

AMERICAN MILITARY UNIVERSITY

**What are the Potential Reactions by Other Major Powers to a
Resurgent Islamic Caliphate?**

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Potential Reactions by Other Major Powers to a Resurgent Islamic Caliphate

Introduction

In the Chinese strategy game of *GO*, the objective to win is to occupy the most areas (Fairbairn, 1995, ¶ 7).¹ Prior to the mid-19th Century, acquisition of lands and control of region through occupying forces was prevalent. However, as nations stabilized along cultural, economic, and religious lines into the 20th Century, controlling nations required larger conflicts to gain success. The two World Wars in the early and mid-20th Century are examples of violent attempts to assume control over neighboring nation-states.

Other overarching domination of large areas of land occurred in Imperial Russia due to neglect by the ruling class paving the way for communist dominance. However, the resulting Soviet Union quickly reverted to the police state of previous attempts to control large amounts of land, people, and countries via dictatorships.

This also occurred in the transition from Imperial China to Communist (Red) China in the mid-20th Century—China was subsumed by revolutionary fervor and communist takeover which later became similarly oppressive. However, the creation of Red China differed from the Soviet Union in the aspect of absorbing smaller nation-states. Unlike the dozens of countries which were pulled into the Soviet Union, Red China pulled fewer, preferring to approach the acquisition of land via long-term hegemony rather than overt attempts.

Red China into the 21st Century continues to take the “long look” for global domination whereas the Soviet Union’s attempts refused to waiver from a more

¹ The modern name for *GO* in China is “weiqi” which means the “surrounding game;” however, in ancient times, the term “yi” was used.

traditional approach of global hegemony through military revolution. China looks forward in decades and adapts as it moves outward, taking advantage of tactics enabling it to acquire knowledge, information, technology, and energy resources.

Ultimately, counting in Western capitalistic approaches, China's advances are focused on large and varied areas. Technology and bio-technology, global economic coalition building to support containment of extremist organizations using terror as a tactic, genetics, and an expansion past industrial age full-scale warfare involving global battles are some of the major areas. This approach has polarized the world into distinct lines. However, it is the extremist groups which use terror as a tactic which focus their extreme interpretations of Islam which could shape the future far differently than Western, Chinese, European, Southeast Asian, and Russian nations have considered.

A question to ask is, "how does a potentially emerging, expansionist entity acquire land, resources, technology, and dominance over existing nation-states?" In centuries past, simply attacking until your enemies were conquered was how. The campaigns of Xerxes, Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan, the Islamic Caliphate, and the Roman Empire show examples of such territorial expansion.

Conflicts of the past moved forward when key technological developments occurred enabling superiority over other nation-states. Coupled with advanced techniques and tactics associated with those technological discoveries—shifting from stone to bronze, bronze to iron, iron to steel, manpower to horsepower, horsepower to wind power, and wind power to steam—these were limiting factors in that even with development of techniques to support them; the phalanx formation; use of heavy cavalry; rudimentary

artillery using catapults; they all required closing with and fighting hand-to-hand to destroy the enemy and acquire his land and resources.

Development and proliferation of gunpowder enabled long range tactics to augment existing techniques and revolutionized warfare and the acquisition of land. The rapid growth of technology from the late 18th Century into the 19th Century utilizing steam power continued to allow expansion. But a new limiting fact began to emerge as the world moved into the 19th Century: population growth.

As more and more people began to fill up territory, simply killing them off during a conflict was not economical; especially when it expended resources better used to defeat enemy armies. As better methods of warfare were perfected by technological development, so too did the rise of warfare laws protecting certain elements of nation-states from harm. Augmenting these laws of warfare were the emergence of international norms of ethical standards for waging war. As populations continued to grow, outside of areas continuing tribal means of living, and nation-state infrastructures began to expand the need to attack the civilian population shifted to including them in the conflict—they became “collateral damage.”

Collateral damage occurred on a routine basis for most of the period from the dawn of civilization to the 18th Century. Further understandings, agreements, treaties, and conventions followed international norms resulting in civilian populations and various areas within zones of conflict (i.e., religious sites, cultural treasures) being exempted from attacks and destruction. As the increase of population continued into the 19th and early 20th Century, civilian populations were, for the most part, allowed to leave the area of conflict.

During the mid-20th Century, particularly World War (WW) II, as large areas of territory were subsumed under the Axis Powers of the National Socialist Party (Nazi) in Europe and Imperial Japan in Southeast Asia, demoralizing the population evolved as a way to wage war. In Europe, Nazi persecution of Jews occurred. In Asia, persecution of Chinese, Korean, and numerous other ethnic populations by the Japanese occurred. This led, in part, to a relaxation on the norm of militaries conducting combat operations against civilian populations. The Western Allies used strategic bombing campaigns against the Axis to demoralize the populations under the Axis. Bombing of civilians was a “strategic necessity” to ensure Allied nation-state way of life survival (Thomas, 2001, p.89).

Relaxing of internationally established ways of doing business—a relaxation of “norms”—against attacking civilian populations to goad them into rising up or working against the Axis powers became acceptable. The re-establishment of attacking civilian populations in World War II, much like during conflicts prior to the 19th Century, paved the way for later extremist organization’s rationalizing that they could attack civilians under purely religious interpretations. Carefully using elements of religious teachings to proliferate untruths through strict interpretations, civilians became clear targets to be attacked if they did not believe “the right way.”

Islamic Caliphate Overview

One of the goals/themes proclaimed by various Middle Eastern extremist organizations which use terror as a tactic, particularly Al Qaeda (AQ), is reestablishing the Islamic Caliphate under *Sharia* (Islamic) Law (Rashid, 2002, p. 118). This message has been proliferated via various *fatwas* noting any person (Muslim) that does not work

to kill non-believers (infidels) to support an Islamic state is not doing their individual duty as directed by god (Burke, 2003, p. 158-159). At Figure 1 are the Caliphate's boundaries in the 8th Century as of AD 750. After that time, the Caliphate's boundaries began to shrink. During the rule of the Ottoman Empire, between the 13th and 20th Centuries, the boundaries of the Caliphate surged in Europe, reaching as far as Vienna, Austria.




Figure 1. The Islamic Caliphate (AD 750)²

By the end of WW I the Ottoman Empire, having backed the losing Central Powers, lost its place as a world power via internal strife and partitioning of territories by the victorious nations. By 1923, the Ottoman Empire was fully partitioned by the Treaty of Lausanne (Lawrence, 1924, np).³ The seat of power of the Ottoman Empire, the Caliphate, was formally abolished by Turkey's first president, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in mid-1924.

As the global polarization of the Cold War occurred between the West (represented by

² Wikipedia. (2007). "Caliphate." Retrieved October 28, 2007 from <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caliphate>.

³ The Treaty of Lausanne nullified the unratified Treaty of Sèvres, which laid out the overall partitioning of the Ottoman Empire, by both partitioning the Empire and specifying the borders of Turkey.

the U.S.) and East (represented by the Soviet Union), state-sponsored terrorist acts occurred coupled with smaller conflicts between nations backed by the U.S. or Soviet Union. As the Cold War ended, old conflicts arose in the Balkans, Middle East, and Central Asia. As part of these conflicts, Islamic extremist organizations arose espousing the re-establishment of the Caliphate to its former boundaries and then expanding, to eventually dominate the world, as depicted in Figure 2.

Establishing the Caliphate to its former boundaries and beyond would cause any of several reactions from the leading nation-states such as China, the U.S., Russia, and the countries of the European Union.



Figure 2. Interim & Long-Term Islamic Extremist Goal to Dominate the World⁴

At the same time, the nation-states of the West, Southeast Asia Europe, and Russia appear not to be approaching the problem of a resurgent Caliphate correctly. This is due to the continued approach by these nations to respond to Islamic extremist organizations

⁴ Sensing, Donald. (2006). "The coming Caliphate?" Retrieved November 3, 2007 from <http://www.donaldsensing.com/?m=200610>.

as traditional nation-state actors. This is an example of the West, China, and Russia using traditional third generation warfare (e.g., large military forces) to fight fourth generation warfare actors (e.g., tribal, extremist, insurgent) who are able to leverage technology to their benefit (Hammes, 2007, p. 16). At the same time, these extremist organizations are not tied to any specific nations and are receiving support and resourcing from numerous locations within a large number of countries across the globe.

With the current Islamic population being well over one billion people of all types, not just Middle Eastern, spanning the globe, addressing a forming Caliphate becomes formidable. Adding to the mix is the fact that one person can effect the status of a nation-state, whether attacking by himself or through his actions as viewed by the media. These phenomena are identified in two ways. One is fifth generation warfare where one or two individuals attack a nation-state and remain free while massive resources are expended to find them unsuccessfully. This was illustrated by the investigation to find who mailed anthrax to Capitol Hill in the U.S. (Hammes, 2007, p. 21). The other is the notion of the “strategic lieutenant” who affects a nation-state’s policy via actions or words broadcast in the media (Vandergriff, 2007, ¶ 10).

Supporting fifth generation warfare and the “strategic lieutenant” is the “CNN effect” of instant, global, 24/7 news broadcasting. This effect allows unprecedented insight for enemies to gather intelligence, identify locations, and conduct propaganda and information operations to their benefit (Vandergriff, 2007, ¶ 11). Synopsized by MAJ (RET) Donald Vandergriff in an article titled “Developing Adaptive Army Leaders: 10 Questions For Don Vandergriff:”

“But in today’s environment, where everyone can become a ‘strategic Lieutenant’ you’ve got to be tougher in your selection or accession

process. And young officers must learn more attributes and skills earlier than in the past in order to be successful in the operating environments [of] today and in the future...There's a phenomenon called the 'CNN effect.' What that means is the decisions these people make, say, on the streets of Baghdad or in Afghanistan, or wherever they're going to be, could impact the operational or strategic levels of war. If they make a mistake in mishandling a crowd or lose a lot of their people ... every casualty is highlighted, so these people have to be really good [in missions] from warfighting to rebuilding. So these people have more of an impact than they ever have had before."

Objective

The purpose of this paper is to present a predictive study of reactions by major powers of the world to a resurgent Islamic Caliphate. While the results may seem self-evident, clearly an analysis of this topic should be addressed to support long-term planning; especially as the U.S. and several Western nations understand the aspects and effects of a "Long War" (Graham and White, 2006, ¶ 3)⁵

The current conflict against trans-national fourth and fifth generation warfare threats, specifically global terrorism operations, is focused at fighting a more traditional conflict encompassing extremist and insurgent forces in specific countries—namely in the Middle East (Iraq) and Central Asia (Afghanistan). Understanding that should an overtly resurgent Caliphate appear, the effects must be studied and the results planned for. Similarly, the realization that a pseudo-Caliphate may already exist on one level, due to global support flowing to specific areas and extremist organizations must also be realized.

While this paper will not be a complete authoritative study, it can set the stage for more in-depth consideration and understanding. This paper's limitations are intentional

⁵ Much like the Cold War before it, the "Long War" theme was espoused by GEN John Abizaid, Commander, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) in 2004. The term was utilized to "...underscore the challenge posed by al-Qaeda and other Islamic extremist groups."

and unintentional. They include lack of knowledge of ongoing, classified studies amongst the major nation-state powers as well as exclusion of any classified material. This paper's author's entry level of understanding of global analytical processes as envisioned under the Lockwood Analytical Method of Prediction (LAMP) is a further limitation.

Using the LAMP, this paper will focus on addressing analysis of various futures related to scenarios involving reactions by the major powers due to a resurgent Islamic Caliphate. This paper will work to identify and describe the potential impacts various alternate futures will have on the West and other non-Islamic nations of a resurgent Caliphate.

THE 12 STEPS OF LAMP

Step 1: Determine the predictive issue -- What are the Potential Reactions by Other Major Powers to a Resurgent Islamic Caliphate?

Several broadband definitions and assumptions will be utilized to support the various alternative courses of action developed within this paper. Major powers are defined as traditional nation-states such as the U.S., China, or Russia, and confederations of nations such as the European Union (EU) and what remains of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (i.e., remnants of the Former Soviet Union).

Use of the term "Terrorist Organization" (TO) will occur in this paper. TOs are defined as Islamic extremist organizations using terror as a tactic.⁶ These organizations are made up of extremists who are further defined as Jihadists; specifically, those

⁶ Identifying organizations as "terrorist organizations" has long occurred in the media and in nation-state policy and propaganda. This is a misnomer. Terror is a tactic and not an entity. Therefore, if Al Qaeda is a terrorist organization, the U.S. military is alternatively a Hasty Attack, Deliberate defense, or Retrograde Organization. In other words, identifying an organization by the tactic they use is misleading.

individuals who feel violent struggle is required to support the TO's senior leader's goals and beliefs.

Assumptions cover various levels from the individual Jihadist to the major powers. Other assumptions will focus on an existing Islamic Caliphate's foundation—a supporting infrastructure which currently exists in many countries globally coupled with extremist cells operating globally as well. Identifying these countries specifically, beyond those countries identified in open source mediums (i.e., the main stream media), will not occur beyond unclassified depictions from unclassified documents. This is to maintain the unclassified aspect of this paper.

Building upon this supporting structure and extremist cells are the “returning Jihadists.” These are individuals who have left their countries of origin to fight for various extremist groups. Upon receiving training and combat experience, and if they have survived fighting, they have returned home to build upon their lessons learned. This includes conducting fourth or fifth generation warfare attacks, establishing their own terrorist groups. Finally, the assumption that existing major nations may already be working their own plans of global hegemony will be factored into this paper.

Hypothesis: A resurgent Islamic Caliphate will result in an acceleration of major power's overt and covert expansion into lesser power countries to offset and counter the emerging Caliphate. Further, that in doing so, additional unforeseen conflicts may arise with various major powers being reduced to lesser powers through inaction, failure to anticipate the second and third order effects of simply reacting within the confines of a 20th Century (third generation) warfare mindset, and ignoring the 21st Century fourth and fifth generation warfare effect.

2. Specify the actors bearing on the problem.

This paper will utilize specific actors, identified as major powers, based upon these country's abilities to affect global change, structure, and events. Much like the game of *GO*, these nations focus on the status quo of existing nations or acquisition strategy of global territory through domination, expansion of belief in a non-religious cause (i.e., Western style Freedom), or economic and social gains. .

Major powers, for the purposes of this paper, are identified as those blocs who control various regions of the globe and may or may not be nuclear powers. Specifically:

1. **Coalition (CON):** the U.S and key allies such as England, Australia, Japan, South Korea, and current and emerging North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries; EU countries are also included as many EU countries are also NATO countries. This encompasses all of Europe and former WARSAW Pact nations including Hungary, Romania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Turkey, and Pakistan but excluding the Balkan countries of Serbia, Bosnia and Montenegro.
2. **Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS):** Russia and remaining former Soviet Union countries such as Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia.
3. **SINO/SE:** China, North Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, India, Vietnam, and the Philippines.

TOs include but are not limited to various organizations such as al-Qaeda, Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines, Hizb ut-Tahrir in Central Asia, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Those countries and organizations specifically supporting TOs are, for the purposes of this paper, identified as STO. STOs focus on those countries dedicated to

overtly supporting or sponsoring TOs and include North Korea, Iran, Syria, and Serbia.

TOs and STOs are not identified as major powers for the purpose of this paper.

However, reference to a “Caliphate,” outlined above, will occur during this analysis.

This Caliphate is more economic in nature rather than broad-base territorial or strategic resource based.⁷ This conundrum of a Caliphate that is not a Caliphate stems from the extremely large Muslim population in nearly every country around the globe; a population well over one billion. Some Muslims are in TO related organizations, or contribute to these organizations, which supply money for training and weapons procurement. As there is no central seat of power in this economic Caliphate, nor does it have a standing military or other traditional aspects of a nation-state, this Caliphate remains a loose economic organization only.

Other STOs which provide personnel, funding, and technology but do not specifically state they support TOs include most of the Middle East (Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt) and within Central Asia (Pakistan, Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and others). STOs also include many Western, European, and Southeast Asian countries where TO supporters exist, integrated or not, into those countries infrastructure.

Countries in regions not addressed above are not identified as global actors for this paper. These nations can and do affect their regions, but are supporting and not overarching actors on the world stage. They include Central Asia, Africa, and South and Central America. This is not to say that the actions of these countries do not have global

⁷ The notion of an existing Islamic Caliphate strictly based as an economic entity is a theory created by this paper's author.

connotations, simply that they do not have dedicated global effects based on their individual actions.

TO/STO will also not be addressed in the analysis beyond support the analysis. TO/STO are a catalyst for COA development event though they do meet the criteria of global actors. At the same time, they are not global actors by definition of third generation warfare and including TO/STO into the LAMP process would generate false-positive data.⁸

Finally, a large factor in fourth and fifth generation warfare that will not be addressed in this paper, but does require additional review, is the aspect of armed contractors operating external to military oversight. This lack of oversight is causing increased negative effects on GWOT operations, but is not a focus of this paper (Singer, 2007, p. 38-39).

3. Conduct in-depth study of perceptions and intentions of each actor.

Each of the identified global actors is being examined as to their reaction to an expansionist Islamic Caliphate. Territory acquisition and global hegemony are the focus of the major powers (actors). Discussions of fourth (asymmetric, insurgency) and fifth (single player, strategic lieutenant) generation warfare will occur however, these are supporting arguments. Identifying indicators derived from various scenarios supporting courses of action (COA) under the LAMP is one of the goals of this paper. Use of events from the past and present will support COA development.

⁸ Third Generation Warfare nations maintain standing armies, navies, air forces, and have large sustainment base production facilities. Fourth and fifth generation warfare actors realize insurgent/asymmetrical warfare shaped around guerrilla tactics and the "lone actor," respectively. Information operations are significant to fourth and fifth generation warfare while not nearly as developed in third generation warfare.

While TOs have their specific agendas, they will not be included as rational actors; especially as their strict interpretation of Islam is not accepted by well over 85% of the Muslim global population. TOs are irrational by method and therefore provide no analytical benefit beyond noting the fourth and fifth generation warfare aspect.

By working to determine the overall reaction to a resurgent Islamic Caliphate, several questions arise which direct the LAMP. These questions are not comprehensive, but serve to frame the analysis as well as focusing the analysis on global actors. The questions include:

1. How will the Caliphate's current technical existence on a very low level (e.g., support infrastructure on a global scale) be addressed by the major powers?
2. What would the reactions be by the non-Islamic nations/regions?
3. Could one or more of the major powers align with the Caliphate for a measure of control?

Coalition (CON)

The CON interest in keeping a Caliphate from emerging and achieving a major power status is primarily economic and secular. Tied to this is a security factor which looks to reduce TO attacks on CON citizens. Further, ensuring infrastructure damage is kept at a minimum so resources and capital are not expended for repair and medical treatment because of TO attacks is an ongoing effort. While overseas Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) efforts result in killed and wounded CON personnel, they have a second order effect of keeping attacks outside the Middle East and Central Asia at a very low level. This is due to potential Jihadists flocking to these regions to fight the CON Soldiers.

CON focuses on integration and the fact that a resurgent Caliphate is in no way interested in assimilating with Western values and standards is a cause for consternation. This runs counter to the basis of freedom and individual rights that CON citizens enjoy and wish to continue to enjoy. Further, many of CON countries worry about the appearance of not being considerate of other's beliefs and take great pains to observe these beliefs—sometimes to the detriment of CON's society's perceptions.

CON also understands the implications of a resurgent Caliphate particularly due to the severe restrictions and requirements that could be imposed by an overtly powerful Caliphate. Life under or attempting to co-habit with the Caliphate and its extreme laws requiring submission and decrease in basic freedoms are not objectives desired by CON. In other words, CON focuses on advancement while supporting the individual's right to freely accomplish their goals rather than direction to "know one's place" to not infringe upon the Caliphate's goals.

CIS

CIS efforts are similar to CON with some differences. CIS is still dealing with its reduction in status and territory post-Cold War. CIS is also far more ruthless than CON is when dealing with TOs preferring to kill not only the TO personnel engaged in an attack, but the STO elements identified as well. This is to ensure similar TO attacks do not occur.

CIS has not been key to CON GWOT efforts outside CIS and former Soviet Union borders. This is due in large part to previous support to Middle Eastern (Iraq) countries which lead to the first Gulf War (Operation DESERT STORM) and the ongoing GWOT effort (Operation IRAQI FREEDOM). A lack of CIS support in Central Asian is two-

fold; CON-lead efforts to support Afghani rebels to push the CIS, as the Soviet Union, out of Afghanistan caused a cascade effect in this region. Large areas of territory were lost to the CIS as a result of the end of the Cold War. Loss of CIS's status as a global superpower also occurred during the shift from communism to a more democratic, capitalistic political and economic structure.

With the emergence of CIS as a leader in natural gas production, a measure of power has been restored. CIS support to CON to ensure a Caliphate does not emerge supports CIS efforts to expand economically. While the current geography of countries along the southern CIS borders is from former satellite nations of the Soviet Union, an expanded Caliphate could infringe upon CIS territories affecting economic expansion.

Lastly, CIS support to CON, and to SINO/SE, to keep the Caliphate operating at a reduced, economic only stature assists in keeping lesser powers from providing the support a Caliphate would need to organize and expand.

SINO/SE

SINO/SE is approaching the issue of a resurgent Caliphate in several ways. Integrating globally to ensure foresight and knowledge of where an emerging Caliphate may be indicates potential for SINO/SE to work with the Caliphate, for a time. For example, given the current "buy American" focus which has caused reduction in U.S. partnerships, trading/commerce, and training opportunities with other countries China is expanding in lesser power regions (i.e., Latin American, African, and European countries). This expansion is being accepted well due to its "soft" economic approach being non-threatening. The majority of South American countries see China as a counterbalance to the U.S. on several levels. With the Chinese highly diplomatic

approach to developing trade relations is increasing dividends, the U.S. response of caution and warnings is undermining U.S. influence and efforts in this region (Kenny, 2006, p. 61-63, 66).

China in a leadership role in Southeast Asia (SEAsia) is very similar to the U.S. leadership role of the West during and after the Cold War. Economically, China and SEAsia (SINO/SE) have rapidly growing economies requiring more resources acquired from abroad. From an economic standpoint, the SINO/SE expansion around the globe to fill the “vacuum” left by the U.S. resembles the CIS argument that the U.S.-lead NATO is “encircling” them.

While SINO/SE expansion is primarily economic and comparatively at odds with the game of *GO*, by virtue of the areas around the globe that SINO/SE is moving in and providing support to is also territory gains. Economically occupying huge areas of the globe—the more area you control the better you are to be successful in *GO*—plays into the SINO/SE long-term plans. Making small in roads over a series of years and decades, in places such as South America (Venezuela) and Africa, supports SINO/SE’s expansionist hegemonic approach. A resurgent Caliphate could have serious impacts on this long term expansion.

Not only is SINO/SE making inroads economically on a global scale, but many of the nations within SINO/SE are moving to incorporate more modern weapons into their inventories while reducing military infrastructure. These moves to modernize while expanding economically and working to expand diplomatic ties are telling when put together. A quote from the former CIA Director, George Tenet, succinctly identifies this (Barron, 2001, ¶ 1):

“Mr. Chairman, let me now turn to China, whose drive for recognition as a Great Power is one of the toughest challenges that we face. Beijing's goal of becoming a key world player and especially more powerful in East Asia has come sharply into focus. It is pursuing these goals through an ambitious economic reform agenda, military modernization, and a complex web of initiatives aimed at expanding China's international influence--especially relative to the United States...Russian arms are a key component of this buildup. [But] arms sales are only one element of a burgeoning Sino-Russian relationship. Moscow and Beijing plan to sign a 'friendship treaty' later this year, highlighting common interests and a willingness to cooperate diplomatically against US policies that they see as unfriendly to their interest.”

Therefore, CON/CIS incorporation of SINO/Se, or at the least, laying inroads to ensure SINO/SE undermining of CON doesn't support a resurgent Caliphate should occur. Lack of effective oversight could lead to opening the door for a SINO/SE assumption of world leadership due to extremely overstretched CON and a marginalized CIS (Liang and Xiangsui, 1999, np).⁹

4. Specify courses of action for each actor.

Focusing on the regional bloc approach of this paper, there are only three courses of action (COA) for each of the major powers. These COAs are derived from a *GO* strategy approach. This approach focuses not only on the acquisition of territory via control of land, but through economic strength and strategic resources.

- Power Consolidation (PC) – All three major powers consolidate against the Caliphate.
- Power Acquisition (PA) – A major power links with the Caliphate for global hegemonic control against other major powers.
- Power Marginalize (PM) – A major power links with one other major power, but not both, against the Caliphate.

⁹ In the late 1990s, a book written by two Chinese officers was released which noted China assuming the role of world leader in the mid-21st Century with the West subsumed due to over-extending.

5. Determine the major scenarios.

Scenario 1 (Caliphate becomes a major power): The Caliphate expands into a major power continuing to receive support from the STOs without any major power support.

Scenario 2 (Caliphate remains economic based utilizing terror as a tactic): The Caliphate's STOs link more strongly expanding to encompass areas not under major power control. Caliphate continues to be de-centralized with terror as the main tactic.

Scenario 3 (Caliphate and a major power(s) mutually support): The Caliphate expands into a major power continuing to receive support from the STOs with support from one or more major powers.

6. Calculate the number of alternate futures.

Use of the LAMP base equation $X^Y = Z$, where X is the number of COAs for each major power, Y is the number of major powers, and Z is equal to the number of alternate futures. Therefore, using this equation, a total of 27 alternate futures is identified. This total number of futures is calculated as:

$$X = 3 \text{ and } Y = 3; 3^3 = 27.$$

7. Do a pair-wise comparison of alternate futures.

Future#	CON	CIS	SINO/SE
1	PC	PC	PC
2	PC	PC	PA
3	PC	PA	PC
4	PC	PC	PM
5	PC	PM	PC
6	PC	PA	PA
7	PC	PA	PM
8	PC	PM	PA

9	PC	PM	PM
10	PA	PC	PC
11	PA	PC	PA
12	PA	PC	PM
13	PA	PM	PC
14	PA	PM	PA
15	PA	PM	PM
16	PA	PA	PM
17	PA	PA	PC
18	PA	PA	PA
19	PM	PC	PC
20	PM	PC	PA
21	PM	PC	PM
22	PM	PM	PC
23	PM	PM	PA
24	PM	PM	PM
25	PM	PA	PM
26	PM	PA	PA
27	PM	PA	PC

With three separate scenarios, each with 27 alternate futures, there is a total of 81 alternate futures compared in this analysis.

8. Rank the alternate futures for each scenario from highest relative probability to the lowest based on the number of “votes” received.

A synopsis of Step 8’s mathematical equations from the LAMP process is required to understand the voting process. The total number of votes is derived from n which is the number of alternate futures to be analyzed and X equals the total number of pairwise comparisons. “The formula for the number of pairwise comparisons is expressed as X = (n-1)+(n-2)...+(n-n)” or expressed completely: $X = \frac{n(n-1)}{2}$ (Lockwood and Lockwood, 1994, p. 60).

Scenario 1 (Caliphate becomes a major power)

Future#	CON	CIS	SINO/SE	Vote	Rank
1	PC	PC	PC	17	2
2	PC	PC	PA	18	1
3	PC	PA	PC	10	7
4	PC	PC	PM	15	4
5	PC	PM	PC	16	3
6	PC	PA	PA	5	9
7	PC	PA	PM	11	6
8	PC	PM	PA	12	5
9	PC	PM	PM	15	4
10	PA	PC	PC	11	6
11	PA	PC	PA	4	10
12	PA	PC	PM	8	8
13	PA	PM	PC	8	8
14	PA	PM	PA	2	12
15	PA	PM	PM	4	10
16	PA	PA	PM	1	13
17	PA	PA	PC	1	13
18	PA	PA	PA	0	14
19	PM	PC	PC	8	8
20	PM	PC	PA	3	11
21	PM	PC	PM	5	9
22	PM	PM	PC	5	9
23	PM	PM	PA	0	14
24	PM	PM	PM	3	11
25	PM	PA	PM	1	13
26	PM	PA	PA	0	14
27	PM	PA	PC	0	14

Scenario 2 (Caliphate remains economic based utilizing terror as a tactic)

Future#	CON	CIS	SINO/SE	Vote	Rank
1	PC	PC	PC	27	1
2	PC	PC	PA	15	5
3	PC	PA	PC	16	4
4	PC	PC	PM	22	2
5	PC	PM	PC	18	3
6	PC	PA	PA	4	11
7	PC	PA	PM	7	8
8	PC	PM	PA	7	8
9	PC	PM	PM	14	6
10	PA	PC	PC	9	7
11	PA	PC	PA	2	13
12	PA	PC	PM	6	9
13	PA	PM	PC	6	9
14	PA	PM	PA	1	14
15	PA	PM	PM	3	12
16	PA	PA	PM	1	14
17	PA	PA	PC	2	13
18	PA	PA	PA	0	15
19	PM	PC	PC	5	10
20	PM	PC	PA	4	11
21	PM	PC	PM	4	11
22	PM	PM	PC	4	11
23	PM	PM	PA	1	14
24	PM	PM	PM	3	12
25	PM	PA	PM	1	14
26	PM	PA	PA	0	15
27	PM	PA	PC	0	15

Scenario 3 (Caliphate and a major power(s) mutually support)

Future#	CON	CIS	SINO/SE	Vote	Rank
1	PC	PC	PC	11	6
2	PC	PC	PA	14	3
3	PC	PA	PC	6	7
4	PC	PC	PM	13	4
5	PC	PM	PC	5	8
6	PC	PA	PA	15	2
7	PC	PA	PM	11	6
8	PC	PM	PA	15	1
9	PC	PM	PM	12	5
10	PA	PC	PC	5	8
11	PA	PC	PA	4	9
12	PA	PC	PM	5	8
13	PA	PM	PC	2	11
14	PA	PM	PA	3	10
15	PA	PM	PM	5	8
16	PA	PA	PM	4	9
17	PA	PA	PC	1	12
18	PA	PA	PA	3	10
19	PM	PC	PC	0	13
20	PM	PC	PA	3	10
21	PM	PC	PM	2	11
22	PM	PM	PC	0	13
23	PM	PM	PA	3	10
24	PM	PM	PM	1	12
25	PM	PA	PM	1	12
26	PM	PA	PA	1	12
27	PM	PA	PC	0	13

9. Analyze consequences of alternate futures.

The most likely scenarios are 2 and 3. Both of these scenarios follow the more logical path of progression. A graphic depiction of how the scenarios are linked within the

LAMP process is depicted in figure 3 below. Beginning with Scenario 2, a ramp-up of economic support due to Western (CON) operations in the Middle East (Iraq, Gulf States) and in Central Asia (Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Pakistan) has occurred over the last several years. CON operations that occurred in Afghanistan were seen as a logical




Figure 3. Linkages within the LAMP Method.¹⁰

response to the 9/11 attacks on the U.S. The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq caused a large increase of support from Islamic organizations globally which are, in the last year, only now being addressed by countries that are (England) and are not (Germany, France) engaged in the Middle East.

Overtones over the last year (2006-2007) that Iran may soon be the target of a U.S. attack due to Iran's questionable nuclear technology developments also support a potential increase of resources to Islamic extremist groups. This leads into Scenario 3

¹⁰ Anser Analytic Services Inc. (2002). "The Lockwood Analytic Method for Prediction (LAMP): 15 January 2002 – An Innovative Methodological Approach to the Problem of Predictive Analysis." IN520 – Analytical Methods, American Military University, slide 6.

with an already ongoing engagement by China throughout Northern Africa, South America, and China's stand-off position on the CON operations in the Middle East and Central Asia. China's goals of quietly waiting for the CON to overextend itself and then stepping in a "replacement" for the CON economically and militarily over the next 50 years, Scenario 3 gains strength as a logical follow-on to Scenario 2.

Scenario 1 is least likely due to a vast majority of the Islamic population of the globe not aspiring to the extremist views of the TOs. The extreme interpretation of Islam, and the need to impose *Sharia* Law so completely is not something a majority of Muslims want.¹¹ As current TOs are not globally linked and Osama bin Laden is not the global leader of all TOs, Scenario 1 becomes even more unlikely.

Within each scenario, the three most likely alternate futures will be reviewed. After each alternate future is reviewed, Steps 10 and 11 will identify key focal events and indicators within the most likely alternate futures.

Scenario 2 (Caliphate remains economic based utilizing terror as a tactic).

Scenario 2 reflects the most likely overall of the three scenarios. According to the pairwise comparison of this scenario, alternate futures 1, 4, and 5 have the highest probability of occurrence. Scenario 2 is a more likely mid-term focused scenario. As the GWOT continues, and the economic support increases causing propaganda support against the CON to increase, more effort to shift the overall suppression of TOs to the STOs will occur. Similar to putting a band-aid on a virus, going after the source with antibiotics needs to occur to decrease the end result—TO attacks and support to insurgencies—or the overall GWOT effort is moot.

¹¹ The extremist *Wahhabism* sect of Islam believes that *Sharia* Law must be strictly interpreted and that anyone not following it the way they do is not a true Muslim.

Alternate Future 1 (CON, CIS, SINO/SEC consolidated against the Caliphate - 27 votes) predicts all of the three major powers will consolidate against a resurgent Caliphate in what ever form it takes. This is scenario 2's most likely COA. This is based on recent (2003-2007) events noted above; especially due to the continued TO use of terror as a tactic coupled with the use of the Internet and mainstream media (MSM). While use of MSM has allowed the 4th and 5th Generation warfare results TOs have been using to be viewed in near real time (i.e., beheadings, kidnap victim exploitation, etc), it has also had a negative effect which has contributed to keeping a global expansion of a more overt Caliphate stalled Muslim organizations who identified their support and resources for TOs have, in some cases, balked at further support, chastised the TOs for broadcasting a negative image of Islam to non-Muslims, and even had Islamic leaders come further to denounce these operations. This has also lead to the TOs denouncing the Muslim organizations because of their lack of support for the TOs further driving a wedge into a larger Caliphate developing.

Alternate Future 4 (CON/CIS consolidated against the Caliphate; SINO/SE supports CIS only - 22 votes) is similar to Alternate Future (AF) 1 except that not all major powers are united against the Caliphate directly. In this case, CON and CIS are focused against the Caliphate, but SINO/SE is linked to, most likely, CIS due to historical interaction during the Cold War. This AF is further supported by the low-level interaction between SINO/SE and various elements in the Middle East, Northern Africa, South America, and areas/countries in Southeast Asia. SINO/SE linking to a resurgent Caliphate would be to ensure the Caliphate does not expand further than SINO/SE wants it to. Overtly denying support to a Caliphate, while working behind the scenes to ensure

the Caliphate becomes a viable opponent to CON/CIS, perhaps with Iran as the Caliphate seat of power, is a COA SINO/SE has conducted in the past; specifically, SINO/SE support during the Korean War.

Alternate Future 5 (CON & SINO/SE consolidated against the Caliphate; CIS supports CON only - 18 votes) resembles AF 4 except that CIS is most likely aligned with CON in this case. The ongoing Global War on Terror (GWOT) has shown that while CIS is overtly supporting CON against TOs and the potential for a resurgent Caliphate, CIS has also worked against CON with dealing to Iraq, Iran, and other Middle Eastern and Central Asian nations. This interaction is a hold over from the Cold War and continues into the 21st Century. Further, internal CON (U.S.) inability to address CON country (e.g., Germany, France) previous support to various Middle Eastern countries (e.g., Iraq, Iran) weakens CON. CIS support provides leverage for U.S. to bring Germany/France “back into the fold” due to economic pressures (i.e., potential for CIS to cut off flow of natural gas to Europe).

Scenario 3 (Caliphate and a major power(s) mutually support).

Scenario 3 reflects the next most likely (or most dangerous) overall of the three scenarios. According to the pairwise comparison of this scenario, alternate futures 8, 6, and 2 have the highest probability of occurrence. While alternate futures 8 and 6 received equal votes, 8 has a higher probability of occurrence due to past mutual support between CIS and SINO/SE in the 20th Century.¹² Scenario 3 is a true divergence into the “what if” of alternate futures (AF); particularly AFs 8, 6, and 2. Scenario 3 assumes the

¹² While the former Soviet Union and Red China had border clashes and diplomatic issues, during the Cold War (1945-1989), also identified as World War III, as noted by former CIA Director John Woolsey in 2003, both bloc’s socialist/communist foundations and operations against a capitalistic West led by the U.S. built a foundation, while shaky at times, between the two blocs.

Caliphate has been left to grow into a major power, perhaps with a central seat of power in Central Asia emerging (e.g., Iran). Left to itself, the resurgent caliphate has expanded, as noted in Figure 2 above, while CON and CIS have apparently dramatically decreased GWOT efforts, have been reduced in overall global status by SINO/SE efforts, or a series of attacks by TOs with nuclear technology has occurred in many places allowing the Caliphate to organize and expand.

Alternate Future 8 (CON supported by CIS; SINO/SE linked to Caliphate - 15 votes) ties in votes with AF 6, however, the COAs for each major power push this AF's ranking above that of AF 6. While AF 8 appears similar to current (2007) events, the leadership of CON, coupled with support from a reduced in status CIS, against a resurgent Caliphate, supported by SINO/SE, diverges from the current time. AF 8 assumes the Caliphate is already a major power and the SINO/SE support is firmly entrenched. This AF identifies the possibility of a 21st Century Cold War/Hot War-like structure of the 20th Century's Cold War. This war would be a World War (WW) V as previous depictions of the Cold War as WW III and the ongoing GWOT as WW IV have occurred (Feldman and Wilson, 2003, ¶ 1). SINO/SE is not overtly in conflict with CON/CIS allowing the Caliphate to execute global diplomatic maneuvers (Cold) with smaller country/region brush wars (Hot) as the theme.

Alternate Future 6 (CON alone against a Caliphate supported by SINO/SE & CIS - 15 votes) assumes the CIS is able to subsume its non-negotiation with terrorism using extremist organizations to link with SINO/SE and the Caliphate against CON. While appearing unlikely at first glance, the 20th Century linkage between CIS and SINO/SE could be brought to bear to reduce and/or eliminate the threat of TO attacks on

CIS by the Caliphate. CIS expansion into formerly held territories in the Balkans, Baltic States and portions of Central Asia to consolidate economic holds (i.e., Russia as one of the major suppliers of natural gas) as a competitor to the Caliphate's natural oil and strategic mineral reserves would bring the CIS back to its former status as the USSR. Further, SINO/SE integration into various regions around CON (e.g., Africa, South America, Southeast Asia) and expanding use of SINO/SE and Caliphate individuals and organizations within CON to undermine and isolate CON makes AF 6 the most likely AF within scenario 3.

Alternate Future 2 (CON/CIS consolidated against the Caliphate; SINO/SE linked to Caliphate - 14 votes) is a stronger version of AF 8 in that CIS retains an equal footing with CON, but due to the scenario it falls under is not ranked higher. CIS retains its stature and power similar to CON and is an equal partner with CON. Like AFs 8 and 6, SINO/SE remains linked with the Caliphate.

10. Determine focal events for alternate futures.

For each AF, there are key focal events (FE) which analysts must be able to detect that, should they occur, will bring about a specific AF within an identified scenario. These FEs lead to the scenarios playing out and analysts must be able to provide these FEs to decision makers to ensure the proper COAs are conducted to ensure the scenarios do not play out.

Scenario 2 (Caliphate remains economic based utilizing terror as a tactic)

Alternate Future 1 (CON, CIS, SINO/SEC consolidated against the Caliphate).

FOCAL EVENT: TOs resume external to Middle East/Central Asia attacks on Western countries.

FOCAL EVENT: STOs decrease support/expand criticism of TO attacks.

FOCAL EVENT: Western Information Operations (IO) gain credibility against TO IO.

Alternate Future 4 (CON/CIS consolidated against the Caliphate; SINO/SE supports CIS only).

FOCAL EVENT: Expanded SINO/SE & CIS relations.

FOCAL EVENT: Decreased CON status in various regions globally (e.g., Africa, South America).

FOCAL EVENT: SINO/SE IO directed against CON due to SINO/SE offensive economic Operations against CON.

FOCAL EVENT: TOs resume external to Middle East/Central Asia attacks on Western countries.

FOCAL EVENT: Increased SINO/SE links to Iran and covert support to Central Asian region due to CON/CIS offensive operations in Central Asia (i.e., Iran).

Alternate Future 5 (CON & SINO/SE consolidated against the Caliphate; CIS supports CON only).

FOCAL EVENT: Expanded CON & SINO/SE relations.

FOCAL EVENT: Expanded CON/CIS relations.

FOCAL EVENT: CIS decrease of economic support (e.g., flow of natural gas) into Europe.

FOCAL EVENT: CON decreased status due to political in-fighting.

Scenario 3 (Caliphate and a major power(s) mutually support).

Alternate Future 8 (CON supported by CIS; SINO/SE linked to Caliphate).

FOCAL EVENT: Caliphate a major power.

FOCAL EVENT: CIS decrease of economic support (e.g., flow of natural gas) into Europe.

FOCAL EVENT: Vietnam/Korean conflict-like brush wars emerge singularly or in parallel.

FOCAL EVENT: SINO/SE emerges as global mediator of conflicts.

FOCAL EVENT: Increased SINO/SE links to Iran and covert support to Central Asian region due to CON/CIS offensive operations in Central Asia (i.e., Iran).

Alternate Future 6 (CON alone against a Caliphate supported by SINO/SE & CIS).

FOCAL EVENT: Caliphate a major power.

FOCAL EVENT: CON decreased status due to political in-fighting.

FOCAL EVENT: Expanded SINO/SE & CIS relations.

FOCAL EVENT: CIS decrease of economic support (e.g., flow of natural gas) into Europe.

FOCAL EVENT: Vietnam/Korean conflict-like brush wars emerge singularly or in parallel.

Alternate Future 2 (CON/CIS consolidated against the Caliphate; SINO/SE linked to Caliphate).

- FOCAL EVENT: Caliphate a major power.
- FOCAL EVENT: SINO/SE emerges as global mediator of conflicts.
- FOCAL EVENT: Expanded CON/CIS relations.
- FOCAL EVENT: Vietnam/Korean conflict-like brush wars emerge singularly or in parallel.
- FOCAL EVENT: Increased SINO/SE links to Iran and covert support to Central Asian region due to CON/CIS offensive operations in Central Asia (i.e., Iran).

11. Develop indicators for each focal event.

For each of the focal events (FE), there will be indicators identified from trends and incidents which support the analyst’s analysis. The indicators are the start point for the “chain reaction” into FEs leading to the likelihood of a specific COA occurring within a scenario. Figure 4 graphically depicts how this chain reaction occurs.




Figure 4. The Concept of the Analytical Map.¹³

¹³ Anser Analytic Services Inc, *Op Cit*, slide 8.

Below are the different indicators for the 14 FEs utilized in Step 10 above.

FOCAL EVENT: TOs resume external to Middle East/Central Asia attacks on Western countries.

- KEY INDICATOR – Extremist organization attacks begin in CON
- KEY INDICATOR – Unsuccessful attacks stopped increase
- KEY INDICATOR – TO propaganda dramatically increases in media and Internet
- KEY INDICATOR – A weapon of mass destruction (WMD) incident occurs (nuclear, chemical, biological) in one or more CON nations

FOCAL EVENT: STOs decrease support/expand criticism of TO attacks.

- KEY INDICATOR – Muslim leaders openly support CON/CIS
- KEY INDICATOR – Reduction in TO operations due to lack of weapons and personnel
- KEY INDICATOR – Increase in returning Jihadists to home nations with those nations dramatically increasing arrests of these individuals
- KEY INDICATOR – Extremist Islamic messages disparaged in CON/CIS media

FOCAL EVENT: Western Information Operations (IO) gain credibility against TO IO.

- KEY INDICATOR – Media shifts criticism from CON to TO
- KEY INDICATOR – Middle Eastern and Central Asian nations fail to criticize CON IO and laud IO as credible
- KEY INDICATOR – CON operations in Middle East/Central Asia see decrease in Casualties and increase in TO personnel captures due to local population support

FOCAL EVENT: Expanded SINO/SE & CIS relations.

- KEY INDICATOR – United Nations marginalizes CON efforts by supporting SINO/SE & CIS efforts
- KEY INDICATOR – Majority of NATO nations reduce support to U.S. secondary operations in the GWOT (e.g., theater missile defense facilities cancelled across Europe)
- KEY INDICATOR – American losses in GWOT touted as result of imperialistic efforts and not as response to 9/11 attacks accepted by CON nations
- KEY INDICATOR – Multiple WMD attacks in CON nations downplayed in the rest of the world as result of GWOT gone to long

FOCAL EVENT: Decreased CON stature in various regions globally (e.g., Africa, South America).

- KEY INDICATOR – “Buy American” policy used as main theme to remove U.S./CON combined operations and economic status from lesser power regions
- KEY INDICATOR – CON price of oil dramatically increases due to shift of OPEC output to SINO/SE as primary recipient

KEY INDICATOR – Muslims in CON nations carrying out suicide attacks praised by SINO/SE & CIS backed media

FOCAL EVENT: SINO/SE IO directed against CON due to SINO/SE offensive economic operations against CON.

KEY INDICATOR – SINO/SE IO focuses highlighting U.S. inability to lead CON due to U.S. status as global leader in debt

KEY INDICATOR – CON media reflects SINO/SE IO as credible with no challenges from CON leadership other than to “spin” the media responses to reflect a more positive effect

KEY INDICATOR – CON politicians openly support SINO/SE message to placate a “disgusted public” in an attempt to appease SINO/SE

KEY INDICATOR – Hollywood and counterpart CON public figures openly gather, similar to 2003 efforts, against CON to organize anti-CON efforts focused on supporting SINO/SE IO

FOCAL EVENT: Increased SINO/SE links to Iran and covert support to Central Asian region due to CON/CIS offensive operations in Central Asia (i.e., Iran).

KEY INDICATOR – CON attacks into Iran cause attacks on CON infrastructure supported covertly by SINO/SE

KEY INDICATOR – Organizations with global effects (i.e., OPEC, UN) openly condemn CON attacks into Iran

KEY INDICATOR – All CON support bases directed to close in Central Asia

KEY INDICATOR – Accidental attacks on CON shipping in India Ocean occur with regular frequency

FOCAL EVENT: Expanded CON & SINO/SE relations.

KEY INDICATOR – SINO/SE identifies advantages of assisting CON against Caliphate

KEY INDICATOR – North Korea isolated by SINO/SE; severe decrease in North Korean missile and related WMD technology proliferation

KEY INDICATOR – SINO/SE provides support to CON to reduce tensions in Kashmir and Myanmar

KEY INDICATOR – SINO/SE openly supports resolution of the Kashmir region conflict with India and Pakistan

FOCAL EVENT: Expanded CON/CIS relations.

KEY INDICATOR – CIS natural gas cutoff threats eliminated with near doubling of gas flow into Europe

KEY INDICATOR – CIS supports CON implementation of a theater missile defense system; requests to add own like systems to augment

KEY INDICATOR – CIS provides military forces in Middle East and Central Asia to support CON forces

FOCAL EVENT: CIS decrease of economic support (e.g., flow of natural gas) into Europe.

- KEY INDICATOR – CIS implements near cut-off of natural gas into Europe due to “differences” with Ukraine and Belarus
- KEY INDICATOR – Cooperation with SINO/SE to provide large quantities of natural gas via ground shipments until pipeline construction begins
- KEY INDICATOR – CIS moves to close off oil output from Azerbaijan

FOCAL EVENT: CON decreased status due to political in-fighting.

- KEY INDICATOR – U.S. inability to have France and Germany to support continuing GWOT and increase of economic Caliphate status
- KEY INDICATOR – Various CON nations provide overt support to Iran and openly identify potential for Iran to assume Caliphate “control” to better ensure WMD incidents do not occur
- KEY INDICATOR – Various CON nations openly blame U.S. for past and current TO attacks on their populations
- KEY INDICATOR – U.S.-led GWOT identified by CON nations as reason for rise of Caliphate; CON nations begin large-scale withdrawal of support for GWOT

FOCAL EVENT: Caliphate a major power.

- KEY INDICATOR – Martial law declared in several Middle Eastern and Central Asian nations following military coups ousting secular leaders
- KEY INDICATOR – Middle Eastern nation’s leaders friendly to CON government Replaced by pro-Iranian military or revolutionary leaders
- KEY INDICATOR – Extremist cells and STOs expand operations in CON nations forcing reduction in CON GWOT related efforts overseas
- KEY INDICATOR – Increased security measures within CON lead to breakdown of civil liberties; Caliphate led by Iran emerges during turmoil
- KEY INDICATOR – Major economic recessions and depressions occur in CON nations due to infrastructure damage and dramatic increase of oil and strategic mineral prices
- KEY INDICATOR – WMD attacks within CON nations kill large numbers of population; resulting in compounded economic burden

FOCAL EVENT: Vietnam/Korean conflict-like brush wars emerge singularly or in parallel.

- KEY INDICATOR – CON nations reduce GWOT counter-insurgency operations in Middle East and Central Asia to combat more traditional third generation warfare (3GW) in lesser power regions
- KEY INDICATOR – Multiple WMD attacks globally increase burden on CON to provide humanitarian support decreasing CON resources during recession/depression

KEY INDICATOR – Inability of CON to continue humanitarian, 3GW, and GWOT related operations causes CON public to openly advocate isolationist approach to ensure survival of CON

KEY INDICATOR – CON inability to conduct large-scale, overseas operations results in widespread withdrawals; resulting power vacuums cause global recession and sharp increase in ethnic cleansing

FOCAL EVENT: SINO/SE emerges as global mediator of conflicts.

KEY INDICATOR – UN unable to mediate conflicts and increased ethnic cleansing

KEY INDICATOR – SINO/SE uses overt and covert pressures to successfully mediate numerous conflicts and atrocities

KEY INDICATOR – SINO/SE provides humanitarian support to numerous lesser power regions

KEY INDICATOR – SINO/SE support to CON nations after numerous WMD Attacks reduces CON stature globally

12. Assess the potential for transposition between alternate futures (only the most likely alternate futures are analyzed for potential transposition).

Transposition is literally the “branch point” where alternate futures can proceed into various different directions. These points are where, like the opening of a chess game, a line of occurrences appears to resemble a previous starting event for a past series of occurrences. Using the chess example, one player may attempt to use an opening that may be unfamiliar to the other player to gain an advantage. However, the opponent may identify a move or series of moves which brings the game back to more familiar lines of play. Therefore, transposition has occurred as the unfamiliar opening then lead to that of another series of familiar lines of play (Lockwood and Lockwood, 1994, p. 64).

In scenario 2, all of the AFs can easily transpose on each other. AF 1 is, for all appearance, what is occurring now and in the foreseeable future. At the same time, AFs 4 and 5 can easily play out if AF 1 is the start point. All of the AFs are linked in that the CIS can lose its status as a lead major power due to continued attempts to cut-off economic support to various CON elements, thus reducing its stature. Similarly, in AF 5 where CON

loses portions of its stature due to political in-fighting, a transposition from AF 1 to AF 5 and back could also occur.

In scenario 3, AFs 8 and 2 are most likely to transpose with little or no effect on AF 6. AFs 8 and 2 focus on a consolidated spilt between CON/CIS and SINO/SE and the Caliphate. Whether CIS is reduced in stature, as depicted in AF 8, or remaining a viable counterpart to CON, as in AF 8, the end result is the same overall.

Final Review and Analysis

Based on the analysis, it is true that the original hypothesis is correct. Keeping the potential for a resurgent Islamic Caliphate from achieving major power status will continue to cause SINO/SE and CIS to work to expand into various lesser power countries and regions. CON will continue to espouse democracy and free-market systems, but lose ground to SINO/SE due to related hubris of “standing for freedom on freedom’s principles.”¹⁴

The continued support by STOs of TOs will occur for the foreseeable future. As depicted in Figures 5 and 6 below, the extent of extremist operations (i.e., extremist cells and al-Qaeda financing) through the globe is extensive. While the openness of CON is exploited for these extremist organizations to operate within CON, and other countries, the continued expansion of extremists cells and STOs depicted in both figures show that the economic Caliphate is not simply mere speculation. Whether actions come in time to keep the Caliphate from expanding to the level of a major power from an economic, and somewhat limited operational, entity remains to be seen.

¹⁴ Student note: the continued efforts of the U.S. Congress to force the “Buy American” laws will continue to decrease the U.S.’s influence in lesser power regions leaving gaps for SINO/SE and, potentially, CIS to fill. More likely, SINO/SE will continue on the path of global hegemony as CON continues to overextend itself looking the wrong way. CIS expansion is a lesser threat as the majority of Former Soviet Union satellite countries remain wary of CIS intentions.

Conclusion

The rise of conflicts to keep CON and CIS busy also exists to ensure SINO/SE can move forward along economic and political lines to achieve territorial gains laid out in the *GO* strategy. SINO/SE misdirects via support of an economic or developing Caliphate would divert CON/CIS attention away from SINO/SE overall goals.



Figure 5. Presence of Radical Islamist Cells 1996-2006.¹⁵

Continued over-expenditures by CON and misdirected economic efforts by CIS could, over the next 10-20 years, cause an ever increasing amount of SINO/SE and Caliphate backed brush wars to occur or appear to be ready to occur. This would increase the effects on CON and CIS by scattering their attention and resources while SINO/SE works to acquire more resources and territory (at least through backing of various regions against CON/CIS). Reduction of key CON/CIS lead countries to a lesser power status by failing to anticipate the second and third order effects of SINO/SE efforts without moving into a 21st

¹⁵ Hoekstra, Peter. (2006). "Al-Qaeda: The Many Faces of an Extremist Threat: Report of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence." Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, p. 7

Century focus could relegate CON/CIS to the current status of lesser power regions (e.g., South America, Africa, Southeast Asia).



Figure 6. Al-Qaeda Financing 2004-2006.¹⁶

Without a shift of all aspects of CON/CIS, to include political, social, and economical aspects, into 21st Century realities rather than early 20th Century understandings (i.e., industrial/computer age operations and thoughts), CON/CIS will be overwhelmed by 4th and 5th generational warfare. This type of warfare will shift the balance from nation-state to tribal and individual's ability to change CON/CIS policy. This ability to effect major power abilities will reduce CON/CIS capabilities leaving both unable to recover their current stature.

¹⁶ Hoekstra, *Ibid*, p. 11.

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