

**AMERICAN MILITARY UNIVERSITY**

**TAIWAN, THE MORNING AFTER:  
A LAMP Analysis  
of the Actions of the People's Republic of China,  
the United States, and Japan  
Following an Attack and Invasion of Taiwan  
by the Peoples Republic of China**

**Submitted to Dr. Jonathan D. Lockwood  
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**INTRODUCTION**

One of the most well known potential flash points for conflict in the world today is Taiwan, where the Republic of China (ROC) and the People's Republic of China (PRC) remain locked in an unresolved civil war. Over the nearly 60 years following the flight of the ROC to Taiwan, the status of each combatant has changed so that the status and seat formerly held by the ROC in the UN is now held by the PRC. And the economic power of the PRC is such that they have succeeded to a large extent in diplomatically isolating the ROC. Taiwan is nearly universally recognized as an integral part of China, but the inhabitants of Taiwan are as yet not ready to be reunified with the mainland, particularly as they will be subject to the governance of the PRC. In recent years, there has been a growing movement toward independence for Taiwan, with an accompanying hardening of PRC attitude and policy that independence for Taiwan is absolutely unacceptable under any circumstances.

At this point the U.S. and its key regional ally, Japan, are seen as the main opponents in preventing the resolution of what the PRC sees as a major territorial sovereignty issue in Taiwan. The history of the post-Opium Wars period with its foreign dominance and dismemberment of China plays heavily into the emotion-laden, near-obsession with Taiwan, with the island's status operating as a lens to focus hostility against what are perceived as the last representatives of the foreign oppressors of that period.

The circumstances of the situation involving Taiwan are further complicated by the island's relationship with the cold war's surviving super power, the United States, whose involvement in Asia in general, and with Taiwan specifically is viewed extremely negatively by the PRC and its citizens. The PRC's rising economic power is accompanied by a similar rise in its military power, as it modernizes its People's Liberation Army (PLA) with a direct view to the capabilities of the U.S. military and the situation in the Taiwan Strait.

Not only is Taiwan an historical sovereignty issue, but the simple fact of the PRC's rise raises the threat of conflict. If it were not enough that the PLA spends much of its resources focused on the Taiwan situation, the PRC's status as a rising power predisposes it to conflict with the U.S. as the current dominant power in the western Pacific. The PRC wishes to exert its historic dominance in its region, but finds its ability to project its power limited by the U.S. Taiwan represents the near term focus of the PRC's tension with the U.S., but its aspirations for greater influence and even control of its own region would conflict with the U.S. dominance in the region ultimately even were the Taiwan situation resolved.

Several times over the last decades events have brought the PRC and the U.S. nearly to blows, and a miscalculation or a wrong-headed move by the ROC or one of the other major participants could readily lead to a military conflict focused on the island of Taiwan.

Much of the literature dealing with the current state of PRC military affairs versus those of the ROC on Taiwan discuss the likelihood that the PRC could overwhelm the Taiwanese military and invade Taiwan. As the capabilities of the PLA increase and its ability to strike swiftly at Taiwanese installations and command and control capability improve, there appears to be an ever greater chance of the PLA actually succeeding in a swift attack and invasion before the U.S. could bring its massively capable forces to bear in Taiwan's defense. Although much discussion has been focused on the ability of the PLA to accomplish this initial success, much less has been focused on what might happen after such a success.

This study uses the Lockwood Analytical Method of Prediction to analyze how each of the major likely participants in such a conflict – the PRC, Japan, and the U.S. would interact and react to the post invasion situation.

**LITERATURE REVIEW**

To accomplish this analysis, a literature review was accomplished to fill gaps in understanding and knowledge of a broad range of topics. The range extends from domestic politics and foreign policy to military strategy and capability. Such a list of diverse topics makes for what seems to be an odd mix of studies, but this eclectic mix of sources are necessary to arrive at the information necessary to formulate each step of the analysis.

**The studies consulted:**

Tammen and Kugler, in their article titled “Power Transition and China-US Conflicts”, provide a realist-approach study using a variant of a power transition theory that considers the relative balance of power between states and integrates that with probable points of conflict or cooperation in what they describe as a level of satisfaction or dissatisfaction. They contend that the PRC is a rising power that has the highest likelihood of direct conflict with the United States, with power parity achievable by the PRC somewhere between 2025 and 2035 (Tammen and Kugler 2006, 45). They note that rising powers that are dissatisfied with their situation will act before achieving parity if they are within a certain distance of parity, and by their analysis the window for that potential between the PRC and the U.S. opens in the next decade. They point to the major source of the PRC's dissatisfaction as the Taiwan sovereignty issue, in the near term. But they state clearly that the probability of the PRC approaching parity with the U.S. clearly establishes the need for considerable development of engagement and cooperative relationships between the two states to avoid open conflict.

Thomas J. Christensen in his article, titled “Posing Problems without Catching up: China's Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security Policy”, takes an unconventional realist-based approach to looking at the PRC's plans and motivations around the core issue of Taiwan. In the article he

states, “My thesis is that with certain new equipment and certain strategies, China can pose major problems for American security interests, and especially for Taiwan, without the slightest pretense of catching up with the United States by an overall measure of national military power or technology” (Christensen 2001. 7). Christensen's approach to proving his “thesis” is first to demonstrate that a number of weaker powers have chosen to attack stronger powers. He accomplishes this convincingly, citing several studies and providing several specific instances of such actions, including the Japanese attack on the United States in 1941. He reviews a number of the reasons for such actions which include the attacker's political situation, the attacker's perceptions (or misperceptions) of the enemy's resolve, the defender's distraction with other conflicts, the opponents' relative risk acceptance, or desperation. This also includes assessment that an attack by a weaker power simply may be a choice of the time and place for commencement of hostilities when a conflict is perceived as inevitable.

Christensen discusses some of the specific motivations for the PRC's interest in strategies to attack a stronger U.S. military. Of course he cites the territorial imperative of Taiwan, with the PRC still smarting over the humiliation of losing control of territories in previous periods. But he also cites PRC sources warning of a need for the Communist Party to retain legitimacy in the eyes of an increasingly nationalist population who expect it to stand up to foreigners over territorial issues. He states that he saw from his interviews and encounters in the PRC in preparing the study that in regard to Taiwan “...true words of optimism regarding peace over the longer term appeared rare in Beijing in the first half of 2000” (Christensen 2001, 16).

Thomas Christensen approaches this subject more directly in an article, titled “Windows and War: Trend Analysis and Beijing’s use of Force”, found in the book *New Directions in the Study of China's Foreign Policy* (2006). In this study, Christensen analyzes the history of the

People's Republic of China's use of force in various disputes. He enumerates various trends he found in his analysis of the PRC use of force, with one notable trend described as follows: "The use of force to shape long-term trends in security politics rather than to resolve a security problem once and for all. In these instances force is seen as therapeutic rather than curative" (Johnston 2006, 51). Specifically in regard to the situation involving Taiwan, he notes that the PRC has stated that it will act to prevent a move to independence and that means they would consider acting in spite of U.S military superiority if they saw a window of opportunity that would leave them some advantage. In his concluding paragraphs, he makes the following statement:

If, at a time when China had developed more robust military options against Taiwan than it currently has, PRC elites were to become very concerned about these trend lines (as they were in early 2000) and frustrated that factors like Taiwan's economic dependence on the mainland and PLA coercive capacity were not producing Taipei's accommodation, then Chinese use of force for largely political purposes seems quite possible, even if Taiwan had not yet declared legal independence and *even if Beijing elites did not believe they could resolve the issue on their own terms by using force* [emphasis added] (Johnston 2006, 77)

This is an ominous conclusion as it appears that the PRC's leadership might initiate use of force against Taiwan even if they believed that they might not prevail, depending on the alternative outcomes they foresaw if they did not act.

Michael Chase in his article from *China Brief*, titled "Taiwan's Threat Perceptions: Underestimating China's Capabilities and Intentions", discusses the state of affairs in regarding Taiwan and explores the PRC's motivations and potential actions. As part of his discussion, Chase raises the question of the ROC official perception of the PLA's preparedness for a cross-strait invasion. The ROC appears to believe that the PRC might have a problem in the near term pulling off an attack and invasion as indicated by some analysts' reading on the state of the PLA's modernization. The article makes the following statement in regard to ROC perceptions:

“Most official assessments indicate that ROC officials view a full-scale invasion of this type as the least likely potential Chinese course of action, at least in the near-term, because the PLA does not yet have the capabilities required to successfully conduct a large-scale “invasion warfare” campaign. For example, the 2006 *National Security Report* [ROC] states that “at present the PLA does not have the capability to launch a large-scale invasion of Taiwan” (NSC 2006 *National Security Report*, p. 41). The most recent MND [Ministry of National Defense, ROC] report also concludes that the “invasion warfare” scenario is “highly unlikely” in the short-term, given the current political and economic environment and the limitations of Chinese military power (MND 2006 National Defense Report)” (Chase 2007, 10-11).

Even with the short-fall in potential power relative to being able to succeed in a cross-strait invasion as claimed by the ROC analysts, Chase believes that the PRC would still engage in intimidating military exercises and activities to maintain pressure on the ROC government of Taiwan. One key difficulty presented by the ROC perceptions of the PRC’s unpreparedness for a cross-strait attack is that they might underestimate the danger of such an attack. The ROC could conceivably engage in some act that might be seen as a provocation by the PRC based on a mistaken belief that the PRC would be incapable of a successful invasion. If the PRC felt that it was necessary due to the seriousness of the ROC provocations, and particularly if the ROC estimates were wrong, ROC might wake up to missiles falling on its bases and command installations and PLA Navy vessels landing troops on Taiwan.

In the book *The United States and Asia, Toward a New U.S. Strategy and Force Posture*, a team of authors provide a series of articles dealing with the changing circumstances in Asia and what options the United States may have to respond or anticipate them. The authors discuss the developing political situations and the changes in force structure, alliances, and regional diplomacy that the U.S. might consider. Of particular interest in this work, of course, were the studies on the situation relative to potential combat involving Taiwan. The topics range over the full scope of military forces – from ground forces type and basing to theater and national missile

defense. Options for preparation and use of such forces are considered. Although the work centers on the situation faced by the United States Air Force, the discussions broadly review the military situation and options in a fashion which provides unique data and viewpoints useful to understanding the overall strategic situation. As an example, in one chapter the authors discuss the implications of the United States choices of its reaction to an attack on Taiwan are shown to have wider foreign policy affects that would drive its decision making:

Failure on the part of the United States to react, for example, might be attributed to an unwillingness to risk a military conflict with China. If this were so, then America's failure to react could have devastating effects on U.S. credibility in the region and might lead regional states to believe they had no choice but to seek accommodation with a rising China. The United States could then find itself in a dilemma in which regional states were unwilling to support U.S. action to defend Taiwan but would react adversely to U.S. failure to support Taiwan (Khalilzad 2001, 20).

In another chapter, "Implications for the Military and USAF: The Challenges of Change", discusses the problems faced by the U.S. Air Force in basing fighter aircraft in range of potential conflict over Taiwan. The authors provide data indicating that the locations available would involve one-way ranges of 500 nautical miles which puts the available bases at the maximum practical range for such aircraft, making swift response at those distances nearly impossible. This would indicate that the practical solution would require the use of aircraft carriers to maintain fighter support for operations over Taiwan. The data provided is useful to the development of potential conflict scenarios.

In the 2006 RAND study *Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Transformation and Implications for the Department of Defense* a team of authors reviews and discusses the Chinese planning for their national strategy and military modernization. It is useful to this study as it reviews a range of Chinese responses to the United States' Revolution in Military Affairs and

potential U.S. counter-responses. The authors state that the PRC is intensely studying the U.S. military's increased capabilities, but they state directly, "Yet the concomitant acceleration of the pace of Chinese military modernization also suggest that the Chinese are not dissuaded by U.S. military prowess, but instead are driven by a range of strategic and military motivations to continue their efforts apace" (Mulvenon 2006, iii). The study provides an assessment of strategic issues that should be considered when contemplating potential conflict between the PRC and the U.S. and provides excellent context for development of potential scenarios. For example, the book discusses the Chinese view of ballistic missile threat to the U.S., defining it as either a war-preventing or war-ending capability (Mulvenon 2006, 115).

Karsten von Hoesslin in his study titled, "The China Question: A Window of Opportunity", proposes that the PRC is approaching a period where it may actually have the ability to dominate the U.S. Navy in the China Sea through the acquisition of and development of surface ships, anti-shipping missiles, submarines and torpedoes. Von Hoesslin discusses the PRC's desire to control the China Sea and proximate shipping lanes and discusses the weapons capabilities versus a U.S. Navy that failed to keep up its anti-submarine warfare investments beginning in the 1990's, focused too long on the Russians after the Soviet collapse, and postponed necessary developments in ship building due to priority changes after September 11, 2001. It is interesting that Robert Sutter in his study from the same period titled "Why does China Matter" cites a report by a task force of the Council on Foreign Relations which merely asserts in the event of a Taiwan incident that "PLA naval surface combatants, submarines, and missiles and torpedoes could slow a U.S. intervention" (Sutter 2003, 81). Von Hoesslin's study appears to indicate that the Chinese could more than "slow" a U.S. response which difference could dramatically affect the strategic development of a Taiwan-based conflict.

A book particularly useful to this study was *Japan's Security Strategy in the Post-9/11 World: Embracing a New Realpolitik* by Daniel M. Kliman. The book is an exploration of the development of Japanese foreign policy and its alliance with the United States. It offered a thorough review of the history of the development of the alliance and provided historical context to support the author's conclusions, including recent developments with the North Korean situation which were extremely helpful in illustrating Japan's reaction and posture in those events. The author uses those events to illustrate more recent developments in Japan's relationship with the PRC. With the potential for conflict presented in eastern Asia by the rise of the PRC, as well as Japan's economic power and increasing involvement in international relations, an understanding of Japan's position versus the U.S. and the PRC is key to understanding any potential conflict scenarios. The book describes Japan's support for the U.S. in terms of its desire to support the U.S. as its only ally capable of aiding in its defense against powerful opponents. Kliman makes it clear that Japan recognizes that by itself it cannot withstand an opponent as powerful as the PRC, and that Japan recognizes that it must respond to the expressed desires of its major ally in the interest of maintaining a positive relationship. This work was extremely valuable to this study as it provided excellent information on the exact nature and current state of development of the relations with the United States and the PRC, even to the extent of supporting necessary predictions of Japan's behavior in various key scenarios.

Peter Navarro in his recently published book, *The Coming China Wars, Where They Will Be Fought and How They Can Be Won*, offers an inflammatory analysis of future relationships with the PRC projecting a number of negative trends in the PRC's handling of its economy and its foreign policies. The author clearly falls into the group of analysts who perceive the PRC as a very real threat which can be expected to use any means to benefit itself. Navarro is an

economist who has published a number of works on business and economic issues, a few of which dealt with threatening economic or business conditions. In this work he enumerates likely causes of conflict between the PRC and various foreign powers as well as discussing the likely course of such conflicts. The range of issues Navarro covers includes such issues as the drug trade, export competition, energy competition, intellectual property rights, and so on. As suggested by the title, Navarro sees the PRC's activities in these areas as tantamount to warfare in economic form. This work is included in the literature review as it offers some unique data on the functioning of the PRC's economy which would likely come into play in scenarios involving direct conflict between the U.S. and the PRC. One point that he makes in regard to the PRC's situation is its dependence upon imported oil. He states, "China is already heavily dependent upon oil imports. It currently imports more than 40% of its needs, and oil import dependence is projected to reach 60 percent by 2020. As the largest economy without a substantial strategic petroleum reserve, the PRC is highly vulnerable to oil-market disruptions. It has on hand less than 10 days [sic] supply versus about 60 days for the United States and 100 days for Japan" (Navarro 2007, 68) It is interesting to read the footnote for this entry, which says:

In 2005, China finished building its first tank farm in Zhendai, which is located in the port city of Ningbo. This 33-million-barrel facility will hold about one third of China's planned reserves, but high oil prices have made it difficult to fill. (*China Daily* [sic], September 2, 2005). Even when China's reserve is finished sometime over the next five years, it will only hold 20 days of consumption (102 million barrels versus the 700 million barrel capacity of the united States) (Navarro 2007, 230).

Further, Navarro goes on to illustrate the potential effect this might have on a future PRC/U.S. conflict, saying:

The paramount fear of the Chinese is that at some point, the United States might attempt to do what it once did to Japan – disrupt China's oil supplies as a means of exerting pressure on Chinese economic, trade, or foreign policies... The most likely U.S. oil-embargo scenario would involve a Chinese invasion of Taiwan... As a practical matter, this would be a relatively simple task because the U.S. Navy currently controls most of

the shipping lanes through which oil now flows. This includes the Strait of Hormuz, which is the critical entryway for all tanker-based oil deliveries from the Middle East. It also includes the very narrow Straits of Malacca, the link between the Indian and Pacific Oceans that provide passage for about 80% of China's oil imports and are considered to be the key chokepoint in Asia (Navarro 2007, 69).

The potential use of oil as leverage against the PRC could stimulate a much wider conflict depending upon both the PRC's and the United States' actions and reactions in a crisis over Taiwan.

In his article titled "China's Nuclear Gambit", Richard Weitz discusses the energy situation in the PRC. The impetus to move forward with a dramatic expansion of nuclear-based electrical power generation is driven by the dramatic increases in the PRC's energy use tied to its economic growth. The author discusses the Chinese perception of its dependency upon imported oil, saying, "Chinese policy makers appear particularly worried by China's dependence on Persian Gulf energy sources, which amount to over half its oil imports despite vigorous Chinese efforts in recent years to diversify energy sources to include African, Central Asian, and Latin American countries. Not only is China's access to the Persian Gulf uncomfortably vulnerable to interception by foreign navies, but the tumultuous situation in Iraq and the dispute over Iran's nuclear program also threaten to disrupt oil exports from the region's other oil producers" (Weitz 2007, 11) Weitz also notes that for the first time the PRC, which has the third largest coal reserves of any nation in the world, is having to import coal to support its economic growth, subjecting the PRC to similar concerns for its other main fossil fuel. Again, the shipping lanes over which this coal travels are subject to disruption by foreign powers. This information supports and extends the premise offered by Navarro's previously cited work.

The book *China's Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy* by Minxin Pei (2006), calls into question whether the PRC's current form of government can

support continued economic growth, let alone growth of its military capability. Pei concludes that the PRC's transition to a capitalist economy with a more democratic government cannot continue, and its growth will falter and stall due to flaws in the structure of its governance. He envisions large scale difficulties with a party elite clinging to power, delaying the democratic and market economy transitions while looting the economy in anticipation of its eventual loss of power. He describes a state where the PRC will be trapped indefinitely in some sort of transitional mode. Contrary to his conclusion, such a stalled transition seems inherently unstable considering the aspirations of the Chinese who openly demonstrate against current government problems and have migrated in mass to achieve improvements in their personal situations. He avoids touching on other possibilities where the PRC would undergo a crisis of some sort which might involve revolutionary change to a more democratic government, a break up into separate geographic components, or some similar change which would effectively remove the PRC as a threat. Pei believes that the Chinese people are focused on the issue of Taiwan and measure their leadership, by their actions in regard to this issue. The book was useful to this study as scenarios involving conflicts over Taiwan would have to take into account the reactions of the Chinese people to such major events.

Melissa Murphy in her monograph titled *Decoding Chinese Politics: project director Intellectual Debates and Why They Matter* discusses the various political debates going on at the highest levels of the Chinese Communist Party and Chinese government. She uses published articles from intellectuals and party officials which through their positions and connections appear to represent positions taken by various factions of the leadership. The section of her study dealing with economic development appears to echo Minxin Pei's concerns about the potential for unrest. Murphy says, "The increasing resentment among marginalized groups toward those

with political and economic connections is spilling over into the streets, and China has seen an unprecedented increase in the number and size of protests, demonstrations, and incidents of social unrest” (Murphy 2008, 5). In an attached footnote Murphy offers supporting data, saying, “Official Chinese statistics put the number of ‘public order disturbances’ at 87,000 in 2006, up from 74,000 in 2004 and 8,700 in 1993” (Murphy 2008, 5).

In the Secretary of Defense’s Annual Report To Congress: The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2005, there is a discussion of the flow of oil and raw materials and the shipping lanes critical to the PRC. The report notes that particularly the supply of oil is of major concern to the PRC, saying,


China began the process of constructing a strategic petroleum reserve (SPR) in 2004. By 2015, Beijing plans to build the SPR to the International Energy Agency standard of 90 days’ supply. Poor logistics and transportation networks suggest this may still prove inadequate. For the foreseeable future, China will rely on overseas sources for oil and other strategic resources, meaning China will remain reliant upon maritime transportation to meet its energy demands (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2005, 10).

Further discussions state the perception that at the date of the report the PRC would have trouble keeping sea lanes open against an active blockade saying:

With its present force structure, according to the Intelligence Community, Chinese surface combatants would have difficulty projecting power into the Strait of Malacca, especially if it were conducting simultaneous blockade or invasion operations elsewhere. Similarly, although the PLA Navy occasionally patrols as far as the Spratly Islands, its limited organic air defense capability leaves surface ships vulnerable to attack from hostile air and naval forces. The PLA Navy Air Force and PLA Air Force currently lack the operational range to support PLA Navy operations. In recent years, however, the PLA Navy’s South Sea Fleet, which has operational responsibility over the South China Sea, has been assigned more capable surface combatants and submarines, including two destroyers (one LUDA IV class and one LUHAI class) that provide it with its first short-range area air-defense capability, the HHQ-7C surface-to-air missile systems (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2005, 33-34).

The theme of the criticality of the PRC’s supply lines is continued in the Secretary of Defense’s Annual Report To Congress: The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2007. The map and note shown below illustrate the areas which the oil tankers from the Persian gulf must traverse to reach ports in the PRC.

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**Note:** In 2004, over 80 percent of Chinese crude oil imports transited the Straits of Malacca, with less than 2 percent transiting the Straits of Lombok. (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2007, 9)

Further, the 2007 report discusses PLA development of capabilities to project power well beyond the area around Taiwan into other areas of the China Sea.

China's approach to dealing with this challenge centers on what DoD's 2006 *Quadrennial Defense Review* report refers to as disruptive capabilities: forces and operational concepts aimed at preventing an adversary from deploying military forces to forward operating locations, and/or rapidly destabilizing critical military balances. In this context, the PLA appears engaged in a sustained effort to develop the capability to interdict, at long ranges, aircraft carrier and expeditionary strike groups that might deploy to the western Pacific. (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2007, 15-16)

The capabilities and ranges involved are indicated in the following statement from the report:

To prevent deployment of naval forces into western Pacific waters, PLA planners are focused on targeting surface ships at long ranges. Analyses of current and projected force structure improvements suggest that in the near term, China is seeking the capacity to hold surface ships at risk through a layered defense that reaches out to the "second island chain" (i.e., the islands extending south and east from Japan, to and beyond Guam in the western Pacific Ocean) (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2007, 16)



**The First and Second Island Chains.** PRC military theorists conceive of two island "chains" as forming a geographic basis for China's maritime defensive perimeter (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2007, 16).

The preceding map illustrates not only the geographic extent of the planned defense perimeter discussed in intended to interfere with hostile force deployment against the PRC, but comparing the lines defining the ranges when extended mentally to cover the area of the shipping lanes with choke-points critical to the PRC also implies the development of an ability to interfere with the establishment and maintenance of a blockade of those shipping lanes.

Secretary of Defense's report indicates that this capability is in some stage of development with full realization of the capability at some future date. The report also makes the following statement:

As PLA modernization progresses, twin misperceptions could lead to miscalculation or crisis. First, other countries may underestimate the extent to which Chinese forces have improved. Second, China's leaders may overestimate the proficiency of their forces by assuming new systems are fully operational, adeptly operated, adequately maintained, and well integrated with existing or other new capabilities (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2007, 15).

This is an interesting dual warning as it speaks to possible miscalculations potentially dangerous to both the PRC and U.S. planners and decision-makers regarding the ability to absolutely predict capabilities in a clash between the two powers. The U.S. should not take for granted that the PRC is not capable of projecting power at the distances discussed, nor should the PRC take it for granted that the development of its power projection has been fully realized such that it will be able to overwhelm U.S. forces at those distances.

In his book, *Interpreting China's Military Power: Doctrine Makes Readiness*, Ka Po Ng analyzes the military doctrines of the PRC as a lens to view the development of its military capabilities, what threats it perceives, and how it might use military power to deal with those threats. The author uses heavy documentary research as evidenced by an extensive list of Chinese language books, periodical articles, essays, news stories, statements, government

documents, interviews, etc. to study the PRC's military doctrine and military capabilities. Ng states that the subject of most strategic doctrinal development is done in the context of U.S. military capabilities. The author proceeds to outline the capabilities under development to implement the doctrines he describes. Ng describes the PRC's security concerns as having moved from survival to territorial sovereignty, including as central issues Taiwan and areas in the China Sea involving sea lanes and energy resources, noting the significance of the Chinese adopting the terms “maritime territory” and “maritime interests” into their discussions as they expand their strategic planning beyond defense of the homeland (Ng 2006, 27). This work is useful for this study as it both discusses Chinese military preparation for conflict with the U.S. and also reflects on the Chinese military leadership’s readiness for the actual scale of the conflict which might erupt. He makes no predictions, but he discusses his concerns that the new doctrines might lead to unanticipated consequences: “Now, that its military leaders embrace the merit of, and in their eyes, the necessity for taking the offensive. Scientific and technological developments reinforce their conviction that war is increasingly controllable” (Ng 2006, 155). The author has accurately identified this conviction as problematic, considering that the history of wars of the last two centuries tends to be one where states initiate conflict presuming they see a near term outcome, only to be drawn into wars of unanticipated intensity and length.

In her book *Dangerous Strait: The U.S. – Taiwan – China Crisis* Nancy Bernkopf Tucker assembled a group of studies exploring the issues and relationships surrounding the ongoing situation involving Taiwan. The various authors elaborate on historical as well as current political positions and actions to assist in the development of a greater understanding of the dynamics and choices facing each of the key participants. Detailed discussions of the evolution of the Taiwan independence movement in the dual context of overall Taiwanese politics and

international relations is particularly helpful in developing a deeper understanding of the forces and issues at play which are more nuanced than the summary discussions available through print and broadcast news would imply. The facts and historical detail behind the headline issues provide a good context for development of potential scenarios.

Two essays in Tucker's book discuss the potential for ROC government action to negatively influence public opinion. Richard Bush in his essay on Lee Teng-hui discusses the realities of Lee Teng-hui's [president, member of the KMT party] apparent commitment to separatism, which upon analysis may be found to be oriented toward reunification even though the People's Republic of China portrayed them as defining a path to Taiwanese separation and, therefore, highly provocative. Lee was followed in Taiwan's presidency by Chen Shui-bian, the candidate of the DPP party which had long promoted independence for Taiwan. Steven Phillips in his essay "Building a Taiwanese Republic", asserts that Chen was deliberately provocative, saying "The President's policies seemed motivated by a complex mixture of cynical political opportunism and nationalist idealism. In light of a high unemployment rate and questions over his administration's competence, he sought to sway voters by goading the mainland government into threatening the island as it had done during the 1996 election of Lee Teng-hui, facing the last four years of his long political career, may have come to believe that he must secure his place in history by pushing the island toward permanent separation from the mainland" (Tucker 2005, 67). In both cases, the international media viewed the actions of the government of the Republic of China as provoking a Chinese response. Under such circumstances the United States might find it difficult to justify to the American public spending blood and treasure to bail out a regime which irresponsibly causes a conflict.

Another essay in Tucker's book by Michael Swaine discussing Taiwan's defense reforms

and another by Michael Chase on U.S.-Taiwan security cooperation indicate that Taiwan's military may not be realistic in its assessment of the true scope of the threat of the PRC's military developments as well as believing that its economic value to the PRC or its political and economic relationship with the United States will serve as a form of defense against attack by the People's Republic. This leads to the dual possibility that its military could be very rapidly overwhelmed in an attack, leaving little time for the U.S. to do more than enter the conflict faced with a Taiwan occupied by the People's Liberation Army relatively undamaged or unimpaired by the Taiwanese. And this circumstance might follow a period of deliberate provocation of the People's Republic by a Taiwanese government which had miscalculated the threshold for action and the actual imminence of the threat of attack and invasion from the mainland.

Evan A. Feigenbaum in his article, titled "China's New Military Posture and the New Economic Geopolitics" (1999) asserts that a historical review of the People's Republic of China's use of force since 1949 is driven more by their inflexible definition of territorial sovereignty than by concern with resources and economic needs or concerns with international balance-of-power. He states his opinion that the PRC's military modernization program is decades away from allowing them to challenge U.S. power directly for control of the region [the reader should note that the article dated from nearly a decade ago]. Feigenbaum notes that a change in the commitment or the ability of the U.S. to maintain its hegemony would directly affect the perceptions of the Chinese regarding accelerating or aggravating their need to assert control over the economically important region. As long as U.S. protection of sea lanes in the Pacific allows the PRC to hitch a free ride on U.S. power, the PRC has no need to project its own to protect them. A perception of a weakened or distracted U.S. hegemon unwilling to continue its projection of power might also cause the Chinese to reassess their ability to force both a

resolution to the Taiwan situation and control of the sea lanes. The two issues taken together, control of Taiwan and control over the shipping routes, are linked through the variable of U.S. power in explaining or predicting Chinese behavior, but he touches on, and largely ignores, likely Chinese behavior or decisions regarding Taiwan. Perhaps if Feigenbaum were writing the study today and considering the reaction of the U.S. to its Vietnam experience in comparison and combination with the apparent decline in its will to project power in Iraq and the Middle East, he might give more importance to the possibilities of the PRC's use of force in regard to these issues.

Gurmeet Kanwal in his article, titled "China's Long March to World Power Status: Strategic Challenge for India" (1999), provides a study of the PRC's apparent strategy and actions from the Indian viewpoint, summarizing the PRC's strategy as having moved from one of coastal defense to what he calls "Oceanic Offensive" with an emphasis on building up naval and air forces to project power at some larger distance from its shores (Kanwal 1999, 2). He notes the PRC's focus on Taiwan, but also elaborates on the PRC's ultimate goal being the ability to accomplish force projection well into the China Sea and even the Indian Ocean. Kanwal speaks from the viewpoint of India's strategic situation, addressing the Chinese interest in deep water ports in Myanmar as well as an electronic listening post in the eastern Indian Ocean as efforts to encircle India strategically. Kanwal may have overlooked the strategic problem the PRC has in its need to protect its energy supply lines and its main shipping lanes in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea. He clearly depicts a development for Chinese strategy in the direction of enhancing its geographic reach even if he may miss one critical motivation for it.

The book *China: The Balance Sheet* uses a realist approach to broadly consider economic, technological, diplomatic, military, and other bases of comparative power to assess the PRC's

position versus the US and its neighbors, and then how the US should deal with the PRC. The authors demonstrate that the PRC considers the United States as its main opponent, who the Chinese believe, pursues a policy of containment against the PRC. They propose that the PRC does not have broad global ambitions in the near to medium term and is interested mainly in power adequate to regionally protect its own territorial sovereignty and economic interests. The authors assert that the PRC is adopting new strategic doctrines to allow them to develop military capabilities appropriate to their weaker position versus the United States, speaking of “active defense” in seeking opportunities to take the offensive in “indirect/asymmetric confrontation and concentrated strikes” to accomplish objectives (Bergsten et al. 2006, 151). Scenarios that the authors paint in which the PRC might use its modernized forces in the relative near term include an overt move to independence by Taiwan or a legitimacy crisis in which the Chinese government would be forced to act against Taiwan to maintain popular support.

Mark Stokes in his study, titled *China's Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States*, discusses the modernization of the PLA in terms of new strategic doctrines and systems that go well beyond simply upgrading conventional forces. Stokes summarizes the point of his study, saying, “There is an influential segment within China's defense-industrial complex which is concentrating on the development of doctrine and systems designed to enable targeting of adversarial strategic and operational centers of gravity, and defend its own, in order to pursue limited political objectives with an asymmetrical economy of force” (Stokes 1999, 1). Stokes describes a set of capabilities that will allow the PRC to blind and cut off communications for U.S. forces at the same time key bases and carrier groups would be attacked. He uses extensive Chinese sources, including articles, books, government papers, speeches, etc. with several dozens of reference notes for each chapter. Stokes develops the study (1) from the strategic

foundations for the new doctrines, (2) to the technologies involved, (3) to the means by which the technologies are or would be obtained, (4) to descriptions of the weapons systems proposed or in development, and finally (5) to examples of how the systems would interact in combat. Stokes demonstrates the effects of the operation of the systems he enumerates, and describes the strategic dilemmas that might be created for the United States by developing a very believable scenario for an attack by the PLA on Taiwan to describe the effects of the force structure and systems that they are developing and deploying. Stokes work is useful to this paper in providing dimension to the kind, intensity, and speed of the combat that could be expected at the opening of a conflict involving the PRC, Japan and the U.S. as well as the resulting strategic decisions the participants would face.

## **THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

It is fascinating that in all the literature reviewed to prepare for this study that so little material dealt with the aftermath of the opening rounds of a conflict that begins with an attack on Taiwan by the PRC. In fact, most of the literature appears even reluctant to address that initial attack in depth or detail - almost as if discussing it would in some way encourage or lead to the actual event. This void is reminiscent of discussions or planning for many of the conflicts that mark recent centuries. Some conflicts occurred without forethought, but others that were considered or even planned out in grand scale failed to anticipate many actual turns of events – most notably the scale or duration of the conflicts. Many of these conflicts were initiated with the thought that a resolution could be accomplished in weeks or months, when in fact they dragged on for many years, consuming unanticipated large numbers of troops and wealth - even for the victors. Since few nations initiate conflict planning on failure, many if not most of the

participants were surprised frequently at the actual flow of events. And the losers were both grandly surprised and dismayed.

It seems logical then to consider how events might play out following a successful (even marginally successful) attack and invasion of Taiwan by the PRC. And since the potential flow of events might lead to a number of potential scenarios, the LAMP method which compares and ranks such scenarios in probability for further analysis would appear to be a preferred method to accomplish such an analysis. The steps to accomplish the analysis are listed below:

1. Define the issue for which you are trying to determine the most likely future.
2. Specify the national "actors" involved.
3. Perform an in-depth study of how each national actor perceives the issue in question.
4. Specify all possible courses of action for each actor.
5. Determine the major scenarios within which you compare the alternate futures.
6. Calculate the total number of permutations of possible "alternate futures" for each scenario.

The general formula for computing the number of alternate futures is:

$$X^Y=Z$$

Where X equals the number of courses of action open to each actor, and y equals the number of national actors involved (assuming each actor has the same number of courses of action open to it), Z equals the total number of alternate futures to be compared.

7. Perform a "pairwise comparison" of all alternate futures within the scenario to determine their relative probability.

The total number of votes is a function of the number of alternate futures to be analyzed, which in turn is a function of the number of actors and courses of action the analyst has determined for the issue. The formula for the number of pairwise comparison is:

$$X=\frac{n(n-1)}{2}$$

Where *n* equals the total number of alternate futures to be analyzed, and X equals the total number of pairwise comparisons.

8. Rank the alternate futures for each scenario from highest relative probability to the lowest based on the number of "votes" received.
9. Assuming each future occurs, analyze each alternate future in terms of its consequences for the issue in question.

10. Determine the "focal events" that must occur in our present in order to bring about a given alternate future.
11. Develop indicators for the focal events.
12. State the potential of a given alternate future to "transpose" into another alternate future.

## **1. THE ISSUE**

The issue in question is the actions of each of the nations and the possible outcomes of an attack and invasion accomplished by the PRC against the ROC forces on Taiwan before any of the ROC's allies could bring their forces to bear in Taiwan's defense.

## **2. THE NATIONAL ACTORS INVOLVED**

The national actors in this situation are the People's Republic of China (PRC), the United States, and Japan. It might seem odd that the Republic of China government and forces on Taiwan are not considered a separate actor, but, frankly, the ability of the ROC forces to resist and survive an attack and invasion attempt by the PLA is open to question. Even if some forces survive the initial massive assault, the contribution of surviving ROC forces to ongoing combat operations are likely to be minimal. U.S. forces and Japanese forces will be the remaining potential opposition to PLA forces once the PLA overwhelms the island's main defenses, forces a landing, and overruns the island. Therefore, the likely actions of those two national actors, the United States and Japan, plus those of the PRC are the only ones considered in this study.

**3. THE PERCEPTIONS OF THE NATIONAL ACTORS****Peoples Republic of China**

Probably the overriding issue in the Taiwan situation is one central to the PRC's connections to Chinese history. Regaining sovereignty over historical Chinese territory is a matter of great national concern. The actions of various colonial powers taking control of large swaths of China in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries has left a legacy in the Chinese national outlook on dealing with foreign powers held responsible for those encroachments. This not only involves regaining control over those territories, but also reversing the humiliations that the colonial powers inflicted upon the Chinese nation such that the PRC can restore itself to the position of authority and power it held historically in the region. These are priorities that the Chinese people feel deeply. To maintain legitimacy in the minds of the populace, the leadership of the Communist Party and of the Peoples Republic of China must be seen to be actively and energetically working to reestablish control over lost territory and regain the historical influence that most Chinese feel is their rightful place in the region. The continued separation of Taiwan is viewed in the context of this territorial and regional authority focus by the people and leadership of the PRC.

Although the U.S. was only peripherally involved in the colonial depredations inflicted by the colonial powers, it is a current surrogate for those powers as it conducts itself as the peace-keeper or policeman for the western Pacific and has for several decades held itself in a position of opposition to many of the policies and interests of the current government of the PRC. The animus held toward the U.S. is aggravated by its developing alliance with Japan which appears clearly posed in opposition to the PRC. The U.S. is publicly encouraging Japan to increase its military capabilities and become more active in the defense alliances in its region.

The separation of Taiwan is difficult enough to accept by itself, but with Japan's re-involvement through U.S. encouragement, it almost appears to be an extension of the earlier historical period when Japan controlled the island.

Japan still bears the baggage in Chinese minds of both the colonial period as well as the still-living memories of the atrocities Japan committed during World War II in China – some of the worst committed by any power on a conquered population during that war. And now the U.S. and Japan are both publicly backing the continued separation of Taiwan from the mainland.

The U.S. position as what would historically be called a great power - known in current parlance as a super power - appears to offer a natural challenge to the PRC, which is clearly a rising power. To the PRC the U.S. appears to be an obstacle to its rising authority in its own region, let alone the general international arena. The PRC is at great pains to identify the U.S. at the UN and in other international forums as an international problem to weaken the U.S. in its actions as a sort of self-appointed policemen or mediator. As suggested by the previously cited work by Tammen and Kugler, the PRC may feel compelled to push against the control it feels being exerted by the U.S. in a predictable act by such a rising power. And the PRC may feel compelled to do this even though they may not have yet achieved military or economic parity with the U.S. Taiwan may simply be the most obvious point of irritation or conflict between the U.S. and the PRC.

Gurmeet Kanwal in his previously cited article on China's rising power status provides an Indian viewpoint noting that the PRC is actively working to project power to reassert control over territories it considers historically Chinese as well as to project power and some degree of control over neighboring states. The PRC has stated and to varying extent taken actions to exert territorial claims to such areas as island chains disputed with Japan, the Philippines, and

Vietnam, and it has taken unilateral actions such as its projects to divert water from the Mekong River which has and will affect millions of persons in nations outside the borders of the PRC without consultation with the affected neighboring nations.

Kanwal also notes in his comments about the assertiveness and aggressiveness of the PRC's policies is its desire to control shipping lanes for the supply of energy and raw materials crucial to its economy and military. As Evan Feigenbaum suggested, as long as there was no reason to contest with the U.S., the PRC was content with the U.S. acting as a sort of policeman for those shipping lanes, with this situation actually saving the PRC from having to expend its own resources. With rising tension between the PRC and the U.S., the issue of control of the shipping lanes through the Indian Ocean and the straits entering the South China Sea has become an issue of strategic significance, as is clearly noted in the two reports to Congress by the Secretary of Defense cited above. The PLA is working to develop a blue water navy to project power well beyond the shores of the PRC, and is negotiating to develop ports for that navy in the Indian Ocean to allow power projection against maritime opponents who might threaten those sea lanes.

As the abilities of the PLA Navy, the PLA's missile forces (both ballistic and cruise) and air forces increase, the PRC will be ever more capable of engaging U.S. and Japanese forces at some depth. This will allow the PRC to contest blockades of its shipping lanes and to strike at bases, carrier groups, and other key points well back from an active engagement occurring on and around Taiwan.

Mark Stokes study, for example, talks of such developments, and he asserts that the PRC has intently studied U.S. operations and doctrine in the Balkans and in the Middle East to determine where they might best strike to weaken or disable U.S. forces in the event of a

confrontation. They have pursued development or purchase of technologies that would allow them to make effective strikes against key points in the U.S. military, with particular interest in the C4ISR structures, including space-based systems. It is clear from many of the works on PLA force modernization that the PRC is intent on developing increased military power mainly in the context of conflicts involving Taiwan. As time passes, and the PRC brings more of these new technologies and systems to operational status, it may be reflected in their overall posture and actions versus the U.S. and Japan in general, and specifically in regard to Taiwan.

Should the PRC and the U.S. actually come to blows over Taiwan, the leadership is very aware of the ability of the U.S. to deliver massive strategic strikes against the PRC. In recent years, the PLA has openly discussed its development of mobile intercontinental ballistic missile systems as well as nuclear missile submarines to make clear its intent to have a capability to threaten U.S. targets to counter-balance the U.S. strategic preponderance. Such mobile systems could not for a certainty be destroyed by preemptive U.S. action and would be seen as a means to place a prohibitive price on attacks on mainland PRC targets. It would hardly seem to be contemplated as a first-strike strategy as the first use of such weapons by the PRC against the U.S. could be expected to trigger a direct response well beyond PRC capabilities. The existence of such weapons in the PRC is more likely intended to affect U.S. decision-making in future conflicts with the PRC, and there have been not-so-subtle suggestions that the U.S. consider whether an escalating conflict over Taiwan is worth an attack on cities in the continental U.S.

It is worth considering the sort of issues or provocation that might lead to an attack. The PRC has made it clear that any serious move by Taiwan toward independence would be cause for attack. The recent discussions and actions of by the ROC leadership, particularly those of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party, have caused much consternation and

threatening military demonstrations by the PLA as warnings against further moves toward independence. Over-confidence or miscalculation on the part of ROC leadership could trigger an unanticipated reaction if they stepped over some threshold in PRC perceptions.

Accidents which involve forces deployed in and around Taiwan, such as the collision that occurred between the U.S. Navy EP-3 electronic spy plane and PRC F-8 fighter, would have the potential to spiral out of control.

A calculation of the PLA's ability to accomplish a successful attack and invasion balanced against perceptions of U.S. unwillingness or inability to pursue a military campaign of sufficient intensity to eject PLA forces already in possession of Taiwan might cause an aggressive and ambitious PRC to back a confident PLA leadership in a quick strike to force reunification and present the U.S. and Japan with a *fait accompli* that would be beyond their ability or will to contest.

The PRC has also concluded that the civilian or commercial systems of the U.S. are a strategic weakness that would be vulnerable to key point strikes. This could be in the form of physical, electromagnetic or software attacks on space-based systems or software attacks against the information technology systems critical not only to the functioning of the economy, but also to the support for the military, as military systems make use of a large proportion of commercial satellite and communications systems as an essential part of its infrastructure. Attacking these systems offers the dual advantage of disrupting the military while at the same time disrupting the operation of the American economy and directly negatively distracting and affecting the will of the American people to support a conflict.

As the rapid economic and social changes inside the PRC occur in tandem with the amazing growth in the economy, the uneven benefits of the changes, the problems and social

disruptions created by the industrialization and related population shifts, and the endemic corruption evident in the leadership all contribute to a growing unrest in the PRC. If this unrest rose to the extent that a leadership crisis occurred, it is conceivable that Taiwan could be used as a cause around which the leaders would attempt to rally the population.

To look at the other side of this “coin”, if Taiwan moved toward independence and the leadership did nothing, offered some ineffective response to the situation, or grossly failed in an attempt to prevent independence, there could be civil unrest over the legitimacy of such a government for China. This could result in some sort of leadership change either within the Communist Party or, in an extreme situation, a complete change of leadership away from the Party. It might even lead to local unrest which could threaten to progress to the breakaway of some regions.

### **United States**

The history of the U.S. relationship with the ROC is one of support through several crises which has almost come to open conflict with the PRC on several occasions since the ROC fled the mainland and established its refuge on Taiwan. The U.S. is effectively the last remaining ally of the ROC, even though it has formally stated that the ROC does not represent a separate nation. The U.S. has agreed to the principle of “one China”, but it supports the ROC in its position that reunification must be accomplished on a voluntary, democratic basis with a majority of the residents of Taiwan agreeing to the actual reunification.

The U.S. has a history of confrontation and opposition to the PRC, since the earliest exchanges of artillery fire and threats between the PRC and ROC forces after the ROC evacuation from the mainland. When PLA divisions crossed the Yalu River into Korea, the U.S.

found itself locked in a drawn-out war against what appeared to be at least a client state of the Soviet Union in a hot theater of the cold war. In spite of some slight warming of relationships after both the U.S. and the PRC found it useful to establish some level of positive relationship to counter-balance Soviet influence, and the period of “peaceful-rise” which began under Deng Xiaoping, the relationship between the U.S. and the PRC has been mainly one marked by distrust and opposition, both overt and covert.

In recent decades, the U.S. has re-balanced its relationships between the PRC and the ROC. Where in the past, there has been little question of the U.S. fully supporting the ROC against the PRC, the U.S. has modified its position to tilt more toward the PRC. There is less of a feeling of unconditional support for the ROC, and the commitment felt by the American people has decreased as economic and diplomatic involvement with the PRC has increased.

The U.S. has remained the main counter-balance against PRC aggressiveness for a number of nations in the western Pacific. Even though the PRC has been at some pains to appear unaggressive, PRC’s assertive, almost expansionist demeanor has reinforced concerns extending territorial claims to island chains disputed with Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam, as well as taking such actions as projects to divert water from the Mekong river which has and will affect millions of persons in nations outside the borders of the PRC without consultation with the affected neighbors. The role of the U.S. in alliances in the area in the context of these developments looks ever more critical.

At the same time as tensions involving the PRC’s growing assertiveness cause its neighbors to consider how to deal with the balance between the assertiveness of the PRC and an alliance with the U.S. , They are watching how the U.S. conducts itself in the Middle East with some concern as to the U.S.’s reliability as an ally. Recent experiences with American popular

reaction to Iraq and Afghanistan appear to raise the question of the long term reliability of the U.S. The reaction by the U.S. to internal political debates among a populace which is hyper-sensitive to casualty rates and averse to long-term commitments to conflicts may make the U.S. a questionable ally against a determined opponent.

The U.S. presently remains committed to the support of the ROC against a forced reunification, but actions and statements by the independence movement on Taiwan have complicated the situation, almost seeming to be provoking a response from the PRC. Such provocations appear to weaken U.S. popular support for the ROC, and would possibly cause negative popular opinion to impair U.S. support if the opinion were that the ROC provocation effectively dragged the U.S. into a conflict with the PRC.

In any event, failure of the U.S. to follow through on its commitment to support the ROC would likely result in U.S. regional allies calling into question the worth of their relationship with what might well prove to be an unreliable supporter against the PRC - a growing regional, if not global, power.

Complicating the situation for the U.S. is the number of military commitments it must maintain in various areas of the world. With the resources expended and still committed in active conflicts in the Middle East and southwest Asia, the military appears stretched somewhat thin. And the need to replace expended stores and munitions as well as aging weapons systems will be a challenge for the U.S. in the face of its domestic priorities. Both the PRC and the U.S. allies are watching to see how the U.S. will manage its force structure and its capabilities. Public U.S. debates continue over the expense of supporting the two conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan while developing next generation weapons systems based on forecasts of strategy, doctrine, and

operational force structure necessary to deal with future threats, the major of those being an emerging, hostile nuclear-power in Iran, a resurgent Russia and, of course, the PRC.

Specifically in regard to the PRC, the discussions by the Department of Defense which speak of strategies and doctrines to deal with the PLA seem to deal with air and naval forces focused on interdiction and denial of PLA access to the waters and air space around Taiwan. There is, as mentioned above, also discussion of the PRC's vulnerable shipping lanes. In the main, the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy carrier forces are intended to be the main instruments of the relevant strategies, which center on delivering punishing blows to PLA air and naval forces. As the forward bases available to the U.S. are all at least 500 miles from Taiwan, the brunt of combat to maintain immediate air superiority over Taiwan would have to be borne by carrier forces, save for longer range bombing missions launched from the more distant land bases. Likewise, air support for any naval blockade, particularly of the western sea lanes through and from the Indian Ocean would be supported from carrier groups. The strategy, doctrine and force structure represented by the carrier groups and air force units which are or would be deployed to confront the PRC are specifically designed to project power to support these missions, particularly through the development of the C4ISR systems which allow collection and rapid dissemination of information as well as precision attacks which are the envy of the rest of the world's militaries.

The forward air bases and the carrier groups represent high value assets which the PRC clearly views as key points critical to the U.S. military. And these are very dependent upon the C4ISR systems, many of which rely on key points represented by a relatively small number of satellite-based systems. The PRC has focused intently on these systems to pick out vulnerabilities to allow them to attack these key points to neutralize or weaken U.S. forces.

Although the U.S. military speaks confidently about its ability to deal with such anticipated attacks by the PRC, it may be that any such certainty is really only possible in the aftermath of a successful defense against such an attack when the PLA has used all of its strategic and tactical options against the vulnerabilities they believe they have identified.

A void that seems to exist in the U.S. planning is strategy or operational planning to deal with the need to land and confront a significant PLA force already occupying Taiwan. If the PLA can accomplish a swift attack and invasion, and the U.S. is confronted with an occupied Taiwan, it appears that the only near term options available would be blockade and a campaign of attrition against the PLA. Should such a campaign fail to dislodge the PLA, the U.S. could be faced with the necessity to plan for and develop the capability for a direct assault against PLA ground forces.

In a conflict scenario involving a successful attack and invasion on Taiwan by the PRC, potential combat losses by U.S. forces could be horrendous. Where in Iraq it took five years to accumulate a killed-in-action count of 4000, it is conceivable that combat involving the destruction of a single carrier group with damages inflicted on other carrier groups, land air bases and naval and air force air crews could result in a casualty count not far from the five-year Iraq War total in a matter of days. How the American population would react to such losses could be a major obstacle to continued U.S. support for a conflict involving Taiwan.

The ability to reconstitute the U.S. forces lost in such heavy combat would be another issue, even not considering the training time for replacement of personnel. Replacement of a carrier is a multi-year effort. Refitting a carrier damaged in heavy combat could take many months. And replacing significant numbers of combat aircraft could take months or years, depending how fast production could be increased. Likewise, the replenishment of the

sophisticated munitions used by U.S. forces could require months. The replacement of critical satellite-based systems would likely stretch into months or years, presuming the PRC doesn't adopt a debris or radiation-based space denial strategy.

Most of the U.S. planning for conflict presupposes a combat of limited duration – which is not atypical of most pre-war planning in recent history – and does not foresee the need for extensive production of major assets or consumables at the rates necessary for a protracted conflict. Nor does it project the potential need for dramatic changes in its operational doctrines, which a successful attack against its C4ISR systems would require. The successful resolution of a conflict between the U.S. and the PRC which devolved into a protracted struggle would be dependent upon the ability to maintain the morale and commitment of the American people for the longer term, with recent history indicating that this would be difficult.

Complicate a conflict situation with the effects of potential attacks against commercial space-based systems and the internet, and the lives of the American people would be severely affected. An argument could be made that this might anger them enough to support a response against the attacker, but in the wrong circumstances, such disruptions could contribute to a decline in support for a conflict.

## **Japan**

The last decade, in particular, has seen a shift in Japan's posture regarding defense issues. From a reluctance to address any issues which involved the deployment of the Japanese Self Defense Force (SDF) outside of its own region, Japan has actually deployed the SDF in a combat zone and provided active support to military forces actually engaged in that combat. This

represents a major change in its approach to national security instigated by its major ally, the United States.

From a posture in which the U.S. led its defeated enemy in World War II to create a government constitutionally restricted from engaging in other than the most necessary self – defense, the U.S. has changed its priorities for its former enemy/present ally. Where the American public once supported the creation and maintenance of a pacifist culture and outlook for the Japanese, this outlook has been largely replaced by a desire for the Japanese, whose economy has grown to the world’s second largest, to bear a larger share of the costs of their own security and not receive a free ride on the backs of American tax payers by sheltering nearly completely under the U.S. defensive umbrella.

A large segment of Japan’s citizenry is still not warm to the idea of a large military or an active combat role for Japan’s military. Until recent years, there was even significant resistance to the creation of an anti-ballistic missile system for Japan, as this was viewed as provocative to potential opponents and implied greater direct Japanese involvement in potential conflicts than many Japanese found acceptable.

As the share of the population born after World War II increases and more of these younger Japanese achieve active political age, there are greater numbers of Japanese voters who are comfortable with a more normal role for Japan in dealing with matters of international security. Now that Japan is a global economic power, they question why Japan should not act as a global power in security matters, particularly those involving Japanese security in its own region.

But the proportion of the population which remains largely anti-war was sufficiently large that as late as 2003, when the Diet voted to authorize dispatch of SDF troops to Iraq in

support of the U.S., polling determined that the proportion of those Japanese who were against committing the SDF to Iraq in support of the U.S. never dropped below 52% (Kliman 2006, 137). Kliman argues convincingly that only a general Japanese understanding of the importance of the strategic relationship with the U.S. allowed the Diet and Prime Minister to take such an action and not trigger a change of government and a resulting election and change of prime minister.

With the North Koreans test firing missiles over Japan and the shocking divulgence of their program to kidnap Japanese from Japanese soil for the express purpose of obtaining resources to train agents to act against Japan, the Japanese experienced a sort of awakening to the threats against them. Albeit with much debate and some U.S. pressure, the Japanese commenced a program of ballistic missile defense system development in cooperation with the U.S.

Further revelations about North Korean nuclear weapons development even re-opened the subject of nuclear weapons development by Japan itself as a self-defense measure. Kliman describes the government of Japan's interpretation of Article 9 (the sole article in Chapter II of the Japanese Constitution, titled "Renunciation of War", known as the peace clause) stating, "Fifty years of creeping reinterpretation have, from a constitutional perspective, enabled virtually the entire intensity spectrum. Even nuclear weapons and long range missiles – currently absent from the SDF's inventory – are partly exempted from the peace clause" (Kliman 2006, 184). Kliman expresses doubts that a consensus could be generated to openly initiate nuclear weapons development, but the discussion does imply the emotion with which foreign threats are viewed. The open discussion of such matters in Japan also serves as something of a warning to neighboring states that Japan will not be helpless in its own defense.

Since 2004 the PRC has begun to openly deliver more threatening messages to Japan. The PRC has declared its sovereignty over part of the Spratly islands and other maritime territories claimed by Japan, such as the demarcation of sea bottom available for potential energy exploitation. PRC research vessels have committed incursions into Japanese waters, and even a PRC submarine was positively identified after illicitly penetrating Japanese waters. The Japanese have reacted negatively to the PRC's assertiveness, observing carefully the supposedly spontaneous, violent protests and demonstrations against Japan beginning in 2005 in addition to the other threatening gestures previously mentioned.

Japan responded to the perceived growing threat by joining the U.S. in a statement of a shared strategic objective of a peaceful resolution to the issue of the separation of Taiwan from the mainland. This statement was part of an announcement of revisions made to the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance in February of 2005. Comments by a senior Japanese government official clarified the position as follows:

"It would be wrong for us to send a signal to China that the United States and Japan will watch and tolerate China's military invasion of Taiwan," said Shinzo Abe, the acting secretary general of Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party who is widely considered a likely successor to Junichiro Koizumi as prime minister. "If the situation surrounding Japan threatens our security, Japan can provide U.S. forces with support." (Faiola 2005, 2)

Although the declaration may have spoken of peace, it was clearly intended to warn the PRC against use of force to resolve the issue. Japan also took actions to affirm its claim to certain areas in the South China Sea in one case even building up reefs to project above the sea level high enough to qualify them as islands and issuing warnings to the PRC to halt test drillings for oil or gas in Japanese territory in a region that lies between Taiwan and Japan.

Even though the government of Japan has not yet fully endorsed joint combat operation with the U.S. and Japanese constitutional restrictions still apply to joint combat operations that are not clearly in Japan's interest, the flexible interpretation of Article 9 discussed above could be seen as a vehicle to deliver the necessary flexibility of interpretation if operations against the PRC became necessary.

Having noted the official Japanese government statements, it is worth noting the anti-war sentiments of the Japanese people. The debates over allowing the participation of the SDF in a supporting role in Iraq touched on the likely public response to casualties. At that time it was felt that any casualties - let alone significant casualties - would be unacceptable to the Japanese public. Whether the Japanese feel that engaging in heavy combat to force the PRC back from an invasion of Taiwan is worth the likely costs is still open for debate. Whether public opinion would even allow the commitment to combat or maintain that commitment in the face of heavy combat losses may be difficult to predict until the actual point of decision is reached.

It would be easy to propose that Japan supports the ROC in the main because the U.S. supports the ROC. But it might also be possible that Japanese leadership see the situation as a line which they must help defend lest the PRC cross that line and keep on going – all to the detriment of Japan's future. The Japanese know they could not stand up to the PRC without the support of the U.S. Their willingness to support the U.S. in such a direct confrontation would depend on the perception of what would be at stake in terms of their status in the western Pacific if they did not support the U.S.

**4. COURSES OF ACTION FOR THE NATIONAL ACTORS**

**People's Republic of China**

1. The PRC goes to the UN to get the new status of Taiwan affirmed and asks for negotiations to end hostilities with the new status quo being the reunified status of Taiwan. (SQ)
2. The PRC withdraws from Taiwan, still asserting that Taiwan is an integral part of the PRC's territory. (WS)

**United States**

1. The U.S. opposes the PRC with military force, asks for negotiations to end hostilities, and goes to the UN and other international bodies to ask for sanctions and support to oppose the PRC's action as it refuses to recognize a changed status for Taiwan that does not involve voluntary reunification on the part of the Taiwanese. (MV)
2. The U.S. opposes the PRC with military force, asks for negotiations to end hostilities, and goes to the UN and other international bodies to ask for sanctions and support to oppose the PRC's action as it refuses to recognize a changed status for Taiwan that does not involve voluntary reunification on the part of the Taiwanese – ultimately domestic support for the conflict collapses and the U.S. withdraws in favor of negotiations. (MW)
3. The U.S. goes to the UN and other international bodies to ask for sanctions and support to oppose the PRC's action but does not directly intervene militarily. (UN)
4. The U.S. offers no military opposition to The PRC's actions and de facto recognizes the new status of Taiwan as reunified with the mainland. (NM)

**Japan**

1. Japan opposes the PRC with military force, asks for negotiations to end hostilities, and goes to the UN and other international bodies to ask for sanctions and support to oppose the PRC's action as it refuses to recognize a changed status for Taiwan that does not involve voluntary reunification on the part of the Taiwanese. (MV)
2. Japan opposes the PRC with military force, asks for negotiations to end hostilities, and goes to the UN and other international bodies to ask for sanctions and support to oppose the PRC's action as it refuses to recognize a changed status for Taiwan that does not involve voluntary reunification on the part of the Taiwanese – ultimately domestic support for the conflict collapses and Japan withdraws in favor of negotiations. (MW)
3. Japan goes to the UN and other international bodies to appeal for support against the PRC's actions but does not directly intervene militarily. (UN)
4. Japan offers no opposition to the PRC's actions and recognizes the new status of Taiwan as reunified with the mainland. (NM)

**5. THE MAJOR SCENARIOS**

1. The PRC attacks and invades Taiwan – the attack and invasion are successful.
2. The PRC attacks and invades Taiwan – the attack develops into a protracted struggle.
3. The PRC attacks and invades Taiwan – the attack and the invasion fail.

**6. NUMBER OF PERMUTATIONS OF ALTERNATE FUTURES**

X = number of courses of action

Y = number of actors

Z = number or permutations of “possible futures” for each scenario.

$$X^Y = Z$$

(2 courses of action for the PRC) x (4 courses of action for United States) x (4 courses of action for Japan) = Z

$$2^1 \times 4^1 \times 4^1 = 32 \text{ alternate futures}$$

## **7. PAIRWISE COMPARISONS OF ALTERNATE FUTURES**

The number of pairwise comparisons is calculated using the following formula:

X = Total number of pairwise comparisons that must be performed

N = Total number of alternate futures to be analyzed

$$X = (n-1) + (n-2) \dots + (n-n)$$

n = 32 alternate futures to be analyzed

$$X = (32-1) + (32-2) \dots + (32-32) = 496 \text{ pairwise comparisons to be performed}$$

The Pairwise Comparisons for the three alternate scenarios with the 32 alternate futures in each are shown in tables numbered 1, 2 and 3 on the following pages. (See Appendix for actual voting records and summaries.)

Table 1

Scenario 1: The PRC attacks and invades Taiwan. – The attack and the invasion are successful.

Possible Future	PRC	United States	Japan	# Votes
1	SQ	MV	MV	31
2	SQ	MV	MW	30
3	SQ	MV	UN	29
4	SQ	MV	NM	28
5	SQ	MW	MV	21
6	SQ	MW	MW	27
7	SQ	MW	UN	26
8	SQ	MW	NM	25
9	SQ	UN	MV	19
10	SQ	UN	MW	19
11	SQ	UN	UN	24
12	SQ	UN	NM	23
13	SQ	NM	MV	16
14	SQ	NM	MW	17
15	SQ	NM	UN	21
16	SQ	NM	NM	20
17	WS	MV	MV	11
18	WS	MV	MW	12
19	WS	MV	UN	14
20	WS	MV	NM	13
21	WS	MW	MV	9
22	WS	MW	MW	12
23	WS	MW	UN	10
24	WS	MW	NM	10
25	WS	UN	MV	8
26	WS	UN	MW	6
27	WS	UN	UN	4
28	WS	UN	NM	3
29	WS	NM	MV	4
30	WS	NM	MW	2
31	WS	NM	UN	1
32	WS	NM	NM	1
				496

SQ = PRC new status quo is the reunified status of Taiwan

WS = PRC withdraws

MV = Military action to preserve Taiwan voluntary action

MW = Military action to preserve Taiwan voluntary action, domestic pressures lead to withdrawal

UN = No military, appeals to the UN and other nations

NM = No military action de facto recognition new Taiwan status

Table 2

Scenario 2: The PRC attacks and invades Taiwan – the attack develops into a protracted struggle.

Possible Future	PRC	United States	Japan	# Votes
1	SQ	MV	MV	31
2	SQ	MV	MW	30
3	SQ	MV	UN	29
4	SQ	MV	NM	28
5	SQ	MW	MV	21
6	SQ	MW	MW	20
7	SQ	MW	UN	21
8	SQ	MW	NM	17
9	SQ	UN	MV	7
10	SQ	UN	MW	15
11	SQ	UN	UN	20
12	SQ	UN	NM	18
13	SQ	NM	MV	13
14	SQ	NM	MW	14
15	SQ	NM	UN	17
16	SQ	NM	NM	18
17	WS	MV	MV	27
18	WS	MV	MW	26
19	WS	MV	UN	25
20	WS	MV	NM	24
21	WS	MW	MV	12
22	WS	MW	MW	12
23	WS	MW	UN	11
24	WS	MW	NM	5
25	WS	UN	MV	9
26	WS	UN	MW	8
27	WS	UN	UN	7
28	WS	UN	NM	3
29	WS	NM	MV	4
30	WS	NM	MW	3
31	WS	NM	UN	1
32	WS	NM	NM	0
				496

SQ = PRC new status quo is the reunified status of Taiwan

WS = PRC withdraws

MV = Military action to preserve Taiwan voluntary action

MW = Military action to preserve Taiwan voluntary action, domestic pressures lead to withdrawal

UN = No military, appeals to the UN and other nations

NM = No military action de facto recognition new Taiwan status

Table 3

Scenario 3: The PRC attacks and invades Taiwan – the attack and the invasion fail.

Possible Future	PRC	United States	Japan	# Votes
1	SQ	MV	MV	0
2	SQ	MV	MW	2
3	SQ	MV	UN	3
4	SQ	MV	NM	4
5	SQ	MW	MV	6
6	SQ	MW	MW	12
7	SQ	MW	UN	11
8	SQ	MW	NM	11
9	SQ	UN	MV	1
10	SQ	UN	MW	8
11	SQ	UN	UN	7
12	SQ	UN	NM	9
13	SQ	NM	MV	5
14	SQ	NM	MW	13
15	SQ	NM	UN	13
16	SQ	NM	NM	15
17	WS	MV	MV	31
18	WS	MV	MW	30
19	WS	MV	UN	29
20	WS	MV	NM	28
21	WS	MW	MV	27
22	WS	MW	MW	24
23	WS	MW	UN	22
24	WS	MW	NM	19
25	WS	UN	MV	26
26	WS	UN	MW	21
27	WS	UN	UN	23
28	WS	UN	NM	20
29	WS	NM	MV	25
30	WS	NM	MW	17
31	WS	NM	UN	18
32	WS	NM	NM	16
				496

SQ = PRC new status quo is the reunified status of Taiwan

WS = PRC withdraws

MV = Military action to preserve Taiwan voluntary action

MW = Military action to preserve Taiwan voluntary action, domestic pressures lead to withdrawal

UN = No military, appeals to the UN and other nations

NM = No military action de facto recognition new Taiwan status

**8. RANKED ALTERNATE FUTURES**

The pairwise comparison of futures results in each potential future receiving different numbers of votes based upon their relative probability to each other. In this step the futures are rank-ordered from "most likely" to "least likely" based upon the number of votes received. The rank-ordered tables, numbers 4, 5, and 6, are shown on the following pages.

Table 4 – Rank Ordered Futures

Scenario 1: The PRC attacks and invades Taiwan. – The attack and the invasion are successful.

Possible Future	PRC	United States	Japan	# Votes
1	SQ	MV	MV	31
2	SQ	MV	MW	30
3	SQ	MV	UN	29
4	SQ	MV	NM	28
6	SQ	MW	MW	27
7	SQ	MW	UN	26
8	SQ	MW	NM	25
11	SQ	UN	UN	24
12	SQ	UN	NM	23
5	SQ	MW	MV	21
15	SQ	NM	UN	21
16	SQ	NM	NM	20
9	SQ	UN	MV	19
10	SQ	UN	MW	19
14	SQ	NM	MW	17
13	SQ	NM	MV	16
19	WS	MV	UN	14
20	WS	MV	NM	13
18	WS	MV	MW	12
22	WS	MW	MW	12
17	WS	MV	MV	11
23	WS	MW	UN	10
24	WS	MW	NM	10
21	WS	MW	MV	9
25	WS	UN	MV	8
26	WS	UN	MW	6
27	WS	UN	UN	4
29	WS	NM	MV	4
28	WS	UN	NM	3
30	WS	NM	MW	2
31	WS	NM	UN	1
32	WS	NM	NM	1
				496

SQ = PRC new status quo is the reunified status of Taiwan

WS = PRC withdraws

MV = Military action to preserve Taiwan voluntary action

MW = Military action to preserve Taiwan voluntary action, domestic pressures lead to withdrawal

UN = No military, appeals to the UN and other nations

NM = No military action de facto recognition new Taiwan status

Table 5 – Rank Ordered Futures

Scenario 2: The PRC attacks and invades Taiwan – the attack develops into a protracted struggle.

Possible Future	PRC	United States	Japan	# Votes
1	SQ	MV	MV	31
2	SQ	MV	MW	30
3	SQ	MV	UN	29
4	SQ	MV	NM	28
17	WS	MV	MV	27
18	WS	MV	MW	26
19	WS	MV	UN	25
20	WS	MV	NM	24
5	SQ	MW	MV	21
7	SQ	MW	UN	21
11	SQ	UN	UN	20
6	SQ	MW	MW	20
8	SQ	MW	NM	17
10	SQ	UN	MW	15
12	SQ	UN	NM	18
13	SQ	NM	MV	13
14	SQ	NM	MW	14
15	SQ	NM	UN	17
16	SQ	NM	NM	18
21	WS	MW	MV	12
22	WS	MW	MW	12
23	WS	MW	UN	11
25	WS	UN	MV	9
26	WS	UN	MW	8
9	SQ	UN	MV	7
27	WS	UN	UN	7
24	WS	MW	NM	5
29	WS	NM	MV	4
28	WS	UN	NM	3
30	WS	NM	MW	3
31	WS	NM	UN	1
32	WS	NM	NM	0
				496

SQ = PRC new status quo is the reunified status of Taiwan

WS = PRC withdraws

MV = Military action to preserve Taiwan voluntary action

MW = Military action to preserve Taiwan voluntary action, domestic pressures lead to withdrawal

UN = No military, appeals to the UN and other nations

NM = No military action de facto recognition new Taiwan status

Table 6 – Rank Ordered Futures

Scenario 3: The PRC attacks and invades Taiwan – the attack and the invasion fail.

Possible Future	PRC	United States	Japan	# Votes
17	WS	MV	MV	31
18	WS	MV	MW	30
19	WS	MV	UN	29
20	WS	MV	NM	28
21	WS	MW	MV	27
25	WS	UN	MV	26
22	WS	MW	MW	24
29	WS	NM	MV	25
27	WS	UN	UN	23
23	WS	MW	UN	22
26	WS	UN	MW	21
28	WS	UN	NM	20
24	WS	MW	NM	19
31	WS	NM	UN	18
30	WS	NM	MW	17
32	WS	NM	NM	16
16	SQ	NM	NM	15
14	SQ	NM	MW	13
15	SQ	NM	UN	13
6	SQ	MW	MW	12
7	SQ	MW	UN	11
8	SQ	MW	NM	11
12	SQ	UN	NM	9
10	SQ	UN	MW	8
11	SQ	UN	UN	7
5	SQ	MW	MV	6
13	SQ	NM	MV	5
4	SQ	MV	NM	4
3	SQ	MV	UN	3
2	SQ	MV	MW	2
9	SQ	UN	MV	1
1	SQ	MV	MV	0
				496

SQ = PRC new status quo is the reunified status of Taiwan

WS = PRC withdraws

MV = Military action to preserve Taiwan voluntary action

MW = Military action to preserve Taiwan voluntary action, domestic pressures lead to withdrawal

UN = No military, appeals to the UN and other nations

NM = No military action de facto recognition new Taiwan status

**9. ANALYSIS OF EACH ALTERNATE FUTURE - CONSEQUENCES FOR THE ISSUE IN QUESTION.**

**SCENARIO 1: The PRC attacks and invades Taiwan. The attack and the invasion are successful.**

**Alternate Future #1: The U.S. and Japan intervene militarily, but they are unable to force the PRC to withdraw. Taiwan is effectively reunified with the mainland.**

In this future, the attack and invasion by the PRC have caused the United States to intervene militarily, immediately dispatching carrier groups to within striking distance and moving Air Force combat units to forward bases in Guam, Okinawa, and Japan and conducting intense surveillance of Taiwan and the surrounding South China Sea. Japan supports the action following through on its stated commitments to the U.S., mobilizing its forces to control the sea and air spaces around Japan and dispatching naval units in support of the United States Navy. As the PRC had accomplished its invasion before either Japan or the United States could directly oppose the invasion itself, they are faced with the necessity of dealing with PRC forces in place on Taiwan and would need to act to cut off those forces from support from the mainland and potentially directly attack those PRC forces digging in on Taiwan itself. The U.S. would address the U.N. Security Council requesting sanctions against the PRC and U.N. support for Taiwan, but this would likely result in nothing more than speeches from concerned parties.

The attack by the PRC would be swift and overwhelming in its use of hundreds of ballistic missiles and significant air power to destroy or neutralize key points in the ROC defenses. More than likely PRC attacks would include attacks on satellite surveillance and communications systems to isolate Taiwan and blind space-based U.S. and Japanese ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) and communications to slow any potential

support. These attacks might be in the form of jamming or spoofing of the communications or control signals, but might extend to the actual destruction of satellites, depending upon PRC capabilities and mind set at the time of the attack. The ROC forces would lose command and control functions within the first hour or two of the attack and the PLA could be expected to move forces to take control of the island.

Depending on U.S. force dispositions at the time of an attack, it is possible that minimal actions might be conducted initially by the PRC against U.S. or Japanese conventional forces, although the PRC would likely not hesitate to attack any such forces responding to calls for help from the ROC. It would be likely, based on recent precedents in Kuwait, that some dialogue would be established between the U.S. and Japan and the PRC while forces were being moved into position rather than simply opening combat operations on a large scale. The PLA's nuclear ballistic missile capability comes into play at this point as the PRC could imply that attacks on the Chinese mainland might open the door to attacks on the continental U.S. as justifiable retaliation.

The PRC capabilities in ballistic missile, cruise missile, air force, and submarine force capability are such that the U.S. and Japan could find themselves taking significant damage to their air and naval forces such that their ability to maintain a high level of combat operations against the PLA in and around Taiwan would be impaired, effectively leaving them unable to damage the PLA sufficiently to force a withdrawal. The U.S. might find it politically difficult to continue the conflict after the initial exchanges with the PLA as the size of the losses and the ability to reconstitute its forces in the face of mounting domestic debate over a costly intervention in what could be interpreted to be an internal Chinese affair could reduce domestic support to levels which would make continuation of the conflict difficult or impossible. The U.S.

might find that it would have to limit future efforts to negotiations with the PRC and actions in the UN which would likely have no result other than reaffirming the new status of Taiwan. Japan would be faced with similar options and would feel itself in no position to continue combat operations on its own.

**Alternate Future #2: The U.S. and Japan intervene militarily, but Japan withdraws from the conflict. The U.S. is unable to force a PRC withdrawal. Taiwan is effectively reunified with the mainland.**

This alternate future differs from Alternate Future #1 in the speed with which Japan finds it necessary to withdraw from the conflict as the initial losses and damage affected Japanese public opinion. The U.S. could find that very quickly after the initial exchanges, Japanese domestic debates force the government to withdraw from the conflict, potentially even denying the U.S. further use of facilities on Japanese territory. The Japanese withdrawal from the conflict could be received by the U.S. public as a morale reducer. It might also trigger an angry reaction to what could be perceived as abandonment by a fickle ally who has benefited from the decades-long commitment of American defense resources in the face of a crisis and serve to harden domestic will for some period.

The U.S. would find itself in a very difficult situation with a key ally impeding the development of a potential counter-offensive even as it is dealing with its own losses from the initial combat operations. This would exacerbate domestic U.S. debates and weaken the U.S. in international forums as it attempts to maintain some momentum against the PRC. The U.S. would likely find itself forced to fall back on negotiations and appeals to the UN which would ultimately not affect the new status quo for Taiwan.

**Alternate Future #3: The U.S. intervenes militarily, while Japan holds its response to the level of an appeal to the U.N. The U.S. is unable to force a PRC withdrawal. Taiwan is effectively reunified with the mainland.**

This alternate future is similar to Alternate Future #2 except that Japan is unwilling to act militarily from the beginning of the conflict. The U.S. population's sense of abandonment by Japan would likely still develop, even with vehement public support by Japanese officials in public forums.

**Alternate Future #4: The U.S. intervenes militarily, while Japan makes no response. The U.S. is unable to force a PRC withdrawal. Taiwan is effectively reunified with the mainland.**

This alternate future is very similar to Alternate Future #3 in its affect on the U.S. except that Japan, again probably following an intense domestic debate, decides to simply sit on the sidelines entirely, apparently endorsing the PRC's actions through an effective abstention from any action or comment. The American public would likely take such abandonment of the relationship very hard, and it would likely intensify the domestic discussions by clearly demonstrating that the U.S. was acting alone. This impression of "going-it-alone" would speed a likely decline in U.S. domestic support for the conflict.

**Alternate Future #6: The U.S. and Japan intervene militarily, but they cease hostilities and withdraw from the conflict. Taiwan is effectively reunified with the mainland.**

The prospect of massive casualties and the initiation of a major war of great intensity would cause much public debate in both the U.S. and Japan. It is entirely likely that the American and Japanese public would be very much against a large scale engagement against the

PRC over what is perceived to be a part of China anyway. If the ROC were seen to be the source of provocation that caused the PRC to attack, public opinion in the U.S. and Japan might tilt strongly against bailing-out the ROC from its mistakes at great cost in blood and assets.

With the populations of both countries engaging in a highly emotional debate about the costs of a war with the PRC, the U.S. and Japan could pull back from further combat and continue negotiations with the PRC which would likely not change the new status quo.

**SCENARIO 2: The PRC attacks and invades Taiwan. The attack develops into a protracted struggle.**

**Alternate Future #1: The U.S. and Japan intervene militarily, and the PRC defends its gains on Taiwan. A longer term conflict develops.**

In this alternate future, the initial attack and invasion by the PRC may or may not involve preemptive strikes against U.S. and Japanese bases and carrier groups. If these do not occur, it may provide an opportunity for the allies to deliver to the PLA some initial blows to weaken future responses or attacks. Even with severe damage from these counter-attacks, the government of the PRC would be hesitant to withdraw from Taiwan and precipitate a legitimacy crisis as the population of the PRC evaluates the performance of the government and the Communist Party leadership on an issue so emotionally laden as the territorial issues represented by Taiwan. The U.S. and Japan might find themselves in the position of developing a strategy involving imposing a blockade across the shipping lanes bringing essential raw materials to the PRC while waging an air campaign of attrition against PLA forces on and around Taiwan while developing a plan and a capability to launch an actual amphibious assault to retake Taiwan. While it is entirely feasible that they could accomplish the blockade, and over time deploy a force structure

to wage an air campaign to attrite PLA forces, the ability to project an amphibious invasion of enough power to engage and defeat Chinese conventional forces on Taiwan across hundreds of nautical miles from the Japanese home islands, Okinawa and Guam would take some large amount of time.

Should the PLA be able to launch effective preemptive strikes against carrier groups or forward bases and destroy or significantly damage carriers and other air force assets, it would complicate U.S. and Japanese responses enormously. The allies would be faced with redeployment and redevelopment of forces to replace those lost in the initial exchanges in order to accomplish the strategic goals of blockade, attrition, and amphibious assault listed above.

The PRC could be expected to include attacks on U.S. space-based assets to block or complicate ISR and communications at a time when those would be critical to the allies' actions. Replacement of those capabilities, which might be complicated by a PRC strategy of space-denial through deliberate creation of clouds of debris in critical orbits, would be a necessity. The U.S. would find itself having to reconstruct its C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence surveillance, and reconnaissance) capabilities critical to both its current military doctrines as well as domestic economic activity which would add significantly to the time frames involved in this alternate future.

The large scale combat exchanges and losses would inevitably affect the domestic affairs of both the U.S. and Japan and might actually contribute to a hardening of attitude and will in both countries to initially support long term efforts necessary to accomplish the development and deployment of the assets critical to achieve the strategic goals.

Likewise in the PRC, with predictable large scale combat losses and increasing scarcities in the economy due to a developing blockade of shipping lanes, it would be necessary for the

government to frame the situations in such terms that the population would perceive this to be part of a national struggle against historic enemies of China. Framed properly, the conflict might actually serve to distract the population from issues which recently have caused unrest in the Chinese population such as unequal economic benefits to various segments of the population or government corruption. It should be possible to cast the conflict in the context of the recent past with multi-year struggles against the Japanese occupation and the long running civil war. The government would have incentive to support a long term conflict to maintain its legitimacy in the eyes of its population.

Both the PRC and the U.S. could be expected to attempt to involve other nations in the conflict on their sides either actively or to bring diplomatic and/or economic pressure on the other actor. Other nations might find it an opportune time to act, particularly against the U.S. as its attention and resources would become drawn to the conflict with the PRC. The actions of such nations as India, Russia, or North Korea would bear observation under these circumstances depending how the conflict proceeded as they might at least indirectly be involved in a growing conflict.

Whether in a long term struggle other regional allies could be persuaded to support the U.S. would be problematic. Even without overt support from its purported regional allies, concern over their perceptions would provide incentive to the U.S. to maintain its opposition to the PRC's action as wavering in its resistance to the occupation of Taiwan could call into question by other U.S. regional allies the value of a strategic relationship with the U.S. Hanging back and not supporting the U.S. against the PRC while gauging the U.S. determination to stand up to the PRC would certainly appear to be a perverse reaction in view of the region's general

perception of the PRC's desire to ultimately dominate the region, but such a situation has recent historical precedents in both Europe and the Middle East.

The time frames under discussion here for this alternate future could be expected to extend into years, rather than weeks or months. How long the populations of the national actors could be expected to maintain support for the magnitude of the efforts required and to endure the predictable losses and disruption to their cultures, economies, and lifestyles would be a key question. Outcomes of such a long, drawn-out struggle would be difficult to predict.

**Alternate Future #2: The U.S. and Japan intervene militarily, but Japan withdraws from the conflict. The PRC defends its gains on Taiwan. A longer term conflict develops.**

This alternate future differs from Alternate Future #1 in that Japan, probably due to domestic debates, would withdraw from the conflict either as a result of the initial losses or in anticipation of ongoing losses in a drawn-out war. Japan could likely request that the U.S. not use bases on its territory to conduct operations. This would greatly complicate the U.S. strategic problems and likely draw out the development of its strategic responses to the PRC's actions. As the bulk of the combat in either Alternate Future #1 or #2 would be borne by the U.S., the main issue created by the Japanese action would be the location of bases from which the U.S. could operate in its blockade, air campaign or counter-invasion.

The Japanese withdrawal from the conflict could be received by the U.S. public as a morale reducer. It might also trigger an angry reaction to what could be perceived as abandonment by a fickle ally who has benefited from the decades-long commitment of American defense resources in the face of a crisis and serve to harden domestic will for some period.

All the other major concerns or consequences enumerated for Alternate Future #1 would apply to this alternate future.

**Alternate Future #3: The U.S. intervenes militarily, while Japan holds its response to the level of an appeal to the U.N. The PRC defends its gains on Taiwan. A longer term conflict develops between the PRC and the U.S.**

This alternate future differs from Alternate Future #2 only in Japanese unwillingness to act militarily from the beginning of the conflict. The U.S. population's sense of abandonment by Japan would likely still develop, even with vehement public support by Japanese officials in public forums.

All the other major concerns or consequences outside of Japanese participation enumerated for Alternate Future #1 would apply to this alternate future.

**Alternate Future #4: The U.S. intervenes militarily, while Japan makes no response. The PRC defends its gains on Taiwan. A longer term conflict develops between the PRC and the U.S.**

This alternate future is quite similar to Alternate Future #3 except that Japan, again probably following an intense domestic debate, decides to simply sit on the sidelines entirely, apparently endorsing the PRC's actions through an effective abstention from any action or comment. The American public would likely take such abandonment of the relationship very hard, and it would likely intensify the domestic discussions by clearly demonstrating that the U.S. was acting alone. This impression of "going-it-alone" might affect how long the U.S. could maintain its effort to support the conflict.

All the other major concerns or consequences outside of Japanese participation enumerated for Alternate Future #1 would apply to this alternate future.

**Alternate Future #17: The U.S. and Japan intervene militarily. The PRC withdraws from Taiwan. A longer term conflict develops following the PRC withdrawal from Taiwan.**

In the event that the U.S. and Japan could inflict serious damage to the PLA forces on and around Taiwan through air and missile attack as well as perhaps inflicting serious damage to the PLA naval capabilities, the PRC might anticipate either future losses to, or even ultimately isolation of, its forces on Taiwan and withdraw them to the mainland. Although the PRC's government and military have stated a willingness to act even with a probability they would not succeed, the potential legitimacy crisis this would provoke could cause them to continue the conflict in some fashion. This would be particularly true if the U.S. and Japanese forces took heavy losses in the engagements. Certainly the expenditure of armaments and other supplies would be extreme and require replenishment. A comparison might be made to the period after the initial engagements of World War I on the Western Front where the preparations for the conflict in both supply and strategy anticipated a conflict of a few months. After a very short period, both sides found it necessary to slow operations to resupply and re-plan for continued conflict and the warfare devolved into a protracted style of trench warfare which was unanticipated by none of the national actors.

The PRC could conceivably maintain capability to maintain some degree of isolation of Taiwan through air, missile, or naval action to require the expenditure of U.S. and Japanese resources to keep supply lines open to the population of Taiwan. Even with the exertion of just enough activity to interfere with normal economic activity on Taiwan, the PRC could throw the burden of maintaining the Taiwanese on the U.S. and Japan. This would affect both military supply chains as well as adding burdens to civilian economies which would already likely be

affected by damages inflicted by PRC attacks upon civilian space systems and computer systems which are anticipated in PLA planning.

The ability of the U.S. to project power adequate to subdue the PRC over several thousand miles if it took damage to its existing force structure, space-based C4ISR, and other assets necessary to its domestic economic activity could have unanticipated affects. It certainly calls into question any certainty that it would have the ability to establish and maintain a high tempo of combat operations on a scale adequate to bring the conflict to a relatively rapid close if the PRC chose to continue hostilities after pulling back to the mainland.

One major option available to the U.S. and Japan which has been discussed at some length is the ability to cut off the PRC from oil and other necessary raw materials related to its dependence upon the sea lanes coming through the island chains surrounding the China Sea. It is likely that the PLA would force the expenditure of resources against various forms of attack for the U.S. and Japan to establish and maintain such a blockade. Depending upon the PRC's capabilities to inflict damage upon U.S. naval forces, establishing an effective blockade of the shipping lanes to cut off Chinese access to oil and raw materials could be problematic and require much more time and commitment of resources than has been anticipated. And that presumes that the PRC might not be successful in arranging other shipping routes through Russia or other Asian countries, albeit having to endure shortages and scarcities while establishing such alternatives.

Certainly, the elimination of the necessity for an invasion of Taiwan changes the strategic picture for the U.S. and Japan. But the ability to end forcibly an ongoing conflict with the PRC would require an enormous commitment of resources by the U.S. and Japan. And to repeat what has been said in regard to the likely duration of an alternate future involving a protracted

struggle, the time frames under discussion here for this alternate future could be expected to extend into years, rather than weeks or months. How long the populations of the national actors could be expected to maintain support for the magnitude of the efforts required and to endure the predictable losses and disruption to their cultures, economies, and lifestyles would be a key question. Again, outcomes of such a long, drawn-out struggle would be difficult to predict.

**SCENARIO 3: The PRC attacks and invades Taiwan. The attack and invasion fail.****Alternate Future #17: The U.S. and Japan intervene militarily. The PRC withdraws from Taiwan.**

This alternate future resembles the Alternate Future #17 discussed above under the previous scenario. The difference here would arise in the PRC's ability or desire to maintain a protracted struggle. The failure of the effort to forcibly reunify Taiwan with the mainland would raise legitimacy concerns in the mind of the mainland Chinese population. With the unrest evident in the population due to uneven economic development and unequal benefits accruing to various segments of the population combined with a perception that the Chinese Communist Party leadership obtain greater power and benefits than the average citizen, the situation would be ripe for a domestic crisis within the PRC that would preclude continuing a conflict with the U.S. and Japan.

If the severity of the reverses inflicted upon the PLA were particularly severe, it would contribute to the development of such a crisis as it would lend itself to intensifying the questioning of the credibility of the Communist Party and the leadership's ability to deliver a positive future for the PRC. If not actually struggling to maintain their preeminence and control against active resistance, at least the leadership might find itself focusing on defusing the internal

crisis rather than supporting an extension of the conflict. A regime or leadership change of some kind would be predictable even with the Communist Party maintaining its preeminence. Whether there would be an actual negotiated end to the conflict or the situation would return to the pre-conflict status quo is open to question depending upon the posture adopted by each of the national actors. The U.S. and Japan might find it beneficial to simply stand back and allow events inside the PRC to take their course without exerting pressure, although there is no certainty that a successor regime or government would be any less bent on reunifying Taiwan with the mainland or any less hostile to the U.S. or Japan as they would even more closely be identified with the continuation of the separation. The whole conflict crisis over Taiwan could play itself out again after some period of time.

**Alternate Future #18: The U.S. and Japan intervene militarily, but Japan withdraws from the conflict. The PRC withdraws from Taiwan.**

This alternate future plays out very similarly to Alternate Future #17 above. The difference would be that Japan, probably due to an intense domestic debate driven by the opening phases of the combat, withdraws its forces from the conflict. As the bulk of the combat would be borne by U.S. forces, there would likely be little difference in the actual course of the conflict, although losing the Japanese resources and potentially the use of bases on Japanese territory would cause difficulties for the U.S. The outcome of this alternate future in regard to internal events in the PRC is little different from that discussed above in Alternate Future #17.

**Alternate Future #19: The U.S. intervenes militarily, while Japan holds its response to the level of an appeal to the U.N. The PRC withdraws from Taiwan.**

This alternate future is again similar to that in Alternate Future #17, with the difference that Japan, likely responding to domestic debates triggered by events leading up to the attack and invasion by the PRC, decides to limit its response to appealing to the UN and other international forums for intervention.

**Alternate Future #20: The U.S. intervenes militarily, while Japan makes no response. The PRC withdraws from Taiwan.**

This alternate future is effectively a duplicate of Alternate Future #19 as Japan taking no action at all would likely have the same effect on the conflict as Japan appealing to the UN – none.

**Alternate Future #21: The U.S. and Japan intervene militarily, but the U.S. withdraws from the conflict. The PRC withdraws from Taiwan.**

This alternate future has an odd outcome with the PRC withdrawing from Taiwan, the U.S. withdrawing its forces, and Japan maintaining a military presence in the face of a withdrawal by the other combatants from the area of Taiwan. The main reason this alternate future garnered enough votes to end up on the short list for this scenario is that it is about the only other scenario which ensures motivation for the PRC to complete its withdrawal from an essentially defeated ROC with one of the other main opponents stepping back from the fight. As unlikely as it would be for Japan to stay in the fight after the U.S. would withdraw, if the opening rounds of the fight caused serious domestic problems for both the PRC and the U.S., Japan might be the only combatant of the three which might stay the course due to its population's fears of a resurgent China, particularly if its military and its government had a "read" on a likely PRC withdrawal due to mounting domestic problems as the result of severe reversals inflicted by the

U.S. and Japan before the U.S. was itself forced to withdraw. The situation discussed in Alternate Future #17 above, in which the PRC entered some form of a leadership crisis would be sufficient cause for a PLA withdrawal, particularly if unrest were increasing in the mainland population. Likewise, a domestic crisis in the U.S. triggered by losses in the combat with the PRC, perhaps in combination with other international situations, might lead to the U.S. withdrawing or redirecting its forces elsewhere to deal with its own domestic political imperatives. Rather than a situation with the Japanese finishing the combat, it might be more of a situation with Japan being the last actor with combat forces on the scene.

#### **10. THE "FOCAL EVENTS" THAT MUST OCCUR TO BRING ABOUT A GIVEN ALTERNATE FUTURE.**

**SCENARIO 1: The PRC attacks and invades Taiwan. The attack and the invasion are successful.**

**Alternate Future #1: The U.S. and Japan intervene militarily, but they are unable to force the PRC to withdraw. Taiwan is effectively reunified with the mainland.**

##### Focal events

- Japan deploys its forces in support of the U.S. and releases them to engage in combat in conjunction with U.S. forces
- The PRC attacks U.S. C4ISR systems including space-based systems and also damages similar civilian systems involved in support of military operations
- PRC attacks on forward bases and carrier groups reduce U.S. capabilities to a level which proves incapable of forcing a near term withdrawal from Taiwan of the PLA

- Domestic politics in reaction to the initial combat losses and evaluation of potential ROC responsibility for provocation of the PRC attack allow the U.S. to continue military operations as long as desirable
- After a time the U.S. reluctantly accepts the de facto status quo – Japan follows the U.S. lead and accepts the new status quo

**Alternate Future #2: The U.S. and Japan intervene militarily, but Japan withdraws from the conflict. The U.S. is unable to force a PRC withdrawal. Taiwan is effectively reunified with the mainland.**

Focal events

- Japan deploys its forces in support of the U.S. and releases them to engage in combat in conjunction with U.S. forces
- The PRC attacks U.S. C4ISR systems including space-based systems and also damages similar civilian systems involved in support of military operations
- PRC attacks on forward bases and carrier groups reduce U.S. capabilities to a level which proves incapable of forcing a near term withdrawal from Taiwan of the PLA
- In the middle of this combat, domestic debates in Japan force the government to cease hostilities and withdraw its forces from combat – the cessation may include a request for the U.S. to cease using bases on Japanese territory in support of operations against the PRC
- Domestic politics in reaction to the initial combat losses and evaluation of potential ROC responsibility for provocation of the PRC attack allow the U.S. to continue military operations as long as desirable

- After a time the U.S. reluctantly accepts the de facto status quo

**Alternate Future #3: The U.S. intervenes militarily, while Japan holds its response to the level of an appeal to the U.N. The U.S. is unable to force a PRC withdrawal. Taiwan is effectively reunified with the mainland.**

Focal events

- Domestic debates in Japan causes the government to announce that it will not militarily support the U.S. against the PRC, but that it will take the case to the UN in support of the ROC and the U.S. – this announcement may include a request for the U.S. not to use bases on Japanese territory in support of operations against the PRC
- The PRC attacks U.S. C4ISR systems including space-based systems and also damages similar civilian systems involved in support of military operations
- PRC attacks on forward bases and carrier groups reduce U.S. capabilities to a level which proves incapable of forcing a near term withdrawal from Taiwan of the PLA
- In the middle of this combat, domestic debates in Japan force the government to cease hostilities and withdraw its forces from combat – the cessation may include a request for the U.S. to cease using bases on Japanese territory in support of operations against the PRC
- Domestic politics in reaction to the initial combat losses and evaluation of potential ROC responsibility for provocation of the PRC attack allow the U.S. to continue military operations as long as desirable
- After a time the U.S. reluctantly accepts the de facto status quo

**Alternate Future #4: The U.S. intervenes militarily, while Japan makes no response. The U.S. is unable to force a PRC withdrawal. Taiwan is effectively reunified with the mainland.**

Focal events

- Domestic debates in Japan causes the government to announce that it will not act in opposition to the actions of the PRC – this announcement may include a request for the U.S. not to use bases on Japanese territory in support of operations against the PRC
- The PRC attacks U.S. C4ISR systems including space-based systems and also damages similar civilian systems involved in support of military operations
- PRC attacks on forward bases and carrier groups reduce U.S. capabilities to a level which proves incapable of forcing a near term withdrawal from Taiwan of the PLA
- In the middle of this combat, domestic debates in Japan force the government to cease hostilities and withdraw its forces from combat – the cessation may include a request for the U.S. to cease using bases on Japanese territory in support of operations against the PRC
- Domestic politics in reaction to the initial combat losses and evaluation of potential ROC responsibility for provocation of the PRC attack allow the U.S. to continue military operations as long as desirable
- After a time the U.S. reluctantly accepts the de facto status quo

**Alternate Future #6: The U.S. and Japan intervene militarily, but they cease hostilities and withdraw from the conflict. Taiwan is effectively reunified with the mainland.**

Focal events

- Japan deploys its forces in support of the U.S. and releases them to engage in combat in conjunction with U.S. forces
- The PRC attacks U.S. and Japanese space-based C4ISR systems and also damages civilian systems involved in support of military operations
- Domestic politics in reaction to the initial combat losses and evaluation of potential ROC responsibility for provocation of the PRC attack cause hesitation on the part of the U.S. to continue to engage in combat - both the U.S. and Japan cease hostilities due to a lack of domestic support for continued combat
- After a time the U.S. reluctantly accepts the de facto status quo

**SCENARIO 2: The PRC attacks and invades Taiwan. The attack develops into a protracted struggle.**

**Alternate Future #1: The U.S. and Japan intervene militarily, and the PRC defends its gains on Taiwan. A longer term conflict develops.**

- Japan deploys its forces in support of the U.S. and releases them to engage in combat in conjunction with U.S. forces
- The PRC attacks U.S. and Japanese C4ISR systems including space-based systems and also damages similar civilian systems involved in support of military operations

- PRC attacks on forward bases and carrier groups reduce U.S. capabilities to a level which proves incapable of forcing an immediate withdrawal from Taiwan of the PLA
- Domestic politics in reaction to the initial combat losses and evaluation of potential ROC responsibility for provocation of the PRC attack allow the U.S. to continue military operations as long as desirable
- Domestic politics in the PRC support a continuation of the conflict to maintain the forced state of reunification of Taiwan with the mainland
- The U.S. and Japan adopt a tri-fold strategy (1) to blockade the PRC's supply lines for oil and other critical raw materials, (2) to conduct a campaign of attrition against the PLA, and (3) to build up the capability to conduct (or at least credibly threaten) an amphibious assault to drive PLA forces from Taiwan
- The PRC, the U.S., and Japan settle into a conflict marked by PRC attacks on blockading forces and U.S. and Japanese attacks on the PLA on and around Taiwan with an indeterminate long-term outcome

**Alternate Future #2: The U.S. and Japan intervene militarily, but Japan withdraws from the conflict. The PRC defends its gains on Taiwan. A longer term conflict develops.**

**Focal events**

- Japan deploys its forces in support of the U.S. and releases them to engage in combat in conjunction with U.S. forces
- The PRC attacks U.S. and Japanese C4ISR systems including space-based systems and also damages similar civilian systems involved in support of military operations

- PRC attacks on forward bases and carrier groups reduce U.S. capabilities to a level which proves incapable of forcing an immediate withdrawal from Taiwan of the PLA
- In the middle of this combat, domestic debates in Japan force the government to cease hostilities and withdraw its forces from combat – the cessation may include a request for the U.S. to cease using bases on Japanese territory in support of operations against the PRC
- Domestic politics in reaction to the initial combat losses and evaluation of potential ROC responsibility for provocation of the PRC attack allow the U.S. to continue military operations as long as desirable
- Domestic politics in the PRC support a continuation of the conflict to maintain the forced state of reunification of Taiwan with the mainland
- The U.S. adopts a tri-fold strategy, albeit with the complications offered by Japan's withdrawal, (1) to blockade the PRC's supply lines for oil and other critical raw materials, (2) to conduct a campaign of attrition against the PLA, and (3) to build up the capability to conduct (or at least credibly threaten) an amphibious assault to drive PLA forces from Taiwan
- The PRC and the U.S. settle into a conflict marked by PRC attacks on blockading forces and U.S. attacks on the PLA on and around Taiwan with an indeterminate long-term outcome

**Alternate Future #3: The U.S. intervenes militarily, while Japan holds its response to the level of an appeal to the U.N. The PRC defends its gains on Taiwan. A longer term conflict develops between the PRC and the U.S.**

Focal events

- Domestic debates in Japan causes the government to announce that it will not militarily support the U.S. against the PRC, but that it will take the case to the UN in support of the ROC and the U.S. – this announcement may include a request for the U.S. not to use bases on Japanese territory in support of operations against the PRC
- The PRC attacks U.S. C4ISR systems including space-based systems and also damages similar civilian systems involved in support of military operations
- PRC attacks on forward bases and carrier groups reduce U.S. capabilities to a level which proves incapable of forcing an immediate withdrawal from Taiwan of the PLA
- Domestic politics in reaction to the initial combat losses and evaluation of potential ROC responsibility for provocation of the PRC attack allow the U.S. to continue military operations as long as desirable
- Domestic politics in the PRC support a continuation of the conflict to maintain the forced state of reunification of Taiwan with the mainland
- The U.S. adopts a tri-fold strategy, albeit with the complications offered by Japan's refusal to support military operations (1) to blockade the PRC's supply lines for oil and other critical raw materials, (2) to conduct a campaign of attrition against the PLA, and (3) to build up the capability to conduct (or at least credibly threaten) an amphibious assault to drive PLA forces from Taiwan

- The PRC and the U.S. settle into a conflict marked by PRC attacks on blockading forces and U.S. attacks on the PLA on and around Taiwan with an indeterminate long-term outcome

**Alternate Future #4: The U.S. intervenes militarily, while Japan makes no response.**

**The PRC defends its gains on Taiwan. A longer term conflict develops between the PRC and the U.S.**

Focal events

- Domestic debates in Japan causes the government to announce that it will not act in opposition to the actions of the PRC – this announcement may include a request for the U.S. not to use bases on Japanese territory in support of operations against the PRC
- The PRC attacks U.S. C4ISR systems including space-based systems and also damages similar civilian systems involved in support of military operations
- PRC attacks on forward bases and carrier groups reduce U.S. capabilities to a level which proves incapable of forcing an immediate withdrawal from Taiwan of the PLA
- Domestic politics in reaction to the initial combat losses and evaluation of potential ROC responsibility for provocation of the PRC attack allow the U.S. to continue military operations as long as desirable
- Domestic politics in the PRC support a continuation of the conflict to maintain the forced state of reunification of Taiwan with the mainland
- The U.S. adopts a tri-fold strategy, albeit with the complications offered by Japan's refusal to support military operations (1) to blockade the PRC's supply

lines for oil and other critical raw materials, (2) to conduct a campaign of attrition against the PLA, and (3) to build up the capability to conduct (or at least credibly threaten) an amphibious assault to drive PLA forces from Taiwan

- The PRC and the U.S. settle into a conflict marked by PRC attacks on blockading forces and U.S. attacks on the PLA on and around Taiwan with an indeterminate long-term outcome

**Alternate Future #17: The U.S. and Japan intervene militarily. The PRC withdraws from Taiwan. A longer term conflict develops following the PRC withdrawal from Taiwan.**

Focal events

- Japan deploys its forces in support of the U.S. and releases them to engage in combat in conjunction with U.S. forces
- The PRC attacks U.S. and Japanese C4ISR systems including space-based systems and also damages similar civilian systems involved in support of military operations
- PRC attacks on forward bases and carrier groups fail to reduce U.S. capabilities and U.S. response is of sufficient intensity to force an immediate withdrawal from Taiwan of the PLA
- Domestic politics in reaction to the initial combat losses and evaluation of potential ROC responsibility for provocation of the PRC attack allow the U.S. and Japan to continue military operations as long as desirable
- Domestic politics in the PRC support a continuation of the conflict in spite of the failure of the attempt at forced state of reunification of Taiwan with the mainland

- The U.S. and Japan adopt a dual strategy (1) to blockade the PRC's supply lines for oil and other critical raw materials and (2) to protect Taiwan from continued attacks by the PLA
- The PRC, the U.S., and Japan settle into a conflict marked by PRC attacks on blockading forces and Taiwan and the surrounding sea lanes and U.S. and Japanese attacks on the PLA forces around Taiwan with an indeterminate long-term outcome

**SCENARIO 3: The PRC attacks and invades Taiwan. The attack and invasion fail.**

**Alternate Future #17: The U.S. and Japan intervene militarily. The PRC withdraws from Taiwan.**

Focal events

- Japan deploys its forces in support of the U.S. and releases them to engage in combat in conjunction with U.S. forces
- The PRC attacks U.S. and Japanese C4ISR systems including space-based systems and also damages similar civilian systems involved in support of military operations
- PRC attacks on forward bases and carrier groups fail to reduce U.S. capabilities and U.S. response is of sufficient intensity to force an immediate withdrawal from Taiwan of the PLA
- Domestic politics in reaction to the initial combat losses and evaluation of potential ROC responsibility for provocation of the PRC attack allow the U.S. and Japan to continue military operations as long as desirable

- Domestic politics in the form of a leadership crisis in the PRC due to the failure of the attempt at forced state of reunification of Taiwan with the mainland force a cessation of hostile actions aimed at Taiwan
- The U.S. and Japan adopt a posture on and around Taiwan intended to protect Taiwan from potential attacks originating from the mainland

**Alternate Future #18: The U.S. and Japan intervene militarily, but Japan withdraws from the conflict. The PRC withdraws from Taiwan.**

Focal events

- Japan deploys its forces in support of the U.S. and releases them to engage in combat in conjunction with U.S. forces
- The PRC attacks U.S. and Japanese C4ISR systems including space-based systems and also damages similar civilian systems involved in support of military operations
- In the middle of this combat, domestic debates in Japan force the government to cease hostilities and withdraw its forces from combat – the cessation may include a request for the U.S. to cease using bases on Japanese territory in support of operations against the PRC
- PRC attacks on forward bases and carrier groups fail to reduce U.S. capabilities and U.S. response is of sufficient intensity to force an immediate withdrawal from Taiwan of the PLA
- Domestic politics in reaction to the initial combat losses and evaluation of potential ROC responsibility for provocation of the PRC attack allow the U.S. to continue military operations as long as desirable

- Domestic politics in the form of a leadership crisis in the PRC due to the failure of the attempt at forced state of reunification of Taiwan with the mainland force a cessation of hostile actions aimed at Taiwan
- The U.S .adopts a posture on and around Taiwan intended to protect Taiwan from potential attacks originating from the mainland

**Alternate Future #19: The U.S. intervenes militarily, while Japan holds its response to the level of an appeal to the U.N. The PRC withdraws from Taiwan**

Focal events

- Domestic debates in Japan causes the government to announce that it will not militarily support the U.S. against the PRC, but that it will take the case to the UN in support of the ROC and the U.S. – this announcement may include a request for the U.S. not to use bases on Japanese territory in support of operations against the PRC
- The PRC attacks U.S. C4ISR systems including space-based systems and also damages similar civilian systems involved in support of military operations
- PRC attacks on forward bases and carrier groups fail to reduce U.S. capabilities and U.S. response is of sufficient intensity to force an immediate withdrawal from Taiwan of the PLA
- Domestic politics in reaction to the initial combat losses and evaluation of potential ROC responsibility for provocation of the PRC attack allow the U.S. to continue military operations as long as desirable

- Domestic politics in the form of a leadership crisis in the PRC due to the failure of the attempt at forced state of reunification of Taiwan with the mainland force a cessation of hostile actions aimed at Taiwan
- The U.S. adopts a posture on and around Taiwan intended to protect Taiwan from potential attacks originating from the mainland

**Alternate Future #20: The U.S. intervenes militarily, while Japan makes no response. The PRC withdraws from Taiwan.**

Focal events

- Domestic debates in Japan causes the government to announce that it will not act in opposition to the actions of the PRC – this announcement may include a request for the U.S. not to use bases on Japanese territory in support of operations against the PRC
- The PRC attacks U.S. C4ISR systems including space-based systems and also damages similar civilian systems involved in support of military operations
- PRC attacks on forward bases and carrier groups fail to reduce U.S. capabilities and U.S. response is of sufficient intensity to force an immediate withdrawal from Taiwan of the PLA
- Domestic politics in reaction to the initial combat losses and evaluation of potential ROC responsibility for provocation of the PRC attack allow the U.S. to continue military operations as long as desirable
- Domestic politics in the form of a leadership crisis in the PRC due to the failure of the attempt at forced state of reunification of Taiwan with the mainland force a cessation of hostile actions aimed at Taiwan

- The U.S. adopts a posture on and around Taiwan intended to protect Taiwan from potential attacks originating from the mainland

**Alternate Future #21: The U.S. and Japan intervene militarily, but the U.S. withdraws from the conflict. The PRC withdraws from Taiwan.**

**Focal events**

- Japan deploys its forces in support of the U.S. and releases them to engage in combat in conjunction with U.S. forces
- The PRC attacks U.S. and Japanese C4ISR systems including space-based systems and also damages similar civilian systems involved in support of military operations
- PRC attacks on forward bases and carrier groups fail to reduce U.S. capabilities and U.S. response is of sufficient intensity to force an immediate withdrawal from Taiwan of the PLA
- Domestic politics in reaction to the combat losses and evaluation of potential ROC responsibility for provocation of the PRC attack cause the U.S. to withdraw its forces from further combat with the PRC
- Domestic politics in reaction to the initial combat losses and evaluation of potential ROC responsibility for provocation of the PRC attack allow Japan to continue military operations as long as desirable
- Domestic politics in the form of a leadership crisis in the PRC due to the failure of the attempt at forced state of reunification of Taiwan with the mainland force a cessation of hostile actions aimed at Taiwan

- Japan adopts a posture on and around Taiwan intended to protect Taiwan from potential attacks originating from the mainland

## **11. INDICATORS FOR THE FOCAL EVENTS.**

**FOCAL EVENT:** Japan deploys its forces in support of the U.S. and releases them to engage in combat in conjunction with U.S. forces – Scenario 1, Alternate Futures #1, #2, and #6; Scenario 2, Alternate Futures #1, #2, and #17; Scenario 3, Alternate Futures #17, #18, and #21.

### **INDICATORS:**

- The Japanese prime minister publicly orders the Japanese military to deploy and support combat operations jointly with the U.S.
- The Japanese Diet votes to support the Prime Minister in issuing orders for the Japanese military to deploy and support combat operations jointly with the U.S.
- The Japanese Prime Minister privately interprets his constitutional authority in terms of the PRC actions as a threat to Japan and orders the Japanese military to deploy and support combat operations jointly with the U.S.

**FOCAL EVENT:** Domestic debates in Japan causes the government to announce that it will not militarily support the U.S. against the PRC, but that it will take the case to the UN in support of the ROC and the U.S. – this announcement may include a request for the U.S. not to use bases on Japanese territory in support of operations against the PRC – Scenario 1, Alternate Future #7; Scenario 2, Alternate Future #3; Scenario 3, Alternate Future #19.

### **INDICATORS:**

- Public opinion in Japan causes demonstrations of growing intensity, and debates in the Diet indicate serious opposition to committing Japanese forces to combat

operations, and the Prime Minister chooses not to act in support of the U.S. beyond support in the UN

- The Japanese Diet offers a vote of no confidence to the Prime Minister over the issue of committing Japanese forces to combat offering the consensus for taking the case to the UN

**FOCAL EVENT:** Domestic debates in Japan causes the government to announce that it will not act in opposition to the actions of the PRC – this announcement may include a request for the U.S. not to use bases on Japanese territory in support of operations against the PRC – Scenario 1, Alternate Future #4; Scenario 2, Alternate Future #4; Scenario 3, Alternate Future #20.

**INDICATORS:**

- The actions of the ROC government are taken as provocative and public and governmental opinion in Japan consolidate around a position indicating that Japan will not commit its forces to combat to “bail out” the ROC
- The Prime Minister publicly commits to Japanese forces supporting the U.S. in combat operations’ and the Japanese Diet offers a vote of no confidence resulting in a suspension of further action pending new elections
- Public opinion in Japan causes demonstrations of growing intensity, and debates in the Diet indicate serious opposition to committing Japanese forces to combat operations, and the Prime Minister chooses not to act in support of the U.S. recognizing the weakness of his position versus domestic opposition

**FOCAL EVENT:** The PRC attacks U.S. and Japanese space-based C4ISR systems and also damages civilian systems involved in support of military operations – Scenario 1, Alternate

Future #1, #2, #6; Scenario 2, Alternate Future #1, #2, #17; Scenario 3, Alternate Future #17, #18, #21 .

**INDICATORS:**

- Both US and Japanese military C4ISR systems are attacked
- Both US and Japanese civilian communication and computer systems are attacked, including space-based systems

**FOCAL EVENT:** In the middle of combat, domestic debates in Japan force the government to cease hostilities and withdraw its forces from combat – the cessation may include a request for the U.S. to cease using bases on Japanese territory in support of operations against the PRC – Scenario 1, Alternate Future #2; Scenario 2, Alternate Future #2; Scenario 3, Alternate Future #18.

**INDICATORS:**

- Damage from PLA attacks on civilian communications and computer systems drive a shift in Japanese public opinion against the conflict with the PRC resulting in demonstrations of growing intensity, and debates in the Diet indicate serious opposition to continuing to commit Japanese forces to combat operations, and the Japanese government chooses to withdraw Japanese forces from further combat
- Initial combat losses by the Japanese military drive a shift in Japanese public opinion against the conflict with the PRC resulting in demonstrations of growing intensity, and debates in the Diet indicate serious opposition to continuing to commit Japanese forces to combat operations, and the Japanese government chooses to withdraw Japanese forces from further combat

**FOCAL EVENT:** Domestic politics in reaction to the initial combat losses and evaluation of potential ROC responsibility for provocation of the PRC attack cause hesitation on the part of the U.S. to continue to engage in combat - both the U.S. and Japan cease hostilities due to a lack of domestic support for continued combat – Scenario 1, Alternate Future #6.

**INDICATORS:**

- Initial combat losses cause a hardening of public opinion against the cost of further losses to maintain Taiwan independence
- Public opinion identifies the initial combat losses as unjustifiable based on the provocations initiated by the ROC and solidifies behind not “bailing out” the ROC
- The U.S. President orders U.S. forces to pull back from further combat as public support wanes
- If engaged in support of the U.S., Japan follows the U.S. lead, perceiving that it cannot stand alone against the PRC

**FOCAL EVENT:** PRC attacks on forward bases and carrier groups reduce U.S. capabilities to a level which proves incapable of forcing a near term withdrawal from Taiwan of the PLA – Scenario 1, Alternate Future #1, # 2, #3, #4, #6; Scenario 2, Alternate Future #1, #2, #3, #4.

**INDICATORS:**

- Forward bases and carrier groups take significant damage and losses in initial preemptive attacks which quickly deliver enough damage to significantly reduce combat capability requiring redeployment or even reconstitution of U.S. forces to reestablish offensive capability

- Even though there is no preemptive attack on bases or carrier groups by the PLA, after initial combat operations by the U.S., PLA counter-attacks quickly deliver enough damage to significantly reduce combat capability requiring redeployment or even reconstitution of U.S. forces to reestablish offensive capability

**FOCAL EVENT:** Domestic politics in reaction to the initial combat losses and evaluation of potential ROC responsibility for provocation of the PRC attack allow the U.S. to continue military operations as long as desirable – Scenario 1, Alternate Future #1, #2, #3, #4; Scenario 2, Alternate Future #1, #2, #3, #4, #17; Scenario 3, Alternate Future #17, #18, #19, #20.

**INDICATORS:**

- Domestic public opinion in the U.S. views the attack by the PRC on Taiwan as unjustified and supports direct confrontation and combat with the PRC
- Congress either votes to support a military response to the PRC's actions or at least does not act in opposition to the military response

**FOCAL EVENT:** After a time the U.S. reluctantly accepts the de facto status quo – Scenario 1, Alternate Future ##1, #2, #7, #8.

**INDICATORS:**

- U.S. Domestic public opinion begins to wane after an extended period of stalemate, where the U.S. does not have the capability to force a near term withdrawal without continued sacrifices in combat along with economic and societal disruption
- The U.S. Congress in tandem with the shifts in public opinion begins to express dissatisfaction with the ongoing conflict and concomitant resource requirements

and starts a series of debates on funding and other issues necessary to continuation of the conflict

- Domestic political imperatives force the U.S President to order the U.S. military to pull back from continued conflict while likely engaging in dialogue in the UN or directly with the PRC to recognize the status quo – if Japan is engaged, it will follow the U.S. lead as it perceives it cannot stand alone against the PRC

**FOCAL EVENT:** Domestic politics in the PRC support a continuation of the conflict to maintain or continue to strive for the forced state of reunification of Taiwan with the mainland – Scenario 2, Alternate Future #1, #2, #3, #4, and #17.

**INDICATORS:**

- PRC internal unrest does not increase and may even decrease with the population supporting the effort to confront historic enemies and force reunification of lost territory with the mainland.
- Actual spontaneous demonstrations in support of the PRC leadership and indications of a public willingness to accept additional hardship for the duration of a conflict operating to the benefit of the PRC
- Unity of purpose within the Chinese Communist Party leadership and the PLA leadership

**FOCAL EVENT:** The U.S. adopts a tri-fold strategy, with or without Japan's support (1) to blockade the PRC's supply lines for oil and other critical raw materials, (2) to conduct a campaign of attrition against the PLA, and (3) to build up the capability to conduct (or at least credibly threaten) an amphibious assault to drive PLA forces from Taiwan – Scenario 2, Alternate Future #1, #2, #3, #4.

**INDICATORS:**

- The U.S. with or without Japanese support begins to redeploy and reconstitute its forces and begins to interfere with PRC supply lines
- The U.S. with or without Japanese support begins acquisition and development of equipment and personnel to conduct a naval and land based air and missile campaign of attrition against the PLA on and around Taiwan
- The U.S. with or without Japanese support begins acquisition and development of equipment and personnel to conduct an amphibious assault on Taiwan
- Congress and the American public support the financial and recruiting activity necessary for the resource commitments to support the above activities
- Congressional and public support are maintained for a multi-year period

**FOCAL EVENT:** The PRC and the U.S. settle into a conflict marked by PRC attacks on blockading forces and U.S. attacks on the PLA on and around Taiwan with an indeterminate long-term outcome – Scenario 2, Alternate Future #1, #2, #3, and #4.

**INDICATORS:**

- Congressional support and public support are maintained for a multi-year period
- In alternate futures involving Japan, governmental and popular support are maintained for a multi-year period
- PRC Leadership and PLA unity and support and popular support are maintained for a multi-year period

**FOCAL EVENT:** Domestic politics in the PRC support a continuation of the conflict in spite of the failure of the attempt at forced state of reunification of Taiwan with the mainland – Scenario 2, Alternate Future #17

**INDICATORS:**

- Confrontation with historic enemies viewed as the key actors blocking a nationally desired goal of reunification of lost territory with the mainland PRC serves to rally popular support despite the setback - internal unrest does not increase beyond tolerable levels
- Confrontation with historic enemies viewed as the key actors blocking a nationally desired goal of reunification of lost territory with the mainland PRC serves to unify the Chinese Communist Party leadership and the PLA leadership despite the setback

**FOCAL EVENT:** PRC attacks on forward bases and carrier groups fail to reduce U.S. capabilities and U.S. response with or without Japanese support is of sufficient intensity to force an immediate withdrawal from Taiwan of the PLA – Scenario 2, Alternate Future #17; Scenario 3, Alternate Future #17, #18, #19, #20, #21.

**INDICATORS:**

- PLA attacks on C4ISR systems fail to degrade U.S. capabilities to preclude effective defense against further attacks or reduce offensive capabilities.
- PLA attacks on forward bases and carrier groups fail to more than minimally degrade offensive capability.
- PLA assets expended in the attacks and destroyed or damaged in the U.S. (and in some futures, Japanese) counter-attacks accumulate to significant levels, forcing PLA forces to be withdrawn from Taiwan to preclude further losses

- The failure of the attacks to achieve damage against the U.S. forces sufficient to blunt their offensive capabilities, and the following counter-attacks cause a failure of will in the PLA and PRC leadership resulting in a precipitative withdrawal

**FOCAL EVENT:** Domestic politics in the form of a leadership crisis in the PRC due to the failure of the attempt at forced state of reunification of Taiwan with the mainland force a cessation of hostile actions aimed at Taiwan – Scenario 3, Alternate Future #17, #18, #19, #20, #21.

**INDICATORS:**

- A replacement of leadership occurs in both the Communist Party and the PLA
- Internal unrest increases to the level that the legitimacy of the entire current leadership is challenged leading to some form of political conflict
- Internal unrest increases to the level that the legitimacy of the entire current leadership is challenged leading to actual internal conflict
- Regional unrest occurs challenging the legitimacy of PRC governance and these areas try to separate from the PRC

**FOCAL EVENT:** Domestic politics in reaction to the combat losses and evaluation of potential ROC responsibility for provocation of the PRC attack cause the U.S. to withdraw its forces from further combat with the PRC –Scenario 3, Alternate Future #21.

**INDICATORS:**

- A realization that the actions of the PRC resulted from ROC provocations calls into question the motivation for U.S. intervention and continuation of combat operations even as the PLA is beginning to collapse – Domestic popular debates

drive Congressional and Presidential discussions and decisions against the continuation of combat operations

- U.S. combat losses in the initial attacks from the PRC and the counter-attacks against the PRC are so high as to call into question the continuation of the combat actions around Taiwan even as the PLA is collapsing – Domestic popular debates drive Congressional and Presidential discussions and decisions against the continuation of combat operations
- The U.S. forces, after inflicting damage on the PLA in a flurry of counter-attacks, withdraw almost simultaneously with a PLA withdrawal.

**FOCAL EVENT:** The U.S. and/or Japan adopt a posture on and around Taiwan intended to protect Taiwan from potential attacks originating from the mainland – Scenario 3, Alternate Future #17, #18, #19, #20, and #21.

**INDICATORS:**

- The U.S. and /or Japan move forces into Taiwan as the PLA withdraws
- The U.S. and/or Japan decide not to engage PLA forces beyond what is necessary to protect Taiwan from further attacks rather than becoming involved in a conflict on the mainland which might re-unify or rally the various groups in contention inside the PRC.
- The U.S. and/or Japan establish a defensive posture in anticipation of a new power structure resolving itself in the PRC which would again focus on the separation of Taiwan from the mainland.

**12. THE POTENTIAL OF A GIVEN ALTERNATE FUTURE TO "TRANSCOPE"  
INTO ANOTHER ALTERNATE FUTURE.**

In Scenario 1, 2, or 3, alternate future #1 can transpose to any of the alternate futures #2, #3, or #4 with an intense anti-war movement taking Japan out of the conflict at one point or another. This would apply to most of the alternate futures which include an active role by Japan. In any case, U.S. forces would likely carry the brunt of combat operations in most of these alternate futures.

In a similar fashion, a swing in public opinion in the U.S. could transpose any of the alternate futures into a withdrawal future such as Scenario 1 alternate future #6, or Scenario 3 alternate future #21. In the second scenario, such a swing in public opinion would change any of alternate futures #1, #2, #3, or #4 into a Scenario 1 alternate future with the PRC realizing success as the U.S. withdrew. Even Scenario #17 would be transposed into one of the Scenario 1 alternate futures if the U.S. withdrew and allowed the PLA to reoccupy Taiwan.

Scenarios 1 and 2, which would have the PRC either successful or engaged in a prolonged struggle, respectively, could transpose into a Scenario 3 failure for the PRC if public opinion in the PRC turned against the leadership and precipitated a leadership crisis.

It would appear, then, that the ability of the U.S. and the PRC to maintain a determination in its population to continue the conflict is critical to the outcome of any of the scenarios. This bodes ill for the U.S. in particular which has suffered from an inability in recent decades to have its popular opinion remain positive for any substantial length of time while taking combat losses and making large expenditures of resources. The American public would have to feel a substantial commitment, or be responding to a sense of outrage, or fear of the consequences of a PRC success to support a conflict of significant size or duration.

Another major source of potential transposition would be the outcome of the initial PRC attacks and U.S. counter-attacks on the damage inflicted to the opposing forces. The analysis of consequences, focal points and indicators posits that the essential nature of any of the alternate futures is determined by the outcome of this initial round of combat. In Scenario 1 and the first 4 alternate futures of Scenario 2 are basically structured around the U.S. not having the capability to inflict serious damage on PLA forces in the initial round of combat. Scenario 2 alternate future #21, and in all five alternate futures of Scenario 3 the basic structure of the alternate futures are determined by the U. S. being able to inflict enough damage upon PLA forces to cause a withdrawal.

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APPENDIX

Scenario 1: The PRC attacks and invades Taiwan. – The attack and the invasion are successful.

Voting Record and Summaries

Scenario	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	Total Votes	
1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	31	
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3	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	29	
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6	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	27	
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8	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	25	
9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	19	
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32	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1

Scenario 2: The PRC attacks and invades Taiwan – the attack develops into a protracted struggle.

Voting Record and Summaries

Scenario	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	Total Votes	
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17	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	27	
18	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	26	
19	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	25	
20	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	24	
21	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	12	
22	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	12	
23	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	11	
24	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	5	
25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	9	
26	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	8	
27	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	7	
28	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	3	
29	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	4	
30	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	3	
31	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
32	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Scenario 3: The PRC attacks and invades Taiwan – the attack and the invasion fail.

Voting record and summaries

Scenario	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	Total Votes		
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
3	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
4	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
5	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6
6	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	12
7	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	11
8	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	11
9	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
10	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8
11	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7
12	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	9
13	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
14	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	13
15	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	13
16	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	15
17	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	31
18	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	30
19	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	29
20	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	28
21	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	27
22	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	24
23	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	22
24	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	19
25	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	26
26	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	21
27	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	23
28	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	20
29	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	25
30	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	17
31	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	18
32	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	16