusion

The original purpose of this LAMP study is to **predict the Pakistani government's most likely response to the resurgence of the Taliban in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas.** By thoroughly examining each actor, their perspectives and goals, as well as the options available to them, a number of conclusions can be made in the larger context.

First, Pakistan's natural inclination toward the Taliban is negotiation. Historically, the Pakistani government has been a friend and benefactor to the Taliban, even providing them with the arms and resources to rule Afghanistan. Pakistan's army is inferior to the battle-hardened jihadists making any combat within the mountainous area of the FATA especially dangerous for Pakistani forces. Pakistani society in general feels that the Pakistani government is doing the will of the US by fighting in the FATA, and that angers them. So much so, that civil revolt may lead to the toppling of the military governing regime in order that a more democratically-minded government may take over.

Second, as the US goes, so goes Pakistan. If the US increases its military and financial support to the GWOT and increases offensive operations against terrorist organizations and the governments that harbor them, then the Pakistani government will follow suit. The US contributes so much in terms of money and armaments to Pakistan, that if that flow were to increase to even higher levels, it may leverage the Pakistani government into further doing as the US wills. Generally, as the US increases hostilities against terrorism, so does Pakistan. The one has the natural leverage on the other. However, given that Pakistan's natural tendency is toward negotiation with the Taliban, the opposite of that statement is especially true. If the US decreases support to the GWOT or Pakistan finds itself politically or militarily isolated, its government will seek negotiations.

Thirdly, the Taliban are not inclined toward peaceful coexistence with those it considers apostates and heretics. So any ceasefire with them is only temporary as their *modus operandi*, in fact, their reason for living, is jihad and jihad does not stay still.

Jihadists wage religious war in their own country or in other countries. If the Pakistani government negotiates a ceasefire with the Taliban, it will be only temporary and the decision to do that may come back to haunt Pakistan in one form or another.

Nevertheless, as strong and supportive as the US is, and as tenacious as the Taliban are, ultimately, the decision is Pakistan's. Pakistan must decide whether it is going to fight the Taliban and become its master, or if it will negotiate with the Taliban, and thereby become its servant. And Pakistan must decide soon.

To expand this topic, a detailed media study of Pakistani native source newspapers and opinion journals of merit, as well as news broadcasts and online political forums would be especially valuable. An effort would be made to track the Pakistani government's attempts to sculpt public opinion through the media from 9/11 to the present and would give the analyst a deep understanding of how the government perceives the GWOT and the Taliban in the FATA. Also, understanding of the public resistance to government "party line" would provide the analyst with an understanding of the dissenting undercurrent of common man's opinion and the desire for change in government policy. Incredibly valuable would be to see when, how, and if the two begin to merge and what form resistance to the GWOT takes in Pakistan media.

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