

# How Can the Conflict in Chechnya Become More Unstable?

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Leor Kass  
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American Military University

Dr. Lockwood

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Chechnya is about the same geographic size of Wales, but has become a far larger concern in the post-Soviet period. The situation in Chechnya has again refocused attention on the relationship between Moscow and its periphery, which was essentially silenced during the Soviet era. Following its collapse, Chechnya declared independence from the successor Russian Republic while other former Soviet republics became autonomous countries. Then-Russian President Boris Yeltsin objected to Chechnya's claim of being an independent country because it was viewed as an inherent part of Russia. Moreover, the move undermined Moscow's leadership role over the newly-created Commonwealth of Independent States and the Caucasus region through Yeltsin's "near abroad" policy (Baev 1999). The Chechen republic became more unstable in the early 1990s partly from Moscow-supported efforts in undermining Grozny's independence movement.

On December 11, 1994, Russia relied on the military to stabilize this breakaway republic. Moscow thought its forces would easily quell the insurgency. It took three months for Chechnya's capital to fall, far longer than expected. Chechen forces used sophisticated Soviet military equipment left behind following its collapse in 1991. Russia's military fared poorly against the smaller and more motivated Chechen forces. The armed forces were ill-equipped, unprepared and unmotivated in fighting a conflict many officers openly objected. Mounting losses coupled with diminished public support at home further eroded the idea in Moscow of a quick victory. After nearly two weary years, Russia's military eventually gained control of the republic and installed a new president. Despite Moscow's offer of total autonomy, Chechnya wanted complete independence. In mid-2006, some of rebel forces attacked the capitol to wrestle control from the Russians. Moscow responded with a fierce attack that included shelling Grozny and other cities. Fighting continued until both sides signed the Khasavyurt Accords in

September 1996. Moscow claimed victory against Chechnya despite relying on brutal military actions that subsequently helped create a humanitarian crisis with massive waves of refugees living in squalor tent camps.

Tent cities and refugees were two of many traits Chechnya shared with other ethnic conflicts that occurred throughout the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe during the 1990s. More than 15 conflicts on varying levels of intensity driven by secessionist ideas occurred in places like Bosnia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Kosovo. In each of these wars, warring parties were driven partly by some of the following factors: resource disparity, unapproved boundaries, historic animosities, and nationalism (Hughes 2001). These driving forces created a turbulent period with different parties addressing issues that were quieted during the Soviet period. Without central control, different ethnic communities sought to redress historic grievances under their terms.

The above-noted characteristics help define what Crocker (2004) called, 'intractable' conflicts. In such struggles, elites benefited from continuing the instability and were not interested in negotiating a settlement. Intractable conflicts also were fought for decades (some for centuries), with deeply seeded psychological wounds, fluctuating but prevalent levels of violence, and third-parties' facing a climate unsporting of a conflict resolution. Heads of State were often a contributing factor to a conflict becoming intractable because their political or economic fortunes depended on continuing the struggle. These types of situations also often occurred in underdeveloped regions that lacked suitable external security organizations. These institutions could not prevent conflicts from spreading or becoming more dangerous. Internally, civilians had few ways of controlling the military, thus the armed forces are more easily controlled and can more easily influence the political agenda (Crocker 2004).

Some of these existed in the second Chechen war. On August 7, 1999, some Chechen rebels invaded neighboring Dagestan to support a separatist group that sought establishment of an independent Islamic country. Numerous terrorist attacks throughout Russia led to over 300 casualties. These events served as added reasons for Moscow to again attack Chechnya. Moscow effectively used the psychological horrors of the September 11, 2001 terrorist tragedies as additional justification for its brutal tactics in Chechnya, including shelling of cities and razing villages. Grozny fell to Russian forces in December 1999, which helped end the war. In June 2000, Moscow installed Akhmad Kadyrov president as temporary leader of the pro-Russian government. Soon after the war ended, Moscow quickly started supplying the republic with an infusion of money for rebuilding its cities and ushering a more stable period.

In analyzing the two recent wars between Moscow and Grozny, one question worth analyzing from above discussion is “How prepared is the Russian military in the post-Cold War period to face the threats of terrorism?” Numerous possible warning signs indicate that the situation could move into Chechnya’s neighboring republics. These indicators are important for the international community to monitor. Containing the situation is an invaluable way of preventing Moscow’s ill-prepared military from losing more lives, lethality, and credibility.

Given the history of animosity between Russia and Chechnya, a new approach is needed to answer the specific research question: “How can the conflict in Chechnya become more unstable?” Uncovering and analyzing the warning signs that can help answer this question are quite achievable with the Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP) program because it views the conflict primarily from the national actor’s perspective. National actors have “free will” to shape the future. Comparing all options at the actors’ disposal determines the alternate future with the greatest probability of occurring. Through its 12 steps, the LAMP tool explains

how these national actors can shape the alternative futures most likely to occur (Lockwood and Lockwood 2003).

The general and specific research questions help in establishing this project's primary hypothesis: Russia's policy of selecting Chechen presidents is a key reason both sides have been unable to resolve this conflict. The thesis explores the Chechen conflict in a slightly different way. In doing so, the author believes that the subsequent debate this paper generates within various arenas results in more ways policymakers and conflict resolution practitioners can more closely monitor this, and other, ethnic struggles.

#### LITERATURE REVIEW

Validating this thesis requires analyzing a large body of literature about the two Chechen wars. Many scholarly sources have analyzed this conflict from the perspective of Russia's military or exploring each side's perceptions. One frequently discussed Russian military tactic used during the Chechen conflicts was artillery attacks on Chechen villages. In "Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks? Evidence from Chechnya," Lyall explores the relationship between Russian indiscriminate shelling of villages in Chechnya from 2000 to 2005 and the level of insurgency. Using statistical and geospatial modeling, Lyall validated the argument that the insurgency's lethality decreased following a period of Russian artillery attacks. His chief argument—sustained attacks on villages effectively suppressed counterinsurgent responses—was grounded in history. American aerial attacks on Vietcong villages and Chinese assaults on South Korean towns were historical examples that made Lyall's arguments more salient. Shelling of Chechen villages undermined the insurgents' will and support among the locals. In making this point, Lyall unearthed the challenge facing human rights groups who seek to protect innocents from such attacks. Historical analysis avoided discussing how this policy developed into becoming a part of Soviet military strategy. Exploring the motivations behind

employing indiscriminate shelling during the war was essential in understanding the Russian military's flaws.

Gerber and Mendelson (2008) further broadened the analytical scope about the Chechen issue by exploring how Moscow shaped public opinion regarding a military operation. Their emic approach advanced the literature on the Chechen war in three primary ways: by focusing on this topic without analyzing an American conflict, altering how individuals perceived the war, and fully discussing the levels of ethnic prejudice that existed in Russia regarding the Chechens. Interviews and focus groups were the authors' analytical tools that helped explore these areas. Respondents viewed Russian casualties as their primary concern, while not too focused on the human rights abuses that occurred on both sides. Justifying the war as an ethnic conflict was problematic for Moscow because it could have undermined its argument that it was seeking ethnic harmony. Missing from this valuable work is discussion of roles that other non-governmental organization (NGO)s or the Catholic Church have played in this conflict. These actors could have become more involved in resolving the war peacefully. Merely assessing the value of conflict-resolution tools and their value would have enhanced the article's value. Gerber and Mendelson presented a series of compelling arguments that view the Chechen conflict from many perspectives. Collectively, these perspectives further reminded the audience about this conflict's, ethnic dimension and perceiving it from a different perspective.

Discussion of third-party actors were the focus of Forsberg and Herd (2005)'s scholarly article, more specifically, the European Union (EU)'s role during both Chechen wars. The authors argued that the EU lacked a collective and uniform strategy to the conflicts. They also accused individual members of seeking short-term benefits from Moscow without openly criticizing its actions in Chechnya. This undermined the EU's policies of seeking security

throughout the continent. As additional justification for this key argument, the authors noted a double-standard that arose over how the EU approached this conflict and the one in the former Yugoslavia. EU members viewed safeguarding Russian sovereignty as holy, but not in the Balkans. The EU recognized that maintaining closer relations with Russia was far more important than demonstrating its conflict-resolution capabilities and role in safeguarding the continent's collective integrity. While unmentioned, the authors could have reinforced this argument with a statement that the EU's policies created the perception that Yugoslavia was less valuable to short-term EU interests than Russia.

Fundamentally, Forsberg and Herd contended that the EU lacked the desire, capability, and tools to become more engaged in resolving the Chechnya war. In discussing the short-term benefits members would obtain from closer relations with Moscow, the authors also neglected to fully explain in what ways members were rewarded for avoiding publically condemning Russian actions. Discussing the EU's role in this conflict greatly advanced the existing literature by demonstrating the difficulty third-parties faced in resolving a conflict, and the importance of avoiding sacrificing short-term political gains for long-term regional security.

Besides lack of effective third-party intervention, another reason for Russia's difficulties in Chechnya was the military's low level of morale. Simunovica (1998) noted in her policy-focused article that morale existed in two parts: individual and organizational. The Russian military suffered greatly in both forms of moral. Simunovica used quotes from high-ranking military officials to demonstrate the difficulties Russian troops encountered throughout the campaign. Troops were plagued by numerous deficiencies including: lack of suitable training, shortages of equipment, limited understanding of their objectives, and ways individual efforts supported the overarching war effort. Some of the organizational issues that existed in the

military included: widespread corruption, internal arguments within military circles of meeting goals and repeated battlefield defeats.

Simunovica correctly mentioned that morale was not only a multi-faceted aspect of warfare, but continually changed. A high level of morale was sorely lacking in Russia's military when it attacked Grozny and other Chechen towns. Soldiers questioned why their military was even in the republic. The author could have developed a correlative analysis between low morale in this conflict and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Beyond the fact that one conflict was external and the other internal, analysis of possible lessons learned from the Afghanistan invasion and would have served as an excellent case study in seeing if the Russian army repeated them with similar results in Chechnya.

Further contributing to the low levels of moral in Russia's military was many of Chechnya's combatants were foreign fighters who participated for various reasons. In having various groups engaged, the military was overwhelmed by the various tactics used by the separatists. More and Tumelty (2008)'s policy-oriented manuscript explained the varying motivations of foreign fighters during the Chechen wars. The authors argued that analyzing the fluctuating motivations of foreign fighters in the hopes of stimulating additional discussions of the factors drove volunteers from across the world to participate in a conflict against a larger power. Detailed analysis of how the influence of foreign fighters has evolved throughout the two Chechen war was behind the author's central point: the nonexistence of a strong link connecting Chechen rebels and Al-Qaeda. While Al-Qaeda's influence was prevalent, it actually declined because of the centralized organizational structure that Arab fighters in Chechnya followed, which was incongruent with Al-Qaeda's doctrine. The acceptance of Arab extremist elements in

Chechnya helped ‘internationalize’ the conflict, which was a claim Moscow repeatedly made in justifying its actions.

The article helped the reader understand the evolutionary changes between the two Chechen conflicts by discussing differing Chechen tactics. In the first war, Chechen rebels avoided relying on suicide bombers partly because of minimal extremists Arab elements. In contrast, the younger generation who led the second Chechen war supported the use of suicide bombers and mass casualty attacks—the Beslan school and Moscow theater sieges. While Arabs favored the idea of suicide bombers, none participated as part of the Chechen war partly because they recognized the war was one between Chechnya and Russia, not one of Islam against the west. This manuscript broadened the literature about this subject by introducing the reader to the composition of Chechen fighters. Doing that gave the reader greater insight into underlying Chechen tactics and motivations. These often changed based on the participants’ backgrounds and the two wars’ overarching objectives. The article also advanced the literature by undermining Putin’s nationalistic claims that the Chechen war was another chapter in the fight against Al Qaeda and its direct supporters.

Further understanding the differences between both Chechen wars required viewing it primarily from Russia’s perspective. In Dannreuther and March (2008)’s scholarly historical article, they argued that while the situation in Chechnya has improved, some lingering tensions remain that could destabilize the area. The authors credited Putin’s strong and consistent policies, which were a stark contrast to Yeltsin’s wavering ideas, with much of the improvement in Chechnya. The authors discussed the key differences between how Putin and Yeltsin handled the first and second Chechen wars, respectively. Whereas Yeltsin shirked from being responsible for any negative developments, Putin was more engaged. His strong-handed military

actions during the second Chechen conflict and subsequent pacification policies helped legitimize his centralization of power in Moscow while justifying the value of authoritarian regimes. The authors explained that the situation in Chechnya has stabilized. Greatly contributing to that was Moscow's policy of Chechenisation—hand-picking a leader to shepherd the republic's improvement.

Chechenisation has succeeded in Chechnya, but increasing instability throughout other parts of the North Caucasus undermined Moscow's ability to apply this policy elsewhere. The leader of Ingushetia lacks Ramzan Kadyrov, the current Chechen President's political acumen and is therefore seen as weak. Moscow perceives the instability in Ingushetia and elsewhere driven by hostile external powers. The challenge Russian President Dmitry Medvedev faces is controlling Putin's nationalistic ideas without undermining security. Moscow's reliance on Kadyrov put it in a difficult situation: pinning this republic's stability on the shoulders of a person with a history of brutality and creating a cult of personality. Missing from this useful discussion is how Western powers have engaged Russia during both wars and their views of Kadyrov. While some nations see the issue as solely an internal issue, others know that the Chechen conflict can easily spread.

#### ACTORS & PERCEPTIONS:

The literature review provides the current status about this topic. Noticeably missing from it is a thorough discussion of how the situation in Chechnya may become more unstable. Identifying this topic satisfies the first step in LAMP: Determine the issue for which you are trying to predict the most likely future. Identifying the topic clearly and succinctly narrows the project's focus to uncover a suitable number of primary actors. Developing a topic that is too

broad generates too many actors to analyze, while vague research topics create difficulty for the author to focus on a specific research area (Lockwood & Lockwood 2003).

Another benefit of integrating the literature review with the LAMP tool is that the former addresses the latter's second step: specifying the national "actors" involved. Four primary actors shape this predictive research effort: Russia's army, Russia's government, Chechen resistance fighters, and Chechnya's government. Russia's army is an instrument of the state, but does have latitude in deciding on to carry out policies. Naturally, other actors are involved in the conflict and play varying roles in continuing or stopping the bloodshed. Given the time constraints, which framed the literature review's scope, the research is focused on these four actors. Doing that keeps the number of "alternate futures" that this project will analyze at a suitable number (Lockwood & Lockwood 2003).

Hämmerli, Gattiker, and Weyermann (2006) employ a different methodology for finding the primary actors in this conflict, but still generated similar results. Using the German-created FAST database, the authors determined the level of centrality between the various actors. Cluster analysis and computer software helped the researchers discover that civilians played a central role in the struggle. Interestingly, the Russian president was ranked lower than expected. This project deviates slightly from their work by viewing Russia's government as a central actor.

The third and last step of LAMP this section addresses is performing an in-depth study of how each actor perceives the issue in question. Doing that requires analyzing not just how each actor views the conflict, but differences in language, history, culture, etc. Failure to do that increases the likelihood of the researcher employing "mirror-imaging" in conducting analysis. Mirror imaging involves applying the researcher's logic to the national actor. Doing that likely misconstrues the data when comparing the chances various alternative futures can occur,

reducing the reliability of the predictions (Lockwood and Lockwood 2003). The discussion below analyzes the conflict from each actor's perspective. Completely explaining each actor's different perceptions of the conflict requires analyzing each actor individually while leaving some room for overlap.

### **Actor 1: Russia's Military**

Russia's military has experienced unprecedented changes in the wake of the Soviet Union's collapse. While head of the RAND Corporation's International Security and Defense Policy Program, Edward Lambeth (2005) wrote that economic stagnation in the military led to dramatic drops in spending, investment, and training. Proud Soviet soldiers who were prepared to attack Western Europe were replaced by a ragtag motley crew of soldiers who were no longer protecting a proud superpower against the West. He mentioned that enlisted personnel fighting in Chechnya were young and unmotivated led by unprepared and demoralized officers. Some of them openly acknowledged they were not sure of the military's objectives in Chechnya. Compounding the problem in Russia's military was Moscow siphoning away billions of dollars from much-needed military housing projects, updating its aging fighter jet fleet, and routine maintenance in support of the first Chechen war. Despite vastly outnumbering Chechen forces and enjoying air supremacy, Russia's military was still unable to achieve its objectives.

Many of problems that plagued Russia's military arose during the 1980s. Mathersa (1999) mentioned that under glasnost, the military lost some of its stature as the public became aware of organized bullying or *dedovshchina* in military units. Morale in the Soviet military plummeted from its demoralizing war in Afghanistan. Conscripts avoided becoming part of this once-respected institution, particularly after officers waited months for payment and lived in unsuitable conditions. Educated and enthusiastic young men explored becoming bodyguards to

the new class of oligarchs or elites over becoming a part of this failing institution. Despite the military's numerous problems, Moscow attacked Chechnya in the mid-1990s and suffered significant losses in the process. Russian troops lacked suitable equipment, combat training, and were unprepared for the motivated guerrilla units they encountered in Chechnya. Widespread opposition in Russia to the military quagmire helped lay the groundwork for a peace treaty in 1996.

This happened according to Arbatov (2000) because Moscow conducted the war without defining it as a *State of Emergency*. He explained that had Yeltsin viewed the conflict in such terms, he could have mobilized more forces. The devastating civilian losses and shelling of Chechen cities and towns created a political firestorm in Moscow. Politicians viewed the military's conduct and then-Russian President Boris Yeltsin's policies toward the republic as an embarrassment, and according to Arbatov (2000) the war contributed to impeachment proceedings against Yeltsin.

### **Actor 2: Russia's Government**

The Chechen conflict profoundly affects how Russia's military will respond to future threats. On October 2003, Russia's Ministry of Defense released a new military doctrine, *Urgent Tasks for the Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation*, also called the *Ivanov Doctrine* (named for its then-Defense Minister, Sergei Ivanov). One prevailing theme within this document is responding to operations in Chechnya. Russia Ministry of Defense's designation of transitional threats as vital dangers to the country signals a strong move away from the traditional Soviet model, which viewed these matters as less of a concern. Two Chechen wars painfully demonstrated to Russia that its Cold War military doctrine was incongruent with reality (Bouldin 2004).

One part of the *Ivanov Doctrine* is Russia's armed forces will maintain a one million-person military that can address numerous internal and external dangers. Its desire for a large and sophisticated military requires significant increases in its defense budget. The challenge of equipping the armed forces with advanced equipment is compounded by the idea of maintaining such a large military (Bouldin 2004). The then-deputy head of the Duma defense committee stated that maintaining such a sizeable military will require quadrupling the defense budget, which Russia is unlikely to happen in the future (Livkin 2003). Alexei Arbatov likely made this argument knowing that Russia no longer had the erstwhile military clients it enjoyed during the Cold War. Syria, Egypt, and other traditional military recipients of Soviet equipment obtained materials from more stable and reputable sources.

Overall, the *Ivanov Doctrine* overlooked fundamental reforms that the military must implement. Major General (Ret.) Pavel Zolotarev, president of a public fund organization for military reform remarked "...The armed forces should be prepared to repel any of the range of threats [facing Russia] and not only terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles" (Livkin 2003). Despite significant numerical advantages during both Chechen wars, Russia had difficulty swiftly meeting its objectives. Determining its greatest threats requires a more comprehensive reevaluation of its security environment. Only then will Russia understand that its response to regional dangers requires a different mindset than training for a more conventional battle. The chances that Russia will fight against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces are slim, while the exact opposite can be said of the terrorist threat. Only after Russia effectively allocates resources to each threat can its military play a greater role in safeguarding the country.

Yeltsin's successor applied policies in Chechnya that helped the military achieve most of its objectives. Then-President Vladimir Putin perceived the situation in the Caucasus as a far greater danger to Russian security than relying on a military incapable of effectively stopping terrorism. He halted Russia's necessary military reform efforts so the armed forces focused on quelling the Chechen insurgency. Baev (2005) stated that Russia's deployment of more troops into the region created a situation reminiscent of the first Chechen war—troops unable to defeat smaller, but more determined, Chechen insurgents.

Moscow learned some important lessons from the first Chechen war, including publicly presenting the war from a more nationalistic perspective. Putin noted that Moscow supported Chechen efforts to become independent in 1996: "What we got instead of a new state entity was a quasi-state of a terrorist nature...." Terrorists infiltrated Chechnya, using it as a base to conduct operations against Russia. Putin viewed Chechnya as another chapter in the Global War on Terror. In 2005, Putin stated in a speech that foreign fighters who infiltrated the republic were responsible for the conflict. He accused insurgents of not only pervading each part of Chechnya's government, but perverting Islam to achieve their goals (Putin 2005). Such policies received strong support from the Bush administration and European countries. They viewed Putin as a far more capable leader than his predecessor, which gave him greater legitimacy at home, while moving Russia away from its embarrassing conduct during the first Chechen war.

Putin perceived those who attacked innocent Russian civilians or engage in suicide bombing as terrorists. He hoped that other countries avoided supporting "...separatism in the Russian Federation. If we allow people to try to re-delineate borders, especially in Europe, then Europe will tumble into an abyss of continuous confrontation and ethnic wars" (Putin 2001). In providing this history lesson, Putin attempted to remind the world to avoid supporting efforts to

redefine Russia's borders. Maintenance of Russia's territorial integrity was of utmost importance to Moscow and perceiving the Chechen resistance and their supporters as terrorists was Putin's way of justifying Russian policies.

### **Actor 3: Chechen Separatists**

The Chechen struggle for independence predates the Soviet Union. Hughes (2001) explained three key differences between the Russia and Chechnya: 1. Russia having colonial control over Chechnya; 2. Societal differences of the modern Russian state versus the kinship ties that were a part of Chechen communities, and 3. Religious differences between the Russian Orthodoxy and Chechen Islam. Russia suppressed Chechen religious movements and pacified the area partly through the placement of industries, towns, and railroads. Such instruments of modernity kept Russian peasants tied to the Caucasus region, including an influx of migrants into Grozny. The city witnessed tremendous growth as a result of becoming a center of petrochemicals and a point along the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline. In 1936, Chechnya morphed into the Checheno-Ingushetia Autonomous Republic. Tsarist and Soviet modernization, especially industrialization dramatically changed Chechnya (Hughes 2001).

Despite the republic's transformation, Chechens remember history quite well. The republic experienced periods of independence until it became a part of the Soviet Union. The idea of resistance against Russia was seared into the Chechen people following Stalin's February 1944 deportation of 400,000 Chechens into central Kazakhstan and Kirghizia (present-day Kazakhstan) to punish them for allegedly conspiring with the Nazis. The deportation led to the deaths of 100,000 people (Hughes 2001). It remains a central reason for Chechnya's continued resistance against Russia.

Perceiving the conflict through the Chechen resistance movement's perspective is more difficult to achieve because the amount of first-hand reporting is often tainted by claims of Russian brutality, whether exaggerated or accurate. Nonetheless, former Chechen rebel leader Shamil Basayev spoke to western media about the struggle against Russia. Basayev was responsible for, or linked to, some of the conflict's most tragic terrorist attacks, including the 2004 Beslan school attack, a 2002 hostage-taking at a Moscow theater that left 170 people dead, and a suicide bombing at a Moscow rock concert. Before his death in 2006, Basayev stated that "There's a struggle going on for our national independence." While admitting to being a terrorist, he blamed Russia for not caring about the massive loss of Chechen civilians or safeguarding human rights. In fighting for independence, Basayev believed he was part of a struggle against an oppressor that robbed Chechnya of its independence and only through violence could it have become a free country (ABC News 2005).

#### **Actor 4: Chechnya's Government**

While relative peace in Chechnya exists partly because of Basayev's assassination, Putin's appointment of Ramzan Kadyrov as this republic's president is a far stronger reason. Kadyrov, like his father, fought the Russians during the Chechen wars. Ramzan's father was Chechnya's president in 2003 thanks to a Russian-driven election that attempted to undermine the Chechen rebels' power. President Akhmad Kadyrov's assassination seven months later increased the level of attention on his son. Ramzan remained deputy prime minister for a short time before becoming prime minister. A power struggle between the charismatic Ramzan and Chechen president Alu Alkhanov quickly ensued partly over how to move the republic forward. Moscow viewed Alkhanov as an ineffective leader and replaced him with Kadyrov soon after he

turned 30 (the legal age for becoming president). Chechnya's parliament easily approved Kadyrov as president.

Three years after becoming president, critics still question Putin's decision of entrusting this republic to Kadyrov. Soon after becoming President, Kadyrov placed family members in his inner circle and created a cult of personality in Chechnya in manner similar to what Stalin instituted throughout much of the Soviet Union. Like "Uncle Joe," Kadyrov uses large imposing posters to remind Chechens who is in charge. Kadyrov also emulates Stalin's means of swiftly silencing rivals and critics. Austrian security authorities concluded in an investigation that Kadyrov was responsible for the kidnapping and subsequent death of a Chechen refugee who filled a formal complaint that accused Kadyrov of being responsible for torturing, abducting, and murdering people in support of Russia's counterinsurgency efforts against Chechnya (RFE/RL April 2010). Kadyrov had a hand in silencing various rivals (Saradzhyan 2008), including the leader of an elite army unit that killed Chechen insurgents on the Kremlin's behest (RFE/RL 2009). Despite Kadyrov's troubling past, Putin made a highly calculated move in appointing this charismatic insurgent president. Ruslan Martagov, a Chechen political analyst and former spokesman for another Moscow-installed Chechen government explained:

"With [Chechnya] in the hands of one single man, they'll be able to do anything with it in the future, should the need arise. Had the people been given the right to choose their leader, it would be united like one family. But when they place one man at the head of the republic without asking the people's opinion, this republic is easier to destroy and frighten. This is precisely why this situation has been created and is being sustained" (RFE/RL 2007).

Giving the presidency to a person who fought for Chechen independence helps pacify the resistance. Kadyrov's charm offensive included obtaining Moscow's approval for granting amnesty to those who fought against Russia in the second Chechen war. Hundreds of insurgents believed Kadyrov's reassurances that if they stopped fighting, they would have a job after returning to a civilian life (RFE/RL July 2010). In hand-picking Kadyrov, Putin saw his strategy

of vertically consolidating power get repeated in Chechnya. Much of this was driven by utmost loyalty to Moscow, which Putin highly values. Russian approval of Kadyrov's policies is often seen in the form of economic aid to help rebuild Chechnya (Russell 2008).

It remains a mystery how long Putin's golden goose in Grozny will continue laying Fabergé eggs. Freedom House executive director Jennifer Windsor commented "...it is hard to believe that Chechens will be better off if they are entirely subject to the brutal whims of Ramzan Kadyrov" (Freedom House 2009). Unforeseen competitive forces prevent one-person regimes from governing indefinitely. Insurgent movements often create black markets as revenue sources, which help stifle the competitive climate seen in a liberal marketplace. Having elites define parameters for the market to operate gives them a sense of legitimacy while ensuring they reap the rewards. As such, elites benefit from maintaining the status quo, one trait of an 'intractable conflict (Crocker 2004). Greater control over the economic levers keeps external forces from undermining the elites' mandate to rule (Metz 2007-2008). Eventually, a struggle for controlling the levers of government arises. The one-person regimes are replaced by a more balanced government that distributes power more evenly.

The literature review uncovered a wide variety of material that analyzed Russia's military and its difficulties in quickly meeting Moscow's objectives during the two Chechen wars. Addressing them requires a realistic reevaluation of its military doctrine and operations. While it showed few changes between both conflicts, the same could not be stated about how Presidents Yeltsin and Putin led the wars. Both leaders responded to the conflicts differently, but Putin effectively used the Global War on Terrorism to cloak the military's brutal actions during the second Chechen war. Doing that muted any concerted international calls to condemn Russia's

actions. Instead, many European nations were far more focused on achieving short-term political gains by reengaging Moscow.

**RESEARCH DESIGN:**

Determining and analyzing the primary warning signs that could indicate greater instability in Chechnya requires analyzing the conflict employing a different research tool. The LAMP program will help answer this project's specific research question while providing conflict resolution practitioners and policymakers additional tools to diagnose and predict when conflicts are becoming more unstable. Optimally, this will avoid bloodshed, establish legitimacy of the actors, and give third-parties more options in moving the actors closer to reconciliation. Determining these tools requires acknowledging that because each future action is "based on the sum total of interactions of free will, the relative probability of each alternative future will be constantly changing based on how each national actor behaves as we move through history" (Lockwood and Lockwood 1993).

Comparing all of the alternative choices available to each actor helps determine the possible future actions with the highest relative probability of occurring. Each actor has "free will" to change their future, but in one's life, the number of options available decreases as a person gets older (Lockwood and Lockwood 1993); similarly, the number of options available to Russia in handling the Chechen conflict also has significantly decreased. As discussed in the literature review, in comparing the two Chechen conflicts, Dannreuther and March (2008) noted that Putin had far fewer options at his disposal than his predecessor. Even so, it was impossible to accurately predict Putin's policies.

This research effort benefits from the LAMP predictive tool in ways unmatched by traditional probability theory and the Delphi Method. Probability theory assigns a percentage of probability to an event's occurrence. It is impossible to determine how Moscow will act in the

future regarding Chechnya—Russia is a rational actor with free will. The Delphi program also is incongruent with this project because it seeks group consensus on an issue with a broad scope that lacks enough historical information. As seen in the wide-ranging literature review and extensive historical discussion, the Chechen conflict lacks such traits. The LAMP tool openly welcomes a wealth of historic and contemporary material. Having broad range of literature will yield a diverse range of options at the actors' disposal (Lockwood & Lockwood, 1993 16-25).

While using LAMP has advantages, it also has limitations, which are partly driven by the research project. Those with large numbers of actors are incongruent with LAMP because they would require performing analysis on an unwieldy number of alternative futures. The probabilities of these futures have to remain unknown for LAMP to operate correctly. Assigning percentages to an alternative future prevents it from being equally comparable. Lastly, LAMP requires making multiple “either-or” decisions. Regardless of an alternative's plausibility, a researcher ought to still have it included in the design unless they it is impossible for that future to occur (Lockwood and Lockwood, 1993 32-33; 91-93).

Developing a broad range of possible future alternatives occurs from consulting a myriad of sources. Material included in this research effort was written by experts from different backgrounds. Combining material from research journals, speeches, news reports, and other primary sources helped present the reader with a complex and multifaceted topic. Using a variety of different sources also reduced the level of bias. Avoiding including material that advocated a policy based on unfounded assertions kept the research effort balanced. Bias can not only drive a researcher's focus away from considering alternative sources, but develop a project that fails to move the existing literature into a new dimension.

While consulting a variety of scholarly sources helps reduce the magnitude of bias, it still exists. One source of bias is seeking material that provides possible ways of resolving this conflict. Proscribing solutions might cause authors to overlook the inherent difficulties of finding solutions to issues that have deep-seeded historical connections. Animosity against each party can effectively get addressed only after a careful analysis of the case study.

### **CASE STUDY/ANALYSIS/FINDINGS**

This section presents the predictive analysis through the final eight steps in the LAMP tool. Each step builds upon the other in a logical manner that helps determine the probability of various alternative futures.

Discussing each actor and their perceptions of the conflict yields a series of possible courses of action available that is partly driven by the broad scope of literature. Implausible options are still included because they might actually occur in the future. Only impossible choices or those outside the realm of possibilities are discounted in this research effort (Lockwood and Lockwood 2003). Based on the actors and perceptions section, each actor's future actions are grouped into three categories: maintain the status quo (SQ), escalate tensions (ET), or reconcile differences to achieve long-term peace (LTP).

Each actor has a range of options at its disposal as discussed below:

#### **Russia's Military:**

**SQ-**Avoiding another conflict in Chechnya is something the military will likely support so it can focus more on instituting military reform efforts as outlined in the 'Medvedev Doctrine.'

**ET-**A third war will further reduce the military's morale. Military leaders in Moscow would probably oppose a third war unless the objectives were clearly outlined. Even then, it is possible that the military could become again mired in fighting against motivated insurgents.

**LTP-**This option is particularly viable through greater joint training exercises between Russian and Chechen security forces. Equipping and training these units might avoid having the military engage in operations incompatible with its current doctrine.

**Russia's Government:**

**SQ-** Despite sporadic terrorist attacks, Moscow will continue supporting this policy while

Kadyrov remains in firm control of Chechnya. Having him help stabilize Chechnya will allow Moscow to focus on other matters.

**ET-** Unless the situation deteriorates, it is highly unlikely that Moscow will engage in a third war over Chechnya. Russia can ill-afford another prolonged conflict.

**LTP-** Moscow might seek resolution of this matter on its terms. It will likely support any agreement that avoids having it acknowledge the 1944 deportations or human rights violations.

**Chechen Separatists:**

**SQ-** Chechen rebels might continue initiating small-scale and sporadic terrorist attacks. More members could seek amnesty if they perceive the struggle as losing momentum.

**ET-** Increased operations against separatist units by Chechnya's government could create conditions for separatists to become more violent. The conflict's instability is partly predicated on the level of confidence Moscow has with Kadyrov.

**LTP-** Many rebel elements benefit from continuing the struggle, so this option is extremely unlikely. They see Russia's government as an oppressive power with an incapable military.

**Chechnya's Government:**

**SQ-** This is a highly plausible option with Kadyrov continuing to enjoy benefits from Moscow.

Increases of funding for rebuilding the republic will increase its legitimacy while permitting him more latitude to implement policies.

**ET-** Kadyrov could get tired of perceiving himself as Moscow's golden goose and declare Chechen independence. That course of action also could occur from Kadyrov facing increased internal pressure.

**LTP-** Kadyrov represents the Chechen people and understands their mindset. He might serve as the charismatic force that establishes long-term peace with Russia, but doing that might require him to institute unpopular policies that draw into question his independence. Kadyrov could lose significant popular support if any agreement fails to satisfactorily address the many Chechen grievances. The Chechen government might consider this option as a way for Kadyrov to gain more popular support from the people.

Each of the actor's future alternatives occurs within a scenario. Step five in LAMP is to determine the major scenarios to use in comparing the alternative futures. A scenario provides the analysis two advantages: it generates the primary assumptions that will steer the national actors' actions. This frequently is determined by a notable power outside the initial study's scope. The second advantage of using a scenario is acknowledging another actor without including it as part of the overall analysis (Lockwood and Lockwood 1993).

For this project the two scenarios are 1: Russia ignores the Chechen republic's plight, and 2. Chechnya declares independence. These scenarios are entirely plausible in the future partly because they already occurred. Under these scenarios, it is assumed that NATO and other third-parties, including the United States, will remain proponents of Moscow's policies and recognize that Chechnya is an inherent part of Russia. Another assumption is that Kadyrov remains loyal to Russia despite greater pressure from the rebels to declare independence.

### Exploring Analytical Futures (Steps 6-8)

The next three steps in the LAMP tool will be discussed separately because they address comparing and ranking the various futures. The value of performing a thorough historical and cultural analysis of the Chechen conflict will become clearer starting with step six of the LAMP tool: Calculate the total number of permutations of possible “alternative futures” for each scenario. The overall formula for calculating the alternative futures is:

$$X^y=Z$$

X=The number of courses of action available to each actor.

y= The number of a actors engaged.

Z=The total number of alternative futures to be compared.

The number of possible alternatives in this research paper is derived by replacing the three courses of action (status quo, escalate tensions, and long-term peace) for “X;” and the four national actors (Russia’s government, Russia’s military, Chechen separatists, and Chechnya’s government) for “Y.” Doing that generates the equation  $3^4=81$ , which is the total number of alternative futures to compare. Reducing the number of actors was critical in keeping the total number of different choices at a manageable level (Lockwood and Lockwood 2003).

Determining the probability of each future action will occur with step seven: perform a “pairwise comparison” of all alternative futures within the scenario to determine their relative probability. A “pairwise comparison” compares all alternative futures against each other on the premise that those futures compared are the *only* ones that are to occur. The future judged “more likely to occur” is given one vote. The number of votes is based on the number of alternative futures, which is based on the number of actors and courses of action. Numerically, calculating the number of pairwise comparisons is expressed in the following formula:

$$X=(n-1)+(n-2)\dots+(n-n)$$

n=The total number of alternative futures that are studied

X=The total number of pairwise comparisons.

Applying that formula to this project would generate the equation  $X = (81-1) + (81-2) + \dots + (81-81)$ . Regardless of the plausibility of each alternative future, all will be considered. Ruling out certain conditions before comparing them undermines the LAMP approach of making a series of “either-or” decisions across all possibilities (Lockwood and Lockwood 2003).

After determining the number of pairwise comparisons, the alternative futures are ranked under step eight, from the highest relative probability to the lowest. The number of “votes” determines where an alternative future is ranked on Tables 1 and 2 below. They show the pairwise comparison under each scenario (Note: the alternative futures with the top three highest votes are in bold; scenarios with duplicate number of votes did not change the final outcome).

After the futures are ranked, the analysis can begin in earnest.

Table 1: Pairwise Comparison with Scenario #1

Scenario 1: Russia ignores the Chechen republic's plight					
Alternative Future Number	Russia Military	Russia Government	Chechen Separatists	Chechen Government	Number of Votes
1	SQ	SQ	SQ	SQ	55
2	SQ	SQ	SQ	LTP	60
3	SQ	SQ	LTP	SQ	70
4	SQ	LTP	SQ	SQ	71
5	SQ	SQ	LTP	LTP	67
6	SQ	LTP	SQ	LTP	69
7	SQ	LTP	LTP	SQ	74
<b>8</b>	<b>SQ</b>	<b>LTP</b>	<b>LTP</b>	<b>LTP</b>	<b>79</b>
9	SQ	SQ	SQ	ET	67
10	SQ	SQ	ET	SQ	65
11	SQ	ET	SQ	SQ	50

Alternative Future Number	Russia Military	Russia Government	Chechen Separatists	Chechen Government	Number of Votes
12	SQ	SQ	ET	ET	55
13	SQ	ET	SQ	ET	54
14	SQ	ET	ET	SQ	53
15	SQ	ET	ET	ET	15
16	SQ	SQ	LTP	ET	22
17	SQ	LTP	SQ	ET	42
18	SQ	LTP	ET	SQ	47
19	SQ	SQ	ET	LTP	58
20	SQ	ET	SQ	LTP	30
21	SQ	ET	LTP	SQ	33
22	SQ	LTP	LTP	ET	35
23	SQ	LTP	ET	LTP	48
24	SQ	ET	LTP	LTP	54
25	SQ	ET	ET	LTP	25
26	SQ	ET	LTP	ET	27
27	SQ	LTP	ET	ET	29
28	ET	SQ	SQ	SQ	20
29	ET	SQ	SQ	LTP	21
30	ET	SQ	LTP	SQ	28
31	ET	LTP	SQ	SQ	29
32	ET	SQ	LTP	LTP	15
33	ET	LTP	SQ	LTP	24
34	ET	LTP	LTP	SQ	28
35	ET	LTP	LTP	LTP	65
36	ET	SQ	SQ	ET	38
37	ET	SQ	ET	SQ	22
38	ET	ET	SQ	SQ	24
39	ET	SQ	ET	ET	22
40	ET	ET	SQ	ET	27
41	ET	ET	ET	SQ	28
42	ET	ET	ET	ET	1
43	ET	SQ	LTP	ET	59
44	ET	LTP	SQ	ET	55
45	ET	LTP	ET	SQ	50
46	ET	SQ	ET	LTP	48
47	ET	ET	SQ	LTP	45
48	ET	ET	LTP	SQ	43

Alternative Future Number	Russia Military	Russia Government	Chechen Separatists	Chechen Government	Number of Votes
49	ET	LTP	LTP	ET	29
50	ET	LTP	ET	LTP	35
51	ET	ET	LTP	LTP	38
52	ET	ET	ET	LTP	36
53	ET	ET	LTP	ET	33
54	ET	LTP	ET	ET	20
55	LTP	SQ	SQ	SQ	65
56	LTP	SQ	SQ	LTP	66
57	LTP	SQ	LTP	SQ	68
58	LTP	LTP	SQ	SQ	64
59	LTP	SQ	LTP	LTP	78
<b>60</b>	<b>LTP</b>	<b>LTP</b>	<b>SQ</b>	<b>LTP</b>	<b>80</b>
61	LTP	LTP	LTP	SQ	15
<b>62</b>	<b>LTP</b>	<b>LTP</b>	<b>LTP</b>	<b>LTP</b>	<b>81</b>
63	LTP	SQ	SQ	ET	11
64	LTP	SQ	ET	SQ	8
65	LTP	ET	SQ	SQ	7
66	LTP	SQ	ET	ET	3
67	LTP	ET	SQ	ET	2
68	LTP	ET	ET	SQ	18
69	LTP	ET	ET	ET	4
70	LTP	SQ	LTP	ET	17
71	LTP	LTP	SQ	ET	18
72	LTP	LTP	ET	SQ	19
73	LTP	SQ	ET	LTP	14
74	LTP	ET	SQ	LTP	15
75	LTP	ET	LTP	SQ	10
76	LTP	LTP	LTP	ET	9
77	LTP	LTP	ET	LTP	8
78	LTP	ET	LTP	LTP	2
79	LTP	ET	ET	LTP	5
80	LTP	ET	LTP	ET	4
81	LTP	LTP	ET	ET	5

Key: LTP=Long-term Peace  
ET=Escalate Tensions  
SQ=Status Quo

Table 2: Pairwise Comparison with Scenario #2

Scenario #2: Chechnya Declares Independence					
Alternative Future Number	Russia Military	Russia Government	Chechen Separatists	Chechen Government	Number of Votes
1	SQ	SQ	SQ	SQ	1
2	SQ	SQ	SQ	LTP	15
3	SQ	SQ	LTP	SQ	11
4	SQ	LTP	SQ	SQ	10
5	SQ	SQ	LTP	LTP	13
6	SQ	LTP	SQ	LTP	9
7	SQ	LTP	LTP	SQ	8
8	SQ	LTP	LTP	LTP	4
9	SQ	SQ	SQ	ET	7
10	SQ	SQ	ET	SQ	3
11	SQ	ET	SQ	SQ	2
12	SQ	SQ	ET	ET	5
13	SQ	ET	SQ	ET	6
14	SQ	ET	ET	SQ	12
15	SQ	ET	ET	ET	14
16	SQ	SQ	LTP	ET	15
17	SQ	LTP	SQ	ET	17
18	SQ	LTP	ET	SQ	18
19	SQ	SQ	ET	LTP	16
20	SQ	ET	SQ	LTP	20
21	SQ	ET	LTP	SQ	19
22	SQ	LTP	LTP	ET	41
23	SQ	LTP	ET	LTP	22
24	SQ	ET	LTP	LTP	23
25	SQ	ET	ET	LTP	25
26	SQ	ET	LTP	ET	30
27	SQ	LTP	ET	ET	33
28	ET	SQ	SQ	SQ	28
29	ET	SQ	SQ	LTP	34

Alternative Future Number	Russia Military	Russia Government	Chechen Separatists	Chechen Government	Number of Votes
30	ET	SQ	LTP	SQ	17
31	ET	LTP	SQ	SQ	18
32	ET	SQ	LTP	LTP	19
33	ET	LTP	SQ	LTP	20
34	ET	LTP	LTP	SQ	38
35	ET	LTP	LTP	LTP	35
36	ET	SQ	SQ	ET	37
37	ET	SQ	ET	SQ	76
38	ET	ET	SQ	SQ	72
<b>39</b>	<b>ET</b>	<b>SQ</b>	<b>ET</b>	<b>ET</b>	<b>79</b>
40	ET	ET	SQ	ET	65
<b>41</b>	<b>ET</b>	<b>ET</b>	<b>ET</b>	<b>SQ</b>	<b>80</b>
<b>42</b>	<b>ET</b>	<b>ET</b>	<b>ET</b>	<b>ET</b>	<b>81</b>
43	ET	SQ	LTP	ET	17
44	ET	LTP	SQ	ET	15
45	ET	LTP	ET	SQ	19
46	ET	SQ	ET	LTP	59
47	ET	ET	SQ	LTP	14
48	ET	ET	LTP	SQ	58
49	ET	LTP	LTP	ET	57
50	ET	LTP	ET	LTP	16
51	ET	ET	LTP	LTP	41
52	ET	ET	ET	LTP	70
53	ET	ET	LTP	ET	77
54	ET	LTP	ET	ET	78
55	LTP	SQ	SQ	SQ	33
56	LTP	SQ	SQ	LTP	66
57	LTP	SQ	LTP	SQ	65
58	LTP	LTP	SQ	SQ	60
59	LTP	SQ	LTP	LTP	63
60	LTP	LTP	SQ	LTP	56

Alternative Future Number	Russia Military	Russia Government	Chechen Separatists	Chechen Government	Number of Votes
61	LTP	LTP	LTP	SQ	22
62	LTP	LTP	LTP	LTP	18
63	LTP	SQ	SQ	ET	15
64	LTP	SQ	ET	SQ	23
65	LTP	ET	SQ	SQ	25
66	LTP	SQ	ET	ET	29
67	LTP	ET	SQ	ET	23
68	LTP	ET	ET	SQ	39
69	LTP	ET	ET	ET	55
70	LTP	SQ	LTP	ET	58
71	LTP	LTP	SQ	ET	50
72	LTP	LTP	ET	SQ	45
73	LTP	SQ	ET	LTP	48
74	LTP	ET	SQ	LTP	59
75	LTP	ET	LTP	SQ	66
76	LTP	LTP	LTP	ET	8
77	LTP	LTP	ET	LTP	15
78	LTP	ET	LTP	LTP	23
79	LTP	ET	ET	LTP	16
80	LTP	ET	LTP	ET	18
81	LTP	LTP	ET	ET	20

Key: LTP=Long-term Peace  
ET=Escalate Tensions  
SQ=Status Quo

Analysis of the alternative futures with the highest votes initiates the final part of the LAMP tool. Under step nine: Assuming that each future occurs, analyze each alternate future in terms of its consequences for the issue in question. Given the large number of alternative futures, this study will only look at the three with the highest number of votes under the two scenarios. In doing that, answering the specific research question will be a bit easier by providing tools to more easily predict the conditions indicating that the Chechen situation is becoming more unstable based on Russia avoiding addressing the situation or Chechnya declaring independence.

**Top three alternative futures under scenario #1: Russia ignores the Chechen republic's plight**

<b>Alternative Future Number</b>	<b>Russia Military</b>	<b>Russia Government</b>	<b>Chechen Separatists</b>	<b>Chechen Government</b>	<b>Number of Votes</b>
<b>62</b>	<b>LTP</b>	<b>LTP</b>	<b>LTP</b>	<b>LTP</b>	<b>81</b>

Russia's avoidance of the Chechen conflict is a mixed blessing under certain conditions. The military welcomes additional involvement in maintaining security in and near this republic. Greater control by Chechen police forces in safeguarding security is a welcome sign for a military still reeling from two bruising conflicts against a far smaller, but far more motivated, insurgency. Military officials can use the Chechen wars as a case study for how they must reform given the military given the continual threat of terrorism or insurgency groups in other republics.

This scenario is closer to Russia's current policy governing the republic. Moscow is satisfied having the situation under its control with a hand-picked president. The president has significant latitude in governing the republic provided he avoids crossing a threshold Moscow finds unacceptable: openly declaring independence. Russia keeps sending money that the Chechen president can allocate for rebuilding the republic. He can gain greater political support from the people in determining how the money can get spent. Improving the republic's security can create more favorable conditions for pacifying its citizenry. Russia can claim that it has helped rebuild a republic after foreign insurgents used its terrorist for committing brutal and heinous actions.

The benefits for achieving peace in this republic will bring Moscow greater international legitimacy. Russia can claim that it avoided capitulating to a republic, part of its country, in seeking long-term peace. Playing a direct role in resolving the conflict without becoming overly involved would generate more foreign aid to the republic and warmer relations with some

European countries who condemned Russia's actions during both Chechen wars. Russia can use the momentum from resolving this issue to play a greater role in other diplomatic standoffs.

Leaders of Chechnya openly welcome long-term peace with Russia. They will need to compromise on certain conditions, such as not having Russia publicly acknowledge historic grievances or issue a public apology. Nonetheless, having a peace treaty that grants the republic autonomy is far closer to what the people ultimately desire than under present conditions. Recognizing that Chechnya inherently seeks peace and independence is achievable when both avoid relying on redressing historic animosities as reasons for continuing the struggle.

Of all the actors, Chechen separatists have more to lose, but only for a brief period. Members could take their struggle to more unstable areas of the world, or put down their arms and help rebuild the republic. Helping improve Chechnya can create future political or economic aspirations among former insurgents. They can see that making money is far easier legitimately than relying on black or even gray markets.

<b>Alternative Future Number</b>	<b>Russia Military</b>	<b>Russia Government</b>	<b>Chechen Separatists</b>	<b>Chechen Government</b>	<b>Number of Votes</b>
<b>60</b>	<b>LTP</b>	<b>LTP</b>	<b>SQ</b>	<b>LTP</b>	<b>80</b>

The primary difference between this future and the one above is that Chechen separatists seek the status quo while the other national actors achieve long-term peace. Under this alternative future, Chechen separatists are not part of a formal treaty between the other actors. They have more freedom for pursuing their objectives, but will have a harder time achieving them in Chechnya. Maintaining their proxy war against Russia grants them more time for recruiting additional people and purchasing needed material. While some will openly stop supporting the insurgency, other units will continue receiving supplies and waiting for conditions in the republic to deteriorate. Worsening security in the republic can provide the impetus for

initiating more terrorist attacks. The Chechen government can work with Russian counterparts in maintaining security along the border, or exchanging information on different insurgents. Greater collaboration is a notable confidence building measurement that benefits both governments. Chechen separatists hope to undermine the close relationship through a series of increasingly powerful terrorist attacks. These occur soon after the euphoria of a long-term peace agreement resolving the Chechen conflict has ended.

<b>Alternative Future Number</b>	<b>Russia Military</b>	<b>Russia Government</b>	<b>Chechen Separatists</b>	<b>Chechen Government</b>	<b>Number of Votes</b>
<b>8</b>	<b>SQ</b>	<b>LTP</b>	<b>SQ</b>	<b>LTP</b>	<b>79</b>

The two differences between alternative future number 8 and 60 is the Russian and Chechen separatists seek the status quo while the two governments achieve long-term peace. Under this future, a long-term treaty avoids directly addressing security concerns, but grants the parties latitude to establish that under a subsequent agreement. The peace treaty has a condition that its implementation occurs only after both sides security forces' engage in bilateral talks on jointly improving security. Chechen separatists have a deep distrust of Russia, but shaping this region's security is a viable motivating factor for them to help resolve the situation. Giving them political or monetary incentives is a way of persuading them to play a constructive role.

Russia's military also benefits from closely working with the Chechen separatists. Units can learn how insurgents operate, recruit, and respond under various conditions. Knowing how their former enemies function can help Russia's military become more effective. Leaders can cost-effectively allocate the necessary resources that will help the armed forces swiftly respond to future terrorist attacks.

### **Top three alternative futures under scenario #2: Chechnya declares independence**

<b>Alternative Future Number</b>	<b>Russia Military</b>	<b>Russia Government</b>	<b>Chechen Separatists</b>	<b>Chechen Government</b>	<b>Number of Votes</b>
<b>42</b>	<b>ET</b>	<b>ET</b>	<b>ET</b>	<b>ET</b>	<b>81</b>

This scenario is the polar opposite of the first one, with Chechnya declaring independence. As expected, all four national actors are motivated by actions and policies that escalate tensions. Without much debate, Russia's military decides that it must topple the republic's government and reassert complete control in the republic. Regardless of the number of casualties and international calls for a cease fire, the armed forces fully know that Chechnya is a part of the Russian federation. Defending its constitution against such a threat is the only way of preventing other republics from following Chechnya's example.

Russia's government sees this future as a complete act of defiance from the Chechen republic. Political speeches that condemn the move and openly threaten a swift military response are two likely responses. Moreover, reminding the international community to avoid interfering with an internal security matter is Moscow's way of containing the situation without having countries having to decide between supporting Moscow or Grozny.

Chechen separatists hear the threatening tone from Russia and are prepared for supporting independence violently. They openly launch attacks against Russia's military and attack civilians until Moscow agrees to legitimize Chechnya's independence. The floodgates for more foreign insurgents entering the republic would open a chapter in the War on Terror that few want to have written.

In support of the separatists, the Chechen government seeks maintaining an independent policy partly through removing any political links to Moscow. That can occur through declaring that Russian is no longer one of the republic's official languages, and starts printing out a different currency. Small and symbolic gestures of independence are joined by statements that

the Chechen people are completely different from Russians. Another part of Grozny asserting its independence is through seeking support from other countries and international terrorist organizations.

<b>Alternative Future Number</b>	<b>Russia Military</b>	<b>Russia Government</b>	<b>Chechen Separatists</b>	<b>Chechen Government</b>	<b>Number of Votes</b>
<b>41</b>	<b>ET</b>	<b>ET</b>	<b>ET</b>	<b>SQ</b>	<b>80</b>

The difference between alternative future numbers 41 and 42 is the Chechen government declares independence while the Chechen situation becomes more unstable. Inflaming the situation only infuriates Moscow and its military. The levels of rhetoric from political and military officials increase, but that further destabilizes the situation. Grozny's decision to become independent during status quo conditions is seen by Russia as an effort to undermine its Chechen policies. President Putin's policies face increasing scrutiny in entrusting the republic to a leader known for bravado and allegiances to separatists. Rising tensions from a terrorist attack or more belligerent tones from separatist officials further motivate Grozny toward independence. It figures that separatists are ultimately driven by helping the republic become totally autonomous, when they have other motives. Separatists' objectives in seeking to create a miniature Afghanistan is a distinct possibility once Grozny's social and political infrastructures collapse under the weight of Russia's military.

<b>Alternative Future Number</b>	<b>Russia Military</b>	<b>Russia Government</b>	<b>Chechen Separatists</b>	<b>Chechen Government</b>	<b>Number of Votes</b>
<b>39</b>	<b>ET</b>	<b>SQ</b>	<b>ET</b>	<b>ET</b>	<b>79</b>

One change between alternative futures 39 and 41 is that the government seeks following the status quo despite escalating tensions with the other actors. President Medvedev seeks a policy that is somewhat different from Putin and Yeltsin. Choosing to become more engaged

diplomatically is a risk that costs Medvedev political support in Moscow. Putin uses the initial failures of Medvedev's policies to justify attacking the breakaway republic with more force. Medvedev's risky policies continue avoiding addressing the situation in Chechnya. The military's anticipation of another confrontation creates strain within its ranks of again being unprepared. Moscow heeds the warnings from its defense community and avoids a rush to attack the republic until it has clearly defined its objectives.

These future alternatives can change in numerous ways. Under step 10 of the LAMP tool, it is important to discuss the potential of how each of these futures can "transpose" into another one. Transposing alternative futures have the potential to start in one way and continue proceeding through time differently. Some future alternatives are unique and are therefore unable to transpose, while others have the potential of changing.

All four national actors have free to determine their future. In picking choices, the actor rationalizes a series of "either or" options. The alternatives picked can shift for inexplicable reasons. No one can predict the future, but assessing in what ways it can change is important for performing predictive analysis, and by extension, preventive diplomacy.

Many alternative futures can transpose under scenario number 1. Alternative future number 3 can become alternative future number 2 should two conditions flip. Under number 2, Chechen separatists seek long-term peace while the Chechen government seeks the status quo. Flipping both actors' ideas moves transposes this future into number 2. This can easily occur should the separatists conclude that long-term peace is more attainable than maintaining the status quo. Much of that is determined by other nearby conflicts and the policies of the Chechen government.

Similarly, alternative futures 10 can transpose into 11. The Chechen separatists' efforts to escalate tensions could generate more rhetoric from Moscow, but the chances of it responding militarily depend on other factors. President Medvedev is more supportive of maintaining the status quo with this republic than unleashing the military to quell a conflict. Medvedev knows that launching a third war benefits the separatists—it motivates indifferent members to become more engaged while reinvigorating the flow of arms into the Northern Caucasus region.

Under scenario number 2, numerous alternative futures can also transpose. Future 77 can easily transpose into futures 81 or 70. When Chechen separatists conclude that they are becoming targeted by Russia's military and government, their response is resorting to terrorism or becoming more blatant in their attacks against Russian interests. Large-scale terrorist attacks are part of the climate indicating that the Chechen republic becoming increasingly unstable, which occurs in this climate. The opposite occurrence is future 70 with the Chechen government become more engaged as a protector of the Chechen separatists. Grozny argues that by offering amnesty, the separatists can start moving away from an armed struggle.

Another source of transposition is from future number 81 to 78. The difference between them is the Russian government maintains the status quo (78) versus escalates tensions (81). President Medvedev avoids a military confrontation with Chechen separatists and thinks (hopes) that Grozny's more blatant calls for independence are short-lived and half-hearted. Russia sees the value of not overreacting to the situation in the North Caucasus, a clear demonstration that Moscow is applying a new policy. These transpositions are a small representation of the various ways the Chechen problem can shift.

These and many other, alternate futures can transpose because of "forks in the road" that must happen during the present to create a different future. Step 11 in the LAMP program

addresses the “focal events,” an occurrence of suitable magnitude that changes the likelihood of an alternative future. More unconventional futures have numerous “focal events” linked to them because they would each need to occur to change the present into the future (Lockwood and Lockwood 1993). The focal events for each of the three most plausible scenarios are discussed below:

**Scenario #1: Russia ignores the Chechen republic’s plight:**

In alternative future number 62, all four national actors seek long-term peace while Russia is avoiding addressing the republic’s current conditions.

- FOCAL EVENT: Russia’s military focuses its resources away from combating Chechen separatists.
- FOCAL EVENT: Moscow approaches Grozny with an incentive package that includes greater autonomy.
- FOCAL EVENT: Chechen separatists are persuaded to rebuild the republic on humanitarian grounds.
- FOCAL EVENT: Grozny gains popular support for approaching Russia with a peace treaty.

In alternative future 60, three national actors seek long-term peace while the separatists support the status quo.

- FOCAL EVENT: Russia’s military focuses its resources away from combating Chechen separatists.
- FOCAL EVENT: Moscow approaches Grozny with an incentive package that includes greater autonomy.
- FOCAL EVENT: Chechen separatists engage in lower intensity conflicts, while increasing caches.
- FOCAL EVENT: Grozny gains popular support for approaching Russia with a peace treaty.

In alternative future number 6, two national actors seek long-term peace while the other two maintain the status quo.

- FOCAL EVENT: Russia’s military closely monitors the Chechen republic.
- FOCAL EVENT: Moscow approaches Grozny with an incentive package that includes greater autonomy.
- FOCAL EVENT: Chechen separatists engage in lower intensity conflicts, while increasing caches.
- FOCAL EVENT: Grozny gains popular support for approaching Russia with a peace treaty.

**Scenario #2: Chechnya declares independence**

In alternative future number 42, all four national actors escalate tensions.

- FOCAL EVENT: Russia’s military mobilizes for another assault on Chechnya.
- FOCAL EVENT: Moscow vows to root out any Chechen separatists.
- FOCAL EVENT: Chechen separatists launch terrorist attacks against Russia.
- FOCAL EVENT: Grozny begins seeking international recognition and becomes more nationalistic.

In alternative future number 41, three national actors escalate tensions while another seeks the status quo.

- FOCAL EVENT: Russia’s military mobilizes for another assault on Chechnya.
- FOCAL EVENT: Moscow vows to root out any Chechen separatists.
- FOCAL EVENT: Chechen separatists launch terrorist attacks against Russia.
- FOCAL EVENT: Grozny continues supporting Moscow despite its increased rhetoric.

In alternative future number 39, three national actors escalate tensions while another seeks the status quo.

FOCAL EVENT: Russia's military mobilizes for another assault on Chechnya.

FOCAL EVENT: Moscow continues ignoring Chechnya knowing that the rhetoric is short-lived.

FOCAL EVENT: Chechen separatists launch terrorist attacks against Russia.

FOCAL EVENT: Grozny begins seeking international recognition and becomes more nationalistic.

Anticipating these focal events can help conflict resolution practitioners proactively engage the parties well-before the situation spirals out of control. To do that requires being aware of indicators that serve as warning signs of an event occurring or about to occur. The final step in the LAMP program, number 12, calls for developing these indicators. Ideally, once an indicator warns of an alternative future, it can be applied all other conditions linked to that focal event (Lockwood and Lockwood 1993). Having this dynamic method can help warn third-parties of when different conflict resolution tools are more effective. In doing so, the LAMP program helps reduce the level of surprise commonly associated with such protected conflicts. Understanding ways the Chechen conflict can be managed is helpful with a series of indicators for the focal events.

FOCAL EVENT: Russia's military focuses its resources away from combating Chechen separatists.

KEY INDICATOR: Russia increases spending in support of its nuclear arsenal.

KEY INDICATOR: Conducts training exercises away from the region.

KEY INDICATOR: Increases military pay and updates infrastructures at facilities.

KEY INDIACTOR: Engages in more joint exercises with NATO.

FOCAL EVENT: Moscow approaches Grozny with an incentive package that includes greater autonomy.

KEY INDICATOR: Devotes more funding for rebuilding the republic without cumbersome conditions.

KEY INDICATOR: States the value of helping republics become more independent.

FOCAL EVENT: Chechen separatists are persuaded to rebuild the republic on humanitarian grounds.

KEY INDICATOR: Grozny extends amnesty programs for former separatists.

KEY INDICATOR: Grozny offers to purchase weapons from the separatists with an employment guarantee.

KEY INDICATOR: The Chechen president appears more outwardly religious, including using Islamic phrases publically, reminding the separatists about how this religion values human rights.

FOCAL EVENT: Grozny gains popular support for approaching Russia with a peace treaty.

KEY INDICATOR: The Chechen people begin non-violent protests and other forms of civil disobedience to persuade Grozny to seek long-term peace.

KEY INDICATOR: The Chechen republic conducts a national referendum on what provisions the people want in a treaty with Russia.

FOCAL EVENT: Chechen separatists engage in lower intensity conflicts, while increasing caches.

KEY INDIACTOR: Less frequent and smaller-scale terrorist attacks.

KEY INDIACTOR: Discovery of more arms flowing into the republic.

KEY INDIACTOR: More incursions of foreign fighters out of Afghanistan and other areas into Chechnya.

FOCAL EVENT: Russia's military closely monitors the Chechen republic.

KEY INDICATOR: Establishment of more listening posts (mobile and stationary) along the border and in neighboring areas.

FOCAL EVENT: Russia's military mobilizes for another assault on Chechnya.

KEY INDIACTOR: More troops and equipment placed along the border.

KEY INDIACTOR: Warning people to avoid entering the republic or anywhere in the North Caucasus.

KEY INDIACTOR: Massive waves of refugees leave the Chechen republic.

FOCAL EVENT: Moscow vows to root out any Chechen separatists.

KEY INDIACTOR: Increased warnings about the consequences of undermining Russian security.

KEY INDIACTOR: Surgical military strikes against terrorist hideouts in and near Chechnya.

FOCAL EVENT: Chechen separatists launch terrorist attacks against Russia.

KEY INDIACTOR: Claims of responsibility for the events from separatists.

KEY INDIACTOR: Demands that Russia follow to avoid other similar attacks.

FOCAL EVENT: Grozny begins seeking international recognition and becomes more nationalistic.

KEY INDIACTOR: Applies for recognition in the United Nations.

KEY INDIACTOR: Calls upon neighboring countries to outwardly support the move.

FOCAL EVENT: Grozny continues supporting Moscow despite its increased rhetoric.

KEY INDIACTOR: Reminds the people publically that Chechnya has learned from its mistakes and the struggle can achieve its objectives when conducted more peacefully.

KEY INDIACTOR: Avoids responding similarly in public while taking the moral high ground by maintaining the status quo.

FOCAL EVENT: Moscow continues ignoring Chechnya knowing that the rhetoric is short-lived.

KEY INDIACTOR: Politely informs Grozny of how Russia has helped the republic rebuild.

KEY INDIACTOR: Lack of significant troop mobilization along the border with Chechnya.

KEY INDIACTOR: Moscow avoids reciprocal rhetoric in speeches by leaders

KEY INDIACTOR: Brushes aside international concern with statements that the situation is under Russian control.

Conclusion:

The Chechen conflict has ebbed and flowed for centuries. Two wars during the 1990s failed to resolve this republic's status. Instead, they exposed fundamental deficiencies in

Russia's military—one incapable of effectively responding to the threat of terrorism and armed insurgencies. The current doctrine governing the armed forces is only an incremental step in transforming the armed forces. Current and former senior military officials openly questioned the “Medvedev Doctrine’s” logic and ability to meet its objectives. Its acknowledgement that terrorism poses a threat to Russia is a positive step in reforming the military. More importantly, Moscow understands that unless effectively addressed, it could see another Beslan.

Russia's Chechen policies have helped avoid future tragedies on a scale seen during the 1990s. Hand-picking its president was a calculated move by Putin that has kept the situation from further deteriorating. The question of how much longer this relationship will occur is difficult to determine given the conflict's complexity and as Crocker stated, its intractability. Simply ignoring the issue and hoping it disappears is unlikely despite Chechnya's rebuilding efforts and its charismatic leader's charm offensive. Maintaining political legitimacy in Grozny is far different than resolving the conflict, which neither side is currently prepared to address.

Similarly, a long-term peace treaty or period of escalating tensions also can shape all four national actors. Under a long-term peace treaty, the Chechen separatists have the most to lose in the short term, but those are outweighed by the long-term benefits of amnesty, monetary incentives, and possible political rewards from its charismatic Chechen president. That could occur as part of a scenario where Russia simply ignores the republic while it rebuilds and elucidates how it views a long-term peace agreement with Russia.

All four actors also are affected by a period of escalating tensions—an increase in bloodshed, greater international calls for third-party intervention, and human rights atrocities committed on all sides. Many of the actors' pursuance of more belligerent policies in response to a period of escalated tensions creates the conditions for further instability. Chechen

separatists' reliance on terrorism and more belligerent statements further hampers addressing this situation's numerous areas of disagreement. Moscow and Grozny's responses during a period of tension are partly driven by the other two actors.

Under the two scenarios, all of the actors have numerous alternative futures at their disposal. The scenarios depict two dramatically different situations that have historical precedent. Each actor's most likely course of action also is dramatically different. Since either situation can again occur, the alternative future corresponding to these scenarios can shape how the other actors respond.

Determining the most plausible future for these actors requires using a more congruent methodology. The actors have "free will" to decide their path(s) of travel. Having a myriad of options at their disposal gives them the latitude to move in various directions independently. Of course the action(s) taken by one actor are affected by the others. This requires identifying the national actors and understanding the conflict from their perspective. Part of the LAMP program includes delving into how history and culture has shaped each actor's perception of the conflict.

Despite some limitations, the LAMP tool does help policymakers and conflict-resolution practitioners alike understand the conditions that this conflict can become more unstable. Knowing the focal events and their indicators helps predict how each of the focal events can transpose into another alternative future. The combination of focal events and transpositions that can occur in this conflict is mind-boggling. Consequently, understanding the indicators that warn of possible changes is invaluable to helping resolve the conflict.

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