

IN520 Summer 02: Analytical Methods LAMP Paper
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STEP 1: Issue for which you are trying to predict the most likely future.

Issue: What is the likelihood Pakistan will become a Fundamentalist Islamic state?

Hypothesis

The views of the national actors involved heavily influence whether or not Pakistan continues its relatively moderate Islamic stance and movement toward democracy, or becomes a radical, Fundamentalist Islamic state. Conflicting views of the national actors are likely to keep Pakistan in the status quo.

Key assumptions:

Pakistan is a “moderate” Islamic state and is moving toward democracy. (Reference Pres Musharraf’s “Vision for Pakistan” interview) Major stressors, such as war or worsening economic conditions, increase the tendency toward Fundamentalist Islam, as the populace looks for a higher calling and way to deal with poor living conditions. These same stressors also create the conditions for continued dictatorship. Whether or not Pakistan becomes a fundamental Islamist state will determine the nature of Islamabad’s relationship with the US, i.e. whether or not the Pakistani government will be pro or anti-US. For the purposes of simplifying this study, I have chosen to include Islamic militants in Pakistan and Kashmir with “Iran” as a national actor. I could treat the militants as a separate actor, but recognizing the tremendous influence Iran has on militants in the region, the end results of the study will be the same if I lump Iran and the Islamic militants together.

Purpose Why do this study? Why is it important?

The purpose of this study is to develop indicators in order to know what the trigger events might be in the potential movement of Pakistan toward Fundamentalist Islam. We need to know when we are pushing Pakistani President Musharraf too hard for action in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), and to know when India is putting too much pressure on Musharraf to stop militant action in Kashmir. Pressure from either the US or India may inadvertently push Islamabad too far, resulting in a backlash from militants and the country moving toward a Fundamentalist Islamic state. This is a delicate balancing act for both countries.

Pakistan is strategically critical for the US in many areas. It is the sole Muslim country with an established nuclear weapons capability, and as such is key to WMD counter-proliferation efforts. The current Pakistan government provides an important buffer to Iranian extremism, it is in a position to moderate Islamic militants in the region, and it provides the US basing and support for operations in Afghanistan and in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). In addition, Pakistan has long provided the US a foothold in the region as a frontline country in the Cold War against Communism, and now provides the US influence with China, India, and the rest of the ‘Stans.

US Strategic Interests in Pakistan

“Pakistan is a nuclear state with crushing economic problems, a burgeoning population, and few effective civilian institutions. It abuts two regions of the world, the Persian Gulf and Central Asia, that are flash points in America's battles over oil, terrorism, and drugs. Pakistan wields major influence in the growing Islamist movement in Central Asia and the surrounding regions. If Pakistan collapsed, refugees would flood into India and Iran, and Afghanistan's stability would be further undermined. Worse yet, any further weakening of the state could leave Pakistan's nuclear arsenal vulnerable to terrorists.” (Pakistan's Never-Ending Story: Why the October Coup Was No Surprise)

The US needs Pakistan in its camp to counter the spread of Islamic Fundamentalism

Afghanistan, prior to the US successes against the Taliban, was the primary basing area for Islamic militants hoping to spread their cause through violence. “The chief danger to U.S. interests is the rising tide of Islamist militancy and international terrorism emanating from bases in Afghanistan. The Afghan springboard for Islamist militancy endangers other pro-Western governments in the Muslim world, including Saudi Arabia, where a turn toward extremism would severely set back U.S. interests. Afghanistan is the documented training and inspirational base for worldwide militant Islamist operations ranging from American soil to the Middle East, Central Asia, South Asia, and the Philippines. Muslim extremists are menacing Russia's southern periphery, providing ammunition for Moscow's antidemocratic, ultranationalist advocates of regimentation at home to defend against enemies from abroad. The greater the influence of radical Muslims in the Central Asian republics, the more tempted the governments of those republics will be to seek Russian military assistance, further undermining their independence. This has already occurred in Tajikistan, which is now virtually a Russian protectorate.” (A Chance for Peace in Afghanistan: The Taliban's Days Are Numbered)

Pakistan is absolutely pivotal in the spread of a Fundamentalist belt of Islamic states. “If the post-Taliban leadership is wise, it will steer Afghanistan away from the Islamist crusade of Pakistani, Arab, and other foreign extremists attempting to export militant Islam to Central Asia and other parts of the Muslim world”... “The most acute threat to a stable, peaceful, and neutral Afghanistan will continue to come from Pakistan, even though nearly all of Afghanistan's other neighbors also support their own Afghan proxies”. (A Chance for Peace in Afghanistan: The Taliban's Days Are Numbered)

Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)

Pakistan was perhaps the major sponsor of the Taliban, one of Washington's prime targets in the GWOT. “Omar and the other militant mullahs from rural southern Afghanistan in the Taliban leadership were assisted by the powerful Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI), the extremist Pakistani religious party Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), and radical Arab Muslims, including members of Osama bin Ladin's terrorist network. Together, these forces unleashed a powerful coalition that sallied northward from the Pushtun belt that borders Pakistan,” “Afghans are growing suspicious of how heavily the ISI controls the Taliban; ISI officers and Pakistani religious-party firebrands have become ubiquitous in Taliban-controlled cities, including Kabul.”

“...Islamabad funneled troops and military resources to save its own asset, the Taliban. More than 10,000 Pakistanis (fought) alongside Taliban forces in what many Afghans describe(d) as a “creeping” Pakistani invasion of Afghanistan. The ISI, the JUI, Arab extremists such as Osama

bin Laden, and the Taliban leadership all cooperate closely. The ISI (had) long orchestrated this Islamist coalition; its support for the Taliban (was) the biggest obstacle to a political settlement in Afghanistan.” (A Chance for Peace in Afghanistan: The Taliban's Days Are Numbered)

Musharraf recognized his government is a target of Al Qaeda, "bin Laden's ultimate twin towers are Pakistan and Saudi Arabia", and has executed an about face. Now Pakistan provides crucial support to the US in the GWOT. “Secretary of State Colin Powell helped persuade Pakistan to sever its ties with the Taliban, work with Afghanistan's Northern Alliance, provide the bases and over flight rights needed by U.S. forces, and contribute to the general war effort. (A Flawed Masterpiece). US military ENDURING FREEDOM operations in Afghanistan would have been far more complicated and dangerous without such support.

STEP 2: Specify the national “actors” involved.

Which actors can directly affect the nature of the Pakistani government? Which affect the stance of Pakistan toward the US? Which national actors have courses of action available to them to affect the future of Pakistan?

Potential actors involved include: the Pakistani government, personified by President Musharraf; the Pakistani armed forces; India, Iran, Islamic extremists within Pakistan and Kashmir, China, and the United States. For the purposes of simplifying this study, I’ve chosen to limit the actors to Iran, India, China and the US.

Iran is a national actor because of its influence over Islamic militants within Pakistan and Kashmir. India is a national actor because of the tremendous pressure New Delhi puts on Musharraf and Islamabad over Kashmir. The US is a national actor because Musharraf relies on Western aid to keep the Pakistan economy afloat. The US is also a major moderating influence to prevent India from attacking (which helps keep Musharraf in power). However, the US puts pressure on Musharraf to control Islamic extremists, but mostly in compelling Islamabad to actively support the GWOT. China is a national actor because it supports Pakistan in order to balance Indian power and influence. In addition, China has filled a role the US had played up until Pakistan’s nuclear testing was made public and resultant US sanctions. Furthermore, China has provided arms sales and assistance with Pakistan’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs – such support also helps keep Musharraf in power.

STEP 3: Perform an in-depth study of how each national actor perceives the issue in question. What are the strategic interests of each actor in relation to Pakistan? What is the current history from the perspective of each actor? What are the historical events and cultural factors that might impact each nation’s views. What are the implications of these interacting perceptions??

Pakistan - some background

Pakistan has a weak economy, rampant poverty, poor education, and is suffering from the GWOT due to loss of trade with their Taliban clients in Afghanistan.

Pakistan has a history of Jihad which drives the character of the country

Pakistan has relied on Islamic militants to wage asymmetrical warfare against India, but at substantial cost to Pakistan’s internal stability, and worldwide standing. “Pakistani militant groups are killing civilians and engaging in terrorism in Indian-held Kashmir under the guise of holy war. The government in Islamabad supports these militants and their religious schools as cheap ways to fight India and educate Pakistan's youth. But this policy is creating a culture of

violence that exacerbates internal sectarianism and destabilizes the region. Without change, this monster threatens to devour Pakistani society.” (Pakistan's Jihad Culture)

With the GWOT, Musharraf was forced to abandon overt support to the militants. The US made such support too costly, so Musharraf has done an about face. “Pakistan now faces a typical principal-agent problem: the interests of Pakistan (the principal) and those of the militant groups (the agent) are not fully aligned. Although the irregulars may serve Pakistan's interests in Kashmir when they target the Indian army, they also kill civilians and perform terrorism in violation of international norms and law. These crimes damage Pakistan's already fragile international reputation. Finally, and most important for Pakistanis, the militant groups that Pakistan supports and the Sunni sectarian killers that Pakistan claims it wants to wipe out overlap significantly. By facilitating the activities of the irregulars in Kashmir, the Pakistani government is inadvertently promoting internal sectarianism, supporting international terrorists, weakening the prospect for peace in Kashmir, damaging Pakistan's international image, spreading a narrow and violent version of Islam throughout the region ... “(Pakistan's Jihad Culture)

“Islamabad's support for the Taliban and its acceptance of militants operating in Indian-controlled Kashmir helped to create an underground extremist network throughout Pakistan itself. It is this network the Musharraf regime must now eliminate. But to do so, the government has to consolidate its support within Pakistani society while rebuilding the police, intelligence and judicial services.” (Domestic Agenda Dooms Musharraf's Terror Fight)

Kashmir is fundamental to Pakistan, and cannot be separated from the militants. Musharraf cannot crack down on the Islamic militants within Pakistan, without also taking action against the militants in Kashmir. The problem is that it is political suicide for a leader in Pakistan to abandon Kashmir, and removing support from the Kashmiri militants is tantamount to abandoning Kashmir itself. Musharraf runs the risk of alienating the clerics, the moderate population, and the military, his most important base of power.

Pakistan is actively vying for US assistance.

In order to maintain his power base, Pres Musharraf is courting the US for a new era of cooperation. “Musharraf showcased his agenda in the US, stressing his key theme: "Pakistan is a moderate Muslim country." He spoke of the "greater jihad against illiteracy, poverty, and hunger," and enthusiastically detailed his hopes for reshaping his country's crumbling educational system and reforming its controversial religious schools. He denounced terrorism "in all its forms," although his references to the "freedom struggle in Kashmir" in his meeting with the Pakistani community raised familiar concerns about how far his condemnation of terrorism went. Musharraf was also looking for substantial help with Pakistan's multiple problems, and for a lasting relationship with the United States. He sought economic aid, debt relief, and easier market access for Pakistan's textile exports. He also wanted greater US involvement with Pakistan's military and, if possible, resumed military supply. And with the armies of Pakistan and India mobilized on the borders, he pronounced that "bilateralism had failed" to produce a settlement between the two traditional antagonists, and sought U.S. mediation.” (High Stakes for the United States and Pakistan)

US Support

US support is key to Musharraf staying in power. The only way Pakistan is to recover economically is with Western aid – this will not be available with US approval. Movement toward democracy is highly dependent on progress toward a more healthy economy. The same is true of the movement toward fundamentalist Islam. If the masses see no hope in the existing

political and economic situation, they will turn toward more radical, militant means, i.e. fundamentalist Islam. The key to US support is to maintain a low profile. Musharraf cannot be seen as a puppet of the US.

“The F-16s have been a bone of contention between Islamabad and Washington since they were impounded in 1989. Their delivery after a decade and a half delay could substantially boost Musharraf's popularity and his support from both the military and the general population. This would prove especially useful as Musharraf prepares for elections in October and continues to balance U.S. pressure on anti-terrorism, domestic backlash over his cooperation with the United States and his own efforts to reshape Pakistan's future. But if Washington fails to follow through with the delivery-- or drops the subject again instead of continuing negotiations -- the initial benefits from the nation's renewed hope could backfire and leave Musharraf looking more like a U.S. stooge. A myriad of domestic opposition groups have accused Musharraf of being anti-Islamic, undemocratic and of granting too many concessions to the United States. Yet the president has survived challenge after challenge, and more importantly has maintained the military's support by assigning choice political positions to military colleagues and reshuffling the ranks of the armed forces to ensure a base of loyalty. Still Musharraf is far from secure in his position as Pakistan's singular leader. Within the military, there are competing views of how "Islamic" Pakistan should be and how best to balance Islamabad's ties with Washington and Beijing. Those who want both a more Islamic Pakistan and stronger ties with China, at the expense of those with the United States, share a common concern that Washington wants to use Pakistan for its own purposes and that Musharraf is either unwilling or unable to stand up for the country. Musharraf's decision to allow U.S. forces to operate out of Pakistan to support the attack on Afghanistan was controversial enough. But when he then allowed U.S. forces to hunt for al Qaeda inside Pakistan and when he called for militants to use restraint in the disputed Kashmir region, it cast serious doubts on his loyalty to Pakistan among his detractors. There is now talk of a permanent U.S. presence in the country, something that could be interpreted as another step toward giving away Islamabad's sovereignty.” (STRATFOR, F-16)

Musharraf's economic and political reforms challenge the power of the traditional elite in Pakistan but have gained support from the middle class. His decision to cooperate with the U.S. military both in Afghanistan and now inside Pakistan, however, risks a much wider backlash -- not only from militant Islamists and factions in the tribal areas but also from elements within his own military and intelligence services. Although the United States left Musharraf little room to reject cooperation in the anti-terrorism campaign, he now must prove his own independence and value within Pakistan.

Reelection in Oct?

Pakistan has weak democratic institutions – Musharraf contends that Pakistan never really functioned successfully as a democracy. The current power base still lies with the military. Although Musharraf announced elections for this October, he is feeling vulnerable and threatened by former Prime Ministers Bhutto and Sharif. He therefore strengthened his dictatorial rule by pushing through constitutional changes that give him sweeping powers that prevent either still popular PM's from running for President. “Pakistani government figures show that Musharraf won an overwhelming 98 percent of the vote in the highly controversial referendum April 30 to extend his self-appointed presidency another five years. In a referendum

already challenged as unconstitutional, the incredibly high numbers only add to the appearance of impropriety.” (Me, myself, I reign)

Iran

Iran, and the Islamic militants it supports in the region, is pressuring Pakistan toward Fundamentalist Islam. Tehran’s goal is to establish a belt of countries all around it that are governed by Islamic law. Militant Islamists are actively trying to initiate war between Pakistan and India, as they understand the ensuing conditions would establish an environment within Pakistan conducive to a wholesale switch from the current moderate government, to a fundamentalist one. That same environment would also allow the militants to operate in the region with near impunity.

Iran want to stem US influence in the region.

Iran is vehemently against the US expanding its sphere of influence in the Middle East and Asia. An indicator of this is stance is the Iranian conservatives’ anti-Western teachings in Muslim schools throughout the region. Tehran feels particularly vulnerable, in fact, targeted, given the GWOT and increasing ring of military bases the US has established all around Iran. The US has established cooperative military relationships with Pakistan, Oman, Kuwait, Saudi, Turkey, and most recently Georgia and most, if not all, of the ‘Stans. Iran is literally surrounded by countries that now in some way openly cooperate with the US. Tehran is actively trying to counter this expanding influence, and will do what it can to move Pakistan away from the US, but without risk of incurring the wrath of the US military.

Iran is very concerned about the potential of a US attack as part of the GWOT.

As a target of President Bush’s “Axis of Evil”, Iran takes the prospect of a US attack very seriously. Tehran is actively taking measures to prevent the US from attacking, one of which is to de-couple their image of being a state sponsor of terrorism, and of being synonymous with Islamic militants. In fact, in some cases, Tehran is actually cooperating in the GWOT. Iranian security services reportedly captured possible Al Qaeda suspects trying to enter the country, and handed them back to Pakistan. (Iran: Arrests May Signal Shift in Stance on Anti-Terrorism War)

Iran and Pakistan have a history of cooperation, including nuclear assistance

Iran and Pakistan have historically had close religious, strategic, political, and economic ties. In 1955 Iran, Pakistan, Iraq, and Turkey, joined the Baghdad Pact, a security arrangement later called the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) after Iraq's withdrawal. CENTO was followed in 1964 by the Regional Cooperation for Development, again among Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey. Pakistani workers employed in Iran have long provided remittances to Pakistan that was a major source of foreign-exchange earnings. Pakistan, as the only nuclear-armed Muslim country in the world, is a natural target of cooperation for the conservative regime in Tehran. Pakistan has provided assistance with Iran’s nuclear research facility in Isfahan, has trained Iranian scientists and engineers, and has probably also provided ballistic missile development assistance. This cooperation is partly for economic reasons (Iran and Pakistan were 2 of the original 3 members of the Economic Co-operation Organization founded in 1985) but also is very strongly encouraged by Tehran in the hopes it will lead to a nuclear weapons capability in the near future.

Drug smuggling is a serious concern for Tehran.

Pakistan is a major player in regional smuggling. "Iran is a transit route for traffickers bringing drugs out of Pakistan and Afghanistan and into the Persian Gulf, Europe and Central Asia. In return, smugglers take subsidized Iranian fuel -- about 12 cents a gallon -- into Pakistan and Afghanistan. In an effort to stanch the hemorrhage of illegal drugs into the country, the Iranian government has armed tens of thousands of villagers, constructed hundreds of miles of trenches and fences and posted roughly 130,000 law-enforcement officers on its borders." (Iran: Arrests May Signal Shift in Stance on Anti-Terrorism War). Tehran hopes that with a conservative Islamic regime in Islamabad, Pakistan will clamp down on the smuggling problem much more seriously.

Iran's reform movement may be limiting the country's external focus

Iranian President Khatami's reform movement may be the Fundamentalists' biggest concern. "Anxious to turn back a string of recent victories by President Mohammad Khatami and his reformist allies, Iran's conservatives have embarked on a campaign of bloody repression. As the two camps battle for control of the Islamic Republic, the proper moves from Washington just might tip the balance. Modest engagement can help Iran's moderates help themselves." (Iran in the Balance) Focus by the fundamentalists on the internal Iranian political situation may be diverting their attention, for the time being, away from events in Pakistan.

India

India does not want a fundamentalist Pakistani government, but may inadvertently pressure Pakistan into such a status by going to war over Kashmir. India wants a moderate Pakistan -- they are very concerned about the possibility of war with a nuclear-armed fundamentalist state. India is putting tremendous pressure on Islamabad to reign in Islamic militants operating in Kashmir, but knows it can't push too far for fear of getting Musharraf ousted, or to actually incite war. The more heat India puts on Pakistan, the more Pakistan requires/relies on the US to step in and cool things down. India's threat of war empowers Pres Musharraf to more firmly control the fundamentalists, who want to cause a war with India in order to gain power within Pakistan. Whether or not India goes to war with Pakistan is a large driver on the nature of Pakistan's government.

Kashmir

The number one issue for India in regards to Pakistan is the future of Kashmir. India is fighting against a ten year long separatist war with militants in the Muslim-majority state of Kashmir. Pakistan has long supported and trained Kashmiri militants, and a majority of the Pakistani population perceives the separatist war as a national cause. New Delhi, via a massive military show of force this spring and summer, pressured President Musharraf, at substantial risk to his own power, into reigning in support to the militants. Musharraf closed militant training camps and has pledged to stop cross border militant infiltration. There are roughly one million troops faced off across the border of the two countries, attacks continue regularly, and tensions remain high. Despite India's poor economy and the tremendous cost of their military buildup, India is currently in a position, due to sheer military size and relative economic strength, to wear down Pakistan in a prolonged war of attrition.

“The Kashmiri conflict has taken on even greater urgency since the nuclear arms race escalated between India and Pakistan in 1998. The complications began in 1846, when the British "sold" the Muslim-populated valley of Kashmir to a Hindu ruler. At the time of partition in 1947, his great-grandson (the maharajah of Jammu and Kashmir) became angered by Pakistani raids and decided to join India. War between India and Pakistan was halted in 1949 only by a UN cease-fire. By then it had become a multi-party conflict, including not just the United Nations but the people of Jammu and Kashmir; the U.N. then ordered Kashmir to choose by plebiscite its fate, but India never permitted it.” (Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan, and the Unfinished War.)

New Delhi understands the Indian military buildup alone puts severe financial pressure on Musharraf. The financial costs undermine Musharraf’s efforts in addressing pressing domestic economic challenges. “India is aware of Gen Musharraf’s problem. That is why it refuses to withdraw its troops from Pakistan’s border - despite the easing of recent tensions. India wants to use its troops for the non-military purpose of causing economic hardship for Pakistan in terms of the cost of battle readiness.”

India is concerned over renewed Pakistani ties with the US and is trying to disrupt the improved relationship.

Last October, India timed the start of some of the heaviest fighting of the year along the Line of Control just one hour prior to US Secretary of State Colin Powell arrival in Pakistan to start a South Asian tour. India’s action sent a clear signal the US must consider New Delhi’s concerns about the growing cooperation between Washington and Islamabad. “Further fueling India’s concerns are Washington’s tightening bonds with Islamabad. For more than a year before the Sept. 11 attacks, India was vying for closer ties with Washington, based not on a host-sponsor relationship but on strategic interests. New Delhi is expanding its role as a regional power beyond the borders of South Asia and into East Asia and the South China Sea. The government is also redefining its relations with China and Russia to put itself on more equal terms. But Washington’s sudden reliance on Pakistan has thrown those plans into chaos. The last thing India wants to see is the re-establishment of close U.S.-Pakistani ties at its expense. By shelling Kashmir, India sought to remind Powell of its ability to throw this relationship off kilter, setting the stage for renegotiations between New Delhi and Washington over their strategic ties in the short and long term.” (India Seeking to Disrupt U.S.-Pakistani Ties)

India wants the Kashmiri militants targeted as part of the GWOT

New Delhi’s decision to support the GWOT was driven in part by India’s own problems with terrorism. “For a decade, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) had been orchestrating a nasty proxy war against India in Kashmir. Although the insurgency there was rooted in Kashmiri opposition to Indian rule, the ISI helped militant groups train, equip, and move jihadis, or "freedom fighters," across the Line of Control, which separates Indian- and Pakistani-held Kashmir. In joining with Washington, New Delhi hoped to transform this latest and bloodiest chapter of 50 years of Indo-Pakistani conflict into part of the global war against terrorism -- with Pakistan’s ISI cast in the role of al Qaeda and India as the victim.” (India’s Fine Balance)

New Delhi perceives an injustice on the part of the US toward Pakistan. “Indian officials seethe over the United States’ apparent willingness to trade battlefield success against al Qaeda for India’s security from Pakistan-backed terrorism. Seeing an American double standard, all

parties in New Delhi want to rebuff US pleas for Indian restraint. “ (Kashmir Is More Important Than al Qaeda)

China

China has filled much the same balancing role the US used to play, largely to offset India, but also to stem US influence. China’s support has helped keep Musharraf in power, which has helped prevent Pakistan from becoming a fundamentalist state. Beijing does not want a strong fundamentalist movement in Pakistan, as that would directly encourage China’s Muslim areas to move for greater autonomy. With the US reasserting itself in central Asia, China is getting moved back to the sidelines as a secondary player.

China is pro Pakistan in order to counter India.

China allies with Pakistan in order to bleed resources from and gain leverage with India. “The strategic links between China and Pakistan, especially the sale of M-11 missile components, indicates that China views Pakistan as one instrument of its foreign policy toward the subcontinent” (US.-India Tensions: Misperceptions on Nuclear Proliferation)

India and China have long had a contested relationship, including border conflicts, and the complexities of the Cold War. “China outmaneuvered Indian in South Asia by forging ties with Pakistan, Burma, and the Himalayan states. Now, the contest will be resolved only if India accepts Chinese hegemony in South Asia or if China pulls back to leave the subcontinent for India to dominate.” (Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century)

China supports Pakistan in order to stem US influence in the region

China is pro-Pakistan in order to counter the influence of the US in the region. Beijing saw the opportunity to fill a void the US left for the last 10 years. Like Iran, China is concerned about the US expanding its influence in Asia, but recognizes the US as a moderating influence, particularly in relations with India, but also in helping to control the Islamic militants.

China has it’s own militant Islamic problem

China is fighting it’s own Muslim insurgency. “In the wake of the September 11 attacks on the United States, China has launched its own "war on terror." Beijing now labels as terrorists those Uighur separatists who are fighting for an independent state in the northwestern province of Xinjiang, which the separatists call "Eastern Turkistan." The government considers these activists part of a network of international Islamic terror, with funding from the Middle East, training in Pakistan, and combat experience in Chechnya and Afghanistan.” China maintains the separatists were trained and funded by Al Qaeda. Some Uighur separatists were detained by Pakistan, Beijing considers them terrorists and wants them sent back (China's "War on Terror": September 11 and Uighur Separatism) & (The Wrong War)

United States

The US is in a balancing act between the GWOT and ensuring we do not create the conditions that would lead toward a fundamentalist Islamic government in Pakistan. The US runs the risk of inadvertently pressuring Pakistan into that route, as we press aggressively with the GWOT.

Pakistan has been a frontline state for the US

The US has long had strategic interests in Pakistan. “The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan made Pakistan a country of paramount geostrategic importance. In a matter of days, the United

States declared Pakistan a "frontline state" against Soviet aggression and offered to reopen aid and military assistance deliveries." "Under the United States assistance program, Pakistan bought F-16 aircraft, upgraded M-48 tanks, Harpoon naval missiles, helicopters, and artillery, and received second-hand frigates on loan. In the four years after the invasion, Pakistan's armed forces grew by nearly 12 percent, from 428,000 to 478,000 persons. A substantial amount of the costs of modernization and expansion were covered by United States aid." (Pakistan Country Study)

GWOT

The GWOT, and how it is conducted is a major influence on Pakistan. If the US pushes too far, we will cause a backlash from Islamic militants, and potentially much of Pakistan's moderate Muslim population will side with the militants rather than Pres Musharraf. Economic support helps to keep moderates in power and Pakistan moving toward democracy.

Islamabad's support, including allowing the use of its air space, is vital to the GWOT. But the Pakistani government's own internal problems with Islamic militants and pro-Taliban forces, which are upset over its cooperation with the US, severely strain its ability to participate in the coalition. "On his third visit to India and Pakistan since October, Secretary Powell has had to walk a fine line between maintaining Pakistan's help in rounding up Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters who have fled from Afghanistan into Pakistan and pressing President Musharraf to crack down on attacks into Kashmir. President Musharraf is under domestic pressure from Islamic militants, who accuse him of betraying insurgents who have been fighting for more than a decade to achieve a united Kashmir that is either joined with Pakistan or independent."

US economic assistance is key to preventing a fundamentalist takeover

US economic assistance is the most likely means of successfully preventing the conditions for the fundamentalists to take the reins of power. Musharraf expressed his thanks to the US: "I would first of all like to express my gratitude to the United States for having facilitated the application of this overall economic revival strategy through generating the required fiscal space for us, through the debt restructuring of our entire stock of debt that was done at the Paris Club; secondly, through the PRGs facility that we got; and lastly, through the fiscal support that we got. So with this U.S. support, United States support, the application of the economic revival strategy is well on track." (Musharraf Vision of Future)

STEP 4: Specify all possible courses of action for each actor.

The four actors have two options each:

Iran:

1. Pressure Pakistan toward becoming a Fundamentalist Islamic state (FI)
2. Help maintain status quo (moderate Islamic state implementing some degree of democracy) SQ

India:

1. Pressure Pakistan toward becoming a Fundamentalist Islamic state (FI)
2. Help maintain status quo (moderate Islamic state implementing some degree of democracy) SQ

China

1. Pressure Pakistan toward becoming a Fundamentalist Islamic state (FI)
2. Help maintain status quo (moderate Islamic state implementing some degree of democracy) SQ

United States:

1. Pressure Pakistan toward becoming a Fundamentalist Islamic state (FI)
2. Help maintain status quo (moderate Islamic state implementing some degree of democracy) SQ

STEP 5: Determine the major scenarios within which you will compare the alternate futures.

Scenario 1: Musharraf remains in power.

Musharraf is reelected President in the Oct election. The US continues to back Musharraf, with both economic and military aid, and also with regard to India.

Scenario 2: Musharraf is ousted from power.

He loses the Oct 02 elections, is assassinated by Islamic extremists, or is ousted in a coup by the Pakistani military.

Other scenario considered:

Militants incite major attack by India on Pakistan, causing war over Kashmir.

STEP 6: Calculate the total number of permutations of possible “alternate futures” for each scenario.

Using the formula $X^y = Z$, where X equals the total number of courses of action available, ^y equals the total number of actors and Z equals the total number of alternate futures for comparison.

Scenario 1 (Musharraf remains in power): $2^4 = 16$

Scenario 2 (Musharraf is ousted): $2^4 = 16$

STEP 7: Perform a pairwise comparison of all “alternate futures” to determine their relative probability. I have chosen to analyze the more threatening of the two scenarios, which is for Musharraf to be ousted from the Presidency.

Scenario 2: Musharraf is ousted from power

Possible Future	Iran	India	China	US	Votes per comparison	Total Votes
1	FI	FI	FI	FI	8	8
2	FI	FI	FI	SQ	1, 11	12
3	FI	FI	SQ	FI	1, 0, 10	11
4	FI	SQ	FI	FI	1, 0, 0, 8	9
5	SQ	FI	FI	FI	0, 0, 0, 0, 0	0
6	SQ	SQ	FI	FI	0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 2	3

7	FI	SQ	SQ	FI	1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 7	13
8	FI	FI	SQ	SQ	1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 7	14
9	SQ	FI	SQ	FI	0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 2	4
10	FI	SQ	FI	SQ	1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 5	10
11	SQ	FI	FI	SQ	0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1	2
12	FI	SQ	SQ	SQ	1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 4	15
13	SQ	FI	SQ	SQ	0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 3	7
14	SQ	SQ	FI	SQ	0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0	1
15	SQ	SQ	SQ	FI	0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0	5
16	SQ	SQ	SQ	SQ	0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1	6

Possible course of action for each actor:

- Pressure toward Fundamentalist Islamic State (FI)
- Maintain status quo (SQ)

STEP 8: Rank the “alternate futures” for each scenario from highest relative probability to the lowest based on the number of “votes” received.

The most likely futures, given the scenario that Musharraf is ousted from power, is for Iran to put extreme pressure on Islamabad toward Fundamental Islam, while the remaining or at least majority of the other actors maintain a careful balancing act in order to keep the status quo. The possible futures of Scenario 2 (SQ) have been arranged below from those receiving the most votes to the least, or none. Alternate future (AF) 12 received the most votes with 15, followed by AF 8 with 14 votes and AF 7 with 13 votes.

Scenario 2: Musharraf is ousted from power

Possible Future	Iran	India	China	US	Votes per comparison	Total Votes
12	FI	SQ	SQ	SQ	1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 4	15
8	FI	FI	SQ	SQ	1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 7	14
7	FI	SQ	SQ	FI	1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 7	13
2	FI	FI	FI	SQ	1, 11	12
3	FI	FI	SQ	FI	1, 0, 10	11
10	FI	SQ	FI	SQ	1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 5	10
4	FI	SQ	FI	FI	1, 0, 0, 8	9
1	FI	FI	FI	FI	8	8
13	SQ	FI	SQ	SQ	0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 3	7
16	SQ	SQ	SQ	SQ	0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1	6
15	SQ	SQ	SQ	FI	0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0	5
9	SQ	FI	SQ	FI	0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 2	4
6	SQ	SQ	FI	FI	0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 2	3
11	SQ	FI	FI	SQ	0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1	2
14	SQ	SQ	FI	SQ	0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0	1
5	SQ	FI	FI	FI	0, 0, 0, 0, 0	0

Assumptions for Scenario 2: Musharraf is ousted from power

There is no equally effective, moderate leader who takes Musharraf's place after he is removed from office.

STEP 9: Assuming that each future occurs, analyze each "alternate future" in terms of its consequences for the issue in question.

The most likely alternate futures all indicate Iran will pressure Pakistan toward joining the Fundamentalist Islamic camp. India is the most likely other country to pressure Islamabad into Fundamentalism, although New Delhi would do so only inadvertently. The US, like India, does not want to see a Fundamentalist regime take over in Islamabad, but runs the risk of pressuring Pakistan in that direction. China is the least likely actor to do anything that would change the status quo.

Alternate Future 12

The most likely alternate future is not far off from the present situation, where Iran, through militants it sponsors in Pakistan and Kashmir, puts significant pressure on Islamabad toward fundamentalism, with continued attacks against Indian and Western interests, while India, China and the US all maintain a careful balancing act to keep the status quo. In this alternate future, New Delhi refrains from retaliating to continued Kashmiri militant attacks, and the US backs away from demanding large-scale support to the GWOT, and continues substantial economic assistance to Islamabad, keeping the country from sliding into conditions which breed Fundamentalism.

Alternate Future 8

In alternate future 8, Iran continues its sponsorship of Islamic fundamentalist attacks within Pakistan, but also supports spectacular attacks in Kashmir and India proper, compelling India to go to war with Pakistan. The war quickly becomes one between religions and a rallying cry for Fundamental Islamists, who eventually take power over the government in Islamabad.

Alternate Future 7:

In alternate future 7, Iran plays largely the same role of sponsoring militant attacks within Pakistan, while the US continues to demand substantial high profile support in the GWOT. Fundamental Islamists within Pakistan and Iran foment resentment of the Pakistani population to the US presence within the country, causing a popular revolt against the Islamabad government and installation of a Fundamentalist regime.

STEP 10: State the potential of a given "alternate future" to "transpose" into another "alternate future".

The most likely switch to occur would be the "transposition" of AF 3 into either AF 8, or to AF 7. If either India or the US sensed the other to be placing too much pressure on Islamabad, the other will likely compensate by reducing pressure in order to not push Pakistan over the edge.

If India attacks Pakistan, the US is likely to have to deemphasize the GWOT, and will intervene diplomatically between Pakistan and India. As a result, the US will be more sensitive to the possibility of setting up the conditions for a Fundamentalist takeover.

If India sees the US is overly aggressive with the GWOT presence in Pakistan and overly demanding of Islamabad, New Delhi will be less likely to attack Pakistan. The GWOT functions in New Delhi's favor, as it puts additional pressure on the Kashmiri militants, and helps to achieve India's aims. India can to a degree wait on the sidelines for the GWOT to control the militants rather than risk causing a government takeover by Islamic militants, who New Delhi probably assesses would be much more willing to risk nuclear escalation than the current more moderate government.

STEP 11: Determine the “focal events” that must occur in our present in order to bring about a given “alternate future”.

Alternate Future 12:

The only remaining focal event required for alternate future 12 to occur is for Pres Musharraf to lose the presidency of Pakistan.

Alternate Future 8:

The key focal point, in addition to Musharraf being ousted from power, for alternate future 8 to occur, is an attack by India on Pakistan.

Alternate Future 7:

An additional major terrorist attack on the US, traced back to Fundamental Islamists operating in/around Pakistan would be a focal event for alternate future 7 to occur. Such an attack would compel the US to increase its demands of Pakistan to visibly support the GWOT, perhaps at the risk of a fundamentalist backlash.

STEP 12: Develop indicators for the “focal events”.

Focal event indicators for Alternate Future 12:

- Musharraf cracks down on Islamic militants
- Islamic militants openly confront the moderate government
- Worsening economic conditions within Pakistan
- Improved Pakistani relations with Iran

Focal event indicators for Alternate Future 8:

- Open Iranian support to Kashmiri militants
- Increased and more blatant attacks by Kashmiri militants on Indian interests
- Increased anti-Pakistan rhetoric and propaganda by India
- Worsening economic conditions within Pakistan
- Reference general indicators for war, i.e. forward basing of aircraft, engineer battalions, forward movement of supplies, canceling leave, etc.

Focal event indicators for Alternate Future 7:

- Major terrorist attack against the US
- Pakistan identified as a supporter or operating location for terrorist groups
- The US ends operations within Afghanistan
- US decreases economic aid to Pakistan
- US do not follow through on allowing Pakistan to purchase the F-16s
- Pakistan is shown to be cooperating with Iran on ballistic missile or nuclear development

Worsening economic conditions within Pakistan

Conclusions:

Iran, India, China and the US have conflicting views on the nature of the government in Islamabad, which will likely prevent any major change to a Fundamentalist Islamic government. Iran, through militants it supports, will continue to put pressure on Pakistan to create the conditions to cause a switch to a fundamentalist regime. This militant pressure includes continued attacks on Indian interests over Kashmir. India will continue to respond to militant attacks with shows of force that bring Pakistan and India to the brink of war, and necessitate international diplomatic intervention. The US will continue to rely very heavily on Pakistan as a strategic partner in the GWOT, and as such, will ramp up economic support to Islamabad in order to keep a moderate government in power. Both India and the US will maintain a careful balancing act to try to keep the extremists from taking power. China, now sidelined by the US, will continue to look for ways to partner with Pakistan, in order to counter US expanding influence, and as leverage against India. Taken altogether, the competing strategic interests will cause the status quo to be maintained.

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