

Civil War or Peace in Rwanda

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Abstract

This purpose of this study was to conduct a predictive analysis using the LAMP process. The LAMP is a twelve step process used to attempt to provide a most likely future of a scenario. It is not meant to provide a percentage of probability.

The subject of this study is based on the 1994 Rwandan Genocide. Using the LAMP process the paper will research the history of the region, tribes and events leading up to the genocide. The research will also review data after the genocide to attempt to determine a most likely alternate future for Rwanda based on a specific research question. The specific research question for this predictive analysis is: Will international aid prevent a Civil War in Rwanda within the next twenty years? Upon completion of the LAMP process and case study this paper will use another analytical process, the Analysis of Competing Hypothesis.

Introduction:

The Rwandan Genocide of 1994 was the best pre-planned, efficiently executed mass murder with the use of simple tools and organized mass media ever executed. Over the course of 100 days from April 6 to July 16 2004, an estimated 800,000 to 1 million Tutsis and some moderate Hutus were slaughtered in the Rwandan genocide. During this period more than 6 men, women and children were murdered every minute of every hour of every day. Rape was used as a tactic of terror and a method of genocide, between 250,000 and 500,000 women were raped. Sixty-seven percent of women raped were infected with HIV. In many cases this was a systematic and planned use of HIV positive men as a weapon of genocide. (Survivors Fund, 2008)

The Rwanda genocide did not happen overnight, it built overtime from international interference and tribalism. As the genocide began, international interference turned into international avoidance. The international community stood by and watched and debated if it was genocide or a civil war. The massive killing, rapes and the volume of refugees forced out of the country in the mere 100 days would seem to make it easy to declare it genocide. The international community did not act. Not only did they not act, but the majority of the 2500 man peacekeeping force that had been sent as part of the United Nations Mission to (UNAMIR) was withdrawn. (Report of the Independent, 1999) Why was there no intervention? With the history of the Holocaust and Bosnia so fresh in the collective minds of the international community, why was there not an immediate international solution? The tribal divisions are still in place as they were before the genocide. The Hutu government that had been in charge since 1962 has been replaced by a minority led Tutsi government. The tribal grievances that led to the massive killing are not restricted to just Rwanda. It is a regional problem consuming the African Great Lakes region

(AGL). Since the independence of Rwanda and Burundi in the early 1960's Rwanda had been led by a Hutu administration and Burundi had been led by a Tutsi administration. The Hutu and Tutsi tribes are the major tribal groups of this region, with Hutu being the majority at 85%, Tutsi at 14% and 1% Twa. (Evans, 97, 20) The regional issue is all the more reason for positive involvement of the international community. There are a few events and people that are important to remember in the years and months leading up to the beginning of the genocide, the Rwandan Civil War which began in 1990, the Arusha Accords in 1993 and current Rwanda President Paul Kagame. The Rwandan Civil War had started October 1, 1990 and lasted until the signing of the Arusha Accords in 1993. (Freeman, 1999, 23) The civil war and the signing of the treaty began to push to the surface the fears and aspirations of different elements in the country. Hutu President Habyrimana of Rwanda was to implement the accords, but there were Hutu elements that feared allowing the historically dominant, elite Tutsi any part in the government. These crucial events will be explained in more detail later in the paper. A significant person to remember is Paul Kagame the current President of Rwanda, who also the leader of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). He attained that position at the death of the then leader Rwigyama in 1990 in the beginning of the Civil War. There was a treaty signed in 1993 called the Arusha Accords. In spite of the Accords, the genocide began in April of 1994 and Kagame reactivated the RPF and overthrew the Hutu administration that ended the genocide by July. It is important that we consider his background and perspective. As the President his influence is paramount regarding the actions of the government. He had been in exile in Rwanda since his youth and was a Major in the Ugandan army when the RPF invaded Rwanda from Uganda. He had been attending the US Army Command and General Staff College at Ft Leavenworth, Kansas in 1991 when the war

broke out. He left the course and returned to Uganda, left the Ugandan army and went straight to the front and assumed the command of the RPF. (Waugh, 2007, 48)

Step 1: Determine the issue for which you are trying to predict the most likely future.

This is the most important step in the predictive analysis. “If the issue is too broad, the analysts will have too many actors and courses of action to consider, thus causing the number of alternate futures to explode exponentially. If the issue is vaguely defined, the analysts will experience difficulty in focusing his perceptual study of each actor and will end up trying to conduct too general an analysis.” (Lockwood, 1994, 28) The introduction provides some historical information that leads to the general question: Are the underlying grievances of both tribes currently being addressed in Rwanda? In order to determine the answer to this question this paper must review history of the region, determine what the grievances are and the origin of the grievances. We must also review the progress of political, economic, military and information operations areas since the genocide. The immense numbers left orphaned, widowed, diseased and homeless surely developed anger among the Tutsi population that is now in power. The majority Hutu’s have been removed from power and a large number of Hutus are in jail or refugees in the border countries. If these grievances are not being addressed by the Rwanda government and or the international community what will the future hold for Rwanda.

It is with these areas of concern that lead to the specific research question. This paper will conduct a predictive analysis using the Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction to answer the question: Will international aid prevent a Civil War in Rwanda within the next twenty years?

The question is restricted to the next twenty years for three reasons. First, because the genocide was sixteen years ago and with the aging of the population an assumption is being made that the propensity of violence and retribution is higher through the young adult years of the orphaned and homeless. There were 100,000 survivors between the ages of 14 and 21. (Survivor Fund, 2008) Second, the reconciliation, addressing grievances and power sharing process must be in place now to affect the hearts and minds of the people. Third, if these grievances are being addressed it will reduce the chance of civil war and peace through this generation and give the Rwandan government time to mature and the chance to survive. Some of the grievances may only be addressed with over watch and at the insistence of external sources.

We must study this case now for several reasons. First, intervention by the International Community (IC), the United Nations or the United States could have prevented or stopped the intensity of the killing in 1994. Second, to avoid the possible genocide here and in other areas where racial, ethnic, and tribal strife is evident, the problems need to be identified early and appropriate steps taken. Third, by studying this event we might determine why the IC refused to recognize the genocide for what it was and take action. International aid might have been tied to human rights, governance, and economic development. These efforts might have incentivized the government and the people to develop processes that would have been nationally inclusive.

There have been several books and articles written about the Rwandan genocide, mostly in the years immediately after the event. More recent books and articles are limited, but for this research the books will provide an in-depth look about the genocide and the underlying historical issues. To answer the specific question the research needs to look at what has been done to address the issues of political, economic and military issues effecting equality and inclusiveness

among the population and the information operations that effectively communicate the changes to the people of Rwanda. Therefore articles, data and research in these areas that provide the most current data on the economy and foreign policy are on websites and journals. This data should give us some insight to the efforts being provided by international community and the reforms made by the Rwandan government.

Literature Review:

The following works represent an important portion of the literature on the genocide in Rwanda and the many factors and events that lead to the tragedy. The literature demonstrates the history of the Hutu and the Tutsi tribes in the African Great Lakes (AGL) region, including the international interference. The literature shows the changes in the tribal relationships prior to European interference or colonization. Although there is a great deal of discussion and research in the various news media and academia leading up to and including the genocide in Rwanda there is not very much research on the potential for a resurgent genocide or civil conflict in the future. It may be because the genocide is such a recent event in our collective global memory or because it was such a complete embarrassment to the IC for its failure to intervene. It may also be because the violence was so extreme and the losses so large that an assumption is made that the tribes would surely not do anything so extreme again. Therefore, Rwanda is not in imminent danger of a repeat genocide. The problem with that theory is that Rwanda was just the geographical location of this specific incident. To understand the cause of the Rwandan genocide, a study must be conducted on the African Great Lakes region (AGL) and the Hutu and Tutsi tribes which do not reside in only Rwanda. The instability and violent nature of the African

Great Lakes (AGL) region causes the tribes to be fluid, moving between Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). It is for this reason that involvement by the international community is required.

The book “Responding to Crisis in the African Great Lakes” by Glynne Evans provides a political and social background of the region and specifically Rwanda. This is a good reference to begin understanding the AGL. “The polarization of the Hutu and Tutsi is neither natural nor age-old”. (Evans, 1997, 20) There was intermarriage between the tribes and living as neighbors in the same villages. The book provides a good background on the history of the region and external influence. It explains “it took time and application to create the divisions and the myths that now surround both groups. From the late 1950 onwards, the political elite in both Rwanda and Burundi used ethnicity in their struggle for power and state resources. (Evans, 1997, 19)

To further examine the regional environment the book “Security Dynamics in Africa’s Great Lakes Region, by Gilbert M. Khadiagala highlights the actors, issues, and institutions that have animated and propelled political, economic and security relationships in the AGL. The book reviews the many actors by country covering Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and the DRC. It also covers external actors involved in the AGL such as South Africa, Belgium, France, the U.S. and the United Nations. This is a more recent book published in 2006 providing some insight into the security developments in the region and some additional perspective with the advantage of time since the genocide that allows for discovery. The conclusion on Rwanda provided by the book “to contain the volcanic in nature” present in Rwanda would not only require a drawn out cooling off period but also need a commitment that was international, not just regional.” (Khadiglia, 2006, 32)

Blood and Sand, by Ben Kiernan is a global history of genocide from Sparta to Rwanda. The book studies the reason and origin of genocide. The author attempted to do comparisons. He examined Rwanda and Cambodia, and noted the comparison of agricultural based society over white collar and academics. In both cases the peasant class attempted to exterminate the elite. In Cambodia the minority class attempted to exterminate the majority and in Rwanda the majority group attempted to exterminate the minority. In both cases it was the agricultural class killing the elite. Since 1962 the government in Rwanda was Hutu, but the elite who had been supported by the Belgians until independence were the Tutsis. Kiernan tries to find the reason for ethnic strife, from Hesiod praising “the rich man who hastens to plough and plant and manage his household” in his book Work and Days. (Kiernan, 2007, 44) Hesiod began defining the difference between ethnicity, races, and cultures. What is it about the differences that make man hate another to the point they would want to exterminate them? This is important because the reasons for the hatred need to be understood to be able to solve grievances.

Paul Kagame and Rwanda: Power, Genocide and the Rwanda Patriotic Front, Colin M. Waugh, this is an important reading because Paul Kagame is the current President of Rwanda. He was also the leader of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). His influence in the administration of the Rwandan government (GOR) is vital He is responsible for the reforms necessary to make the government and the economy inclusive of both tribes. This book covers Paul Kagame’s exile in Uganda from Rwanda. His education and rise in the Uganda army prepared him for role as the rebel leader that overthrew the Hutu Rwandan government. It is important to understand the perspective of Paul Kagame because his decisions on implementation of policy and cooperation or lack of cooperation with external forces are colored by his past.

To see progress in Rwanda the current information about the policies being implemented in the government must be evaluated. Is the economy improving, and are jobs being provided inclusive of both tribes? The most current data can be found on electronic websites. USAID is the lead for economic aid for Rwanda from the United States. (USAID, 2010) The most comprehensive UN aid site for Rwanda is ONE UN Rwanda. (UNRWANDA, 2010) There are other international organizations (IOs) operating in Rwanda but most of them only have the requirement of security for their personnel and assets. Their own websites can be reviewed to see their humanitarian efforts. This paper will focus on the aid provided by the US and the UN, defined in this paper as the International Community (IC). This aid will require oversight and desires to guide the (GOR) toward government and economic inclusiveness of both tribes. If another civil war is to be avoided the grievances must be determined and addressed.

Step 2: Specify the national “actors’ involved.

When trying to determine who the most likely providers of aid and assistance for the longest duration, the factors that needed to be considered were:

1. Who had the capacity to provide aid?
2. Who had the most to lose by not providing aid?
3. Who suffered the most by not intervening? (Diplomatically, world view) They would have to have a reason to provide aid.
4. Who had the most to gain?
5. Who will provide guidance and requirements that will reform the governance in Rwanda to include all Rwandans?

The UN and the US met these criteria. For the purpose of this paper the UN and the US will be defined as one unit and identified as the International Community. The following statement laid the blame at the feet of the UN, Belgium, France, the US, the AU and the Roman Catholic Church. “The central actors responsible for allowing Hutu extremists to perpetrate the genocide are well known: the government of France, the United Nations Security Council led by the USA with British backing, the UN Secretariat, the government of Belgium, and, by no means least, the Roman Catholic Church. The Organization of African Unity also refused to condemn the genocidaires and proved to be largely irrelevant throughout the crisis. As a consequence of these acts of commission and omission, 800,000 Tutsi and thousands of moderate Hutu were murdered in a period of 100 days.” (Caplan, 2004, 142)

Belgium and France did not have the national will or the access to the country since they were considered by the Rwandan’s as the cause of the event and diplomatic relations were severed. The AU does not have any funding that is not provided from an external source.

So for this analysis the actors will be the International Community (IC) and the Rwandan government (GOR). The research question focuses on the results from external support provided by the IC. To be able to understand the cause of the Rwandan genocide, it must also be understood that the mass killings have not been restricted to just Rwanda. In the years preceding the 1994 genocide Burundi’s Tutsi dominated military had killed approximately 200,000 Hutu’s in Burundi. (Kiernan, 2007, 557) The animosity, anger and fear felt by both tribes have erupted across national boundaries in the AGL. In the region we have five nations sharing borders. It

would be possible to say that all the nations in the AGL could have an effect on the future of Rwanda. Following that rule any predictive analysis in the international arena could expand exponentially. It is this limitation, and in an effort to compensate I have included a complete review of the AGL nations to limit the possibility of missing a major influencing factor. For the purpose of this analysis, I am attempting to determine scenarios and possible alternate futures from the results of the International Community (IC) aid and support to the government of Rwanda (GOR). The surrounding nations have not been known to invade each other for territorial gain. “The Rwandan state is historically strong, and the population tends to be socially conformists.” (Khadiagala, 2006, 16) The conflicts on the borders have been directly related to rebels using border nations to hide in while preparing to re-enter their own countries. I have intentionally made the question specific to identify the aid provided by the IC that has the ability to provide the economic aid and governance support needed to avoid genocide. The second actor is the Rwandan government (GOR) who has to implement the policies and build a government that will provide a stable nation. Economic aid provided to Rwanda would benefit the surrounding nations. It would assist in providing security on their borders and relieve the refugee issues in their countries.

Step 3: Conduct an in-depth study of perceptions and intentions of each actor.

This step involves the greatest amount of historical research on the part of the analyst, and is obviously the most time-consuming. A thorough study of the “current history” and a review of the historical events, culture and perspective of the national actors is the only way to be able to develop credible analysis and scenarios. A failure to do so could cause the analysts to fall into

the trap of various analytical fallacies, such as mirror-imaging, pre-formed conclusions or bias. (Lockwood and Lockwood, 94, 30)

The primary hypothesis of this paper is that the perceptions of the International Community (IC) and the Rwandan government (GOR) is appropriate international aid and government reforms will avert any future attempt at genocide, mass murder or civil war. In the process of validating such a hypothesis, the following questions must considered

1. What is the US national interest in Rwanda and the African Great Lakes region? Nations are almost always driven by national interests.
2. Will the minority Tutsi dominated government be able to reconcile with the majority Hutus and develop a government that is inclusive of both tribes? The underlying of both tribes is the fear of annihilation by the other.
3. Will the Hutus be able to overcome the fear of Tutsi domination?

The International Community and the Rwanda government are the actors in this study. It would be possible to say that all countries have an effect on the future of Rwanda, but that can be said of any nation. The focus in this paper is on the effect of aid and proper government reforms overcoming the tribal grievances. In an effort to compensate I have included a complete review of the AGL nations to limit the possibility of missing a major influencing factor.

Uganda

Uganda is a multi-ethnic nation with over 10 different ethnic groups. It is 84% Christian between Catholic and Protestant with the remainder Muslim 12% and the rest other 4%. (African Eyes, 2002)

Although there have been over 200,000 Tutsi refugees at times that is not mentioned in the current numbers. This is also the country in which the RPF trained and staged their assault on Rwanda in 1990. Much of the RPF leadership were Tutsi refugees schooled and trained in the Ugandan military until the time came to leave the Ugandan army and invade Rwanda.

The boundaries were created by Great Britain in the colonial period. Uganda gained independence in 1962 and had a turbulent time in maturing. During the Idi Amin regime (1971-79) he killed 300,000 of his opponents. The following regime of Milton Obote (1980-85) claimed 100,000 lives and had a guerrilla war and claims of human rights abuses. Yoweri Museveni came to power in 1986 and the country has had relative stability and economic growth during his administration. Even during the last part of the 80's and the 90's with the large number of Tutsi refugees who staged the invasion in January 1990 it has remained stable. Uganda assumed a nonpermanent seat on the UN Security Council for the 2009-10 term. Uganda has a unicameral legislative system and in the past has discouraged a multi-party system. In July of 2005 a national referendum was held that opened the way for Uganda's transition to a multi-party political system. The next parliamentary elections are in 2011. (CIA Fact Book, 2010)

I do not think a comparison can be made between Uganda and Rwanda for what the future holds. There are too many differences from size to the ethnic and religious diversity of Uganda as opposed to 99% of Rwanda being of only two tribes. It is important that Uganda does provide a relative stable, democratic nation with a familiar relationship with the Rwandan government next door.

Tanzania

Tanganyika (Tanzania) gained independence from Great Britain in 1961 and in 1964 merged with Zanzibar to become Tanzania. One-party rule came to an end in 1995 with the first democratic elections held in the country since the 1970s. Zanzibar's semi-autonomous status and popular opposition have led to two contentious elections since 1995, which the ruling party won despite international observers' claims of voting irregularities. President Kikwete has been in office since 2005. Zanzibar has a President and House of Representatives to handle legislative affairs specifically for Zanzibar. It also must be noted that 37 seats in the legislature are reserved for women nominated by the President. (CIA Fact Book, 2010)

Tanzania is 99% African and 1% other with a religious mix of 30% Christian, 35% Muslim and 35% indigenous beliefs. It must be noted that that the semi-autonomous island of Zanzibar is 99% Muslim. (International Religious Report, 2007)

Tanzania is a friendly border nation to Rwanda but is not necessarily a good barometer to measure possible futures for Rwanda. It is important because it provides another relatively safe border with a multi-party, democratic system of government. It is also important in what it does not have, a Hutu or Tutsi population. Although some refugees are in Tanzania they are not harboring Hutu rebels that threaten Rwanda.

These next two nations, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo that border Rwanda have harbored Hutu rebels and genocidaires. The border regions harbor the same tribal mix of majority Hutu and minority Tutsi as Rwanda. Rwanda has fought a border war with the DRC to clean up the mountainous, porous border.

Burundi

Burundi has similar geography and demographics to Rwanda with the difference being the border. Burundi has also suffered similar mass murder, which was run by the government. Even though the Tutsi is a minority they have controlled the government and the military establishment. The CIA Fact book clearly states the past trouble in Burundi and how recent the new government has been established. It is still in the infancy stage and it is still in question as to its stability. “Burundi's first democratically elected president was assassinated in October 1993 after only 100 days in office, triggering widespread ethnic violence between Hutu and Tutsi factions. More than 200,000 Burundians perished during the conflict that spanned almost a dozen years. An internationally brokered power-sharing agreement between the Tutsi-dominated government and the Hutu rebels in 2003 paved the way for a transition process that led to an integrated defense force, established a new constitution in 2005, and elected a majority Hutu government in 2005. The new government, led by President Pierre Nkurunziza, signed a South African brokered ceasefire with the country's last rebel group in September of 2006 but still faces many challenges.” (CIA Fact Book, 2010) Burundi has a bicameral Parliament and a multi-party system. There are 100 seats, 60% Hutu and 40% Tutsi with at least 30% being women; additional seats are appointed by a National Independent Electoral Commission to ensure ethnic representation. This is important since the minorities are only 15% of the population. (State Dept, 2010)

The importance of Burundi to Rwanda is in their identical ethnic makeup, similar fears amongst both tribes with similar colonial backgrounds and tribal history. The similarities to Rwanda do not provide a measuring stick for progress in Rwanda. The democratic government in Burundi is ten years younger than the Rwanda governments. Burundi and Rwanda benefit in the fact that they are both trying to find their way and neither will now overtly harbor rebels or known genocidaires of the conflicts in their country. A separate analysis of Burundi needs to be done to establish how well they might be performing with aid from the IC. Burundi is not an actor in this scenario because the specific question points directly to the Rwandan government's development in relationship to the aid provided. However, the similarities of each country might be beneficial to compare or track the progress of Rwanda to for the benefit of Burundi.

The Republic of Congo

The Republic of the Congo became independent in 1960 from Belgium, but its early years were scarred by political and social instability. Col. Joseph Mobutu seized power and declared himself president in a November 1965 coup. Mobutu was President from 1965 to 1997 by holding fraudulent elections and violence. Civil war, touched off by a massive inflow of refugees in 1994 from fighting in Rwanda and Burundi, led in May 1997 to the toppling of the Mobutu regime by a rebellion backed by Rwanda and Uganda and Mobutu was replaced by Laurent Kabila. A second insurrection again backed by Rwanda and Uganda began in 1999. Rwanda and Uganda had issues with the DRC allowing rebels to operate out of the shared mountainous border region. This war has ended and provincial assemblies were constituted in early 2007, and elected governors and national senators in January 2007. (CIA Fact Book, 2010) This region will continue to be an ungoverned region for the DRC, Burundi, Uganda and Tanzania.

The DRC is very important to the stability of Rwanda due to the ungoverned space inside the DRC at the Rwanda borders. It harbors former Hutu genocidaires and gives them a staging area to try to reverse the control of the nation of Rwanda. The IC is supporting the RG and the importance of the ungoverned space in the DRC makes it all the more important that the RG continue to develop reforms.

Rwanda

The perspective of the Rwandan government is cooperative with the IC to a certain level. They do hold some resentment for the IC not intervening. The current government is Tutsi dominated and the majority of that are members of the RPF. They will do what they believe is necessary to maintain their position and security even over some IC requests. This is understandable since the IC did not do anything to assist them in stopping the genocide and stabilizing the country.

A brief history is required to develop the reason for the antagonism or hatred between the tribes. Around the 1400's the inhabitants of the region had consolidated into a number of kingdoms. In the 1800's, King Rwabugiri of the Kingdom Rwanda conducted a conquest and consolidation resulting in the kingdom of what is Rwanda today. The colonial powers of Germany followed by Belgium allowed the Rwandan court to conquer the remaining local kingdoms along its borders. Using a racial system they created minority Tutsi domination under Rwabugiri.

Belgium granted national independence in 1961 and due to a convergence of anti-colonial, anti-monarchist and anti-Tutsi sentiment from a vastly majority Hutu population. Elections were held resulting in a representative government dominated by Hutus under President Gregoire

Kayibandi. Twelve years later in 1973, ethnic and political tensions worsened when another Hutu, Juvenal Habyrimana seized power. President Habyrimana replaced southern Hutu with the more conservative, former northern Hutu monarchy. While this was going on in Rwanda, next door in Burundi the minority Tutsi dominated government was oppressing the Hutu's forcing many Hutu's across the borders into Rwanda and Rwanda Tutsi's were crossing borders into the DRC, Tanzania and Uganda. Finally in 1990, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a rebel group led by Paul Kagame, a group composed of Tutsi refugees from previous decades of unrest, invaded Rwanda, beginning the Rwandan Civil War. (Kiernan, 2007, 558) The war continued with worsening ethnic tensions until the assassination of Rwanda President Habyrimana and Burundi President Ntaryamisa by the shooting down of the Presidential plane while it was landing in Kigali, Rwanda, April 6, 1994. (Freeman, 1999, 4) It is suspected, but never proven that extremist Hutus shot down the plane because they did not agree with President Habyrimana's Arusha Accord reforms. This was the catalyst for the Hutu's eruption and the beginning of the Rwandan genocide in which hundreds of thousands of Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed. The killing did not end until the RPF conquered the country.

The International Community (composed of the UN and the US in concert)

The United States and the United Nations are working in concert in providing aid and guidance to Rwanda. To be able to cover both entities it is necessary to review their particular perspectives. The UN is the vehicle in which the IC will be involved as a single unit. The international community perspective is that the failure to intervene was due to prejudice, and not in the national interests of any of the major countries. The incident in Mogadishu, Somalia kept the US and the UN out for fear of another international embarrassment. The magnitude of the

killings completely caught the IC of guard. The aid and support given now is partly the proper humanitarian thing to do to put a country on its feet, but much of it from guilt. It is possible that the current government is getting a pass by the IC with some of the policies they have put in place to maintain security.

United States

The U.S. sees the solution from the perspective of their national interests and from the failure to act in 1994. There are two programs that are the lead for the handling of the aid and assistance. USAID and a State Department program called the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA).

USAID's program is to improve governance through increased citizen participation and enhance democratic local government and decentralization, democratic national governance, civil society; and improve community-based reconciliation efforts. USAID will continue to support Rwanda's groundbreaking decentralization program, assist new legislative bodies to carry out their mandates, increase dialogue with citizens, and help civil society organizations (CSOs) increase citizen participation in local and national governmental decision-making. USAID will continue to promote further reconciliation within Rwanda. Efforts to bring justice through the informal mediation systems (Gacaca) or the formal justice system for crimes will be coupled with civil society efforts to ease the trauma still pervasive in Rwandan society. (USAID, Mission Strategy, 2010)

These national interests are not survival or vital interests of the U.S. On the surface they appear to be only humanitarian interests falling into the category of peripheral interests defined as; if

unfulfilled, will result in damage that is unlikely to affect core national interests. (Bartholomees, 2008, 56) Since the genocide, the rise of terrorism and the natural resources of Africa, the continent have taken on new strategic importance and the U.S. has established the new unified command of AFRICOM elevating the alliances in Africa. The U.S. has also developed the African Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA). This program provides funding for equipment and peacekeeping training for participating countries. This funding is contingent upon the participating country providing peacekeepers in support of UN and AU Peacekeeping missions. Rwanda is one of the participating countries along with all the other AGL countries. This participation in UN and AU peacekeeping mission gets buy-in from Rwanda for the success of the entire region and raises the influence of the small African country in the AU. This has also elevated the importance of success in Rwanda. Rwanda does not necessarily have a strategic location or any natural resources. Coffee is their biggest export. Instability in this border country can destabilize the East African sub-region of the AGL, which consists of Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, and Tanzania. As a region they become more important, bordering Sudan, Somalia, and the Horn of Africa. These programs have expectations and requirements. The aid is not completely free. This regional effect elevates the national interests to “important”, defined as; if unfulfilled, will eventually affect core national interests. (Bartholomees, 2008, 56)

(Authors Note: I have personally worked on this project in Rwanda army has been considered one of the major success programs in ACOTA.)

United Nations

The United Nations doesn't have the reputation of successful military intervention or even voting to support military intervention. The UN and the international community did recognize that there was a problem in the AGL, mainly Burundi and Rwanda. The mission was called The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda UNAMIR. The mission was to assist in implementation of the Arusha Accords. The Accords were signed August 4, 1993 to end the Rwandan Civil War. The Arusha Accords and UNAMIR activities were to aid in the peace process between the Hutu dominated Rwandan government and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) As the tensions rose the UN pulled all but about 250 UN soldiers out of Rwanda. The original mandate extended past what became the period in which the genocide occurred and the overthrow of the Hutu dominated government. The UN rules of engagement and withdrawal of troops at the critical point, in the beginning of the mass killing sent a message to the Hutu leadership that they would not be opposed. The mission is thus regarded as a major failure.

The failure of the UN to intervene was monumental even for the United Nations. This credibility gap is one that the UN and its affiliated International Organizations (IO's) need to correct. There are usually not too many restrictions for UN aid, except for security for the systems to function and provide Humanitarian aid. This does leave a source like the US to apply milestones in governance and inclusiveness to some of their funding.

Research Design

This paper will be using the Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction to conduct an analysis which provides a range of likely scenario and alternate futures. As mentioned above the specific

question to be analyzed is: Will Rwanda avoid a civil war within the next twenty years if aid is provided by the United Nations and the United States?

To answer the question, the author will use a comparative study called LAMP. LAMP is a twelve step process of predictive analysis using a pair wise comparison in order to determine the most likely outcome, depending on potential future scenarios. This analysis has specific courses of action that can be taken by the two national actors. The study will attempt to develop possible actions and results of those actions based on the support provided by the United Nations and the United States. This analysis will be done based on some historical data.

LAMP considers the possible courses of action by the actors, in this case the IC and the Rwandan government. The possible future scenarios and courses of action for each actor were developed by a historical study of the African Great Lakes region (AGL) and the identified actors. Information and data was collected from extensive review of literature on the Rwandan genocide most of it secondary sources, with some review of witness accounts. Current news from electronic media and journals was also used to validate the last 16 years of progress and in an attempt to determine trends. These trends were used to develop alternate futures.

A pair-wise comparison is conducted by comparing each combination of actions to every other combination. For example, if there are four possible outcomes, each outcome is compared to three others. The outcome with the largest number of votes is determined to be the most likely.

The twelve steps of the LAMP are:

1. Determine the issue for which you are trying to predict the most likely future.
2. Specify the national “actors” involved.

3. Perform an in-depth study of how each national actor perceives the issue in question.
4. Specify all possible courses of action for each actor.
5. Determine the major scenarios within which you compare the alternate futures.
6. Calculate the total number of permutations of possible “alternate futures” for each scenario.
7. Perform a “pair wise comparison” of all alternate futures within the scenario to determine their relative probability.
8. Rank the alternate futures for each scenario from highest relative probability to the lowest based on the number of votes received.
9. Assuming each future occurs; analyze each alternative future in terms of its consequences for the issue in question.
10. Determine the focal events that must occur in our present in order to bring about a given alternative future.
11. Develop indicators for the focal events.
12. State the potential of a given alternate future to transpose into alternate future.

(Lockwood and Lockwood, 1994, 27 and 28)

Step 4: Specify courses of action for each actor.

The United States and the UN have been providing aid since the genocide and the government and people have had some reactions and changes. The variable that the actors can provide would be withdrawing, increasing or placing restrictions on the aid.

The specific courses of action of the two actors are:

1. (AR) Economic aid provided and GOR cooperates with general guidance of IC. This is defined as the actor requiring reforms in governance that would support a more equal representation in government.
2. (ANLR) Refusing to cooperate or attempt to comply with requests of IC. Although if security is still maintained other IOs will still be conducting humanitarian aid.
3. (MI) Military action. Defined as the GOR using military force to maintain control or the IC using military intervention. To support governance and mitigate violence by government on the people.

There are varying levels of aid, requirements and cooperation and that fact is understood. The effort in this paper is to attempt to analyze aid provided that would be sufficient to improve the basic standard of living for the general population and enough to encourage GOR to cooperate with the IC. A fact to consider is the perspective of the Tutsi administration that does not have any confidence in the IC, since they stood by and watched nearly the entire Tutsi tribes get massacred. Economic aid is being provided since the genocide. A review of the reforms made, aid given and the results of inclusiveness in government and annual income across tribal lines will provide indicators and trends.

Step 5: Determine the major scenarios within which you compare the alternate futures.

Scenario 1: Rwanda forms a successful government and develops a liberal economy and progresses to reforms that is more inclusive of both tribes in governance and economic opportunity. The governments in Rwanda have been manipulated by the colonial powers to

maintain power. They have perpetuated a system of differences among the population. The basic grievance has been fear. The government must institute policies that develop inclusiveness.

Scenario 2: Rwanda does not form a successful government, which could change hands by many methods. If the RG does not develop policies that are inclusive then the fear of domination of one tribe over the other will not dissipate. (NOTE: The government has failed to form a successful government. That is not to be confused with no government. The GOR is in the early stages of upheaval with a possibility of being removed.)

Step 6. Calculate the number of alternate futures.

According to the LAMP the formula for calculating the number of courses of action is:

$$X^Y=Z$$

X is the number of courses of action for each player and Y is the number of players.

There are two actors and two courses of action. Therefore the formula is:

$$3^2=9$$

There are two major scenarios with a total of 18 alternate futures that will be compared in this analysis.

Step 7. Do a pair-wise comparison of alternate futures do determine the most likely alternate futures.

Scenario 1:

Rwanda forms a successful government and develops a liberal economy and progresses to reforms that is more inclusive of both tribes in governance and economic opportunity. The governments in Rwanda have been manipulated by the colonial powers to maintain power. They

have perpetuated a system of differences among the population. The basic grievance has been fear. The government must institute policies that develop inclusiveness.

<u>Future No.</u>	<u>Inter. Com.</u>	<u>Rwandan Govt</u>	<u>Score</u>	<u>Rank</u>
1	AR	AR	5	3
2	AR	ANLR	6	2
3	AR	MI	3	4
4	ANLR	AR	5	3
5	ANLR	ANLR	7	1
6	ANLR	MI	6	2
7	MI	AR	0	6
8	MI	ANLR	3	4
9	MI	MI	2	5

Scenario 2:

Rwanda does not form a successful government, which could change hands by many methods.

If the RG does not develop policies that are inclusive then the fear of domination of one tribe over the other will not dissipate. (NOTE: The government has failed to form a successful government. That is not to be confused with no government. The GOR is in the early stages of upheaval with a possibility of being removed.)

<u>Future No.</u>	<u>Inter. Com.</u>	<u>Rwandan Govt.</u>	<u>Score</u>	<u>Rank</u>
1	AR	AR	0	8
2	AR	ANLR	2	6
3	AR	MI	6	2
4	ANLR	AR	1	7
5	ANLR	ANLR	3	5
6	ANLR	MI	9	1
7	MI	AR	4	4
8	MI	ANLR	5	3
9	MI	MI	6	2

Step 8: Rank the alternative futures for each scenario from highest relative probability to the lowest based on the number of votes received.

Scenario 1:

Rwanda forms a successful government and develops a liberal economy and progresses to reforms that is more inclusive of both tribes in governance and economic opportunity. The governments in Rwanda have been manipulated by the colonial powers to maintain power. They have perpetuated a system of differences among the population. The basic grievance has been fear. The government must institute policies that develop inclusiveness.

<u>Future No.</u>	<u>Inter. Com.</u>	<u>Rwanda Govt.</u>	<u>Score</u>	<u>Rank</u>
5	ANLR	ANLR	7	1
2	AR	ANLR	6T	2T
4	ANLR	AR	6T	2T
6	ANLR	MI	5T	3T
1	AR	AR	5T	3T
3	AR	MI	3T	4T
8	MI	ANLR	3T	4T
9	MI	MI	2	5
7	MI	AR	0	6

Scenario 2:

Rwanda does not form a successful government, which could change hands by many methods. If the RG does not develop policies that are inclusive then the fear of domination of one tribe over the other will not dissipate. (NOTE: The government has failed to form a successful government. That is not to be confused with no government. The GOR is in the early stages of upheaval with a possibility of being removed.)

<u>Future No.</u>	<u>Inter. Com.</u>	<u>Rwanda Govt.</u>	<u>Score</u>	<u>Rank</u>
6	ANLR	MI	9	1
3	AR	MI	6T	2T
9	MI	MI	6T	2T
8	MI	ANLR	5	3
7	MI	AR	4	4
5	ANLR	ANLR	3	5
2	AR	ANLR	2	6
4	ANLR	AR	1	7
1	AR	AR	0	8

Step 9: Assuming each scenario occurs, analyze each alternate future in terms of its consequences for the issue question.

Scenario 1:

Rwanda forms a successful government and develops a liberal economy and progresses to reforms that is more inclusive of both tribes in governance and economic opportunity. The governments in Rwanda have been manipulated by the colonial powers to maintain power. They have perpetuated a system of differences among the population. The basic grievance has been fear. The government must institute policies that develop inclusiveness. This is the best scenario because the “most likely” alternate future precludes military intervention. The government will cooperate with the IC in governance and development of democratic reforms that are inclusive of both tribes. This scenario assumes the government provides equal security, appropriate representation in government and economic opportunity across tribal, ethnic and gender lines. This utopian scenario is highly unlikely, but different levels of success are possible. That is where the alternate futures will apply in the predictive analysis this scenario.

Future #5: Both the IC and the RG apply limited requirements for reforms (ANLR) in the aid packages.

This alternate future sees the GOR staying in power and making limited reforms. Both sides understands some reforms need to be made but initial requirements for security and strict management of the population need to be applied to survive the immediate aftermath of the genocide. It is assumed that most sovereign nations would not comply with all the reforms that an external source would request. They would not acquiesce to all requests because of cultural differences; maintain sovereignty or political legitimacy (not to be seen as a puppet by its own citizens). Rwanda Tutsi dominated government would have an additional reason for push back, based on the failure of the failure of the IC to intervene when Tutsis were the target of the genocide. Some successes in governance in the GOR are the Rwandan Revenue Authority who has developed a reputation of efficiency and professionalism. Bribery is rare and severely punished. If the GOR does not want to do something it will play the “failure to intervene” card to continue to support its own agenda. This is supported by trends seen in the GOR by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy (AEIPP). “The decision to maintain high levels of aid to Rwanda was based as much on the belief that the money could be used effectively as it was on ‘guilt’ the west may have felt over its failure to act to prevent or slow the genocide of 1994. During this same period, Rwandan decision-makers also learned that it is possible to say ‘no’ to donor priorities, or to aggressively push their own priorities, without adverse consequences.” (Lorenzo, 2008)

Based on this information this is the most likely scenario and it is progressively improving the GOR and the positions of the GOR and the people. The environment is fluid and these trends

could change, but as of 2008 the GOR was still able to make the reforms they wanted and still not have reduction in aid.

Future # 2: The IC is requiring reforms tied to the aid packages given and the GOR is not complying completely.

This future is similar to the future # 5 mentioned above. The difference is that the donors have reforms applied to the money. There has not been a downturn in aid to the GOR based on non-compliance, for the same reason that aid has been given with no restrictions. Refer to the article by the AEIPP. Aid that has restrictions has been easy for the GOR to comply with, for example the African Contingency Operations Assistance Training Program (ACOTA). The requirements are to except western doctrine and training in peacekeeping and support AU and UN peacekeeping missions in Africa. This strengthens their military and provides value to the AU for Rwanda. There was only one vote different between the Future # 5 and Future # 2 because by default the IC is placing reforms on some money but not in the manner that the GOR would push back. So by default they are the same.

Future # 4: The IC is providing aid and the GOR is developing reforms ahead of the IC schedule. This is not a likely future from a western perspective because western thought tends to lean toward “not doing anything beyond what I am required to do for the aid.” The GOR is reforming in some areas in which the IC did not immediately require. For example, the IC has insisted upon proper reputation in the governance by both tribes. According to the US State Department, “Elections for the Chamber of Deputies occurred in September 2008; the RPF (Tutsi) won an easy victory in coalition with six small parties, taking 42 of the 53 directly-elected seats. As provided in the constitution, 24 seats were also accorded to women candidates

in direct elections. Women now hold 45 of the 80 seats in the Chamber.” (State.gov, 2010) This is more than other African country and is a majority of the parliament. This holds well for the ability of the GOR to stay n power. Will the trend hold?

Future # 6: The IC does not require reforms and the GOR does not support reforms and uses Military intervention to deal with the population. The GOR could use the military to control the polls, keep them clear of opposition and control the country side. The RPF is in control of the GOR and has used many arrests of opposition to control eligibility in the elections. On April 21, 2010 Victoire Umuhoya, the main opposition to President Kagame in the election was arrested. A major part of her platform is “those who killed Hutu in the 1994 genocide have not been tried.” She is Hutu and she referring to the Tutsi in the RPF, the controlling party of the GOR, are not being tried” (AllAfrica, 2010) She was arrested while Canada’s Governor General was in Rwanda apologizing for the failure of the IC and Canada to intervene. This appears to be timed to use the genocide as an issue to control the elections while continuing to use the IC guilt. The GOR has not used military force yet but has applied civilian police in the arrest under the strict laws about “revisionist discussion” of the genocide. The military leadership is majority Tutsi and RPF. Military force is a possibility. But I do not see it as one of the government’s primary courses of action at this point.

NOTE: The Alternate futures from this point on are not very likely scenarios even though some of the scores rank close to the others in front of them.

Future # 1: The IC requires reforms and the GOR conforms and meets requirements.

This is not a likely future because seldom would a sovereign nation do everything an external source requests. In the event they did considerable reforms would be made. This scenario might cause the same issues that occurred in Iraq with the Shia. The Hutus are 85% of the population and tribes vote along tribal lines. The government would be overwhelmingly Hutu, the same as it was before and leading up to the genocide. The incentive for the government to provide some inclusiveness for the Hutu is to insure they have a voice in the government but with a balance toward protection of the minority tribe of Tutsi. When evaluated using precedent in other areas where there is a huge majority group in tribal culture violence has occurred. As attractive as complete cooperation and compliance between the IC and the GOR would appear on the surface it could be disastrous for the Tutsi. This level of cooperation between the IC and the GOR might be a possibility if needed before going to complete military involvement.

Authors Note: Please note the order of the following alternate futures seems to validate the voting process. As the futures are described it is evident that when summarizing one of the actions precede a rational step to the next future. This will be covered in more detail in Step 10.

Future # 3: The IC requires reforms along with the aid and the GOR does not comply.

If the IC pulls aid, which is unlikely or if the GOR was not building an inclusive government they might lose political power. This could occur if due to election the Hutu majority is able to take control of the Presidency of the Parliament. The Rwandan Defense Force (RDF) which is controlled and led by the RPF might decide to overthrow the GOR. The GOR would lose legitimacy. This event might have aid withdrawn or held up until some reconciliation with a

legitimate GOR. Generally the Rwandan population has historically complied to authority. The Hutus assault on the Tutsi was generated by leaders in the Hutu GOR in 1994. This scenario is not likely because the IC will not pull aid for fear of the collapse of the Rwandan government which would cause refugee issues in the border States. If they did pull aid which precipitated a failed or failing state the IC would step in to avoid genocide and to ensure stabilization of the region. The East African Community, Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya have been some of the best allies to the West and the most stable countries over the last 25 years.

Future # 8: The IC provides military intervention and the GOR is conducting limited or no reforms. This scenario is again not very likely. The likelihood of the IC intervening in a sovereign nation while the legitimate government is still in power is not likely without the government's request. What makes this possible is if the military leadership decides the GOR is not functioning the way they believe it should. If the GOR was not going to reform and develop an inclusive government they would be expecting disturbances in the population and Future # 3 would be in place, which may lead to future # 9 below.

Future # 9: The IC intervenes with military action due to the instability in the GOR and the use of the RDF against its own population to secure the GOR. This a logical step if the GOR was failing. RDF action to secure the GOR could be followed by IC military intervention. Although historically this would be slow in coming. This could occur if due to election the Hutu majority is able to take control of the Presidency of the Parliament. The Rwandan Defense Force (RDF) which is controlled and led by the RPF. The RPF might decide to overthrow the GOR. This

might precipitate IC intervention because of the guilt of the IC over the genocide and to uphold western democratic ideals that it has been championing in the region.

Future # 7: IC military intervention with the GOR meeting the requirement of the IC in reference to the aid packages. This alternate future did not receive any votes for obvious reasons. The reforms proposed by the IC would probably be supportive of the population. Compliance by the GOR would insure more aid. There are probably reasons for the IC to intervene militarily and one would be if the Hutu rebel force would invade from across the DRC border and the RDF did not respond. This is not likely, but never say never.

Scenario 2:

Government of Rwanda (GOR) does not form a successful government, which could change hands by many methods. If the RG does not develop policies that are inclusive then the fear of domination of one tribe over the other will not dissipate. (NOTE: The government has failed to form a successful government. That is not to be confused with no government. The GOR is in the early stages of upheaval with a possibility of being removed.)

This scenario is the worst case of the two main scenarios. This would imply that a military coup has occurred or that a rebel force has been able to develop in the DRC and invade across the border and overthrow the GOR. Another possibility of the GOR failing would be an insurgency for failure of the GOR to include the 85% of the population which is Hutu. Since this study is focused on the next 20 years I do not see this as a real strong possibility. Having traveled in Africa considerably including Rwanda I must remind myself what is said in Africa when

attempting to explain things. “TIA “this is Africa” meaning anything can happen, it usually does and it defies explanation. The following futures are based on what happens if the GOR fails.

Future # 6: IC provides aid without many restrictions and the GOR uses military forces to maintain the GOR causing the majority population to revolt. The Rebels in the DRC come across the border and remove the GOR. This future is based on the scenario that the GOR has failed and loses power and legitimacy. Use of force has become prevalent in the government and the IC has not provided military assistance. This is the most likely because it provides the least military support from the IC to uphold the GOR.

Future # 3: The IC provides Aid with reforms and the GOR had made reforms but is still losing power and legitimacy and is using military force to maintain its position.

The scenario is mainly the same as above with the exception that there have been reforms. An insurgency could form within and be supported by the rebels in the DRC. If reforms have been developed then it would be difficult to develop an insurgency unless the GOR misread the grievances and the reforms did not address the major issue which is security for the individual from the other ethnic group.

Future 9: The IC provides military intervention to protect the non-combatants and the GOR use military force to maintain order and to attempt to keep the current GOR in place.

The military intervention on the part of the IC would be to ensure that the RDF of the GOR was not killing non-combatants. It would most likely not be used to keep the GOR in power but to assist in security and transition of power. This future is made possible by the history of across border invasion in Central Africa. The western border of the DRC and Rwanda is very

mountainous and is an ungoverned space. The success of Rwanda could be affected by the success of the recent establishment of the government in Burundi. It is too early to tell.

Future 8: The IC provides military intervention as peacekeepers and the GOR has failed to implement reforms. This future is possible if the GOR has failed and the IC needs to provide security for the general population. This future received limited votes because it does not have military intervention by the GOR. I do not see a future where the GOR falls and the Rwanda Defense was not used. These votes only came into comparison with futures that did not have GOR military intervention in them.

Future 7: the IC provides military intervention to protect the population and the GOR has implemented reforms requested by the IC.

This future is unlikely because if reforms have been inclusive and have addressed the grievances and insurgency would be less likely and a rebel force would not have any pretense on the international arena for an invasion. If a rebel force were to invade in a failing state, which is what this scenario assumes, then IC military intervention could be sent to shore up the government until order could be restored and protect the population.

Authors note: the following four futures are very similar playing after a scenario where the GOR failed to establish a successful government. All of these futures are based on the GOR producing some level of reforms. In this case with the failing of a third world government this author cannot imagine a scenario where the military would not be used. So although these alternatives are there they are not realistic.

Future # 5, 2, 4, and 1: The IC provides aid with limited or no requirements or with requirements and the GOR implements limited reforms or no reforms.

This could cause the government to fail because the grievances were not addressed. An insurgency could rise from this. Again these futures could happen but not without military intervention on the part of the government. If this happened refer to the first six alternative futures. The problem would come in if a substantial part of the population's grievances were not addressed. If the GOR was to fail there is not any scenario where military intervention would not be part of the formula. The IC would deploy forces either as peacekeepers for protection of the population or the security of the borders or the AGL nations. The regional forces could possibly intervene and there is no doubt that the Rwandan Defense Force would be used by the failing of GOR.

Step 10: State the potential of a given alternate future to transpose into another future.

The alternate futures seem to validate the voting process. As the futures are described it is evident that when summarizing each of the actions precede a rational step to the next future.

Scenario 1: The research leads this analyst to believe that Scenario 1 is the most like scenario with Alternate Future #5 The IC provides aid with limited or no requirements for reform and the GOR provide limited or no reforms. As was discussed earlier the GOR would do some reforms to continue IC sympathies and to acquire as much aid as possible to assist in development and transition into a democracy. Future # 5 could easily transition into Future # 2 and then Future # 4. This is because the courses of action discuss the processes in which aid is provided. Since aid is usually tied to some set of milestones it is negotiable. So even when the aid has built in requirements those milestones can be adjusted. This would blur the lines being drawn by the IC aid and the responses by the GOR. The next major leap after the process of the liberal aid

packages early in aid intervention to more restrictive packages would be the options of using military intervention to insure the GOR is staying in power. If the GOR and the IC have addressed the grievance and created an inclusive government then the next alternate future # 6 includes military intervention by the GOR. This is a logical process since a nation has one major primary function and that is to exist. The government is the entity that executes the function to ensure survival of the state. After following a natural process of attempting to create a society that the population can live with and fails the next tool used would be the military. Alternate futures 8 and 9 have military intervention either by the GOR or the IC or both. This would be the last resort for survival of the government in the event the reforms did not address the grievance of the population. This scenario addresses the GOR being successful in creating an inclusive, successful government. This assumes that has been done and if for some reason that is not the case then the options of military intervention is the next logical and historical step. This is a good segway into Scenario 2.

Scenario 2: Rwanda does not form a successful government, which could change hands by many methods and the GOR fails. (NOTE: The government has failed to form a successful government. That is not to be confused with no government. The GOR is in the early stages of upheaval with a possibility of being removed.)

The most likely alternate **future # 6** in which the IC provides aid without restrictions allows the GOR to apply it where it is needed. Rwanda having failed to develop a successful government begins using military intervention. Once the military has been used it cannot be withdrawn without some return to normalcy. If the government was not able to solve the grievance in peace the odds of it being accomplished by force is not probable. The next four alternate futures # 3, 9,

8, 7 all have military intervention in the formula. The voting process supported the historical process of failing governments to begin using military force until the intervention of a peacekeeping force from the international community. The final four alternate futures # 5, 2, 4, and 1 are not likely and received limited votes, because the possibility of aid and reforms being successful after the sitting government has failed and military intervention is not likely.

The voting process used by the LAMP in this study supported a logical and historical process of aid and international intervention. The alternate futures exhibit an ability of being able to transpose from one alternate future to the next mostly in the order of the rank.

The next two steps will be listed together for continuity and clarity. The steps are listed separately the content is listed together.

Step 11: Determine the focal events that must occur in our present in order to bring about a given alternative future.

Step 12: Develop Indicators for the focal events.

Scenario 1:

Rwanda forms a successful government and develops a liberal economy and progresses to reforms that is more inclusive of both tribes in governance and economic opportunity.

Alternate future # 5 and #2 and #4: IC aid with limited reform and the GOR implements limited reforms. The first three alternate futures are similar and stress the different combinations of aid and reform. The same focal point could be identified for these three futures. Transparency

of the elections, economic development and police harassment of opposition are paramount in determining the progress toward inclusiveness in the country.

FOCAL EVENT: Elections with participation of a majority of the population and both tribes and approved of by the IC.

INDICATOR: The Presidential and Parliamentary elections will be analyzed by UN observers and certifies the quality of the elections.

FOCAL EVENT: Increase in inclusion of Hutu tribal members in governance and the military leadership. The gender barriers have exceeded expectations as women hold the majority of parliament.

INDICATOR: The number of opposition candidates involved in the election and the number of opposition candidates winning and the how close other many races are.

FOCAL EVENT: Civilian Police oppression or harassment of political opposition forces.

INDICATOR: Number of arrest of candidates and or organized protest harassing candidates. This does not include peaceful demonstration of citizens or rallies in support of or against a candidate.

Focal Event: Increase in international private investment.

INDICATOR: This indicator is harder to see but is imperative. Identify companies that are external to the nation investing heavily in infrastructure. This shows faith in the government's ability to run the nation and the trust in the government to not nationalize corporations.

Alternate Future # 6: IC aid with limited reforms and military intervention by GOR.

FOCAL EVENT: Decrease in participation or low turn-out of elections.

INDICATOR: Lower percentage turn out at the polls than previous elections certified by UN observers. Outlaw of new or significant opposition parties.

FOCAL EVENT: Military involvement in oppression of possible candidates.

INDICATOR: Arrests of opposition candidates by civilian police or military.

FOCAL EVENT: Removal of or resigning of government or military leadership.

INDICATOR: Purging or resignation of the army leadership.

FOCAL EVENT: Increase of rebel activity on borders of DRC.

INDICATOR: Resurgence of border activity to include opposition border crossings.

FOCAL EVENT: Hutu refugees entering into Burundi and the DRC.

INDICATOR: Increase in refugees in Burundi and the DRC indicates feeling of persecution of the Hutus by GOR.

FOCAL EVENT: Limited international private investment.

INDICATOR: International companies canceling plans to build or halting expansion. No new or downturn of announcements to invest in Rwanda.

Alternate Future # 3: IC provides aid with reform requirements and military intervention by GOR.

FOCAL EVENT: Use of Military by GOR to control movement of population and oppression of opposition candidates.

INDICATOR: Arrests and harassing of population increase in checkpoints and curfews.

FOCAL EVENT: Increase of rebel and refugee activity on borders of DRC.

INDICATOR: Increase in border crossings and incidents.

FOCAL EVENT: Limited international private investment.

INDICATORS: International companies canceling plans to build or halting expansion. No new or downturn of announcements to invest in Rwanda.

FOCAL EVENT: Increase in protests.

INDICATOR: Civilian police and military being used to control, impede, stop or apprehend opposition protest.

FOCAL EVENT: Increase in inter-tribal assaults.

INDICATOR: Civilian police reports and local official's complaints of assaults.

Alternate Future # 8: The IC conducts a military intervention with limited or no reforms provided by GOR to develop a successful government. (This is not likely as the GOR would conduct military intervention if government was failing before IC would commit troops).

FOCAL EVENT: Riots and protest in streets, looting, assaults.

INDICATORS: Military leaders refusing to deploy troops against its citizens.

FOCAL EVENT: GOR call for IC intervention.

INDICATOR: Authorization of troops by IC and plans for deployment.

Alternate Future #9: Military intervention by IC and GOR.

FOCAL EVENT: Riots and protest in streets, looting, assaults.

INDICATORS: Military used for population control increase in checkpoints, borders closed.

FOCAL EVENT: GOR call for IC intervention.

INDICATOR: Authorization of troops by IC and plans for deployment.

FOCAL EVENT: Arrests of opposition leaders.

INDICATORS: Small arms engagements in the attempted arrest of opposition leaders.

Scenario: 2

Government of Rwanda (GOR) does not form a successful government, which could change hands by many methods. If the RG does not develop policies that are inclusive then the fear of domination of one tribe over the other will not dissipate. (NOTE: The government has failed to form a successful government. That is not to be confused with no government. The GOR is in the early stages of upheaval with a possibility of being removed.)

Alternate Future # 6: IC aid with limited reforms and military intervention by GOR.

FOCAL EVENT: Decrease in participation or low turn-out of elections.

INDICATOR: Lower percentage turn out at the polls than previous elections certified by UN observers. Outlaw of new or significant opposition parties.

FOCAL EVENT: Military involvement in oppression of possible candidates.

INDICATOR: Arrests of opposition candidates by civilian police or military.

FOCAL EVENT: Removal of or resigning of government or military leadership.

INDICATOR: Purging or resignation of the army leadership.

FOCAL EVENT: Increase of rebel activity on borders of DRC.

INDICATOR: Resurgence of border activity to include opposition border crossings.

FOCAL EVENT: Hutu refugees entering into Burundi and the DRC.

INDICATOR: Increase in refugees in Burundi and the DRC indicates feeling of persecution of the Hutus by GOR.

FOCAL EVENT: Limited international private investment.

INDICATOR: International companies canceling plans to build or halting expansion. No new or downturn of announcements to invest in Rwanda.

Alternate Future # 3: IC provides aid with reform requirements and military intervention by GOR.

FOCAL EVENT: Use of Military by GOR to control movement of population and oppression of opposition candidates.

INDICATOR: Arrests and harassing of population increase in checkpoints and curfews.

FOCAL EVENT: Increase of rebel and refugee activity on borders of DRC.

INDICATOR: Increase in border crossings and incidents.

FOCAL EVENT: Limited international private investment.

INDICATORS: International companies canceling plans to build or halting expansion. No new or downturn of announcements to invest in Rwanda.

FOCAL EVENT: Increase in protests.

INDICATOR: Civilian police and military being used to control, impede, stop or apprehend opposition protest.

FOCAL EVENT: Increase in inter-tribal assaults.

INDICATOR: Civilian police reports and local official's complaints of assaults.

Alternate Future #9: Military intervention by IC and GOR.

FOCAL EVENT: Riots and protest in streets, looting, assaults.

INDICATORS: Military used for population control increase in checkpoints, borders closed.

FOCAL EVENT: GOR call for IC intervention.

INDICATOR: Authorization of troops by IC and plans for deployment.

FOCAL EVENT: Arrests of opposition leaders.

INDICATORS: Small arms engagements in the attempted arrest of opposition leaders.

Alternate Future # 8: The IC conducts a military intervention with limited or no reforms provided by GOR to develop a successful government. (This is not likely as the GOR would conduct military intervention if government was failing before IC would commit troops).

FOCAL EVENT: Riots and protest in streets, looting, assaults.

INDICATORS: Military leaders refusing to deploy troops against its citizens.

FOCAL EVENT: GOR call for IC intervention.

INDICATOR: Authorization of troops by IC and plans for deployment.

Alternate Future # 7: The IC conducts a military intervention with limited or no reforms provided by GOR to develop a successful government. (This is not likely as the GOR would conduct military intervention if government was failing before IC would commit troops).

FOCAL EVENT: Riots and protest in streets, looting, assaults.

INDICATORS: Military leaders refusing to deploy troops against its citizens.

FOCAL EVENT: GOR call for IC intervention.

INDICATOR: Authorization of troops by IC and plans for deployment.

Alternate Future # 5, 2, 4 and 1: All of these options involve the IC providing aid to the GOR and the GOR either complying or implementing reforms. Military intervention is not an option in these scenarios. The vote total vote count including all four options was only 6 votes. These votes only accumulated with pair-wise comparisons among the aid only packages. This scenario involved Rwanda not being able to form successful government. This could lead to a failing state. The historical data elevated the propensity of violence high and military support of the GOR to provide security, stability and control high. Once military intervention was involved the scenario was not likely to return to stability without military intervention by the IC. The

snowball effect is in play here. So the later four options seem to be irrelevant in this scenario.

Focal points show indicating these events would not be available.

Conclusion

The genocide in Rwanda in 1994 was a traumatic event for the nation, the African Great Lakes region and the international community. Over 800,000 and estimates up to 1.2 million people were murdered in 100 days. This not take into account the number of rapes, people dying later from wounds and disease (aids). The mental wounds are still in the minds of both tribes. Over 100,000 Hutu were jailed and many were not for killing someone, but for not stopping someone from killing. The trials including the Gacaca courts (local village courts) have still not managed to reconcile many cases. There has not been really any rehabilitation of these individual in jails, refugee camps or the ones released. There are still tens of thousands in jail and hundreds of thousands in Burundi, the DRC and other border nations.

The general research question; Are the underlying grievances of both tribes currently being addressed in Rwanda? The short answer is that some of the grievances are being answered.

There are Hutus in the parliament and the army. The leaders are predominantly Tutsi. The major political improvement is that 45 of the 80 parliament seats are women, the largest percentage in Africa. The women hold a majority. The long answer is a little more difficult. The many issues in the governance, economic equality, oppression that were in the pre-genocide era led to a main issue of "fear". The people of Rwanda, both tribes, have a fear of being exterminated by the other. In the short history of the independence of Rwanda and Burundi in the African Great Lakes region the Tutsis have killed over 200,000 Hutus in organized violence. The Hutus in the 1994 genocide have killed up to 1.2 million Tutsis. The tribes have been more successful and

efficient than Stalin. Stalin killed by execution about 5.5 million his entire time in power, this does not death in labor camps. (Heroes and Killers, 2010) This underlying fear has not been relieved. The killing generation is still alive and that will take time to heal. The current government has made tremendous strides in some areas and seems to be faltering in others. There have been accusations by opposition that the government is managing the elections by controlling potential candidates and strong arm tactics. In the last week, with elections coming up this year, they have arrested the most prominent Hutu candidate for statements she has said about the genocide. Two leading military officers have been arrested for fraud and abuse. These are signs of control. The international community has a tendency to give the GOR a pass because of the circumstances leading up to the genocide and the need for security in the aftermath. The government in power is the minority Tutsi (14%) governing the perpetrators of the genocide, the majority Hutu (85%). It is obvious that the GOR would want to provide security and insure that the large majority could be let in a position to commit another atrocity. It is a difficult balancing act. The same restrictive tactics used to provide security could be same tactics that could develop into an insurgency.

President Kagame has been recruiting very hard for international investment. He is doing this because he doesn't want to have to answer for his policies to the international community. That is a signal that he may not want to go as far as they want him to go with some governance issues. The other side of that is that international companies will not invest if he doesn't produce a stable government. So that is a sign of his intentions to accept the international norms.

The Rwandan government has made tremendous strides and I believe will continue to improve. They must be able to translate to the people of not only Rwanda but Burundi that each citizen

will have the same rights to security whether Hutu or a Tutsi. President Kagame is trying to achieve that for the average Rwandan, but he and his government are not ready to relinquish the parts of the government that would put the Hutu majority in power again.

The answer to the specific research question; Will international aid prevent a Civil War in Rwanda within the next twenty years? Based on the improvement in government, economic recruiting and support from the international community this analyst does not believe there will be a civil war or mass murder event in Rwanda in the next twenty years. The years after the “killing generation” passes on barring negative external intervention will improve the chances of a stable Rwanda. The external focal areas to watch for are the progress of Burundi and the mountainous, ungoverned space in the border region of the DRC.

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Appendix A

Analysis of Competing Hypotheses

Of the Potential of Civil War in Rwanda

In validating the analysis of this analyst conclusion using the LAMP on the probability of Civil War in Rwanda in the next twenty years, a second method of predictive analysis will be performed. The method used will be the Analysis of competing Hypothesis (ACH). Analysis of competing hypotheses, sometimes abbreviated ACH, is a tool to aid judgment on important issues requiring careful weighing of alternative explanations or conclusions. It helps an analyst

overcome, or at least minimize, some of the cognitive limitations that make prescient intelligence analysis so difficult to achieve. (Heuer, 1999, 95)

In an earlier analysis of the ACH I discussed some reason why the ACH would be appropriate to validate research. The human mind is a complex organ with a tendency to take the path of least resistance. Its natural misconceptions and bias and its natural mental processes may convince the analyst of something not true. Because of this tendency the analyst needs a process to check his hypothesis the ACH will be used in this event to confirm or disprove the analysis of the LAMP just completed. The Analysis of Competing Hypothesis (ACH) is a tool for the analysts to develop and review competing hypothesis to ensure that other options are considered in the intelligence analysis.

Research Design

The ACH is an eight step, four phased process with the intent of ensuring the analysts consider other theories. Step 1, the developmental phase, requires the analysts to use a group of analysts with different perspectives in brainstorming to identify possible hypothesis. (Jones, 1999, 181) This requires divergent thinking. Morgan Jones in the book *The Thinker's Toolkit* says, "Divergence is not one of our instinctive processes. Indeed, most of us habitually resist divergence—sometimes passionately, even angrily (Jones, 1998, 49)." It is this process of using other persons with different perspectives that is most important. It is difficult if not impossible for one analyst to stray far from their original ideas. If the first step is done properly it will open the eyes of the analyst to other possibilities.

The matrix phase is steps 2, 3, and 4. This phase is used to develop a matrix which allows the

analyst to visualize and compare the possible hypothesis as a whole as opposed to one at a time. During this process the “diagnosticity” of evidence can be valued. Sometimes there is evidence that will support many different options. The value of that evidence has less value to the analysis than good evidence that supports one option.

The war gaming phase is steps 4, 5 and 6. The analysts will draw conclusions about the relative likelihood of each hypothesis and analyze how sensitive your conclusion is to a few critical items of evidence. The matrix should not dictate the conclusion to you. Rather it should accurately reflect your judgment of what is important and how these important factors relate to the probability of each hypothesis. It is at this step that the experienced analyst must use reflective thinking in the process. The matrix has assisted the process in critical thinking to develop valid, supported theories.

The reporting and tracking phase, the "money phase" is steps 7 and 8. The analyst must report conclusions and identify milestones for future observation. It is this phase where the analyst puts their experience and skill on the line and where the course of action is developed to address the analyst's conclusions. In this report the analyst's conclusions are reported and acted upon.

The eight steps are:

Step-by-Step Outline of Analysis of Competing Hypotheses

1. Identify the possible hypotheses to be considered. Use a group of analysts with different perspectives to brainstorm the possibilities.
2. Make a list of significant evidence and arguments for and against each hypothesis.

3. Prepare a matrix with hypotheses across the top and evidence down the side. Analyze the "diagnosticity" of the evidence and arguments--that is, identify which items are most helpful in judging the relative likelihood of the hypotheses.
4. Refine the matrix. Reconsider the hypotheses and delete evidence and arguments that have no diagnostic value.
5. Draw tentative conclusions about the relative likelihood of each hypothesis. Proceed by trying to disprove the hypotheses rather than prove them.
6. Analyze how sensitive your conclusion is to a few critical items of evidence. Consider the consequences for your analysis if that evidence were wrong, misleading, or subject to a different interpretation.
7. Report conclusions. Discuss the relative likelihood of all the hypotheses, not just the most likely one.
8. Identify milestones for future observation that may indicate events are taking a different course than expected.

Step 1. Identify the possible hypotheses to be considered. Use a group of analysts with different perspectives to brainstorm the possibilities.

The Case Study

In researching the issue in attempting to complete a predictive analysis on the future of Rwanda, more specifically, will Rwanda avoid a civil war over the next twenty years, two hypotheses are developed.

1. Rwanda (GOR) will develop a successful government that has policies that are inclusive of both the Hutu and Tutsi tribes.
2. Rwanda (GOR) will not develop a successful government inclusive of both tribes. The government may still be in office but stresses may arrive that could develop into a replacement of the government.

Step 2. Make a list of significant evidence and arguments for and against each hypothesis.

The arguments for GOR to develop inclusive policies to maintain stability of the nation are listed below:

1. The Tutsi dominated government of Rwanda (GOR) has as a major incentive to develop policies that are inclusive of all citizens of Rwanda. They are the minority by 8 to 1. An uprising of the majority, coincided by Hutu refugees and rebels in the DRC and Burundi could overwhelm the GOR
2. The international community (IC) that failed to intervene during the genocide is being supportive of the current regime and private investment is beginning to develop.
3. Oppressive or non-inclusive policies could hinder IC aid and private investment.

4. Inclusive policies can reduce the fear of oppression among the majority and alleviate grievances.
5. The majority of the GOR is Tutsi dominated, but they have been successful in getting women in to the government. 45 of 80 seats in the Parliament are women. They hold a majority. That is nowhere else in Africa.

The arguments that support the possible failure of the GOR due to lack of inclusive policies are listed below:

1. The Tutsi minority in charge of the government had to take the nation by force after a four civil war. This will make them reluctant to share power with heavy majority of Hutus.
2. The Tutsi minority was the victim of attempted genocide by the Hutu that left over 800,000 Tutsi dead and countless others raped, infected with HIV from the rapes, injured and missing.
3. The GOR allows universal suffrage but has been managing the candidates through legal trickery and ensuring the majority of the candidates are part of a Tutsi coalition.
4. The leadership of the Rwandan Defense Force (RDF) is Tutsi dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)

Step 3. Prepare a matrix with hypotheses across the top and evidence down the side.

Analyze the "diagnosticity" of the evidence and arguments--that is, identify which items are most helpful in judging the relative likelihood of the hypotheses.

Hypothesis

	Rwanda develops a successful Government.	Rwanda does not develop A successful government
<u>Evidence/Argument</u>		
Tutsi dominated government of Rwanda (GOR) has as a major incentive to develop policies that are inclusive of all citizens of Rwanda. They are the minority by 8 to 1. An uprising of the majority, w/Hutu refugees/ rebels in the DRC/ Burundi could overwhelm the GOR.	C	I
The IC that failed to intervene during the genocide is providing aid and private investment is beginning to develop.	C	I
Oppressive or non-inclusive policies could hinder IC aid and private investment.	I	C
Inclusive policies can reduce the fear of oppression among the majority and alleviate grievances.	C	I
The majority of the GOR is Tutsi dominated, but they have been successful in getting women in to the government. 45 of 80 seats in the Parliament are women. They hold a majority.	C-	?

That is nowhere else in Africa.

GOR has been arresting
Opposition candidates
And been accused of
Hindering freedom of
Speech.

I

C

Reluctance to share power
with heavy majority of Hutus.
The Tutsi minority in charge
of the government had to
take the nation by force
after a four civil war.
This will make them

I+

I-

Fear is still present
The Tutsi minority was the
victim of attempted genocide
by the Hutu that left over
800, 000 Tutsi dead and
countless others raped,
infected with HIV from
the rapes, injured and missing.

I

C

The GOR allows universal
suffrage but has been
managing the candidates
through legal trickery
and ensuring the majority
of the candidates are part
of a Tutsi coalition.

C-

C

The leadership of the
RDF is Tutsi dominated
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)

C-

C

Step 4: Refine the matrix. Reconsider the hypothesis and delete evidence and arguments that have no diagnostic value.

The analysis of the above matrix is believed to be accurate. The major underlying grievance is fear of extermination by both tribes. The government must implement policies the insure inclusiveness across tribal lines. This is a delicate balance because the current “killing

generation” is still alive and the collective memories are still intact. Fear by the minority tribe Tutsi fear too much power sharing will cause another attempt at genocide or ethnic cleansing. Fear by the majority Hutu of the Tutsi that they will never have equal rights under the law and persecution by the Tutsi as in the mass organized government sanctions in neighboring Burundi.

This analysis is based on an assumption that both tribal leaderships will work in conjunction with the GOR in influencing the population in a rational manner. The genocide of 1994 is evidence that may not be the case. Any analysis must take that into consideration.

Step 5. Draw tentative conclusions about the relative likelihood of each hypothesis. Proceed by trying to disprove the hypotheses rather than prove them.

Hypothesis 1. Rwanda will establish a successful government implementing policies that are inclusive of both tribes.

It is the best interest of the GOT to slowly increase the role of the Hutu leadership. It might be wise to manage the more radical elements, but establish good report with moderate Hutu leaders. The Tutsi dominated government could continue to avoid opening up the government and high ranking military positions to Hutu members. This would continue to enforce the feeling of oppression and fear among the Hutu that they will always be dominated by the Tutsi minority. The rebels that continue to survive in the ungoverned space in the DRC along the Rwandan border will continue to agitate. If they are successful at getting the Rwandan military to be heavy handed injuring or killing Hutu members it could develop an insurgency.

Hypothesis 2. Rwanda (GOR) will not develop a successful government inclusive of both tribes. The government may still be in office but stresses may arrive that could develop into a replacement of the government.

The failure of a government in Africa is always easy to assume. It has been consistent with the history of the continent, especially in the post-colonial period. Governments that have had some economic success have fallen. Africa, resource rich has not been able to break the cycle of violence, coups and poverty. The continent is hindered by high birth rate, illiteracy, ungoverned spaces and tribal competition. So the saying of TIA, this is Africa. Which means anything can happen probably will and can't be explained is real.

The hope for Rwanda is that the East African Community, consisting of Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi and Rwanda has had some stability. With the exception of the two smallest countries, Rwanda and Burundi, there has relative stability. The only other exception was some small riots in Kenya after the last elections that subsided in weeks. Economic progress has continued and the democratic governments continue to mature. Rwanda is bordered by these stable countries to their East, northeast and southeast. If Rwanda can manage a continuous progress toward including the Hutu leadership to include the military they should be able to put aside the fear of the Hutu tribes and avoid another outbreak of violence they have seen in the past. If not the GOR will fail and violence and instability will return.

Step 6: Analyze how sensitive your conclusion is to a few critical items of evidence.

Consider the consequences for your analysis if that evidence were wrong, misleading, or subject to a different interpretation.

The most sensitive part of the analysis is the government being able to address the grievances of the population and the economic progress. First, if they include the Hutu in the military, who have an 8 to 1 ratio in the population it will be difficult to convince the Tutsi population that the Hutu would not take over the military the government and use the force to attack the Tutsi. Military coups in Africa have been commonplace and are a normal method of transition of power. On the other hand if they do not include the Hutu in governance then how do you convince them that Tutsi the government is legitimate since 85% of the population is excluded? Second, economic progress has to be inclusive. The country main export is coffee. They to date have not found or developed another major source of revenue other than aid. President Kagame has been working to get private investment and has some success. Are the jobs and aid being appropriately distributed? If so is there an information campaign that insures the population sees the fair distribution. In most environments perception is reality, especially in an area with a low literacy rate.

Step 7. Report conclusions. Discuss the relative likelihood of all the hypotheses, not just the most likely one.

In the current environment the best case scenario is Rwanda putting together a successful government. I say this because that is also what makes it the most likely “right now”. This is a snapshot in time and is dependent upon the GOR allowing some representation in the government and the economy. The policies are slowly being implemented. The RDF just fought a border war with the DRC and was supported by Uganda. This was an attempt to clean up the pockets of Hutu rebels in the border region. This was a success and it also caused a change of

government in the DRC. A peace treaty was signed to include an effort by the DRC to control the border. That will not happen because they do not have the capability to do it, but it was a nice thought. The GOR has complete support of the IC with aid and governance support. The complete failure of the IC to stop the genocide has made them acutely aware of their responsibility in this region. Also based on resource, Africa has taken on new significance in the world order. It is just too big and now strategically located it cannot be ignored. The US has established a new command, AFRICOM, to focus on African issues. Rwanda is an ally of the US and is being supported with training and supervision in military affairs and peacekeeping.

TIA,-this is Africa, is still the rule. All the things that Rwanda and the East African community has going in its favor can be halted by tribal alliances and ungoverned spaces. Central Africa is still mountainous and difficult to traverse. Somalia, Sudan, Chad are all border or near the EAC. The disaster of the US and the experience in Somalia is still in our collective memory. What will we do if the GOR looks like it will fail? Will we unilaterally intervene or will we act in concert with the UN? Will we support the other EAC countries to get them to intervene while we financially Rwanda? The national interests of the US in Rwanda are important, but no higher. The chance of Rwanda failing is there and will not go away any time soon.

Step 8. Identify milestones for future observation that may indicate events are taking a different course than expected.

Milestones:

1. Election participation and broad supports of candidates. Will women continue to make advance in the government?
2. Military leaders of both tribes advancing in the RDF.
3. Increase in GDP especially in areas other than agriculture.
4. Stability in Burundi and the DRC.
5. Continued alliance with Uganda. They joined with Rwanda in the war against rebels in the DRC.
6. Management of the ungoverned space on the border of Rwanda and the DRC. Rwanda has similar space they have to control.

Conclusion

The Analysis of Competing Hypothesis has developed additional perspectives that may give the analysis an additional concern. The conclusion by this analyst is still the same that Rwanda can develop a successful government inclusive of both tribes. It will be a slow process and will the GOR have the time to do it while trying to ensure both tribes of their mutual security. It will be necessary for the IC to stay engaged for two major reasons. It will provide aid to the economy and insure participation in the region's economic progress. Second, it will ensure the current government does not become overly oppressive. It will not ensure the people of their security because when the genocide began the IC (UN) pulled out. The people do not have faith in the IC,

but the government has to straddle the fence on human rights issues. It is a good checks and balance.

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