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LAMP Paper
IN520 CA SUM 02
October 3, 2002

Reactions to Iraq's Renewed Bid for Regional Supremacy

Recent History of Aggression

Virtually commencing with Saddam Hussein's acquisition of the presidency in 1979 Iraq has continually posed a formidable threat to the other countries in the Middle East. In 1980 Iraq launched an attack against its neighbor, Iran, which led to a bloody war that lasted throughout the majority of the decade. The buildup of Iraq's military and its nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons led to a pre-emptive strike by Israel in 1981. Another aggressive invasion was launched in August 1990 when Iraq overran Kuwait, its small neighbor to the South. After securing the country's vital areas in a matter of days Iraqi troops began to mass on the Kuwaiti/Saudi Arabian border. These two acts of aggression were sufficient enough to generate an armed response from the international community.

Saudi Arabia did not wish to subject itself to Saddam's rule. King Fahd quickly turned to the United States for protection from its aggressive neighbor. The United States agreed to deploy troops in an effort to defend Saudi Arabia for a number of reasons. Economic motivation arose out of the simple fact that the fossil fuels found in that region comprise the majority of all known reserves. After conquering Kuwait "Saddam already controlled over 20 percent of the world's oil reserves. Saudi Arabia contained an additional 20 percent." (inDepthinfo.com, par. 5) The United States and the majority of the international community did not want to let Iraq assume control over such a significant amount of oil reserves. The economic motivation combined with an emotional one stemming from the brutal treatment of the Kuwaiti people by their conquerors. Also, there was an ideological cause that arose due to Iraq belligerently

ignoring United Nations resolutions requiring it to withdraw from Kuwait and cease all aggressive actions. This allowed the United States to create a coalition of countries that actively supported military intervention.

The United Nations issued an ultimatum demanding Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait by January 15, 1991. Meanwhile the coalition forces were building up military strength in Saudi Arabia both to shield it from attack and then to use offensively in case the UN deadline was not adhered to. On January 16, after the ultimatum had been ignored, the coalition forces launched a devastating air campaign against Iraq. The preliminary air war would last until the end of February. During that time Iraq attempted to invade Saudi Arabia but was repulsed by coalition forces. Iraq also fired Scud missiles at Israel in an attempt to draw them into the war thereby straining the relationship between Arab and non-Arab members of the coalition. The ground war was launched on February 24 and lasted a total of four days. This was in large part due to the extremely effective air campaign that had softened the way for the ground forces. After four days of swift and intense combat Iraqi forces withdrew from Kuwait.

The main objectives of the United Nations and the United States had been accomplished during the Gulf War. Saudi Arabia had been protected from an Iraqi invasion and Kuwait was liberated from their control. Although these immediate goals were met the long term desire to remove threatening and aggressive capability from Iraq was not. Towards the end of the punishing air/ground campaigns led against Iraq several Arab members of the coalition began to have reservations against totally dismantling the Iraqi military forces. Iraq was seen as a counterbalance against Iran and none of the Arab countries wanted to see another Arab country completely crushed. So, a large part of the

Iraqi military was allowed to escape unharmed from the action. This was politically necessary at the time due to the nature of the coalition, but it is a decision that has allowed Iraq to continue its threatening and belligerent attitude throughout the 1990s.

A cease-fire was agreed to and went into effect on April 6, 1991. Along with the cease-fire sanctions were imposed upon Iraq in an effort to further dismantle their military capability. Trade embargoes went into effect to limit their acquisition of military material. Weapons inspectors were given a mandate to monitor and enforce Iraqi compliance with destruction of their NBC weapons and production facilities. Certain restrictions were placed on the type of weapons Iraq could possess, such as limiting the range of any missile they had or developed. Finally, no-fly zones were established in the North and the South of Iraq in order to protect the local populace from bombing by the Iraqi regime and in an attempt to foster an up-rising to replace the regime (an objective of the United States).

Over time the intent of these sanctions was completely unraveled. U.S. and British forces conducted occasional air strikes due to being fired on while patrolling the no-fly zones. However, an increasingly vocal criticism of the strikes grew as time passed. Weapons inspectors were denied access to locations or documents and eventually were pulled out of the country in 1998 after being toyed with by the Iraqi government. Trade embargoes had limited effectiveness due to the desire of several regional countries that wanted to support or at least remain in the good graces of Saddam Hussein. Armament material continued to flow into Iraq via black market connections. Furthermore, world opinion turned against the economic sanctions because it was felt that they were only hurting and killing the people of Iraq, not the terrible regime. The result

has been that for the decade after the devastating Gulf War Iraq presented and continues to present a threat to the Middle East region.

Renewed conflict or not?

The primary concern that the United States has regarding Iraq is with the development of weapons of mass destruction. Iraq used chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war and even against its own people, mainly the Kurds, in an attempt to maintain rigid authority. Iraq had made significant progress towards developing nuclear weapons but the Israeli air strike in 1981 and the Gulf War both set the program back substantially. However, with the UN weapons inspectors removed for four years and a compliant black market system of supply Iraq has been able to build-up its WMD capability. The situation now rests on exactly how far the capability has been developed and how much of the material Saddam has under his control. The way to accurately determine the answers to these questions is to have weapons inspectors back in Iraq monitoring their activity and enforcing UN resolutions regarding their possession of WMD.

Belligerent posturing by Iraq and by the United States has indicated that there is likelihood for renewed conflict between the two countries. This paper is an examination of that likelihood for conflict. The LAMP method will be used to look at two scenarios of Iraqi courses of action. The first scenario will envisage that Iraq does not allow weapons inspectors to return to Iraq. The second scenario has Iraq permitting their return. The responses of the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Israel to these scenarios will be examined. Saudi Arabia and Israel have been chosen due to the changed nature of international opinion versus a decade ago. These two countries represent allies to the United States that are in the region of the possible conflict and should share concern

regarding Iraqi capabilities. This paper was written using information through the middle of September 2002. Any events or information subsequent to that will force a reevaluation of the possible courses of action.

The United States

The United States' main concern with Iraq is with the development of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Throughout 2002 President Bush has repeatedly insisted that Iraq has been developing and possesses an NBC capability of some sort. Not only does this represent a threat to the region and a threat to non-proliferation concerns around the world, but it has the potential for direct effect on the United States if Saddam were to turn over any of these weapons to a terrorist organization. Another goal of the administration is to remove Saddam Hussein from power. On September 12 President Bush gave a speech to the United Nations outlining his case for military intervention in Iraq. He outlined "A Decade of Deception and Defiance" by the Iraqi regime. So the United States wants to remove any NBC capability that Iraq has and the administration feels that the best way to end the regional threat continually posed by Iraq is to change the governing regime.

The problem presented to the United States concerns public opinion, both domestic and international. The president, understandably so, does not wish to reveal the sources of information that let him know Iraq has developed an NBC capability. Public opinion on the matter regards this with a dubious eye. The sanctions have been viewed as unnecessarily harmful to the Iraqi people and much doubt exists that Iraq could have acquired the material necessary to develop these weapons under those sanctions. In this

age of instant information along with widespread distrust of U.S. intentions people want to see some sort of evidence proving what the administration is asserting.

Over the past several months President Bush has been working to establish a base of support for his policy goals. The majority opinion is that weapons inspectors should be allowed in, then if that does not work a decision will be made regarding the use of force against Iraq. Bush, especially in the White House Background Paper on Iraq, asserts that Iraq has all ready ignored and toyed with the United Nations, world opinion, and any weapons inspectors that have tried to operate there. The administration wants to act as soon as possible against Iraq and specifically against Saddam Hussein.

Saudi Arabia

In 1990 Saudi Arabia appealed to the United States for protection from the menacing Iraqi forces piling up on the Saudi/Kuwati border. The United States has had a close relationship with the country ever since it gained its independence. In this instance the U.S. responded quickly not only due to the inclination to thwart aggressive seizure of territory, but also to protect a significant source of its energy. The Saudis allowed the coalition forces to use their country as a staging area for the upcoming war. This was beneficial to them for the protection that all of these forces granted their country, but it did not come at a cheap price. They diverted a large portion of their oil revenue to help pay for the war effort.

Since the Gulf War there has been increased tension between the Saudi-U.S. relationship. Smaller issues such as U.S. female military personnel demanding and finally receiving the right to not wear the traditional headgear while in Saudi Arabia served as minor irritations reminding all about the differences between the two countries.

Larger issues developed as well. One such issue was with the economic sanctions that the majority of world public opinion began speaking out against. Saudi Arabia joined the chorus on that point serving to add tension to the relationship. Additionally, with the terrorist attacks in the United States in September 2001 a great deal more stress was added to the diplomatic ties between the two countries. A large number of the terrorists performing the acts on that day and a large number of individuals rounded up during the campaign in Afghanistan turned out to be Saudi citizens. Those individuals, along with demonstrations showing support for the terrorists and opposition to the United States, led the U.S. to question why so many Saudis were against it. Another point that is still causing strain is the manner that Saudi individuals are being detained in U.S. custody.

Saudi Arabia has a somewhat mixed record regarding the current threat Iraq poses to the Middle East. They certainly do not want an adventurous, risk-taking regime with overwhelming military power right on their border. However, it is felt that there are diplomatic solutions to the problems that are presented. Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah and Foreign Minister Saud al Faisal have repeatedly stated that they are against any attack against another Arab country. The “War on Terrorism” that the United States is pursuing unfortunately points to a lot of targets in that region. Saudi Arabia does not wish to see vaguely defined goals leading to unlimited death and devastation especially in the Arab world. Furthermore, the support that the United States has lent to Israel over the current Intifada from the Palestinians has also led to charges that the U.S. is opposed to the Arab world or is only interested in it for the oil.

The Saudi Arabian government would like to deal with the menace to their North, but they do not want a devastating war to do it. They fear that if Saddam was losing he

might, as a last resort, launch some NBC weapons against neighboring countries. The uncertainties do not end there though. Saudi Arabia said they would not allow the United States to use their bases for operations against Afghanistan. However, U.S. command-and-control for air operations was run out of Riyadh. This shows that they can be flexible when pressure is applied. Also, the Saudi government does not want to do anything too detrimental to the relationship with their largest trading partner in the world. The basic Saudi diplomatic position is that they will support what the United Nations decides is appropriate while hoping that diplomatic efforts will be sufficient.

Israel

During the Gulf War Iraq launched 39 Scud missiles at targets in Israel. This was an effort to draw Israel into the war against Iraq. Saddam felt that if Israel actively participated it would split the coalition and all of the Arab members would refuse to cooperate anymore. Due to intense pressure from the United States Israel did not make any military reply (like it had in the 1981 air strike). This direct attack on Israeli targets was only the culmination of years of propaganda denouncing the country and vowing to drive it into the sea made by Saddam Hussein. In fact it was due in part to this intense animosity for Israel that Jordan tacitly supported Iraqi aggression versus Kuwait and allowed embargoed material to flow through to Iraq after the war.

Beginning in September 2000, the latest Palestinian Intifada has caused a great deal of death, destruction, and insecurity in Israel. The cyclical nature of the conflict where violence begets more violence has led to harsh criticism of Israeli actions in the international arena. Prime Minister Sharon feels that all actions conducted are legitimate punitive reprisals for terrorist actions supported by Yasser Arafat. There is an intense

amount of insecurity in Israel due to their inability to protect all of the citizens and block these terrorist acts.

This feeling of insecurity has been further demonstrated in statements made by Sharon regarding Iraqi actions. Sharon and the Israeli government would like to see Hussein removed from power. They are not going to launch any sort of preemptive strike against Iraq, like 1981, due to the increasing level of Arab animosity against them regarding the Palestinian conflict. However, Sharon has repeatedly made the point that if hostilities were to break out and Iraq launched any sort of attack against Israel, this time there would be a military response. This is exactly the chain of events leading to regional destruction that the Saudis are hoping to avoid and the United States is trying to preempt.

Courses of Action

There are basically three courses of action that each national actor has available:

- 1) military force (MF) – this will designate the actual commitment of troops/material for war fighting or support of others doing the war fighting (as in payments, logistical support, etc...)
- 2) status quo (SQ) – this option implies that although the actor may not be entirely happy with the developments outlined in the scenario, they are not willing to radically alter the present situation which consists of diplomatic negotiation in the international arena.
- 3) concession/support (CS) – this final option will vary between the actors. In one instance it can signify that the actor is giving concessions to Iraq in order to induce a change. Another instance is that the actor begins to support Iraq openly either through a switch in viewpoint or in a critical response of any developing situation (i.e. war breaking out).

Scenarios

The two scenarios that will be examined are as follows:

- 1) Iraq does not allow weapons inspectors to return to its country and continues on its present course of action. The main points in this scenario are that the United States will continue to assert that Iraq has or is actively developing a NBC capability. Although President Bush may be reluctant to reveal any sources of information he may not have to. The United Nations can present a new resolution demanding the return of inspectors and in this scenario Iraq will still deny them admittance to the country. This will gird international diplomatic opinion towards President Bush's stance that negotiation will no longer work and military force is necessary to remove the threat.
- 2) Iraq does allow weapons inspectors to return. This will not be a quick and easy process though. Iraqi diplomats will try to draw out the process as long as possible meanwhile applying counter-pressure to any initiatives through its allies (i.e. Russia, its large trading partner). Eventually inspectors will be allowed in but the real question is how effective they will be. During the 1990s they were denied access to vital places and held up while sensitive material was moved away from the area they were going towards. This time President Bush will demand unfettered access for the inspectors assuming that eventually an incident will happen that will require a swift military response in order to enforce any UN resolution.

Possible Alternate Futures

Using the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Israel as the national actors (column headings table 1) the total number of possible alternate futures has been laid out. The three options are designated:

MF – military force

SQ – status quo

CS – concession/support

Table 1

Alternate future #	United States	Israel	Saudi Arabia
1	MF	MF	MF
2	MF	MF	SQ
3	MF	MF	CS
4	MF	SQ	MF
5	MF	SQ	SQ
6	MF	SQ	CS
7	MF	CS	MF
8	MF	CS	SQ
9	MF	CS	CS
10	SQ	MF	MF
11	SQ	MF	SQ
12	SQ	MF	CS
13	SQ	SQ	MF
14	SQ	SQ	SQ
15	SQ	SQ	CS
16	SQ	CS	MF
17	SQ	CS	SQ
18	SQ	CS	CS
19	CS	MF	MF
20	CS	MF	SQ
21	CS	MF	CS
22	CS	SQ	MF
23	CS	SQ	SQ
24	CS	SQ	CS
25	CS	CS	MF
26	CS	CS	SQ
27	CS	CS	CS

Pairwise Comparison

The comparison and voting on the relative probability between the alternate futures has been conducted and recorded on the attached Excel spreadsheet.

Rank Order

For each scenario the rank order of the alternate futures will be displayed along with the number of votes received. After the table is shown there will be a brief summary and then the three most likely alternate futures will be discussed.

Scenario 1 results:

Table 2

Rank Number	Alternate future #	United States	Israel	Saudi Arabia	Votes
1	2	MF	MF	SQ	26
2	1	MF	MF	MF	25
3	5	MF	SQ	SQ	24
4	4	MF	SQ	MF	23
5	3	MF	MF	CS	22
6	14	SQ	SQ	SQ	21
7	6	MF	SQ	CS	20
8	15	SQ	SQ	CS	17
9	8	MF	CS	SQ	16
10	23	CS	SQ	SQ	16
11	7	MF	CS	MF	15
12	12	SQ	MF	CS	15
13	11	SQ	MF	SQ	14
14	13	SQ	SQ	MF	13
15	17	SQ	CS	SQ	13
16	24	CS	SQ	CS	13
17	9	MF	CS	CS	10
18	21	CS	MF	CS	10
19	18	SQ	CS	CS	9
20	20	CS	MF	SQ	7
21	16	SQ	CS	MF	6
22	22	CS	SQ	MF	5
23	10	SQ	MF	MF	4
24	25	CS	CS	MF	3
25	19	CS	MF	MF	2
26	26	CS	CS	SQ	2
27	27	CS	CS	CS	0

The most noticeable feature of this scenario is the belligerent attitude of the national actors. In all top five of the most likely futures there is military action by at least one of the actors. Status Quo is only preferred in an effort to avoid destruction or harm to

affect their own country (self-interest). Concession/support is provided under the same auspices; it is an effort to avoid penalty to their own citizens and country.

Alternate Future 2 –

Rank Number	Alternate future #	United States	Israel	Saudi Arabia	Votes
1	2	MF	MF	SQ	26

In this future Iraq continues to disregard all ultimatums presented to it by the United Nations and the United States. The United States decides to wait no longer and launches a preemptive strike against Iraq (after a sufficient period of building up forces in the area). There is not the same broad-based worldwide support as there was in 1990/1991 and subsequently no grand coalition of countries. However, there are several allies that the United States persuades to lend assistance to their efforts (notably Britain and possibly Australia or Canada). At some point in the conflict Saddam decides to see how Israel will act when provoked. Some aggressive attack, most likely Scud missiles, will be launched against Israel in an effort to provoke a military response. Hussein is looking for widespread Arab support for his regime in the event that Israel attacks. Israel being thus provoked and feeling abandoned by the U.S. due to pressure regarding the Palestinian conflict will respond with some form of attack (ignoring U.S. requests to stay out of the fight). Saudi Arabia will request a diplomatic resolution of the problem but will tacitly support U.S. efforts until Israel is involved. At that point the government may not be able to lend any assistance to the U.S. due to intense public backlash against Israeli actions.

This alternate future is the most likely because it follows the current path that events are leading to now. The United States is looking for international support or at

least recognition of the need for military force against Iraq. Unfortunately this will bring further destruction and instability to an all ready precarious region of the world.

However, the United States feels that this is the most acceptable way to assure that NBC weapons are not wantonly developed and used by Saddam Hussein. This future will witness increased strain in relations between the United States and both of the other actors. They each have their own agendas and pressures to respond to and the U.S. will not appreciate their separate courses of action while it is doing something to reduce the threat level most directly affecting them. Further stress will be introduced according to the way the U.S. conducts itself after the fighting ceases. Will they replace the regime and rebuild the country, or just leave it to its own accord? This future has the capability of transposing into alternate future 1.

The focal points for this future are Iraqi intransigence in the diplomatic arena, U.S. military build-up in the Middle East, and Israeli public demands for increased security from Iraq. An indicator of Iraqi intentions is stall tactics employed by negotiators in the United Nations. Iraqis will be making excessive demands or vague promises in an effort to draw out the political process as long as possible so they can further augment their forces. The United States will begin deploying more troops and equipment overseas, not in a big public fanfare, but slowly and steadily over time. Bases near Iraq will be built up (such as those in Qatar) and command-and-control elements will be sent in advance. Israeli editorials and demonstrations will call for active protection against Iraq and will climax in the event of an attack against their country.

Alternate Future 1 –

Rank Number	Alternate future #	United States	Israel	Saudi Arabia	Votes
2	1	MF	MF	MF	25

In this future all three actors employ military force of some sort. The United States will seek direct military intervention as in alternate future 2 (above). In this future the United States has been allowed to use some bases in Saudi Arabia for the war effort (perhaps Prince Sultan airbase in Riyadh for c^2 purposes). Iraq will fight tenaciously but once again be overwhelmed by vastly superior force. In a similar last-ditch effort as alternate future 2, Saddam decides to launch weapons against both Saudi Arabia and Israel. Saudi Arabia will not actively participate in the fighting, but they will now switch to supporting the cause more directly in some manner, such as allowing U.S. flights out of airbases or some sort of financial support. Israel will launch a muted attack against Iraq due to intense U.S. pressure demanding that they do not destroy the tenuous links made with Saudi Arabia.

This alternate future will also bring region-wide destruction in an effort to eradicate the threat imposed by Iraq. The majority of Saudi citizens may be opposed to their governments support for any war effort, but King Fahd and Crown Prince Abdullah will not wish to seriously alienate the U.S. or suffer through an Iraqi attack without response. Israel will launch a retaliatory strike of some sort but will mute their efforts in order to assuage the U.S. in its attempts to maintain a fragile coalition with an Arab country. This future will also assure the destruction of any NBC capability that Iraq possesses but it can also lead to post-war recriminations between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. Saudi citizens may feel that they were forced into supporting the U.S. and only attacked due to any U.S. presence in their country. The post-war region will require

major commitment by the international community and the United States in order to rebuild it. This future will not transpose into any of the other alternates.

The same focal events and indicators as alternate future 2 will work for this future. An additional focal event is increased Saudi support for the U.S. diplomatic position. Statements made by Crown Prince Abdullah or Foreign Minister Faisal will show their support in the event of hostilities or at least the allowance of some sort of U.S. usage of their territory.

Alternate Future 5 –

Rank Number	Alternate future #	United States	Israel	Saudi Arabia	Votes
3	5	MF	SQ	SQ	24

In this future the United States still attacks Iraq. Saudi Arabia has decided to remain neutral in the conflict, but does foster a diplomatic effort to end the conflict and remove the NBC weapons from Iraq. This is mainly due to internal public pressure opposing the United States and Pan-Arab solidarity resentful of Western destruction of an Arabic country. Iraq may or may not launch an attack against Israel, but either way the United States will mount an extensive diplomatic effort to keep them out of the conflict. Israel has also decided that its hands are full dealing with the Palestinians anyway.

Once again this future will assure the destruction of any NBC weapons or development capability. There will be a devastated country left behind and the United States will not want to maintain the majority of the responsibility for rebuilding it, especially since few were eager to help remove the threat. A major break could develop in the U.S.-Saudi relationship regarding how each perceives the war effort (justified or

not) and how ready Saudi Arabia is to help out with the rebuilding process. This future could transpose into futures 1 or 2.

The focal points for this future are Iraqi diplomatic stall tactics, U.S. military build-up in the region, and increased negotiations between the U.S. and the other two actors. Iraqi maneuvering the political arena and the movement of U.S. assets overseas are indicators. Other indicators are diplomatic missions between the three countries and press releases showing negotiations between them (but still differences of opinion).

Scenario 2 results:

Table 3

Rank Number	Alternate future #	United States	Israel	Saudi Arabia	Votes
1	2	MF	MF	SQ	26
2	3	MF	MF	CS	25
3	6	MF	SQ	CS	24
4	5	MF	SQ	SQ	23
5	1	MF	MF	MF	22
6	4	MF	SQ	MF	21
7	14	SQ	SQ	SQ	20
8	15	SQ	SQ	CS	19
9	8	MF	CS	SQ	17
10	9	MF	CS	CS	16
11	7	MF	CS	MF	15
12	12	SQ	MF	CS	15
13	23	CS	SQ	SQ	15
14	24	CS	SQ	CS	14
15	11	SQ	MF	SQ	12
16	18	SQ	CS	CS	11
17	21	CS	MF	CS	10
18	17	SQ	CS	SQ	9
19	10	SQ	MF	MF	8
20	20	CS	MF	SQ	8
21	26	CS	CS	SQ	6
22	27	CS	CS	CS	5
23	22	CS	SQ	MF	4
24	16	SQ	CS	MF	3
25	25	CS	CS	MF	2
26	19	CS	MF	MF	1
27	13	SQ	SQ	MF	0

The most noticeable feature of this scenario is that again at least one actor is using military force in the top five most likely spots again. This is due to the perception that the weapons inspectors will be foiled by Iraqi efforts in some way. The slightest provocation or discovery of something amiss will be sufficient to launch military action by the United States. The same alternate future is still the most likely to occur, number 2. However, the next two are different than in scenario 1. Also note that in scenario 1 the last place future was number 27 where each actors action was concession/support. In this scenario that is no longer the least likely combination of actions. Saudi Arabia's intentions have altered the relative ranking of the alternate futures.

Alternate Future 2 –

Rank Number	Alternate future #	United States	Israel	Saudi Arabia	Votes
1	2	MF	MF	SQ	26

In this the United States feels that the weapons inspection system is not operating correctly. Either Iraq is not granting them unfettered access to the country or they are not looking for the evidence hard enough. The United States decides to launch a military attack in order to enforce “real” weapons inspection or to simply destroy the offensive material outright. The military offensive begins to draw out due to lack of overwhelming initial U.S. intervention. In an aggressive move Israel decides to launch an attack as well in an effort to change the Iraqi regime or reduce its threat potential. Saudi Arabia stays out of the conflict working the diplomatic channels for a solution.

This will be a very negative alternate future for the United States. The U.S. will be reducing the threat from NBC weapons that they have assured are there. However, international opinion will view the military strike as preemptory and overly aggressive.

Once Israel makes an attack the Arab countries will be extremely critical of the whole operation. The real diplomatic effort of the United States will be in maintaining Saudi Arabia at a status quo level instead of allowing it to drop down to overt support for Iraq and condemnation of the United States. This future can transpose into alternate future 3.

The focal points for this future are lack of progress in the inspection process, U.S. military build-up, and Israeli continued public hostility towards Iraq. The inspectors may be critical of Iraqi cooperation with their demands or may not be locating well-hidden material. The United States will build-up military forces in the region and Israeli government officials will decry the Iraqi regime and call for a change.

Alternate Future 3 –

Rank Number	Alternate future #	United States	Israel	Saudi Arabia	Votes
2	3	MF	MF	CS	25

This alternate future is similar to alternate future 2 (above) except that now instead of simply working for a diplomatic solution to the crisis Saudi Arabia is publicly supporting Iraq and condemning the U.S. for its actions. This will be a major propaganda benefit for Saddam and his regime. A former U.S. ally will be publicly denouncing its aggressive actions against a country that is seemingly complying with UN demands.

This future will be even more negative for the U.S. than alternate future 2. World opinion will be arrayed against its actions and the close relationship with Saudi Arabia will be brought to the breaking point. When Israel launches its military effort to bring about regime change the entire Arab world will be united in opposition to this arrogant brand of imperialism displayed by the U.S. and its allies. This future will not transpose into another alternate future.

The same focal points and indicators as alternate future 2 will apply to this alternate future. One exception is that Saudi Arabia will make continued statements warning against aggressive action by the United States. When hostilities break out there will be a flurry of condemnations hurled at the United States in the public arena.

Alternate Future 6 –

Rank Number	Alternate future #	United States	Israel	Saudi Arabia	Votes
3	6	MF	SQ	CS	24

In this future the United States still feels that Iraq is not honestly cooperating with the weapons inspectors. With the slightest provocation they will launch a military offensive against Iraq. In this future the U.S. has managed to convince Israel to stay out of the conflict. Saudi Arabia feels that the U.S. is acting like a bully unnecessarily. The Saudi government condemns the U.S. actions as overly aggressive and lends sympathetic support to the Iraqi government.

This future will not be as unpalatable to the Arab world at large as alternate future 3 would be. This is due to the fact that Israel stays out of the conflict in this future. The Arab countries will still denounce U.S. actions as aggressive and bullying but there will not be the same level of denunciation as in future 3. The U.S.-Saudi relations will be at an all time low and will take major efforts to repair. The United States will successfully destroy or deny NBC weapons to the Iraqi government, but the political price will be great to bear. This future can transpose into alternate future 3.

The indicators for this future are unproductive weapons inspections, U.S. military build-up, and Saudi invective against military force. Weapons inspectors may note an uncooperative Iraqi government or be unable to locate the material in question. U.S.

military forces will be increasingly deployed overseas. Saudi official statements and releases will decry any use of force and intensify once the conflict begins.

Conclusion

By systematically applying the LAMP method to this current problem in international affairs a sounder base of understanding of the situation has been gained. The United States at this time seems intent on using military force to deal with the threat that Iraq poses. However, the actions of nation-states are never clear-cut especially when other countries' actions are taken into consideration as well. The LAMP method has displayed the relative likelihood for the different actions of the three national actors involved in this analysis. The ranking of the alternate futures in this examination has shown that presently a conflict in Iraq is likely to occur.

There are still many questions that are left for another examination. If the United States does use military force how decisive and how quick will the war be? Will there be a regime change in Iraq? Will the United States and the international world engage in effectively rebuilding Iraq into a competent and productive nation-state? The answers to these questions will show whether or not the use of military force was proper and justifiable.

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