

AMERICAN PUBLIC UNIVERSITY SYSTEM

Charles Town, West Virginia

IMPLICATIONS OF CHINA'S GROWING MILITARY POWER

A research paper submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

in

INTELLIGENCE STUDIES

by

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Department Approval Date:

April 22, 2010

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this research paper to my beautiful and devoted wife, Stephanie. Without her help, encouragement, and enduring love, the achievement of this project would not have been possible.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to thank the American Military University professors who assisted me throughout my graduate program in intelligence studies. I offer special appreciation to Dr. Mark Riccardi. Dr. Riccardi's dedication, attention to detail and timely responses helped me to improve and refine my research skills and written presentation. I also want to thank Dr. David Lai, Research Professor of Asian Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute, for his assistance in my selection of a predictive research topic and his willingness to explore the issue with me. Finally, I wish to thank my father, Mr. Robert Cron, for his noble example of what it takes to be a successful and effective analyst.

ABSTRACT OF THE RESEARCH PAPER
EXPLAINING THE IMPLICATIONS OF CHINA'S GROWING MILITARY POWER

by

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American Public University System, April 1, 2012

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Dr. Lawrence Cline, Research Paper Professor

Using a structured analytical method, the author endeavors to develop a strategic estimate of likely future actions of Australia, Japan, and the United States in response to China's rise. The author uses the Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP) to demonstrate that East Asia regional stability can only be maintained through a coordinated trilateral alliance. The research suggests that Australia, Japan, and the U.S. must collectively and independently pursue closer ties with China to manage its peaceful transition as a world power.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Purpose Statement

The intent of this predictive research study is to estimate the likelihood of one possible outcome from the relative probability of alternate futures involving China's growing military power, and the United States and Asia-Pacific allied response. "Since the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996, when the United States responded to aggressive Chinese behavior toward Taiwan by sailing two aircraft carriers into the Strait, China has moved to shift the military balance in the Western Pacific in its favor by fielding systems capable of driving up the cost of U.S. military access to the region to prohibitive levels."¹ As China pursues what the U.S. Government (USG) calls an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capability, United States and Asia-Pacific allied response will impact alternate futures in the region. This study will examine China's A2/AD capability; the perceptions of the U.S. and two of its Asia-Pacific allies, Japan and Australia; and possible future scenarios.

Anti-access/area denial is a term that originated in the United States that appropriately describes Chinese military air, sea, and space power modernization intended to counter U.S. intervention in Chinese military affairs. "China's A2/AD focus appears oriented toward restricting or controlling access to the land, sea, and air spaces along China's periphery, including the Western Pacific."² Important to this study is the development of an understanding of how the U.S. and its Asia-Pacific allies perceive China's growing military power and how they might respond to A2/AD.

The United States response to A2/AD is underway. In January of 2012, the USG announced a strategic military shift that "will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region."³ The USG asserts that it will "maintain regional access and the ability to operate freely

in keeping with our treaty obligations and with international law.”⁴ Kaplan suggests that A2/AD will force every country around China to react. United States military experts state that the United States needs the cooperation and involvement of Asia-Pacific allies in order to offset A2/AD.⁵ “Allies such as Japan and Australia, and possibly others, must play important enabling roles in sustaining a stable military balance.”⁶ For this reason, the nature of alternate futures in the Asia-Pacific region is influenced by the dynamics of allied involvement with the U.S.

Research Question

This predictive research study will address the question: What is the potential impact of China’s anti-access/area denial capability on the United States and its Asia-Pacific allies?

Conceptual Model

Strategic research analysis requires, as a prerequisite, a thorough and broad understanding of the issue of China’s military modernization. The nature of strategic analysis is complex and detailed. The conceptual model is a process that simplifies the task of structuring and understanding a multifaceted and comprehensive issue in an appropriate context, thereby permitting familiarity, exploration, and development of the idea. The process resembles the way in which the mind comprehends by connecting and visualizing key elements and concepts. A mind mapping computer application is an excellent tool, when used with issue-related data, for modeling the issue and developing associated narratives. The result is a big picture of the issue that supports the development of a problem definition, assists in identifying national actors, and

provides a target model for perceptual study. The conceptual model is the beginning of strategic research analysis and it enables all other strategic analysis activity.⁷

Historically, China under either nationalist or communist rule, has applied military force while it was in a strong position to repel or deter attacks outside the nation's periphery. Therefore, an examination of China's growing military land, air, sea, and space power is necessary in the context of a grand periphery military strategy. China is a strategic culture that beckons the people's support and a guerilla warfare-based protracted doctrine as a People's War strategy. This culminates in an active defense periphery strategy that represents the idea of first strike when confronted. All past Chinese military campaigns are grounded in this strategy. Although offensive, such a strategy is guided by an Offensive-Defensive Balance (ODB) absent of preemptive strike because it could exhaust China's resources beyond any gain. China perceives benefit in a defensive military might that develops into an offensive advantage. This strategy is driven by China's threat perception that has changed to modern local wars since the fall of the Soviet Union, resulting in aggressive modification and growth in Chinese military capabilities.⁸

China views itself as a non-hegemonic, benign power that does not intervene or interfere in the matters of other nations. As a Middle Kingdom, China's foundation of dominance is its innate central place in world history with an assertion of sovereignty and a memory of what was lost. In China's grand periphery, the South China Sea is a potential area of conflict due to the nation's claim on Taiwan, the need for unfettered and increasing oil imports, and secure and accessible oil reserves. "About 80 percent of China's crude-oil imports come through the South China Sea. What's more, the South China Sea has proven oil reserves of 7 billion barrels and an estimated 900 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, a potentially huge bounty."⁹

In addition to China's assertion of dominance over Taiwan, it must secure Chinese sea lines of communication (SLOC) in order to secure its oil imports that are expected to double by 2015. China claims 80 percent of the South China Sea; nearly 2 million square miles of territory that include the Spratly and Paracel Islands. This position is bolstered by strategic pursuit of military power projection in air, sea, missile, and space capability. As an example of China's aggressive military build-up, test flights of the J-20 stealth fighter were conducted earlier than U.S. intelligence had predicted and China may have as many as 50 stealth fighters by 2020. Also, unmanned combat air vehicles equipped with munitions will enhance strike capability and ocean surveillance with high speed and long endurance. For the first time in 30 years, China's submarine inventory is increasing to include submarine-launched ballistic missile capability. A key to Chinese dominance in the Pacific is that the first indigenous aircraft carrier could be fully operational by 2015 with multiple carriers completed by 2020. The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) fleet will be renovated and aircraft carriers protected as a variety of destroyers, frigates, amphibious warfare ships and landing helicopter docks are constructed. Approximately 1,100 short-range ballistic missiles are pointed at Taiwan. The missiles are based on transporter-erector-launchers. China is expected to achieve anti-ship ballistic missile capability in the near future. Viewed as an area-denial missile, it could strike U.S. aircraft carriers and the Navy's forward-deployed fleet in Japan. Chinese command and control is enhanced by airborne early warning and control (AEWC) and airborne data-links that interface with command and control digital networks. Counter-space capabilities were demonstrated by China with the January 2007 destruction of one of China's own satellites by a medium-range ballistic missile. Also, China is developing directed energy weapons that could be used in anti-satellite (ASAT)

applications. The U.S. and its allies expect that China will have completed a 35 satellite GPS-style network by 2020 for weapons guidance systems.¹⁰

The guiding principle of China's foreign policy is the concept of sovereignty. The context of China's active defense and area denial strategy is a maritime environment to include an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). China asserts a right to control all activity and exclude certain military activities in the EEZ. Increased competition for oil and natural gas resources and fishing are making China's claims of sovereignty more litigious. Three stages delineate China's maritime active defense strategy. First, China implemented a naval strategy to institute control of the waters within the first island chain (the Philippines, Taiwan, and Okinawa) during the period 2000-2010. Second, it will assert control of the waters within the second island chain (Indonesia, Guam, and Ogasawara island chain) during 2010-2020. Finally, China will deploy aircraft carriers in the Pacific and Indian Oceans to offset U.S. dominance.¹¹

The strength of China's active defense A2/AD strategy may be in a methodical and organized missile-centric focus. China's goal is to surpass the platform-centric concept of naval warfare by application of cruise and ballistic missiles in order to dominate a conflict with the U.S. Navy. China's use of missiles would allow them to avoid combat with the United States and others and, instead, deter, complicate, and disrupt the projection of U.S. military assets in the Asian Pacific. Chinese military doctrine stresses paralyzing and destroying the enemy as swiftly as possible through a rapid and methodical offensive campaign. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) views missiles as the most effective means to confront a more powerful enemy according to PLA doctrine. Missiles are difficult to preempt; they are low risk and low cost. Additionally, missiles are transportable, fast, efficient, and do not require air superiority. Interestingly, China is the first nation to adapt ballistic missiles to anti-ship operations. No practical defense exists

against hypersonic ballistic missiles. The locus of A2/AD power may be in the “wide proliferation of long-range ballistic and cruise-missile technologies and the convergence of Chinese military power around a missile-centric” model of power projection.¹²

The previous examination of China’s growing military land, air, sea, and space power in the context of a grand periphery military strategy provides a qualitative conceptual model that supports the development of a visual model (see Figure 1). Moreover, the qualitative convergent phenomena allow for the following target estimates. First, the Chinese military is likely to continue procuring land and sea-based maritime strike aircraft, anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles, diesel-electric submarines, and maritime surveillance capabilities. Second, the Chinese military is likely to continue procuring aerial refueling, aircraft carrier, L-class amphibious and replenishment, and nuclear attack submarine capabilities. Last, the PLA will continue to train in out-of-area operations at remote naval support facilities.¹³




Figure 1. Conceptual Model of China’s Grand Periphery Military Strategy (Cayra MindMap)

Problem Definition

At this point in the study, a broad picture of the issue has been constructed. Next, using the conceptual model, a strategies-to-task approach is used to construct a problem definition. The problem is in understanding China's military modernization which has been given the term active defense A2/AD over the Asia-Pacific region in order to develop a strategic estimate of Australia, Japan, and U.S. response. Components of this problem are: 1) perceived military strategy and doctrine, and air, sea, space, and missile capabilities and intent of China and, 2) the actual strategy, doctrine, and capabilities and intent of Australia, Japan, and the United States. By performing a review of the literature and an application of a structured analytical methodology, an estimate will be developed of how Australia, Japan, and the United States might perceive and respond to China's conceptual model.¹⁴

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

Australia

The Australian Department of Defense reports on strategic implications related to the rise of China. By 2020, China could possibly become the world's largest economy. Nonetheless, essential to China's economic success is a strong U.S. economy. Consequently, China will have a greater risk in the global economic system and rules-based order. This also implies cooperation in a regional security environment. As the strongest Asian military power, China will bear the responsibility to alleviate concern over its power projection capabilities by fostering and

maintaining regional state relationships. Strategic stability in the Asian Pacific region will rely mainly on relations between Beijing and Washington. The Taiwan issue will require that all parties work toward a peaceful resolution to avoid strategic miscalculation. The Australian government supports the *One China* policy meaning that there is one China, including Taiwan as part of China.¹⁵

Bisley discusses the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (JADSC) that sanctions both parties to respond jointly to new security threats in the changing Asian Pacific security environment. Specifically, Japan established formal security ties with Australia because it views China's rise as dejecting Japan's regional position. The agreement emphasizes the association with the U.S. and the Trilateral Security Dialogue (TSD). Notable, is that the agreement is not a mutual defense agreement or alliance treaty, but rather a humanitarian partnership. Australia perceives that its vital security interests are geographically progressing north while Japan sees theirs moving south. The agreement is an opportunity for them to meet in the middle while demonstrating some autonomy from U.S. policy. However, Australia and Japan are heavily dependent on U.S. power projection. Australian forces are stretched thin and subject to recruitment and retention problems. Unless Australia and Japan significantly alter their capabilities, their strategic security relationship may be nothing more than strategic influence rather than force. Nevertheless, Australia does not see China as a threat to Australian interests.¹⁶

Nicolli and Delaney report that Australia believes Asia-Pacific peace depends on the management of the relationships between the United States and China, and Japan and China. Australia intends to be the leading military power in its immediate region. This is evident in Australia's defense spending which will increase by 3 percent annually until 2016. Australia military acquisitions include fighter, transport, and airborne early-warning aircraft; upgraded

frigates, *Aegis* air warfare destroyers armed with interceptor missiles, and submarines equipped with cruise missiles. However, Australia is experiencing military manpower problems, resulting in a shortage of skilled personnel to operate the equipment. Therefore, Australia maintains a close and central alliance with the United States military.¹⁷

Pan asserts that because of Australia's close relationship with China and the United States, if a conflict were to occur between the two, Australia would have to make a choice. China is Australia's second-largest trading partner in energy and raw materials. Australia maintains military and intelligence interoperability with the United States. It is the only nation that has participated with the United States in every major conflict since WWI. Australia's foreign policy is grounded in the Menzies tradition, named after Australia's longest serving Prime Minister, Robert Menzies. The policy intends that partnering with two of the world's most powerful nations, the U.S. and China, best serves Australia's interests. Australia's strategic security depends on maintaining good relations with both the United States and China. Australia views the United States and China each in favorable terms, but recognizes the potential for conflict between the two. Australia understands that the United States is obligated by the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act to defend Taiwan, should China attack the island and considers this a key point of contention between the U.S. and China. Australian leadership asserts that it does not have to choose between geography (China) and history (United States). Therefore, it must actively maintain the Taiwanese status quo and strive to influence U.S.-China policy in order to cultivate regional stability. Australia is in a position to help manage U.S.-China relations. In response to China's destabilizing rise in power, Australia may be able to act in two ways by managing China's rise to power and leveraging U.S. foreign policy. United States foreign policy is viewed as promoting a free and democratic world order by use of military force, more so than

diplomacy. In China's case, the U.S. is perceived as working to strategically encircle China through strengthening East Asia alliances like that of Japan. Australia already participates in trilateral security talks with Japan and the United States. Pan recommends that Australia re-evaluate its alliance with U.S. foreign policy, consider an independent policy on China, and pursue a four-way security dialogue with the United States, Japan, and China. Australia's present stance may "draw the country into an acute foreign policy dilemma."¹⁸

Phillips asserts that the future of Asia is one of peace and stability due to choices that enhanced states' prosperity and security by a strategy of integration into the global capitalist order. China is more satisfied and strengthened by the international status quo through pursuit of a self-strengthening strategy. China has rejected autarky and revolutionary revisionism in pursuit of commercial exchange and regional security. As Australia has seen China become a primary trade partner, China has enjoyed economic interdependence. Revolution and conquest are not the motivation of China. Australia believes that the status quo is being replaced by an age of reconvergence where re-emerging great powers will need to relinquish old privileges. The key to peace and stability lay in inclusion and accommodation.¹⁹

Togo emphasizes the importance of Australia-Japan security cooperation. While the Chinese have established a submarine base at Hainan Island, Japan has deployed submarines in the East China Sea, and Australia intends to field new submarines over the next 20 years. Australia and Japan view China's rise in power as having regional and global consequences. They perceive that the projection of Chinese naval power will be offset by the United States. Australia and Japan share common democratic and economic values, and an interest in maintaining a peaceful Asia-Pacific balance of power through adequate defense and deterrence.

As Japan experiences unprecedented political transformation, Australia will push for closer relations with Japan and help orient its future foreign policy.²⁰

Japan

According to Calder, China's rise to power instigates a struggle with the mature power of Japan. Although Japan has a *no-war* constitution, it maintains an advanced military capability coupled with a strong U.S. alliance and presence on the island. China's domination of the East China Sea threatens Japan's oil and natural gas imports and exploration. China takes the position that the entire East China Sea continental shelf is a natural extension of the Chinese mainland. Disputed waters are now patrolled by Chinese surveillance aircraft, nuclear-powered attack submarines, and warships as Japan pursues political and legislative measures to protect drilling and fishing – perhaps, by force. Two actions by Japan, one structural and the other procedural, in response to China's military build-up could further aggravate Sino-Japanese tensions. Structurally, Japan is cooperating with the United States in the development of ballistic missile defense. Japan's main islands and Okinawa are within range of Chinese missiles. Procedurally, it is likely that Japan will revise the nation's constitution in order to justify their security force and assert its privilege to engage in collective self-defense in cooperation with the U.S.²¹

Goh argues that Japan is most important to the Asian-Pacific security order because it offers vital *public goods*. First, by virtue of Japan's position as host and partner, it guarantees a predominant U.S. presence in the region that promotes regional access to the U.S. market, freedom of navigation, and political stability. Japan accepts much of the weight of protracting U.S. presence in East Asia through alliance with and accommodation of U.S. power projection.

Moreover, Japan sees itself in a dilemma between continuation in an alliance where it may be drawn into a broader U.S. campaign or freeing itself in pursuit of autonomous restoration of international credibility as an independent sovereign state. Second, following the Cold War, a strategic imperative was pursued to connect with China, socialize it, and bring it into a regional security and economic order. Japan has been intentional in offering good will toward China both economically and politically. As Japan engages China, East Asian states are reassured that this relationship is being managed. Last, Japan plays a major role in developing a regional security community. “In its idealized form, such a security community would see Great Powers pooling their sovereignty and giving up the use of force against each other in exchange for regional peace and autonomy, and greater collective influence in the world.”²²

Hughes states that Japan’s security policy is on a long-term course of guarded increase in *normal* military power. Characteristics of the East Asian and global security environment are cause for modernization of the Japanese Security Defense Force (JSDF) and possible revision of a *no war* constitution. The Chinese rise in power is prompting a Japanese move toward military parity with its U.S. ally. Space satellite technology and ballistic missile defense are being deployed to offset Chinese capabilities. Japan is modernizing air defense power and a blue water navy toward power projection to deter or counter Chinese military aspiration. A Japan-China arms race is propelling Japan’s growing military capabilities and power projection ambitions.²³

In his article, Mochizuki explains how a cooperative strategy by Japan with China may be workable if Japan strengthens its alliance with the United States at the same time. Japan could expect that if a cooperative relationship with China were to fail, a U.S. alliance would balance against malign Chinese intentions. This would be possible through a Japanese-U.S. union of perception concerning China and the preservation of the U.S. security commitment to Japan.

Although such an arrangement would reduce any chance that the United States would abandon Japan, there is a risk. China may perceive this arrangement as a move toward containment and respond militarily. Therefore, Japan would need to manage a balance between strengthening its alliance with the U.S. and managing confidence with China.²⁴

Taylor describes Japan as weakening in the shadow of China's rise and moving to become an independent U.S. ally, free from restraints on its own defense. At the same time, Japan's economy and population are declining. Japan's current security policy debate is pointed toward pursuit of increased regional and global responsibility. This is evident in Japan's establishment of diversified security relationship with Australia. Moreover, strategic accommodation appears to be out of the question considering the material disparities that exist between Japan and China. Taylor suggests that the United States reexamine its Asia strategy where Japan is central. If not, the result could be a competitive future with harmful consequences for the U.S. and the Asia-Pacific region.²⁵

As this research is being conducted, Pedrozo reports that on January 21, 2011, a new Special Measures Agreement (SMA) was officially signed by Japan and the United States. This agreement ensures effective application of Japan-U.S. security arrangements. These arrangements include host nation support of U.S. military personnel and advanced capabilities.²⁶

United States

Bremmer explains that China's rise has been supported by American power that protected East Asian SLOC and provided buyers for exports. As a result of China's success, U.S. consumers enjoy low-cost products, and American companies gain profitable opportunities.

American hard and soft power has been critical in securing sound economic growth for China and perpetuating the U.S. economy. Now, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders are ensuring their own political survival and exploiting state control by creating wealth through market manipulation. Chinese state use of markets for political gain is proving to be a successful form of capitalism for China. As a result, CCP leaders are recognizing that American power is no longer essential for China's prosperity. Confident Chinese leaders are now looking inward for solutions. However, intricate economic connections still exist in mutually-dependent U.S.-Chinese relations. This dependence was evident in the U.S. financial crisis that indirectly hit China, but still had a significant impact on the Chinese economy. The United States can expect that during the next decade, Chinese economic expansion will have weighty repercussions for U.S. economics and security. Militarily, the United States believes that "the gap between the U.S. and Chinese militaries is considerable, and widening in America's favor."²⁷

Lai explains that the fundamental values that support the U.S.-led international order are not shared by rising China's dictatorial leaders. China had no part in establishing the present order and it is not a U.S. ally. It is a second-ranked power that is dissatisfied with the status quo. The United States expects that China will serve its interests by eventually changing the international order. Because both nations view key issues differently, the United States perceives China's actions as erroneous, and U.S. involvement is viewed by China as ill-willed meddling in Chinese matters. As China grows in stature, it will be able to assert tougher positions in existing and intensifying issues. China's efforts to modernize include resolution of territorial disagreements in the South and East China Seas, unification with Taiwan, the issues of Xinjiang and Tibet, and PLAN maritime goals.²⁸

The United States is the strongest military power in the Western Pacific and it will maintain a leading edge while China develops its military capability to counterbalance each other. As American and awakened Chinese national powers become equal, the risk of war will increase. While China modernizes and becomes powerful, it must take on Western ways, to include such areas as government, business, and military affairs. Chinese economic reform is driving China's modernization. Thucydides deduced that conflict is caused by the fluid perception of power and fear. A fearful China, rising to power, is generating fear, and a potent United States is projecting power out of fear. The United States perceives that China intends to evict it from Asia and it is committed to doing whatever it takes to stop China from dominating Asia. The United States is skeptical about China's goodwill calls when it refers to the pursuit of harmony and a peaceful rise according to the teachings of Confucius. Examination of Confucius's political teachings reveals that it is entirely authoritarian. China's mission to modernize requires a war-free situation. Therefore, China's great challenge is to accomplish orderly economic and political reform while pursuing a goal to dominate Asia while avoiding war.²⁹

Lai also asserts that the unification of China is one of three sacred missions sought after by the CCP (the other two are protecting global peace and China's modernization). America views China's insistence on Taiwanese unification as unnecessary to its position as a great power because it is large enough geographically. The United States and China both see Taiwan as a critical strategic stronghold. China insists that unification of Taiwan is necessary to its rise in power and that a use of force to do so is a sovereign right. The United States only acknowledges, but does not support Chinese claims of a unified Taiwan. The U.S. views the issue of Taiwan as undetermined. The U.S. position on the Taiwan issue is bound by the Taiwan Relations Act

(TRA) of 1979 as U.S. public law. The TRA is a promise to Taiwan that if China were to use force against it, the U.S. would intervene militarily. Problematic, though, is that with China's rise, the U.S. loses its ability to effectively apply the TRA. Ultimately, the United States understands that "China cannot become a true great power without completing its mission of national unity; and the most outstanding piece is Taiwan, the most likely trigger for a conflict between the U.S. and China."³⁰

Two of China's core interests are the South and East China Seas. China has interpreted the United Nations Convention on the Law and the Sea (UNCLOS) as giving them a dominant control of these waters and claim on a disputed EEZ; a claim categorically rejected by the U.S. Free access to Asia's maritime commons, adherence to international law, and the lack of restrictions on navigation in the South China Sea are in the national interest of the United States. It flatly rejects any attempt by China to control foreign military activities in zones claimed by China. By taking an official stand on the issue, the United States it is not just an interested party, but also a disputant in the South China Sea issue. And, the United States ensures free movement in the SLOC. As China modernizes and expands military capabilities, it will choose to use PLA forces to guard Chinese interests. The national power challenge of the U.S. and China is being tested over the SLOC/EEZ issue. In the next 10 to 15 years, China will probably take a firmer position on the issue. As the United States continues its military activities in the EEZ, Chinese and U.S. national power will judge the outcome. In the China-Japan dispute over islands in the East China Sea, control of those islands is a test on China's ambition. The United States asserts that it will honor its mutual defense treaty obligation to defend Japan if it is attacked by China. The U.S. is keenly aware that China is instituting records of control by exerting effective presence in the disputed area using law enforcement patrols and maritime surveillance. This is

occurring because China maintains that effective management and actual control are central and will prevail in disputes such as this.³¹

Managing China's hard power is the main concern of the United States. During 2010, certain activities presented opportunities for the U.S. to assert its position and check Chinese ambition. The U.S. continues weapons systems sales to Taiwan, as China increasingly objects and applies economic sanctions on those companies involved. The White House hosted the exiled Tibetan leader, Dalai Lama, stirring Chinese government protest. The U.S. State Department criticized China's poor human rights record; China countered in-kind. The United States conducted a naval carrier strike group exercise in the Yellow Sea, a joint U.S.-South Korea exercise in the Sea of Japan, the first U.S.-Vietnam joint naval exercise, and a joint U.S.-South Korea naval exercise in the Yellow Sea. A meeting between the U.S. Secretary of State and Chinese Foreign Minister resulted in a heated exchange over the South China Sea issues when the Secretary asserted that these issues require U.S. involvement. The U.S. Secretary of State stressed that the U.S.-Japan defense treaty covers the disputed islands. And, the United States president warned the Chinese president to stop practicing *willful blindness* to North Korean provocations.³²

Zhang explains that American security and military officials recognize the importance of U.S. missile defense on a possible offensive-defensive arms race with China. China is concerned about U.S. deployment of missile defense in East Asia and they fear space-based missile defense. The United States is willing to offer strategic assurance to China that its nuclear deterrence capability will not be threatened by a U.S. missile defense. Moreover, the U.S. officially opposes weapons deployment in outer space. And, the United States considers the nuclear issue as central

to East Asian security cooperation and is pursuing a strategic nuclear understanding with China's leadership. Therefore, measures are underway to encourage nuclear talks with China.³³

III. METHODOLOGY

Research Design

The strategies of inquiry for this predictive research are phenomenological research and case study. These strategies were selected as a means of examining cultural and societal factors; and current and historical data related to legal, political, and military matters for each national actor. Research was conducted by accessing university online library resources; academic, journalistic, and policy-related research organizations like the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and the Strategic Studies Institute; and the personal library of this research analyst.

Data for this study was derived from current *case studies* and *analyses* literature related to the research topic. Use of a combination of emerging and predetermined coding processes facilitated proper collection and organization of relevant data. For the purpose of this study, a *national actor* is defined as a nation that has a course of action that may directly affect the issue.³⁴ This study uses a non-probability purposive sampling method. Qualitative validity is addressed through the processes of triangulation, bias clarification, and presentation of negative or discrepant information. The use of case studies and priori analysis in this research is validated by the high-profile nature of the A2/AD issue resulting in ample and readily available expert case study and analysis. Data was collected by means of document examination and content analysis.

The Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP) is used for this study. By application of qualitative empirical data from a perceptual study of the national actors, specification of possible courses of action and determination of a major scenario, LAMP “emphasizes prediction of the relative probability of alternate futures.”³⁵ Decision support techniques such as a *Decision Matrix*; and *Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats* (SWOT) *Analysis* were used to develop possible courses of action for national actors. The analysis uses *Key Assumptions Checks* and *Structured Analogies* in order to assess cause and effect. Two foundational assumptions for this study are that 1) China will continue to pursue A2/AD capability, and 2) the future “is the sum total of the interaction of free will of the national actors.”³⁶

The Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction

This research project utilizes the Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP). The project is qualitative study that attempts to systematically predict how three national actors, Australia, Japan, and the United States, might perceive and possibly respond to China’s Anti-Access/Area Denial capability. LAMP facilitates an objective and inductive examination and evaluation of an array of potential alternate futures based upon the comparative possibility of probable courses of actions for each national actor. Conversely, probabilities are not assigned in LAMP. “The probability of any given future will be constantly changing due to the potentially infinite possibilities for free will of the central national actors to affect events.”³⁷

The twelve steps of LAMP are:

1. Determine the issue for which you are trying to predict the most likely future.

2. Specify the national actors involved.
3. Perform an in-depth study of how each national actor perceives the issue in question.
4. Specify all possible courses of action for each actor.
5. Determine the major scenarios within which you compare the alternate futures.
6. Calculate the total number of permutations of possible alternate futures for each scenario.
7. Perform a pair-wise comparison of all alternate futures within the scenario to determine their relative probability.
8. Rank the alternate futures for each scenario from highest relative probability to the lowest based on the number of votes received.
9. Assuming each future occurs; analyze each alternate future in terms of its consequences for the issue in question.
10. Determine the focal events that must occur in our present in order to bring about a given alternate future.
11. Develop indicators for the focal events.
12. State the potential of a given alternate future to transpose into another alternate future.³⁸

Note: The authors have revised the LAMP steps so that transposition is step twelve.

Limitations of this Study

A research design issue exists that relates to the adequacy of perceptual study in that the possibility of mirror-imaging error increases with the insufficiency of the perceptual study of

each national actor.³⁹ Therefore, data must be collected that satisfies descriptive and explanatory analysis criteria in support of predictive analysis.

IV. RESULTS

Issue for Prediction

Step 1: Determine the issue for which you are trying to predict the most likely future.

What is the potential impact of China's Anti-Access/Area Denial capability on the United States and its Asia-Pacific allies, Australia and Japan?

National Actors

Step 2: Specify the national actors involved.

- a. Australia
- b. Japan
- c. United States

Perceptual Study

Step 3: Conduct an in-depth study of perceptions and intentions of each actor.

The primary hypothesis of this predictive research study is that the perceptions and intentions of Australia, Japan, and the United States regarding China's military modernization

and anti-access/area denial capability diverge significantly enough to impact security and stability in the Asian-Pacific. In the process of confirming such a hypothesis, the following questions are addressed:

What is the Australian perception of China's military modernization and anti-access/area denial capability? Australia views China as nonthreatening to its interests. It does perceive escalating conflict in U.S.-China relations and Japan-China relations. Australia believes that a stronger and more satisfied China due to its integration into the international order will add peace and stability to Asia. In conjunction with Australian foreign policy, it partners with China and the United States and views them both in constructive terms. The solution to this policy quandary, where Australia's friends are adversaries with each other, is the Australian intent to actively promote the Taiwanese status quo of a *one China* and strive to influence U.S.-China policy. In the Australian view, China's success as a strong world economy is dependent on a strong U.S. economy. Security cooperation is inherently a part of the participation in a world economy and rules-based environment. Australia believes that China will share responsibility with the United States for regional security and stability. Australia supposes that it is in a position to help direct U.S.-China relations by managing China's rise to power and leveraging U.S. foreign policy. Australia views Japan as a strategic humanitarian security partner as evidenced in the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation. They share common economic and democratic values. Australia recognizes United States as a military security and inter-operability partner and long-time ally in all major conflicts since WWI. The United States is viewed as a nation that relies more heavily on military force rather than diplomacy. Australia participates with the United States and Japan in the Trilateral Security Dialogue. Australia views itself as a leading military power in the immediate region, but stretched thin militarily and

heavily dependent on United States military power projection. Australia intends to maintain friendly U.S. and China relations, pursue closer relations with Japan, and help orient future foreign policies with all three.

What is the Japan's perception of China's military modernization and anti-access/area denial capability? Japan views China as a threat to its national security due to China's claim on the disputed islands of the East China Sea; Chinese control of oil and natural gas imports and reserves, and fishing; and its contention with U.S. military presence on the Japanese island. Japan sees itself in a predicament between operating independently under Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) protection or continuation in an alliance where it may be drawn into a broader U.S. campaign or freeing Japan in pursuit of autonomous restoral of international credibility as an independent sovereign state. Japan plays a major role in developing a regional security community. Japan intends to pursue a long-term course of guarded increase in normal military power. Space satellite technology and ballistic missile defense are being deployed to offset Chinese capabilities. Japan's current security policy debate is pointed toward pursuit of increased regional and global responsibility. This is evident in Japan's establishment of diversified security relationship with Australia. Japan maintains host nation support of U.S. military personnel and advanced capabilities and it will continue to extend goodwill to China and pursue closer ties with Australia.

What is the United State's perception of China's military modernization and anti-access/area denial capability? The United States perceives China's military modernization and A2/AD capability as a threat to regional and global security. The primary concern of the United States is managing China's hard power. Therefore, U.S. efforts are in motion to revise and update Asia-Pacific military power projection capabilities in order to offset China's A2/AD. The

United States believes that one of China's goals is to evict the U.S. from Asia and it intends to do whatever is necessary to block China from dominating Asia. As it becomes more powerful, China will be able to take a tougher stand in disputes and disagreements. The United States understands that for China to become a great power, it must complete a mission of national unity. The most profound element of this mission is Taiwan; considered the most likely cause for a clash between the U.S. and China. Taiwan is extremely important to the United States as a critical strategic stronghold. This position is solidified in the TRA that promises U.S. military intervention if China should use force against Taiwan. On matters of Japan, the United States asserts that it will honor its mutual defense treaty obligation to defend Japan if it is attacked by China. According to the United States, nuclear armament is central to East Asian security cooperation. In response to China's fear that its nuclear deterrence capability would be threatened, the U.S. intends to offer strategic assurance that it will not. Moreover, the United States intends to continue activities that are points of contention with China; activities such as weapons sales to Taiwan, involvement in the South China Sea dispute, a strong military presence in Japan, missile defense system support in Japan, participation in joint naval exercises with Australia and Japan, and a U.S. naval presence in the Asia-Pacific. The U.S. will protect its national interest in Asia's maritime commons through military presence that ensures respect for international law, freedom of navigation, and open access. Chinese military capability is viewed as lesser than U.S. military power projection and the U.S. believes it will remain so. Although, the United States expects that China will serve Chinese interests by eventually changing the international order, it believes that China is and will continue to be dependent on a healthy U.S. economy and a stable security environment.

How have these perceptions influenced the behavior of Australia, Japan, and the U.S. between one another? Because of Australia's perception of the U.S. as a nation that favors the use of military might over diplomacy, it chooses to behave according to leveraging U.S. foreign policy and sharing intelligence. Australia pursues a security partnership with Japan because of their shared values and Japan's fear of China. Japan has relations with Australia because of their shared values and Australia's diplomatic leanings. The U.S.-Japan alliance is compulsory, but it brings with it, the advantage of U.S. military protection and a mutually beneficial missile defense. Japan is leaning toward a reconsideration of this alliance because it perceives U.S. military power projection as provocative toward China's rise. The United States exploits the compulsory alliance with Japan for U.S. strategic advantage and manages its behavior in this alliance in order to keep good relations with its host and a mutually beneficial missile defense. The United States is a military partner with Australia for military interoperability and intelligence sharing and Australia's strategic location.

What are the implications of these interacting perceptions for the future of security and stability in the Asian-Pacific? To begin, as a result of Australia's efforts, Australia, Japan, and the United States might establish a four-way security dialogue with China, resulting in increased cooperation and reduced hostility and fear in the region. Or, Australia and Japan could develop a close, accommodating and inclusive relationship with China and redefine their foreign policies and relationships with the United States, leaving the U.S. alone in a mission to offset A2/AD. Maybe, Australia would assume total responsibility for its national security, achieve military parity with the United States, and limit U.S. military presence in the region. Perhaps, Japan will choose military parity with the United States, assume total responsibility for its national security, and deny U.S. military presence on the Japanese island.

Key Assumptions Check

One of the most commonly used techniques and most useful early in the analytic process is the *key assumptions check*. Since analysis always involves assumptions, this technique provides a method to query assumptions and guide the analyst's reasoning. The first step is for the analyst to accept that the assumptions could be incorrect. Ideally, a small group of outsiders and individuals from the analytic unit would bring their assumptions to a meeting. Then, assumptions are collected and listed on a white board. Next, additional assumptions are solicited and considered; all are critically examined. The group categorizes the remaining assumptions as *solid*, *caveated*, or *unsupported*. Next, distil the list while deleting and adding as the group discusses the assumptions further. A key point is that the accuracy of the analysis "cannot be greater than the weakest link in your chain of reasoning."⁴⁰

Courses of Action

Step 4: Specify all courses of action (COA) for each actor.

Australia Courses of Action:

Australia COA #1 (Maintain present foreign policy): Continue a mutually beneficial relationship of military interoperability with the United States where Australia depends on U.S. military power and the United States enjoys strategic position.

Australia COA #2 (Revise alignment with U.S. foreign policy): Change Australian alliance with U.S. foreign policy and implement an independent policy on China.

Australia COA #3 (Project military force): Project military power in instances where Australia's national security is threatened by China's military force.

Japan Courses of Action:

Japan COA #1 (Maintain present foreign policy): Continue a compulsive and cooperative alliance with the United States where Japan national security is dependent on U.S. power projection and the United States depends on Japan for strategic position.

Japan COA #2 (Revise constitution): Change the Japanese constitution in order to substantiate the JSDF and declare freedom to engage in collective self-defense in cooperation with the U.S.

Japan COA #3 (Project military force): Project military power in instances where Japan's national security is threatened by China's military force.

United States Courses of Action:

United States COA #1 (Maintain present foreign policy): Continue in alliance with Australia and Japan.

United States COA #2 (Revise Asia strategy to decentralize Japan): Release Japan from a compulsive alliance in order to ease China's perception of competition.

United States COA #3 (Preempt A2/AD militarily): Project military force to defend an attack on Taiwan, Australia, or Japan; or obstruct A2/AD before it is able to change the status quo.⁴¹

Decision Matrix

Before proceeding to the next step in LAMP, it is useful to examine the *decision matrix* technique that may be used to evaluate and consider alternate courses of action for an actor. Using Australia as an example in Table 1, first identify desired objectives (based on perceptual study) and courses of action. Then, construct a matrix with objectives in order of importance assigned to rows and courses of action assigned to columns. Assign weights to each objective to equal 100 percent. Beginning with each row (objective) and using a total of 10, assess the relative capacity of each of the actions to satisfy each of the objectives. Next, multiply the assessed value by the weight and add each column. The course of action with the highest value is the best choice.⁴²

Objective (Australia)	Weight	Maintain Present Foreign Policy	Revise Alignment with U.S. Policy	Project Military Force
Regional Stability	50%	4 x 50 = 200	4 x 50 = 200	2 x 50 = 100
Chinese Modernization	25%	5 x 2.5 = 12.5	4 x 2.5 = 10	1 x 2.5 = 2.5
Japanese Relations	15%	4 x 1.5 = 6	5 x 1.5 = 7.5	1 x 1.5 = 1.5
U.S. Relations	10%	4 x 10 = 40	5 x 10 = 50	1 x 10 = 10
Totals	100%	258.5	267.5	114

Table 1. Decision Matrix

Major Scenarios

Step 5: Determine the major scenario(s) within which you compare the alternate futures. Recall earlier, that a foundational assumption for this study is that China will only continue to pursue military modernization and active defense A2/AD capability. Therefore, one specific scenario will be used:

Scenario #1 (China military modernization and A2/AD): This scenario assumes that China will continue a military build-up and pursuit of a three-phase active defense strategy.

Alternate Futures

Step 6: Calculate the number of alternate futures.

$X^Y = Z$, where:

X = number of courses of action available to each actor

Y = number of actors

Z = number of alternate futures

$3^3 = 27$ alternate futures (see Table 2).

Alternate Future	Australia	Japan	United States
1	COA #1	COA #1	COA #1
2	COA #2	COA #1	COA #1
3	COA #3	COA #1	COA #1
4	COA #1	COA #2	COA #1
5	COA #2	COA #2	COA #1
6	COA #3	COA #2	COA #1
7	COA #1	COA #3	COA #1
8	COA #2	COA #3	COA #1
9	COA #3	COA #3	COA #1
10	COA #1	COA #1	COA #2
11	COA #2	COA #1	COA #2
12	COA #3	COA #1	COA #2
13	COA #1	COA #2	COA #2
14	COA #2	COA #2	COA #2
15	COA #3	COA #2	COA #2
16	COA #1	COA #3	COA #2
17	COA #2	COA #3	COA #2
18	COA #3	COA #3	COA #2
19	COA #1	COA #1	COA #3
20	COA #2	COA #1	COA #3
21	COA #3	COA #1	COA #3
22	COA #1	COA #2	COA #3
23	COA #2	COA #2	COA #3
24	COA #3	COA #2	COA #3
25	COA #1	COA #3	COA #3
26	COA #2	COA #3	COA #3
27	COA #3	COA #3	COA #3

Table 2. Alternate Futures

Alternate Futures Pair-Wise Comparison

Step 7: Do a pair-wise comparison of alternate futures to determine the most likely alternate futures.

Using the formula:

$x = (n-1) + (n-2) + \dots + (n-n)$, where:

n = total number of alternate futures.

x = total number of pair-wise comparisons to be made.

A total of 351 votes are applied for the scenario (see Table 3).

Scenario: China military modernization and A2/AD

Alternate Future	Australia	Japan	United States	Votes
1	COA #1	COA #1	COA #1	18
2	COA #2	COA #1	COA #1	15
3	COA #3	COA #1	COA #1	9
4	COA #1	COA #2	COA #1	15
5	COA #2	COA #2	COA #1	13
6	COA #3	COA #2	COA #1	9
7	COA #1	COA #3	COA #1	18
8	COA #2	COA #3	COA #1	13
9	COA #3	COA #3	COA #1	16
10	COA #1	COA #1	COA #2	9
11	COA #2	COA #1	COA #2	8
12	COA #3	COA #1	COA #2	6
13	COA #1	COA #2	COA #2	20
14	COA #2	COA #2	COA #2	16
15	COA #3	COA #2	COA #2	10
16	COA #1	COA #3	COA #2	0
17	COA #2	COA #3	COA #2	2
18	COA #3	COA #3	COA #2	2
19	COA #1	COA #1	COA #3	23
20	COA #2	COA #1	COA #3	26
21	COA #3	COA #1	COA #3	19
22	COA #1	COA #2	COA #3	5
23	COA #2	COA #2	COA #3	6
24	COA #3	COA #2	COA #3	3
25	COA #1	COA #3	COA #3	24
26	COA #2	COA #3	COA #3	25
27	COA #3	COA #3	COA #3	21
			Total	351

Table 3. Alternate Futures Pair-Wise Comparison

Alternate Futures Ranking

Step 8: Rank the alternate futures for each scenario from highest relative probability to the lowest based on the number of votes received.

Alternate Futures Ranked by Votes: China military modernization and A2/AD

Alternate Future	Australia	Japan	United States	Votes
20	COA #2	COA #1	COA #3	26
26	COA #2	COA #3	COA #3	25
25	COA #1	COA #3	COA #3	24
19	COA #1	COA #1	COA #3	23
27	COA #3	COA #3	COA #3	21
13	COA #1	COA #2	COA #2	20
21	COA #3	COA #1	COA #3	19
1	COA #1	COA #1	COA #1	18
7	COA #1	COA #3	COA #1	18
9	COA #3	COA #3	COA #1	16
14	COA #2	COA #2	COA #2	16
2	COA #2	COA #1	COA #1	15
4	COA #1	COA #2	COA #1	15
5	COA #2	COA #2	COA #1	13
8	COA #2	COA #3	COA #1	13
15	COA #3	COA #2	COA #2	10
3	COA #3	COA #1	COA #1	9
6	COA #3	COA #2	COA #1	9
10	COA #1	COA #1	COA #2	9
11	COA #2	COA #1	COA #2	8
12	COA #3	COA #1	COA #2	6
23	COA #2	COA #2	COA #3	6
22	COA #1	COA #2	COA #3	5
24	COA #3	COA #2	COA #3	3
17	COA #2	COA #3	COA #2	2
18	COA #3	COA #3	COA #2	2
16	COA #1	COA #3	COA #2	0
			Total	351

Table 4. Alternate Futures Ranking

Alternate Futures Analysis

Step 9: Assuming each future occurs; analyze each alternate future in terms of its consequences for the issue in question.

Scenario: (China military modernization and A2/AD): China continues a military build-up and pursuit of a three-phase active defense strategy.

Alternate Future #20: (26 votes) Australia changes its alliance with U.S. foreign policy and implements an independent policy on China. Japan maintains a present foreign policy by continuing in a compulsive and cooperative alliance with the United States where Japan national security is dependent on U.S. power projection and the United States depends on Japan for strategic position. The United States projects military force to defend an attack on Taiwan.

The effort in this part of the analysis is to deductively and imaginatively establish *what might be*, given that Australia, Japan, and the United States choose the courses of action of this particular future in the scenario of China's military modernization and anti-access/area denial. The prominent COA in this future is the U.S. military response toward China's use of force against Taiwan. Given that the United States has an obligation to defend Taiwan and intent to maintain Asia-Pacific dominance, this COA will certainly draw Japan into the conflict. Japan has continued the status quo as a host nation to U.S. military power projection and will remain in a situation where the United States is obligated to protect Japanese interests. Significant, in this highest-voted future, is Australia's choice to redefine a relationship with the United States and implement its own Chinese foreign policy. Australia has developed strong ties with China.

Considering Australia's propensity toward diplomatic rather than military measures and its geostrategic location, Australia will be the mediator in a conflict between the United States and China. Australia will be the key to ending conflict in the region through orchestration of a four-way peace and security dialogue with the United States, Japan, and China.

Alternate Future #26: (25 votes) Australia changes its alliance with U.S. foreign policy and implements an independent policy on China. Japan projects military power in a situation where Japan's national security is threatened by China's military force. The United States projects military force to defend an attack on Japan.

Again, analysis establishes what might be, given that Australia, Japan, and the United States choose the courses of action of this particular future in the scenario of China's military modernization and anti-access/area denial. The prominent COA in this future is Japan's projection of military power in the East China Sea when China attempts to evict Japan from a disputed area by force. Japan has continued its alliance with the United States and host nation status to U.S. military power projection. Because the United States is committed to the defense of Japan and a U.S. strategic position in the region, it becomes involved in the conflict.

Noteworthy, in this second highest-voted future is Australia's choice to alter its relationship between China and the United States and implement its own Chinese foreign policy. Australia's decision to be a friend to all and support a strong and stable China enables it to play a lead role in halting hostilities in the region through facilitating accommodation, inclusion, and dialogue.

Alternate Future #25: (24 votes) Australia continues a mutually beneficial relationship of military interoperability with the United States where Australia depends on U.S. military power

and the U.S. enjoys strategic position. Japan projects military power in a situation where Japanese national security is threatened by China's military force. The United States projects military force to defend an attack on Japan.

Analysis reveals what might be as Australia, Japan, and the United States choose the courses of action of future #25 in the scenario of China's military modernization and anti-access/area denial. This future represents the present day status quo. Australia, Japan and the United States are drawn into military conflict when China attempts to evict Japan from an East China Sea disputed area by force. Japan and Australia have continued their strategic alliance with the United States. Japanese host nation status obligates the U.S. to defend its national interest along with United States strategic interest in the Asia-Pacific. Moreover, Australia is involved in the conflict and is a target for reprisal by China because it has maintained its relationship of military interoperability and intelligence sharing with the United States. U.S. military power projection is also committed to Australia as it is drawn into the conflict. Conflict is protracted since Australia is not in a mediatory position. Because the U.S. has maintained its dominance in the region, military conflict ceases when China is overpowered.

Focal Events

Step 10: Determine the focal event that must occur in our present in order to bring about a given alternate future. An event of considerable degree that would alter the relative probability of the world of alternate futures is a focal event. The smallest number of focal events feed the most likely future.

Scenario: (China military modernization and A2/AD): China continues a military build-up and pursuit of a three-phase active defense strategy.

Alternate Future #20: (26 votes) Australia changes the alliance with U.S. foreign policy and implements an independent policy on China. Japan maintains its present foreign policy by continuing in a compulsive and cooperative alliance with the United States where Japan national security is dependent on U.S. power projection and the United States depends on Japan for strategic position. The United States projects military force to defend an attack on Taiwan.

- Focal Event #1: U.S. military power projection in Asia-Pacific modernized

Alternate Future #26: (25 votes) Australia changes its alliance with U.S. foreign policy and implements an independent policy on China. Japan projects military power in a situation where its national security is threatened by China's military force. The United States projects military force to defend an attack on Japan.

- Focal Event #1: U.S. military power projection in Asia-Pacific modernized
- Focal Event #2: Japan military power normalized

Alternate Future #25: (24 votes) Australia continues a mutually beneficial relationship of military interoperability with the U.S. where Australia depends on U.S. military power and the U.S. enjoys strategic position. Japan projects military power in a situation where its national security is threatened by China's military force. The United States projects military force to defend an attack on Japan.

- Focal Event #1: U.S. military power projection in Asia-Pacific modernized

- Focal Event #2: Japan military power normalized
- Focal Event #3: Australia military modernized

Indicators

Step 11: Develop indicators for the focal events.

Indicators are an important way to avoid surprise and are often used in estimates. They give credibility to the analysis and an objective baseline. The following indicators are paired with focal events specific to futures in order to warn which future might be developing within the China military modernization A2/AD scenario. Indicators allow an analyst to spot a gradual change that might otherwise not be detected. This list of indicators is included in order to build “a more concrete case for the analytic conclusions.”⁴³

Focal Event: U.S. military power projection in Asia-Pacific modernized

Indicator #1: Fielding of Next Generation Long-Range Strike System (NGLRS)

Indicator #2: Directed energy weapons testing for anti-satellite and missile defense

Indicator #3: Deployment of enhanced sea basing for operational independence

Focal Event: Japan military power normalized

Indicator #1: Strengthen submarine and Aegis-equipped destroyer fleet

Indicator #2: Upgrade air superiority with joint strike fighter (JSF) acquisition

Indicator #3: Deploy missile interceptor system

Focal Event: Australia military modernized

Indicator #1: Continue acquisition of ships, destroyers, and long-range submarines

Indicator #2: Upgrade air superiority with joint strike fighter (JSF) acquisition

Indicator #3: Deploy missile interceptor system

Transposition Potential

Step 12: State the potential of a given alternate future to transpose into another alternate future.

Previously, a ranking of alternate futures revealed that futures #20, 26, and 25 received the most votes respectively and are the top three most likely to occur in a scenario where China continues a military build-up and pursuit of a three-phase active defense strategy A2/AD. With an understanding of each of the three national actors' perceptions and a reasoned and imaginative analysis of their coalesced courses of action, consequences were described based on what a particular future would look like if it were to occur. Because LAMP considers the free will of an actor as put forth in a COA, the relative probability of an alternate future is influenced by the possibility of transposition or change in a COA. This results in transposition from one alternate future to another. All futures are not subject to transposition because they may "have assumptions that make them unique."⁴⁴

Alternate future #25 is one COA away from transposing into the next highest alternate future #26. If Australia does not continue its alliance with U.S. foreign policy and military interoperability in alternate future #25, but instead implements an independent policy on China, alternate future #25 transposes into future #26. Alternate future #26 is one COA away from transposing into the highest future, alternate future #20. If Japan does not project its own military power in alternate future #26, but rather halts military normalization and continues a mutually dependent alliance with the United States, alternate future #26 transposes into future #20.

V. DISCUSSION

Strategic Estimate

In response to China's rise, Australia, Japan, and the United States are all widening and strengthening their options and they will continue to do so. The modernization of military capability in Australia and military normalization in Japan are to be expected in an environment of changing power and uncertainty. These U.S. allies will be responsible, along with the United States, to a coordinated military balance of power in the region as China grows in stature. Until China arrives at a stable position in the international rules-based order where it can collectively resolve issues such as unification with Taiwan, territorial disputes in the South and East China Seas, and the issues of Tibet and Xinjiang; the U.S. and its allies, together, will be prepared to project a measured military response necessary to maintain regional stability and support China's growth.

Goh, in his article about why Japan is important in the East Asia security order, explains the dynamics involved in a rising China:

The implicit bargain in respect of socializing China has been that it would be accorded its rightful place in East Asia as regional Great Power, in exchange for constraints on its exercise of that power. These constraints would be developed in response to a mix of positive and negative inducements. On the one hand, deepening political/economic interactions and dialogues are confidence-building measures that would reduce threat perceptions between China and its neighbors, and increased interdependence, particularly in the economic realm, would raise the costs of armed conflict. On the other hand, enfolding China within a web of multilateral cooperation frameworks and security institutions that also involve other major powers like the U.S. and Japan enables the Great Powers to help ensure mutual compliance with agreed norms by increasing their ability to monitor and deter each other. Underpinning all these arrangements is continued U.S. security dominance in the region, which constitutes a credible external deterrence against China's defection from this bargain.⁴⁵

While Australia, Japan, and the United States maintain a military balance of power, they will also engage China in official strategic dialogue, meant to guard against hostilities, manage Chinese modernization, and form its development.⁴⁶ The United States will pursue closer economic ties with China and work toward a G-2 model of cooperation. Japan will strengthen the alliance with the United States while developing a cooperative strategy with China.⁴⁷ At some point, perhaps when tensions are high or military conflict is looming or has occurred, Australia will alter its alliance with United States foreign policy and execute an independent policy on China. This political move will further strengthen China-Australia relations and enable Australia as the peace broker for the region. Since the United States is and will continue to be an important partner in East Asia and to foster an essential co-dependence between the two world powers, U.S. leaders will pursue a China policy of mutually assured economic destruction.⁴⁸

VI. ENDNOTES

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