

NEPAL: ALTERNATE FUTURES RESULTING FROM THE DEMANDS MADE BY MAOIST INSURGENTS

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ABSTRACT

This paper attempts to identify the alternate futures of Nepal resulting from the demands – organize a round table conference of entire democratic parties and patriotic powers, formation of an interim government, and election to the constituent assembly -- made by the Maoist insurgents for their objective to move towards creating a new *People's Democratic Republic*. The approach taken in this paper involves conducting an in-depth study of the problem in relation to the three powers in Nepal – Monarchial, Parliamentary, and Maoists – and then to critically evaluate it by using the *Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP)*, a method developed by Dr. Jonathan Lockwood in 1992. This method, which has twelve steps, assumes that the future is really nothing more than the sum total of all possible interactions of “free will” on an international scale. For this the events, perceptions, intentions, and influence of the three powers have been critically examined from the start of Maoist insurgency on 13 February 1996 until the present, where the information cut-off date has been kept as 30 January 2003.

In this study it shows how the Monarchial power changes from active to constitutional and then again to active monarchy; how the Parliamentary power changes from having the full executive power to none and moves around the streets voicing for “joint agitation;” and, how the Maoist power has been changing its perceptions towards the monarch and the political system.

Finally, this study has identified eight future scenarios, within which the worst-case future scenario has three future sub-scenarios. Out of these three sub-scenarios, the most probable sub-scenario has been critical analyzed by including the twenty-seven possible alternate futures for Nepal. Among these twenty-seven alternate futures, an assessment has been given for the five most-likely alternate futures, thus giving a predictive view of the issue in hand, which shows that the possibility for a near future peaceful settlement in Nepal is very rare.

NEPAL: ALTERNATE FUTURES RESULTING FROM THE DEMANDS MADE BY MAOIST INSURGENTS

INTRODUCTION

It is very sad to say that Nepal once envisioned as “the country of simple living and high thinking” with the theory of peaceful co-existence engraved in the hearts and minds of all Nepalese has been torn apart by the vicious tentacles of Maoist insurgency, called “People’s War.”¹ The alternate futures resulting from the demands made by the Maoist insurgents in Nepal is an important indicator and warning system (I&W) for the strategic and tactical planners to safeguard the parliamentary multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy. Because an alternate future is based on the sum total of interactions of free will, the relative probability of the alternate futures will be constantly changing based on how each national actor behaves as it moves through history.² Keeping this in mind, we not only have to see Nepal as it is in present but also have to perceive her past, so that the trends and patterns can be identified to predict the future.

The historical past of Nepal can be taken as the major thrust towards the evolution of modern Nepal. An extract from the article written by Andrea Matles Savada has been quoted below for a general understanding:

This kingdom is ruled by hereditary monarchs and is traditional societies with predominantly agricultural economies; their cultures, however, differ. Nepal's judicial system blends Hindu legal and English common law traditions. Nepal has existed as a kingdom centered in the Kathmandu Valley for more than 1,500 years. Modern Nepal began its

¹ Insurgency is a violence in support, *strategically*, of a political goal, *operationally*, of a political infrastructure, *tactically*, of local political domination. See Tom Marks, *Making Revolution: The Insurgency of the Communist Party of Thailand in Structural Perspective* (Bangkok: White Lotus, 1994), 2.

² Jonathan S. Lockwood and Kathleen O. Lockwood, *The Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP)*, Book of Readings, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: American Military University, 1994), 6.

evolution in the sixteenth century with the founding of the House of Gorkha by Dravya Shah in 1559. In the late eighteenth century, Gorkha conquests extended the kingdom through the Himalayas for almost 1,500 kilometers from the western boundary of Garhwal, India, through the territory of Sikkim in the east. In the early nineteenth century, Gorkha power came into conflict with the British East India Company. The resulting Anglo-Nepalese War (1814-16) was devastating for Nepal: the Treaty of Sagauli reduced the kingdom to the boundaries it has since occupied, less than 900 kilometers from east to west. For almost thirty years after the treaty was concluded, infighting among aristocratic factions characterized Nepal.³

Specifically, Nepal is an official Hindu kingdom, bounded on the north by Tibet, and on the east, west, and south by India. With a total area of 140,800 square kilometers, the east to west expansion is 885 kilometers, while north to south varies from 145 to 241 kilometers, an approximation of the American state of North Carolina. There are three geographical regions: Himalayan (mountains), Hill, and the Terai (flatlands once covered by forest). The country is divided administratively into 5 regions, 14 zones, and 75 districts; a regional commissioner heads each region, whereas chief district officers head the districts -- to look after the day-to-day administrative matters, maintaining law-and-order, and coordinating works of the field agencies of different ministries.^{4 5} The present population is nearly 24 million, comprising of numerous races and tribes, but two-thirds of who originate in the hills.⁶ Besides direct pressure from the Maoist guerrilla-based insurgency, numerous left leaning student groups and radical groups make political life complicated.

³ Andrea Matles Savada, *Nepal*, 3 March 1993 [article on-line]; available from [http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field\(DOCID+np0004\)](http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+np0004)); Internet; accessed 11 November 2002.

⁴ The Himalayan region consists of 19% of the total land, and altitude is between 4877 to 8848 meters; the Hill region consists of 64% of total land, and altitude is between 610 to 1524 meters; and the Terai consists of 17% of the total land, altitude is between 70 to 305 meters.

⁵ Library of Congress Country Studies, *Nepal: Government and Politics*, September 1991 [on-line article]; available from [http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field\(DOCID+np0011\)](http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+np0011)); Internet; accessed 11 November 2002.

⁶ According to the Department of Statistics, National Census Data of Nepal 2001.

Likewise, economically, Nepal is among the poorest and least developed countries in the world, with nearly half of its population living below the poverty line. More recently, political instability -- frequent changing of governments -- has hampered Nepal's ability to forge consensus to implement key socio-economic-political reforms. These grave factors combine with the diversity of culture, terrain, and ethnicity to make it easier for the insurgents to motivate elements of the populace towards supporting insurgency.

The foreign policy of Nepal is focused on maintaining equidistant and friendly relations with India and China.⁷ As a member of United Nations (UN), it follows the norms and conditions mentioned in the UN Charter; is a signatory of different international conventions and treaties; has always been a member of non-aligned movement; had proposed zone of peace in 1975; and, is an active member of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).

Taking these facts into consideration, one can now move towards critically determining and evaluating the possible alternate futures of Nepal resulting from the demands of Maoist insurgents. For the purpose of this paper the Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP), a method developed by Dr. Jonathan Lockwood in 1992, has been used.⁸ This method assumes that the future is really nothing more than the sum total of all possible interactions of "free will" on an international scale.⁹ ¹⁰ LAMP is designed to give the analyst a more powerful method for organizing all available information, based on the perceptions of the national actors, and using it to make relevant predictions about which alternate future is most likely to occur at a given time.¹¹ There are twelve steps in this method – determining the predictive issue, specifying

⁷ Library of Congress Country Studies, *Nepal: Government and Politics*.

⁸ *The LAMP method*, available from <http://www.lamp-method.com/method.html>; Internet; accessed 15 October 2002.

⁹ Lockwood and Lockwood, *LAMP*, Book of Readings, 4.

¹⁰ At the individual level, in theory, free will means that each of us has a nearly infinite array of possible alternate futures that lie before us during the course of our lives. See, *Ibid*.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 6.

the actors bearing on the problem, conducting in-depth study of perceptions and intentions of each actor, specifying courses of action for each actor, determining the major scenarios, calculating the number of alternate futures, doing pair wise comparison of alternate futures, rank ordering the alternate futures, analyzing consequences of alternate futures, determining focal events for alternate futures, developing indicators for each focal events, and assessing the potential for transposition between alternate futures -- which will be used to analyze the stated issue.¹²

This LAMP paper is the first of its kind regarding the subject matter, written especially as a basic predictive reference material for the individuals, organizations, and countries willing to help Nepal settle her 21st century problem. This is very vital because developing a predictive assessment of Nepal's alternate futures is needed for any strategic or tactical move. In the paragraphs that follow, 12 steps of LAMP technique have been used to analyze the present situation and arrive to predictive conclusions. Moreover, in the paper, wherever the sources are not quoted, it must be understood that this was done intentionally for security reasons.

LAMP TECHNIQUE

Step 1: Determine the issue for which you are trying to predict the most likely future.

Issue: What are the alternate futures and its consequences in Nepal resulting from the demands made by the Maoist insurgents?

The purpose of this study is to critically determine and evaluate the possible alternate futures resulting from the demands made by the Maoist insurgents in Nepal, where the information cut-off date has been kept as 30 January 2003. Though the alternate futures and its

¹² See the 12 steps of LAMP method. See *The LAMP method*.

potential consequences of this problem can be numerous, the primary objective of this LAMP paper is to arrive at possible alternate futures of Nepal where the three main political powers -- Monarchial, Parliamentary, and the Maoist -- have been playing a critical role about the three strategic demands made by the Maoists in their continuing seven years of insurgency.¹³ According to the Maoists, the three demands -- organize a round table conference of entire democratic parties and patriotic powers, form an interim government, and conduct election to the constituent assembly – are for the peaceful, positive and progressive solution to the present crisis.¹⁴ Though the wordings of the Maoist demands have differed from time-to-time, the focus seems directed towards one direction: to move towards creating a new communist society, “People’s Democratic Republic of Nepal.”¹⁵

Step 2: Specify the national “actors” involved.

The national “actors” who can directly affect the possible alternate futures of Nepal are the three main political powers, each with its own perceptions, objectives, and possible courses of action. They are:

- The Monarchial Power (MP) –

Constitutional monarch is the main source of this power. At present His Majesty the King Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev personifies this power; moreover, the present Nepalese government headed by Prime Minister Lokendra Bahadur Chand falls under this power.

¹³ Even in the interview given to *The Washington Post* by Dr. Baburam Bhattarai, which was published on 14 December 2002, he has pointed out the current triangular balance of forces in Nepal – namely the monarchists, parliamentary democrats, and revolutionary democrats. See Mr. Chitra Tiwari, *Maoists seek a democratic Nepal*, 7 December 2002 [Interview in *The Washington Post*, published on 14 December 2002]; available from <http://www.washingtontimes.com>; Internet; accessed 17 December 2002.

¹⁴ Maoist press release dated 4 December 2002.

¹⁵ The Maoist leaders tend to divert the general public by phrases like -- democratic republic, Prachanda path, etc., which they call a new model of democracy. See Tiwari.

■ The Parliamentary Power (PP) –

The six major political parties that were in the House of Representative, prior to its dissolution, falls under this power. They are -- Nepali Congress (NC), personified by Mr. Girija Prasad Koirala; Nepal Communist Party (United Marxist Leninist) or NCP (UML), personified by Mr. Madhav Kumar Nepal; Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP), personified by Mr. Pashupati SJB Rana; Nepal Sadbhawana Party (NSP), personified by Mr. Badri Prasad Mandal; Nepal Worker and Peasants Party (NWPP), personified by Mr. Narayan Man Bijukchhe; and People’s Front Nepal (PFN), personified by Mr. Amik Sherchan.¹⁶

■ The Maoist Power (MA)-

The Nepal Communist Party (Maoist), personified by Mr. Pushpa Kamal Dahal is the main source of this power.

Since, it is my objective to analyze the stated issue in-terms of the three “main powers,” I haven’t included the international “actors” like India, China, United States, and the European Community as national “actors” in my paper. Later in the future a different study can be conducted including these countries as part of the national “actors” to determine different scenarios. Until then the national “actors” identified as “main powers” will be the only ones used for the purpose of this paper.

Step 3: Perform an in-depth study of how each national actor perceives the issue in question.

The perceptions and intentions of the three national “actors” mentioned in step two are really the core for the predictive analysis of the alternate futures resulting from the demands of Maoist insurgents in Nepal. The primary hypothesis of this paper is that the perceptions of the three main political powers of Nepal, regarding the demands made by the Maoist insurgents, differ significantly enough to adversely affect parliamentary multiparty democracy and

¹⁶ Before 2 September 2001, People’s Front Nepal was divided into two parties – National People’s Front and United People’s Front.

constitutional monarchy, and will eventually lead to extreme armed conflict resulting in anarchy and civil war.¹⁷ In the process of validating this hypothesis, the following questions have been addressed:

- What is the perception of the Monarchical power since 4 October 2002 regarding the Maoist demands?
- Does the perception of the Monarchical power since the start of “People’s War” until 3 October 2002 differs significantly from the perceptions after 4 October 2002?
- What is the perception of the Parliamentary power since 4 October 2002 regarding the Maoist demands?
- Does the perception of the Parliamentary power since the start of “People’s War” until 3 October 2002 differs significantly from the perceptions after 4 October 2002?
- What is the perception of the Maoist power since 4 October 2002 regarding their recent demands?
- Does the perception of the Maoist power since the start of “People’s War” until 3 October 2002 differs significantly from the perceptions after 4 October 2002?
- How have these perceptions influenced the behavior of the “powers” with one another?
- To what extent do the “powers” view the Maoist demands as “bargaining chips” having little other value?
- What are the implications of these interacting perceptions for the future of parliamentary multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy or the likelihood of extreme armed conflict resulting in civil war and anarchy?

These questions are framed because of the two distinct types of role of monarchy that has been observed since the start of “People’s War” in 13 February 1996 until the information cut-off date, i.e. 30 January 2003. The two identified roles are:

- From 13 February 1996 to 3 October 2002-

This timeframe is further divided into two periods because there have been two Kings:

¹⁷ Anarchy is a situation where there is no government; in a democracy, the government is elected by the people; constitutional monarchy also has a democratic government that limits the monarch’s control; and, republic is a country that has no monarch. Extracted from various books on political science.

- From 13 February 1996 until 1 June 2001-

His Majesty the King Birendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev was the constitutional monarch during this period, who appointed Prime Ministers and the Council of Ministers from the elected parliamentarians as per the Constitution, and played a very passive role in the governance of the country.¹⁸

- From 4 June 2001 until 3 October 2002-

His Majesty King Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev was the constitutional monarch during this period, who appointed Prime Ministers and the Council of Ministers from the elected parliamentarians as per the Constitution, and played a passive role in the governance of the country.

- From 4 October 2002 until the present (information cut-off date is 30 January 2003)-

This is the period where His Majesty the King Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev took over the executive power – but says he is totally committed towards parliamentary multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy -- after sacking the elected Prime Minister and appointing a new Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers from within the former administrators, technocrats, and politicians, thus totally rejecting the demands and views of the main political parties.

To continue further, the paragraphs under respective headings have been outlined to explain “Monarchical power,” “Parliamentary power,” and the “Maoist power.” During the explanation, emphasis has been given to examine the historical developments, events, cultural factors; moreover, it will highlight the perceptions and intentions of the three national “actors” taking into consideration the three main demands put forward by the Maoists.

¹⁸ The period of 2-3 June 2001 have not been quoted in here, because after the death of King Birendra on 1 June 2001, the then Crown Prince Dipendra was declared as the King of Nepal though he was in comma at the military hospital. After His Majesty Dipendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev died on 4 June 2001, the then Prince Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah became the King of Nepal on 4 June 2001.

MONARCHIAL POWER

As it is our responsibility to preserve nationalism, national unity and sovereignty, as well as, to maintain peace and order in the country and also to ensure that the state of the nation does not deteriorate for any reason, a situation has arisen wherein by virtue of the State Authority as exercised by us and in the spirit of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal – 1990, as well as taking into consideration of Article 27 (3) of the Constitution, Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba should be relieved of his office, owing to his incompetence to conduct the general elections on the stipulated date in accordance with the Constitution and the Council of Ministers dissolved.¹⁹

- Address to the nation by His Majesty King Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev on 4 Oct 2002.

Definition of Monarchial Power



Photo 1: His Majesty King Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev. Photo 2: Prime Minister Lokendra Bahadur Chand.
Source: Internet search, under respective names.

For the purpose of this paper, the constitutional monarchy is the source of this power. At present His Majesty the King Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev personifies this power, where in falls the present government headed by Prime Minister (PM) Lokendra Bahadur Chand because he was appointed by His Majesty after taking over the executive power on 4 October 2002.

Historical Development of Monarchy

Prithivi Narayan Shah of Gorkha founded the modern Nepal on 1768 by unifying Nepal and establishing the Shah dynasty. Before him, Nepal was ruled by the Kirats during 7th century BC, Lichchavis from 2nd to 9th century AD, Thakuris from 10th to 11th century AD and then

¹⁹ His Majesty's address to the Nation on 4 October 2002, *King Gyanendra Assumes Executive Power*, 4 Oct 2002 [Unofficial translation by Kantipur Publication on 5 October 2002]; available from http://www.nepalresearch.org/politics/background/gyanendra_0211004.htm; Internet; accessed 10 October 2002.

followed by Mallas for five centuries. During this period, Nepal was divided into many kingdoms, due to which quarrels broke out often between each other. In 1844, the then Prime Minister Jung Bahadur Rana, led a revolt against the royalty, which resulted in the massacre and the Ranas took over power for 104 years, but continued to maintain the Shah family in the palace.²⁰

During the Rana regime of the 1940s, King Tribhuvan Bir Bikram Shah Dev was powerless; and, in November 1950, he escaped to India. When he returned to Nepal in November 1951, after the resignation of the then Prime Minister Mohan Shumsher Jung Bahadur Rana, he re-established the rule of the Shah dynasty. He is considered as the father of democracy in Nepal, and public acknowledges him as the father of the nation.²¹

During King Tribhuvan's rule, parliamentary government under the multi-party system was adopted for some years. After his death in 1955, his eldest son Late King Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev succeeded the throne of Nepal, and in 1960 he introduced a non-party system called "Panchayati System" in the country.²²

After King Mahendra's death in 1972, His Majesty King Birendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev ruled Nepal. During the coronation speech on 24 February 1975, King Birendra put forward the proposal that Nepal be declared a *Zone of Peace*, which had received the endorsement of 116 countries by 1990. A mass movement in 1990 finally persuaded King Birendra, to lift the ban on political parties and turn the absolute monarchy into a constitutional monarchy, and a new democratic *Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal* was promulgated on 9 November 1990.²³

²⁰ Extracted from various history books about Nepal.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

²³ *Nepal faces new political crisis*, 5 October 2002 [on-line CNN World news]; available from <http://asia.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/south/10/05/nepal.govt.crisis/>; Internet; accessed 20 October 2002.

On the night of 1 June 2001 King Birendra along with Queen Aishwarya and seven others died because the then Crown Prince Dipendra Bir Bikram Shah, under the influence of alcohol and drugs, opened fire into the room of his family. Crown Prince Dipendra then turned the gun on himself, in an attempt of suicide over a quarrel with his parents over the woman he wanted to marry. He was admitted to the hospital critically wounded and in a coma, and was still named the next King on 2 June 2001. He died on 4 June 2001, after which the brother of Late King Birendra, Prince Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah was crowned as the King of Nepal. His Majesty King Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev is the twelfth king in the 225 years old Shah dynasty.^{24 25}

Constitutional Provisions regarding His Majesty the King

Monarchical power has been considered as one of the national actors because in the *Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal – 1990*, His Majesty's role has been clearly identified as preserver and protector of the constitution by keeping in view the best interests and welfare of the people of Nepal.²⁶ This constitution states that the words "His Majesty" mean His Majesty the King for the time being reigning, being a descendant of the Great King Prithivi Narayan Shah and an adherent of Aryan Culture and the Hindu Religion.²⁷ His Majesty is the symbol of the Nepalese nationality and the unity of the Nepalese people.²⁸ Moreover, the same constitution has the following provisions relating to the succession to the throne – nothing in this constitution shall affect the custom, usage and tradition relating to the order of succession to the throne by the

²⁴ Travel Information Network, *General Historical Information on Nepal*, [on-line information]; available from http://www.visitnepal.com/nepal_information/history.htm; Internet; accessed 20 October 2002.

²⁵ Does not include His Majesty Crown Prince Trailokya Bikram Shah, son of His Majesty Surendra Bir Bikram Shah.

²⁶ *Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 2047 (1990)*, Article 27(3); available from http://www.hurpeconline.com/southAsia/Nepal/Constitution_nepal_1990.pdf; Internet; accessed 10 October 2002.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, Article 27(1).

²⁸ *Ibid.*, Article 27(2).

descendants of His Majesty, and His Majesty shall have the exclusive power of enacting, amending and repealing the law relating to the succession to the throne by His descendants.²⁹

Likewise, Article 30 of the constitution exempts the income and property of His Majesty from tax and inviolable.³⁰ Similarly, His Majesty may, by warrant under His Royal Seal, appoint any person or council as His Royal Representative to exercise, subject to such conditions as may be specified in the warrant, such functions as His Majesty is to perform pursuant to this constitution or the existing law during His Majesty's absence from Nepal or during any specified period, and the functions exercised by such Royal Representative within the terms and limits specified in the warrant shall, for the purposes of the constitution and exiting laws, be deemed to have been exercised by His Majesty.³¹

The national anthem of Nepal is considered as the royal salute as stated in the Article 33(2) of the constitution. Under Part 6, Article 34 of the constitution, there is a provision of Raj Parishad, which is constituted by His Majesty. The Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Raj Parishad has the authority to summon a meeting of the Raj Parishad on the demise of His Majesty or if His Majesty proclaims His abdication, and if at least one-fourth of the total number of members of the Raj Parishad sign a requisition declaring that His Majesty is unable, by reason of mental or physical infirmity, to perform his functions.³² If a meeting of the Raj Parishad, passes a resolution confirming such incapacity by a majority of two-thirds of its total membership, the meeting of the Raj Parishad shall proclaim the Crown Prince to be the Regent, if He has attained the age of eighteen years, and in other circumstances, it shall, subject to rules made by His Majesty, proclaim a Regent or Council of Regency: Provided that the Regency or

²⁹ Ibid., Article 28(1 and 2).

³⁰ Ibid., Article 30(1 and 2).

³¹ Ibid., Article 32(2).

³² Ibid., Article 34(5).

Council of Regency proclaimed under this clause shall, subject to rules made by His Majesty, dissolve on the demise of or abdication by His Majesty, or on His Majesty informing the Raj Parishad that he is fit to resume the Royal functions.³³

When looking at the executive power of His Majesty, the constitution has clearly mentioned that the executive power of the Kingdom of Nepal shall, pursuant to this constitution and other laws, be vested in His Majesty and the Council of Ministers.³⁴ The provisions of the executive powers of His Majesty that are mentioned within the Article 35, 36, 37, 42, 43 of the constitution are as follows:³⁵

- The powers of His Majesty shall be exercised upon the recommendation and advice and with the consent of the Council of Ministers, submitted through the Prime Minister.
- No question shall be raised in any court as to whether or not any recommendation or advice has been given to His Majesty by the Council of Ministers or any other institutions or official, nor shall any question be raised in any court about what recommendation or advice has been given.
- His Majesty shall appoint the leader of the party, which commands a majority in the House of Representatives as the Prime Minister, and shall constitute the Council of Ministers under his Chairman.
- Accepting written resignation submitted by the Prime Minister, and other ministers through the Prime Minister,
- Relieves the Prime Minister if a no confidence resolution passed by a majority of the total of members of the House of Representatives pursuant of Article 59.
- According to the Special Provisions concerning the Council of Ministers, if no party has a clear majority in the House of Representatives, His Majesty shall appoint as Prime Minister a member who is able to command a majority with the support of two or more parties represented in the House. If no member is able to command a majority in the House of Representatives with the support of two or more parties, His Majesty shall appoint as Prime Minister the leader of the parliamentary party that holds the largest number of seats in the House of Representatives; this Prime Minister has to obtain a vote of confidence within thirty days from the House of Representatives. If this Prime Minister fails to obtain a vote of confidence from the House, His Majesty shall dissolve the House of Representatives and issue an order for holding the elections within six months.

³³ Ibid., Article 34(7).

³⁴ Ibid., Article 35(1).

³⁵ Ibid., Part 7.

- It shall be the duty of the Prime Minister to inform His Majesty the decisions of the Council of Ministers regarding the administration of the Kingdom of Nepal; bills to be introduced in parliament; the current general state of affairs of the country, matters of political, social and administrative concerns, and matters concerning international relations. In these, His Majesty may make recommendations to, or appreciations of, or admonitions to, the Council of Ministers on matters of national importance.

In this way, we can now look at the legislative powers of His Majesty. There is a Legislature in Nepal, called Parliament, which consists of His Majesty and two Houses – 205 members in the House of Representatives, and 60 members in the National Assembly.³⁶ In the National Assembly, His Majesty nominates ten members amongst persons of high reputation who have rendered prominent service in various fields of national life.³⁷ His Majesty shall summon a session within one month after the elections to the House of Representatives are held, prorogue the session of both or either of the Houses of Parliament, may dissolve the House of Representatives on the recommendation of the Prime Minister and specify a date within six months for new elections to the House of Representatives.³⁸ His Majesty may address or send messages either House or a joint sitting of both Houses of Parliament, and He may summon the Members for that purpose.³⁹ No question shall be held in either House of Parliament on the conduct of His Majesty, Her Majesty, and the heir apparent to his Majesty.⁴⁰

Regarding the procedure for the passage of Bills, which becomes an Act after His Majesty grants his assent, a Bill passed by the House of Representatives, shall be transmitted to the other House as soon as possible and such Bill, if passed by the receiving House, shall be forwarded to His Majesty for assent.⁴¹ Except for a finance Bill, if His Majesty is of opinion that

³⁶ Ibid., Article 44, 45(1), and 46(1).

³⁷ Ibid., Article 46(1a).

³⁸ Ibid., Article 53(1, 2, 3, and 4).

³⁹ Ibid., Article 54(1, 2, and 3).

⁴⁰ Ibid., Article 56(1).

⁴¹ Ibid., Article 69(1).

any Bill needs further deliberations, he may send back the Bill with His message to the House of origin of the Bill within one month from the date of presentation of the Bill to Him.⁴² If at any time, except when the Houses of Parliament are in session, His Majesty is satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to take immediate action, He may without prejudicing the provisions set forth in the constitution, promulgate any ordinance as He may deem necessary, but the ordinance will cease to exist after the expiration of six months or if not passed by both Houses within sixty days from the commencement of a session of both Houses.⁴³

In respect to the judiciary power of His Majesty, the Part 11 of the constitution has the provisions. His Majesty shall appoint the Chief Justice of Nepal on the recommendation of the Constitutional Council, and other judges of the Supreme Court on the recommendation of the Judicial Council.⁴⁴ On the other hand, if His Majesty wishes to have an opinion of the Supreme Court on any complicated legal question of interpretation of the constitution or of any other law, the Court shall, upon consideration on the question, report to His Majesty its opinion thereon.⁴⁵

According to the constitution, His Majesty shall on the recommendation of the Constitutional Council appoint the Chief Commissioner and other Commissioners of Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority; the Auditor General of the Auditor-Generals Office; Chairman and other members of the Public Service Commission; and the Chief Election Commissioner and other Commissioners of the Election Commission.⁴⁶ All of the above mentioned appointees have to submit an annual report to His Majesty on the works it has performed in the accordance with the constitution, which His Majesty shall cause such report to

⁴² Ibid., Article 71(3).

⁴³ Ibid., Article 72(1 and 2).

⁴⁴ Ibid., Article 87(1).

⁴⁵ Ibid., Article 88(5).

⁴⁶ Ibid., Article 97(2), 99(1), 101(2), and 103(2).

be laid before the parliament.⁴⁷ Regarding the electoral activities, His Majesty shall, on the recommendation of the Constitutional Council, constitute an Election Constituency Delimitation Commission.⁴⁸ Likewise, His Majesty appoints the Attorney General for the Attorney Generals Office on the recommendation of the Prime Minister.⁴⁹

In respect to the emergency powers of His Majesty under Part 18 of the constitution, if a given crisis arises in regard to the sovereignty or integrity of the Kingdom of Nepal or the security of any part thereof, whether by war, external aggression, armed rebellion or extreme economic disarray, His Majesty may, by proclamation, declare or order a State of Emergency in respect of the whole of the Kingdom of Nepal or of any specified part thereof; every proclamation has to be laid before a meeting of the House of Representatives for approval within three months from the date of issuance.⁵⁰

Regarding the amendment of the constitution, if each House, with a two-thirds majority of its total membership attending, passes a Bill for the amendment of the constitution without prejudicing the spirit of the preamble of the constitution, His Majesty may within thirty days from the day of submission, either grant assent or send it back for reconsideration with His message to the House where the Bill originated.⁵¹

Similarly, under Part 20 of the Constitution, following vital provisions of His Majesty has been stated:⁵²

- His Majesty shall operate and use the Royal Nepal Army on the recommendation of the National Defense Council
- His Majesty is the Supreme Commander of the Royal Nepal Army

⁴⁷ Ibid., Part 12, 13, 14, and 15.

⁴⁸ Ibid., Article 105(1).

⁴⁹ Ibid., Article 109(1).

⁵⁰ Ibid., Article 115.

⁵¹ Ibid., Article 116.

⁵² Ibid., Article 118(3), 119(1 and 2), 120(1 and 2), 122, and 123(1).

- His Majesty shall appoint the Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Nepal Army on the recommendation of the Prime Minister
- His Majesty shall appoint the Royal Nepalese Ambassadors
- His Majesty shall have the power to grant pardons and to suspend, commute or remit any sentence passed by any court, special court, military court or by any other judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative authority or institution
- The titles, honors or decorations to be conferred on behalf of the state shall be conferred by His Majesty

To summarize the constitutional provisions of His Majesty, one can say that the *Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal – 1990*, has considered His Majesty as an integral part of the parliamentary multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy in Nepal. The vital provisions being the executive power lying on both the King and the Council of Ministers, the authorities to – declare “state of emergency,” nominate persons of high reputation to the National Assembly, dissolve the House of Representatives on the recommendations of the PM, give assent to Bills, appoint chiefs of the constitutional bodies on the recommendation of the constitutional council and the PM, safeguard the spirit of the constitution, act as the Supreme Commander of the Royal Nepal Army – and, the inspiration to secure the social, political and economic justice of Nepalese people long into the future.

The Events, Perceptions, Intentions, and Influence of the Monarchial Power since 4 October 2002 regarding the Maoist Demands

His Majesty addressed the nation on the night of 4 October 2002 stating that he had assumed the executive power under Article 127 of the constitution, and has removed PM Sher Bahadur Deuba and his Council of Ministers of their office for incompetence to hold the general election as scheduled.⁵³ He continued by saying that a new Council of Ministers would be formed within five days, consisting of people with clean image who will not participate in the

⁵³ *King removes PM Deuba, elections postponed*, 5 October 2002 [on-line news]; available from <http://www.nepalnews.com.np/archive/2002/october/arc494.htm>; Internet; accessed 5 October 2002.

forthcoming election.⁵⁴ According to Palace officials, the King further said that he is committed to democracy in the Himalayan nation and will not hold power beyond 9 October 2002, Wednesday.⁵⁵

After the royal promulgation of 4 October, His Majesty granted audience separately to the leaders of various political parties and people from different walks of life.⁵⁶ The major political parties collectively forwarded a signed appeal to His Majesty to form the next government with the consensus of the political parties. But on 10 October 2002, His Majesty appointed Mr. Lokendra Bahadur Chand as the new PM of the country; the priority entrusted upon this government was to maintain peace and order, hold the suspended general elections in a free fair and impartial manner soonest and consolidate multiparty democracy, control official corruption, maintain friendly relations with all countries, and to run the day to day affairs of the country effectively and efficiently to serve the people.⁵⁷

At this juncture the view of a Nepalese businessman, Mr. Mahesh Shrestha, given to the *Associated Press* is appropriate to be quoted to show the faith in the King:

The king was our last hope. I hope now there will be at least some stability in the country and elections will be held soon.⁵⁸

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ *Nepali leaders debate political future*, 7 October 2002 [online CNN World news]; available from <http://asia.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/south/10/07/nepal.rally/index.html>; Internet; accessed 10 December 2002.

⁵⁶ His Majesty granted audience to the political leaders separately -- Mr. Girija Prasad Koirala, President of Nepali Congress (NC); Mr. Madhav Kumar Nepal, NCP (UML) General Secretary; Mr. Surya Bahadur Thapa, President of Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP); Mr. Badri Prasad Mandal, Acting President of Nepal Sadbhawana Party (NSP); and Mr. Narayan Man Bijuchhen, Nepal Worker & Peasant Party (NWPP). At the royal audience, His Majesty King asked to recommend the names for the new council of ministers. NC President Koirala pleaded to His Majesty in constituting the new government with the representatives of all the political parties in accordance to the Article 128(2) of the Constitution. NC President Koirala also requested the King for handing over executive power to the political parties. Moreover, during the royal audience NCP (UML) General Secretary Nepal expressed his desire to be the next prime minister of the country. He pleaded to the King to appoint him as the new prime minister. See "After the Royal Promulgation," *Rajdhani* (Kathmandu) daily newspaper in Nepalese language, 6 October 2002, Vol. 2, No. 125.

⁵⁷ *King delegates responsibilities to new government*, 11 October 2002 [on-line news]; available from <http://www.nepalnews.com.np/archive/2002/october/arc500.htm>; Internet; accessed 15 October 2002.

⁵⁸ *Nepal faces new political crisis*.

Likewise, a Nepalese official said to *Reuter's* news agency that His Majesty had to form a new government, and has no intention of keeping executive power with himself; it is not a coup.⁵⁹ This can again be taken as a profound faith in believing that in times of need His Majesty has always given their utmost for the Nepalese people.

To give the completeness, a nine member Council of Ministers was formed on 11 October 2002, as recommended by PM Chand, whom the King outlined the following authorities in addition to the daily work:⁶⁰

- To create a national consensus and remove the present insecurity in the country.
- To conduct local and parliamentary election in a free and fair way and strengthen the multiparty democracy.
- To launch anti-corruption activities to control corruption.
- To strengthen financial discipline and transparency, and conduct service oriented programs for the general public to provide a sense of fair rule.
- To strengthen the foreign policy by having good relation with the neighboring and friendly countries.

To fulfill the authorities invested upon the new government, PM Chand appealed to all the major political parties to come ahead with the initiation in participating in the government; this was refused and the leaders of the main political parties remarked that the Chand government was formed unconstitutionally.⁶¹ In these circumstances, PM Chand remarked that the present government was committed to holding the general election at the earliest possible date, and would call an all-party meeting in order to prepare a framework in finalizing the election date, reshuffling of the cabinet, and that the door had been opened for the dialogue with the Maoists.⁶²

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ News on Radio Nepal, 11 October 2002 at 1510 hrs.

⁶¹ "Major political parties refuse PMs proposal," *Nepal Samacharpatra* (Kathmandu) daily newspaper in Nepalese language, 18 October 2002, Vol. 7, No. 276.

⁶² "Early polls and peace talks with Maoists is a top priority for the present government: PM Chand," *Rajdhani* (Kathmandu) daily Nepalese newspaper, 20 October 2002, Vol. 2, No. 133.

Still no political parties came forward to join the government, His Majesty appointed thirteen new ministers to the existing Council of Ministers on 18 November 2002, thus making it twenty-two -- sixteen Cabinet Ministers and six Assistant Ministers to help obtain the objectives already outlined.⁶³ Fortunately, the Supreme Court's rejection of the writ petition on 23 October 2002 against the cabinet led by PM Chand strengthened the legality of the government in its effort towards fulfilling the prime directives given by His Majesty.⁶⁴ ⁶⁵ These developments made the government come along with a commitment on 22 December 2002 that the government is willing to take positive stand if the Maoists officially come forward with the peace proposal in an "authoritative and credible" manner.⁶⁶

With the start of the new year, a change in His Majesty's move as well as the positive attitude of the public towards the monarch was observed on 3 January 2003, when His Majesty addressed a large number of people at the civic reception organized in the eastern regional hub, Biratnagar, despite the Maoists call for "Mechi-Koshi Zone Closure." The overwhelming welcome and the uninhibited enthusiasm demonstrated by a crowd exceeding all estimates of the proponents and the opponents of the event have, once again, proved beyond a ray of doubt that the monarchy in Nepal still commands great respect and is the picot of hope and inspiration of the people.⁶⁷ In this reception, His Majesty said that mutual differences should be resolved through dialogues with patriotism as a uniting factor; and without directly mentioning the

⁶³ "Chand cabinet expanded," *Kathmandu Post* (Kathmandu) daily English newspaper, 19 November 2002, Vol. X, No. 268.

⁶⁴ "Supreme Court rejected writ against government," *Space Time* (Kathmandu) daily Nepalese newspaper, 24 October 2002, Vol. 2, No. 350.

⁶⁵ No question shall be raised in any court about any act performed by His Majesty. See, *Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 2047 (1990)*, Article 31.

⁶⁶ "Government willing to reciprocate if Maoists formally propose peace initiative," extracted from various daily Nepalese newspapers, 22 Dec 2002.

⁶⁷ "Editorial," *Spotlight* (Kathmandu), JAN 10-JAN 16 2003, Vol. 23, No. 1; available from <http://www.nepalnews.com.np/contents/englishweekly/spotlight/2003/jan/jan10/editorial.htm>; Internet; accessed 18 January 2003.

Maoists, King Gyanendra also pointed out the need for a dialogue to bring an end to the seven year old insurgency waged by the rebels.⁶⁸

Two weeks later, on 20 January 2003, PM Chand complained that the political parties were still not being cooperative with him to fulfill his wish to give an outlet to the ongoing crisis; and also reiterated that the government would hold election as soon as security system improves for which he again requested the political parties to help the government in finding a solution to the Maoist problem.⁶⁹ While the PMs complains were going on, Inspector General of Armed Police Force (IGP) Mr. Krishna Mohan Shrestha, his wife Mrs. Nudup Shrestha, and the bodyguard Mr. Surya Regmi were shot dead on 26 January 2003 by a group of four individuals – said to be Maoists. This took everyone by surprise in the midst of rumors of the oncoming declaration of ceasefire and dialogue. Questions started floating -- What is the strategic move behind this killing? Was it a controlled or uncontrolled killing? What impact would it have on the security force, the present government, and the Maoists? And, ultimately, what would be the result?

To the extreme surprise, on the night of 29 January 2003, the Maoists declared ceasefire stating to willingly participate in the peace talks process.⁷⁰ In response to this, about two hours later on the same night, the government gave a press statement -- revoking the decision of declaring the Maoists as terrorists; withdrawal of red corner notice issued against the Maoists; withdrawal of price tag on the heads of Maoists leaders; and, cease-fire.⁷¹ In other words, the government and the Maoists have decided to agree to a cease-fire as the government has taken

⁶⁸ *His Majesty's address at Biratnagar on 3 January 2003*, 4 January 2003 [on-line news]; available from <http://www.nepalnews.com.np/archive/2003/january/speech.htm>; Internet; accessed 5 January 2003.

⁶⁹ "Prime Minister unhappy for non-cooperation," extracted from various Nepalese newspapers dated 21 January 2003.

⁷⁰ Maoist press release dated 29 January 2003.

⁷¹ "Cease fire declared by government and Maoists," extracted from various Nepalese newspapers dated 30 January 2003.

initiative to resolve the Maoist problem through dialogue, and has appointed Minister for Works and Physical Planning Mr. Narayan Singh Pun as the coordinator of the talks from the government side.⁷²

According to Minister Pun, the process was already underway to hold talks with the Maoist leadership, and initially his preliminary talks that resulted in the declaration of cease-fire was with an individual named Mr. Sagar Chhettri, a Maoist representative.⁷³ The statements given by two individuals who call themselves as government-Maoist talk facilitators can verify his version. According to them, the possibility of an interim government in Nepal does exist:

One of the facilitators for talks, Dadi Ram Lamichanne said talks with his Maoist counterparts were being held on the round table conference as demanded by the Maoists. He also revealed that agreement had already been hammered out for an interim government comprising of representatives from CPN-Maoists [NCP (Maoist)] and other political parties. Another facilitator Dr. Birendra Shrestha Jhapali told *Kantipur FM* [local FM station] that the round table conference would be held within a week.⁷⁴

It is amazing how the rumors⁷⁵ going around Katmandu about the cease fire became true; while the rumor about Maoists talking informally with the Monarchical power was only reported in one of the daily newspapers of Nepal called, *Samacharpatra*, which stated:

The cease-fire came after five hours of talks between the King, Pushpa Kamal Dahal alias Prachanda and Dr. Baburam Bhattarai at the Narayanhiti Royal Palace...Minister for Physical Planning Col. Narayan Singh Pun ferried Dahal and Dr. Bhattarai to Kathmandu by helicopter

⁷² *Maoist, govt. announce cease fire (9:00PM)*, 29 January 2003 [on-line news]; available from <http://www.nepalnews.com.np/archive/2003/january/arc588.htm>; Internet; accessed 29 January 2003.

⁷³ *Col.Pun, Sagar Thapa talks*, 30 January 2003 [on-line news]; available from <http://www.nepalnews.com.np/archive/2003/january/arc588.htm>; Internet; accessed 30 January 2003.

⁷⁴ *Process underway to start dialogue: Minister Pun*, 30 Jan 2003 [on-line news]; available from <http://www.kantipuronline.com>; Internet; 30 January 2003.

⁷⁵ According to a communist intellectual, Mr. Shyam Shrestha, the process of peace-talk started only after the king agreed for round table conference. See Himal Team, "Again Cease-fire," *Himal* (Kathmandu) magazine, 30 Jan-12 Feb 2003, 51.

from Ilam for the rare talks. Maoist leader Ram Bahadur Thapa alias Badal was a facilitator for the talks.⁷⁶

The Royal Palace immediately denied this news.⁷⁷ Likewise, Minister for Physical Planning Colonel Narayan Singh Pun and the two facilitators who helped broker talks between the government and Maoists, also denied the five-hour meeting between King Gyanendra and Maoist leaders Pushpa Kamal Dahal and Dr. Baburam Bhattarai at Narayanhiti Royal Palace.⁷⁸

Development of events leading to the Government-Maoist cease-fire can be looked as a strategic move by both the sides. However, one can justifiably analyze that the distance developing between the King and the political parties, the national security expenses rising day after day, the continuous built-up of pressure from the donor agencies and human rights groups for a peaceful solution, the usage of the nations last resort – state of emergency and Royal Nepal Army – already used with no solution, and the “ultimatum” given by the RPP to the PM Chand to quit the party post or the premiership, was most probably taken as “it’s high time to do something” by the monarch.⁷⁹ All to all, it can be stated that the perception of the Monarchical power seems now actively directed towards getting a permanent solution for the ongoing Maoist insurgency, so that Nepalese can have a better life. Since, the information cut-off date is 30 January 2003 for this paper, I will not be including the other developments.

⁷⁶ “Cease fire after five hours of special dialogue between His Majesty Gyanendra, Prachanda, and Baburam,” *Nepal Samacharpatra* (Kathmandu) daily Nepalese newspaper, 30 January 2003, Vol. 8, No. 20.

⁷⁷ *Royal Palace denies report*, 30 January 2003 [online news]; available from <http://www.nepalnews.com.np/archive/january/arc589.htm>; Internet; accessed 30 January 2003.

⁷⁸ *Meetings between King, Dahal, Bhattarai denied*, 30 January 2003 [on-line news]; available from <http://www.nepalnews.com.np/archive/2003/january/arc589.htm>; Internet; accessed 30 January 2003.

⁷⁹ Himal Team.

The Events, Perceptions, Intentions, and Influence of the Monarchical Power from the start of Maoist Insurgency until 3 October 2002 regarding Maoist Demands

This period had two Kings who appointed Prime Ministers and the Council of Ministers from within the elected Parliamentarians. To begin with, one can start from the beginning of the “People’s War” in 13 February 1996, when His Late Majesty the King Birendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev was the constitutional monarch of this country until his death on 1 June 2001.

Nearly six years before the start of Maoist insurgency, King Birendra had promulgated a new constitution on 9 November 1990, which introduced a parliamentary multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy in Nepal after the popular movement of 1990. Although deeply committed to Nepal’s development, His Majesty Birendra was unable to solve the country’s economic problems nor the corruption in government that beset South Asian nations.⁸⁰

On the other hand, though after the transfer of power to the parliament, the Nepalese army remained loyal to King Birendra; yet He never made any attempt to recover his former position by force.⁸¹ Though this was the scenario, the strong communist showing in the 1991 election was disturbing development from the perspective of King Birendra and the army.⁸² Army officers, most of whom rejected the antimonarchist platform of the communists, invariably regarded the communists as a potential security menace and a threat to the throne; and there was no evidence in late 1991 that the some twenty Nepalese communist factions then in existence commanded any appreciable support within the army rank-and-file.⁸³

⁸⁰ Mark Tully, *The late king Birendra of Nepal*, 23 April 2002 [on-line CNN article]; available from <http://asia.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/south/06/05/nepal.birendra.profile/index.html>; Internet; accessed 20 December 2002.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Library of Congress Country Studies, *Nepal: Internal Security Consideration*, September 2001 [on-line article]; available from [http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field\(DOCID+np0148\)](http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+np0148)); Internet; accessed 30 November 2002.

⁸³ Ibid.

After the Maoists declared “People’s War,” the constitutional monarch King Birendra and his government had to face a lot of ups and downs in all aspect of the society. Though the King didn’t take a very active role during this period, the political parties influenced the running government, because the Prime Minister(s) and the Ministers were a part of the political parties in power.

In addition, changes in the government in this period were so intense, that it’s well justified to state. It is seen that after the restoration of democracy the following parties and their leaders came in power to lead the country: the interim government of 1990 to 1991 was headed by Mr. Krishna Prasad Bhattarai of NC; majority government of NC headed by Mr. Girija Prasad Koirala from 1991 to 1994; majority government of NCP (UML) headed by Mr. Man Mohan Adhikari from 29 November 1994 to September 1995; coalition government of NC, RPP, and NSP headed by Mr. Sher Bahadur Deuba from 12 September 1995 to March 1997; coalition government of RPP, NCP (UML), and NSP headed by Mr. Lokendra Bahadur Chand from 12 March 1997 to October 1997; coalition government of RPP, NSP, and NC headed by Mr. Surya Bahadur Thapa from 7 October 1997 to April 1998; minority government of NC headed by Mr. Girija Prasad Koirala from 15 April 1998 to August 1998; coalition government of NC and NCP (ML) headed by Mr. Girija Prasad Koirala from 26 August 1998 to 24 December 1998; coalition government of NC and NCP (UML) headed by Mr. Girija Prasad Koirala from 25 December 1998 to May 1999; majority government of NC headed by Mr. Krishna Prasad Bhattarai from 31 May 1999 to 17 March 2000; majority government of NC headed by Mr. Girija Prasad Koirala from 20 March 2000 to 19 July 2001; and majority government of NC headed by Mr. Sher Bahadur Deuba from 22 July 2001 to 4 October 2002.⁸⁴

⁸⁴ Extracted from newspapers.

It is during the first tenure of PM Deuba that the “People’s War” started and has been continuing since then.⁸⁵ During July 1999, speaking at the House of Representatives, the Home Minister of the newly elected government from NC said that the government is ready to hold unconditional negotiations with any party by remaining within the constitution.⁸⁶ Similarly, in an interview to the Times of India in August 1999, Prime Minister Bhattarai of NC also spoke about the two prolonged strategy he had adopted to deal with the Maoists – prepared to grant them amnesty and release them from jails – if they agree to a serious dialogue to settle the matter once and for all; however, if they refuse, it would be a case of bullet for bullet.⁸⁷

Later, to curb the insurgency, government registered the “Some Nepal Laws Relating to Internal Administration (Amendment) Bill” on 9 September 1999 at the Parliament Secretariat, which was formally presented before the House of Representative on 21 September 1999, but the Members of Parliament of the opposition side opposed the move.⁸⁸ ⁸⁹ This eventually led a kickback to the legal aspects of controlling the issue in hand.

With the problems escalating day by day, a change in government was again observed on 20 March 2000, which was now headed by Koirala of NC. Koirala formed a high level commission under Mr. Sher Bahadur Deuba to seek a consensus among the political parties on ways to end the insurgency, which was the first concrete step to find the solution to the Maoist problem. Though Mr. Deuba did his best to move along the provided mandate, unfortunately, on 24 August 2000 Deuba said that despite his untiring efforts to broker talks between the

⁸⁵ The problem started when the then Prime Minister (PM) Sher Bahadur Deuba disregarded the forty-point demand of the Maoists.

⁸⁶ *The Maoist Problem*, [on-line article]; available from <http://www.nepal-school-projects.org/maoist%20problem.htm>; Internet; accessed 15 December 2002.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ During the mid-November 1999, the local press reported that the government’s proposal to mobilize the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) to curb the insurgency was commented upon by the Chief of Army Staff indicating that RNA is willing to suppress the Maoists, if there is an all-party consensus in the matter.

government and the Maoists, it was evident that a serious crisis of confidence existed, and overcoming the crisis of confidence was a prerequisite to start any substantive and meaningful dialogue.⁹⁰

Few months later, the then Deputy Prime Minister (DPM) Ram Chandra Poudel from NC stated that Maoist activities are terrorist acts and are targeted against the country, democracy and the constitution.⁹¹ To see the possibilities for a solution, he held a round of informal talk on 27 October 2000 with a Maoist central committee member Mr. Rabindra Shrestha through a leftist human rights activists, Mr. Padma Ratna Tuladhar acting as the mediator; but, the talks could not carry on for long as the Maoist supremo Prachanda brought forward a press release saying no more “informal talks” and again the violence started to gain momentum⁹² To deal with this situation and as a gesture of good will in order to bring the Maoists to the negotiating table, the government released two Maoist central committee members – Dinesh Sharma and Dinanath Gautam from prison – both of whom were later expelled by the Maoists from their party for failing to demonstrate their “revolutionary character,” but this too was not fruitful.⁹³

On the other hand, the government implemented a change of strategy. This time, on 12 March 2001 a *Basket Funding Program* was introduced to give relief to the public by introducing development oriented work in five district of Nepal – Rukum, Rolpa, Kalikot, Jajarkot, and Salyan – which didn’t meet the desired objective and thus resulted in a failure. Similarly, on 23 May 2001, the government introduced the *Integrated Security Development Program (ISDP)* to be launched at the Maoist affected districts to maintain peace and security for the people, control poverty and unemployment, scientific development, and to safeguard the

⁹⁰ The Maoist Problem.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ibid.

unity of the country – for which Gorkha was selected as the first district, for which 800 Royal Nepal Army personnel were mobilized.⁹⁴

Prior to this, to deal with the deteriorating law and order situation, the government formed a special tribunal under the “State Offences and Punishment Act 2043” on 26 December 2000 to prosecute crimes against the state; likewise, on 22 January 2001, His Majesty King Birendra promulgated the Armed Police Ordinance 2057 BS, intended to activate the Armed Police Force (APF) and make arrangements for its deployment against the Maoist insurgents.⁹⁵

After the royal massacre on 1 June 2001, the then Prince Gyanendra became the King of Nepal on 4 June. After ascending the throne, His Majesty Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev addressed the nation reiterating commitment towards multiparty democracy:

The wishes of our brother Late King Birendra of guiding the Nepali people towards a multiparty democratic exercise will always remain a source of inspiration for all of us...we all have to keep alive the close relationship between the two neighboring countries consolidated by His Majesty King Birendra in the interest of this nation and Nepal’s glorious image in the world community.⁹⁶

During the period of royal massacre, when Koirala of NC was the PM, violence was observed on both the facets. On one side there were violent demonstrations in favor of Late King Birendra and denouncing King Gyanendra, whereas, on the other side the Maoists were increasing their attacks by expressing anti-monarchist views. Everywhere there was an unanswered question: what would the new King do? As the new King slowly started conducting the royal actions, the then PM Koirala wanted to mobilize the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) to curb the insurgency. According to PM Koirala, his proposal to mobilize the RNA was hampered because of RNA, who wanted an all-party consensus for the mobilization. This created a rift

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Extracted from various local newspapers dated 5 June 2001.

between the PM and the RNA -- in short it was seen that the army and the PM Koirala didn't agree among each other, and may be this was the reason for his downfall on 19 July 2001.

With the change in the leadership of the government on 22 July 2001, now headed by PM Deuba of NC, a strategic step was initiated for moving towards a peaceful dialogue with the Maoists. Deuba's initiation made possible for three rounds of talks -- first was on 30 August 2001, second on 13 September 2001, and the last on 14 September 2001 -- to be carried out between the Maoists and the government. But, all hopes were shattered when the Maoists called-off the dialogue and attacked the Dang district headquarters on 23 November 2001, inflicting heavy casualty on the side of the government security forces.⁹⁷ Since, there was major casualty on the RNA side, eventually they got involved and a state of emergency was declared – first on 26 November 2001, second on 25 February 2002, and last on 27 May 2002 – for a period of three months each; likewise, “Terrorist and Destructive Activities (Punishment and Control)” ordinance was brought forward, and the NCP (Maoist) was declared as terrorists, and price tags were declared on their heads and request was made to the INTERPOL for the issuances of red corner notices.^{98 99 100}

⁹⁷ *Maoist insurgency (including emergency reports)*, Nepal Research website; available from <http://www.nepalresearch.org/politics/maoists.htm+Maoists&hl=en&ie=UTF-8>; Internet; accessed from 10 November 2002 to 3 January 2003. Also see *Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 2047 (1990)*, provisions of emergencies in Article 115.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ *Nepal*, [on-line lonely planet article]; available from http://www.lonelyplanet.com/destinations/indian_subcontinent/nepal/; Internet; accessed 10 November 2002.

¹⁰⁰ His Majesty the King, according to the Article 115 Clause-1 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 1990, has declared state of emergency across the Kingdom. And, according to the Clause 8 of the same Article of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 1990, His Majesty the King has suspended the Article 12 (Clause 2) sub clauses (a), (b) and (d) and Article 13 sub clause (1), Articles 15, 16, 17, 22 and 23 (except habeas corpus) has been suspended. His Majesty the King, according to the Clause 8 of the Article 115, has suspended the Clause 2 - section (a), (b) and (d) and sub clause (1) of the Article of 12 and Article 15, 16, 17, 22, 23 (except habeas corpus), according to the press statement of the Principal Press Secretariat of His Majesty the King. According to the Clause 1 of the Article 115 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal-1990, 'If a grave emergency arises in regard to the sovereignty or integrity of the Kingdom of Nepal or the security of any part thereof, whether by war, external aggression, armed rebellion or extreme economic disarray, His Majesty may by Proclamation, declare or order a State of Emergency in respect of the whole of the Kingdom of Nepal or of any specified part thereof. Similarly, according to Clause 8 of the Article 115, "His Majesty may at the time of making a Proclamation or Order of a State

During the third stage of the “state of emergency,” on 21 May 2002 PM Deuba recommended to His Majesty Gyanendra to dissolve the House of Representatives and to seek a fresh mandate of the people on 13 November, which His Majesty heeded by dissolving the House of Representatives on 22 May.¹⁰¹ Due to this recommendation, PM Deuba was expelled from the NC general membership from 26 May 2002 for three years on the ground that Deuba had defied the party constitution and rules by ordering snap polls without consulting the party.¹⁰² PM Deuba’s response to this expelling was that he could not ask the security forces to fight terrorists with their hands tied.¹⁰³

After the House was dissolved, a writ petition was given at the Supreme Court by three lawyers arguing that the decision to dissolve the parliament was unconstitutional and with faults, for which the court issued a show cause notice to the government.¹⁰⁴ Later, on 6 August 2002, the Supreme Court nullified the writ petition by stating that it is a political matter between King and the Prime Minister and that the Prime Minister -- can dissolve the house during emergency, has absolute right of dissolution, does not need a cabinet decision to recommend the dissolution of House.¹⁰⁵

On the other hand, both the government officials and Nepalese media were speculating that there was a serious rift within the NCP (Maoists) between “soft-liners” such as Baburam

of Emergency pursuant to Clause (1), suspend sub clauses (a), (b), (d) and (e) of Clause (2) of Article 12, Clause (1) of Article 13 and Articles 15, 16, 17 22 and 23 of this Constitution for as long as the Proclamation is in operation". See, Staff Reporter, “HM declares State of Emergency promulgates Ordinance,” *The Rising Nepal* (Kathmandu) daily English newspaper, 26 November 2001; available from http://www.nepalicongress.org.np/emergency/hm_declares.html; Internet; accessed 27 November 2001.

¹⁰¹ *King removes PM Deuba, elections postponed.*

¹⁰² *PM Deuba expelled from party, 27 May 2002* [on-line news]; available from <http://www.nepalnews.com.np/archive/2002/may/arc399.htm>; Internet; accessed 27 May 2002.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁴ *SC issues show cause notice in house dissolution case, 27 May 2002* [on-line news]; available from <http://www.kantipuronline.com>; Internet; accessed 28 May 2002.

¹⁰⁵ *Supreme Court dismisses writs, 6 August 2002* [on-line news]; available from <http://www.nepalnews.com.np/archive/2002/august/arc445.htm>; Internet; accessed 6 August 2002.

Bhattarai, the “hard-liners” followers of party chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda), and the “extreme hard-liners” led by Ram Bahadur Thapa.¹⁰⁶

While speculations were going on about internal conflict within the Maoists, King Gyanendra in an exclusive interview to the *National News Agency* [Nepal] on the occasion of the first anniversary of his accession to the throne said that monarchy is functioning within the constitutional framework and will continue to function in the future also in the collective interests of Nepal and the Nepalese people; this address is very critical in pointing out the view of His Majesty and thus needs to be quoted:

We will never lag behind in wiping out the hardships of the country and the people...Do something, though small in magnitude, for peace, development and governance...We all know that it is up to us Nepalese people how our nationalism can be strengthened and fortified and given the awareness and vigilance our national flag will go on fluttering for ever...The country does not ask for sacrifice from an individual citizen, it is the citizen who needs to come forward to make the sacrifice.¹⁰⁷

The profound words of nationalism from His Majesty can only be taken as the strategic address, in His role as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Nepal Army, who has been closely monitoring the current, intense military campaign against the Maoist insurgency. A question then does arise at this point, how has His Majesty taken the efficiency of the Deuba government and his predecessors in tackling the ongoing crisis?

To get a global perspective to curb the issue, His Majesty Gyanendra now takes an approach to consult and get the views of the two neighboring countries – Nepal and China. For this His Majesty visited India from 23-26 June 2002, where His views expressed to the Indian

¹⁰⁶ Bertil Litner, *Nepal's Maoists prepare for final offensive*, article first appeared in Jane's Intelligence Review on October 2002 [on-line article in Asia Pacific Media Services Limited]; available from http://www.asiapacificms.com/articles/nepal_maoists/; Internet; accessed 15 November 2002.

¹⁰⁷ *Monarchy will remain committed to wipe out people's hardship: King Gyanendra*, 5 June 2002 [Interview given to Mr. Purushottam Dahal of National News Agency]; available from <http://www.nepalnews.com.np/archive/2002/june/arc405.htm>; Internet; accessed 6 June 2002.

leaders can be seen as a concern for the safety of the nation and targeted towards getting a permanent solution:

In New Delhi, the focus of the King's talks with Indian leaders was on the Maoist insurgency. He outlined his vision for the future of the Kingdom and the ways in which Kathmandu planned to tackle the guerillas. King Gyanendra said in New Delhi that his government had embarked on a campaign to win all the people over to its side. He pointed out that the Maoist insurgency had started in the most impoverished part of the kingdom and that unless the people of the region were won over, it would be difficult for the government to subdue the rebels.¹⁰⁸

The Indian government, on its part, has offered materiel as well as moral support to the campaign against the insurgents; the External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh told the Monarch that India was willing to offer military equipment and share intelligence to help Kathmandu defeat the insurgency.¹⁰⁹ Sources in the Nepalese government said that in dealing with the insurgency, India is apparently suggesting "a judicious mix of political persuasion and military coercion."¹¹⁰

Again, about two weeks later, His Majesty Gyanendra paid a state visit from 9-15 July 2002 to the People's Republic of China. During the afternoon of 10 July, when President Jiang Zemin met with visiting King Gyanendra at the Great Hall of the People, His Majesty reiterated that as a close friend of China, Nepal would adhere to its friendly policy towards China and the One China Policy, and nor would it permit its territory to be used as venues for any activity

¹⁰⁸ "King Gyanendra in India," *FRONTLINE* (India) magazine, Vol. 19, Issue 14, July 06-19, 2002; available from <http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl1914/19141330.htm>; Internet; accessed 5 August 2002.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ C. Raja Mohan, *India reaffirms support to democracy in Nepal*, 22 June 2002 [on-line *The Hindu* news, India's online national newspaper]; available from <http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2002/06/22/stories/2002062203951100.htm>; Internet; accessed 30 June 2002.

undermining China's interests.¹¹¹ During this visit President Jiang said that China supports the crack down on anti-government rebels:

Jiang also highly praised the active role of King Gyanendra in maintaining political stability, promoting economic growth and improving people's living standards. He said that China supports the efforts of Gyanendra and the Nepalese government to crack down on anti-government rebels, adding that the Chinese government opposes and condemns all violence and terrorist activities. He also said that he believes King Gyanendra and his government have the capability to maintain peace, stability and development of the country.¹¹²

While the King was getting neighborly supports, the Deuba government on the other hand didn't seem too confident to carry on with the forthcoming 13 November 2002 election, as the security situation was deteriorating day by day. One of the ministers in the government, Mr. Jaya Prakash Prasad Gupta, was still heard appealing to the Maoists to face the upcoming mid-term poll to join the political mainstream, and said that this election is the right opportunity for the Maoists.¹¹³

Since, nothing flourished that was positive and beneficial to the solution of the crisis in hand, on 3 October 2002 PM Deuba made a submission to His Majesty Gyanendra for postponing the election, due to deteriorating law and order situation, from 13 November 2002 to 19 November 2003. The King did not agree with this recommendation, and thus relieved the PM and the ministers from their office on 4 October 2002, terming them as incompetent and thus took over the executive power until the formation of a new government. It is said that the King

¹¹¹ *President Jiang Zemin Met With Nepalese King Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev*, 10 July 2002, [online news]; available from <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/32426.html>; Internet; accessed 15 July 2002.

¹¹² *Ibid.*

¹¹³ *Government appealed the Maoists to face election*, extracted from Nepalese local newspapers dated 10 August 2002.

came up with this decision after consultations with constitutional experts and political leaders.¹¹⁴ The new government was then formed under PM Lokendra Bahadur Chand on 11 October 2002.

While looking at this period, 13 February 1996 until 3 October 2002, it can be said that this period is full of immaturity, internal squabbles, frequent changes, lack of decision making capability in the part of the governments formed, and the very passive role of the constitutional monarch made the government move way out in the tangent. The monarch, not warning and penalizing the governments to do their jobs better can be taken as a factor for the governments' poor performance, in other words the "check and balance" system was not working efficiently. Likewise, it can be very well seen by the report submitted by the Amnesty International that new trends of state offences were said to be increasing: extra-judicial executions, emerging patterns of disappearances, torture and death in custody, and arbitrary arrest and detention.¹¹⁵ These activities, in addition to the very passive-role played by His Late Majesty Birendra, and the very short time available for His Majesty Gyanendra to make a strategic move, made the governments work their own way entangled within their own party politics and unhealthy competition -- resulting the Maoist power to flourish.

¹¹⁴ *Nepal faces new political crisis.*

¹¹⁵ Amnesty International, *Annual Report 2000*, [online report]; available from <http://web.amnesty.org/web/ar2000web.nsf/>; Internet; accessed January 2002.

PARLIAMENTARY POWER

The political parties were of the opinion that the council of ministers should be constituted according to the will of the Nepalese people expressed through the mass movement of 1990, the spirit of Preamble and Article 128 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal, 1990 and nominating the representatives recommended by the political parties on the basis of their suggestion and consent.¹¹⁶

- *Press Communiqué of six political parties, 25 October 2002*

Definition of Parliamentary Power



*Photo 3: Mr. Girija Prasad Koirala
President of Nepali Congress
Party*



*Photo 4: Mr. Pashupati SJB Rana
Chairman of Rastriya Prajatantra Party*



*Photo 5: Mr. Badri Prasad Mandal
Act. President of Nepal Sadbhawana*



*Photo 6: Mr. Madhav Kumar Nepal
General Secretary of NCP (UML)
Source: Internet search, under respective names*



*Photo 7: Mr. Narayan Man Bijukchhe
President of Nepal Workers & Peasants Party*



*Photo 8: Mr. Amik Sherchan
Chairman of People's Front Nepal*

For the purpose of this paper the Parliamentary Power (PP) is the joint strength of the six major political parties that had elected members in the House of Representatives, prior to its dissolution. The six political parties are -- Nepali Congress (NC), Nepal Communist Party (United Marxist Leninist or UML), Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP), Nepal Sadbhawana Party (NSP), Nepal Worker and Peasants Party (NWPP), and People's Front Nepal (PFN).

¹¹⁶ *Press Communiqué of six political parties, 25 October 2002, available from <http://www.cpunml.org>; Internet; 15 December 2002.*

Historical Development of Political Parties

The historical development of the six main political parties is outlined below for detail understanding:¹¹⁷

1. Nepali Congress (NC)-

NC was founded on the April of 1947, whose main objective is to promote social democracy, nationalism and constitutional monarchy. This party acquired 114 seats during 1991 general election, 83 seats during 1994 mid-term polls, and 113 seats during 1999 general election. The present President of this party is Mr. Girija Prasad Koirala. The NC Central Working Committee was reconstructed on 26 July 1999 by Koirala to strengthen his grip in the party.

The historical background of this party shows that the young educated and energetic Nepalese who had participated in the anti-British movement in India realized the need to form a political party in Nepal to organize a movement against the Rana regime. Bisheshwor Prasad Koirala (B.P. Koirala), then an activist of the Indian Congress's Socialist Group took the lead in forming the Akhil Bharatiya Nepali Congress (All India Nepali National Congress) in October 1946. The party held its first conference in Calcutta of India on 25-26 January 1947, where two other Nepalese organizations, namely the Nepali Sangh and the Gorkha Congress joined it to form the Nepali Rastriya Congress (Nepali National Congress). The objective of this Congress was to provide cooperation for Indian Independence Movement on the one hand and to establish a representative government in Nepal by deposing the Rana from Power. This party organized Biratnager Jute Mills worker's strike – the first labor movement in the history of Nepal. The Ranas suppressed this movement and B.P. Koirala was arrested with his colleagues.

In August 1948, 'C' class Ranas banished in Calcutta organized a party, the Nepal Prajatantrik Congress (Nepal Democratic Congress), with the aim of overthrowing the Rana government.

In April 1950 both parties merged to become NC, where Mr. Matrika Prasad Koirala was elected as the Chairman of the party, and the party adopted a four-star flag – symbolic meaning being socialism, nationalism and constitutional monarchy.

The NC launched an armed revolution against the Ranas in November 1950, ending in Delhi, India – compromise reached between King Tribhuwan and

¹¹⁷ The historical development of the major political parties were collected and compiled by one of my schoolmate Mr. Subodh Singh, who is working at an international organization (last information update done was on 31 December 2002); I am very much indebted to him. There are few changes that I have made, so that it flows with the content of this paper.

the Ranas mediated by Indian Prime Minister Jwaharlal Nehru. The NC became a partner in the Rana Congress Coalition Government in 1951-52; formed its own single party government in 1952-53; and, received absolute majority in the 1959 parliamentary elections and formed the government.

With the dissolution of parliamentary system by King Mahendra in December 1960, all NC ministers, including Prime Minister B.P. Koirala, were put behind bars – thousands fled to India. Later, B.P. Koirala, Gnash man Sigh, and other Congressmen were released from prison in 1969, and they went to self exile to India, and made some abortive attempts to launch a movement in Nepal to overthrow King's monocratic *Panchayat system*.

After the death of B.P. Koirala in 1983, many NC cadres joined the Panchayat, until in early 1990 when both the NC and the United Left Front (ULF) spearheaded to pro-democracy movement and in April 1990 King Birendra was forced to lift the ban on political parties and disband the *Panchayat system*. The NC leader Krishna Prasad Bhattarai was called upon to form the Interim Government with the United Left Front (ULF) members as partners in the cabinet.

Later during 2002, there was again a internal conflict between PM Sher Bahadur Deuba and Girija Prasad Koirala in NC, where NC meeting-turned general convention chaired by then Prime Minister Deuba ousted G.P. Koirala from the party, and Deuba was elected party President on 19 June 2002. This matter was brought to the attention of Election Commission, where it was decided for the Deuba faction to come under a different name. Now, Deuba Congress has been named as Nepali Congress (Democratic) registered at the Election Commission on 23 September 2002; whereas, the Girija faction is still called the Nepali Congress.

2. Nepal Communist Party (United Marxist Leninist), or NCP (UML)-

NCP was founded on the 15 September 1949, whose main objective is to promote communism through participation in multi-party political process. Late Pushpa Lal and four others founded the NCP in Calcutta, India. Late Puspa Lal was then working as office secretary of the Nepal Rastriya Congress (Nepal National Congress), or (NRC). The unity talks between NRC and the Nepal Prajatantrik Congress (National Democratic Congress) for the creation of Nepali Congress was disliked by Pushpa Lal, and his radical posture pushed him towards communist ideology and in September 1949, upon the inspiration of Indian Communist leader Ajoy Ghosh, Pushpa Lal founded the first communist party in Nepal.

After the 1950-51 revolution the NCP opposed the Delhi compromise and spearheaded anti-Indianism in Nepal. In January 1952, the NCP supported the abortive coup staged by Dr. K.I. Singh. Consequently, the party was banned. It however, continued to expand its underground cells all over the country. In 1956, following the party's decision to accept non-violence and constitutional

monarchy, the government lifted the ban imposed on it. In 1959 elections, it own 4 seats in the parliament. After the royal take-over of 15 December 1960, Pushpa Lal managed to escape to India where he continued his organizational activities.

The NCP suffered a major split into two in 1961 during its Third Congress held in Durbhanga in India. Dr. Keshar Jung Rayamajhi led one, while Pushpa Lal led the other. Pushpa Lal emphasized for the need of a united front with the Nepali Congress to fight against the King's Government in Nepal, while Dr. Rayamajhi's group opposed any united front with the NC, which the group considered to be an agent of international comprador capitalism and imperialism. Dr. Rayamajhi's group was in majority, so Pushpa Lal and his group were expelled from the party. Thus, Pushpa Lal organized his own congress, where Tulsi Lal Amatya was made the General Secretary. Both Pushpa Lal and Tulsi Lal also could not go along for too long. Tulsi Lal advocated for the National Democracy as prescribed by the Soviet Union for the Third World, and Pushpa Lal began to tilt towards Mao's New Democracy.

In 1969, Pushpa Lal organized a conference of his own supporters and revived the party, which was inactive until 1968. He consistently considered the monarchy as enemy number one and advocated for a united front with the Nepali Congress to fight against the King's monocratic system of Panchayat. He died of heart attack in 1978; following his death the leadership of the party was taken over by his widow, Mrs. Sahana Pradhan.

In 1987, the NCP (Sahana) and NCP (Manmohan Adhikari) factions merged and identified themselves as NCP (Marxist). During the pro-democracy movement of early 1990, this group participated actively as a constituent of the United Left Front (ULF). Mrs. Sahana Pradhan had the honor of being the chairperson of ULF.

On 7 December 1991, this party merged with NCP (Marxist-Leninist) to become NCP (United Marxist Leninist); the NCP (Marxist-Leninist) was the offspring of the early 1970s Indian Naxalite movement that centered on eastern borders of Nepal. The NCP (UML) acquired 69 seats during 1991 general election, 89 seats during 1994 mid-term polls, and 69 seats during 1999 general election. The present General Secretary of the party is Mr. Madhav Kumar Nepal.

On 6 March 1998, the split in Nepal's mainstream communist party NCP (UML) became official. The new formation was NCP (ML) and NCP (UML). Again a major breakaway-faction of NCP (ML) merged into NCP (UML) on 15 February 2002.

3. Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP)-

RPP was founded on 29 May 1990, whose main objective is to promote democratic principles. At present, Mr. Pashupati SJB Rana is the Chairman of

the party. This party won three seats by RPP (Chand) and one seat by RPP (Thapa) during general election of 1999, secured twenty-seats during mid-term polls, and eleven seats during 1999 general elections.

With the dissolution of the *Panchayat system*, all Panchas belonging to it found themselves dismantled. The senior leaders of the *Panchayat system*, namely, Surya Bahadur Thapa, Lokendra Bahadur Chand, Rajeswore Devkota and a host of others decided to form a party. But it was not easy for the Panchas, who were divided into 'liberal' and 'hard-line' camps during their own regime, to form a single party. All attempts to form a united Pancha party failed and in late May 1990 both camps came out with their respective parties but with same name -- Rastriya Prajatantra Party (Thapa) and Rastriya Prajatantra Party (Chand).

The two factions of RPP reunited on 10 December 1999 under the guidelines of Birgunj convention, which gives absolute powers to the party President but retained the party Leader post as part of the unification deal.

4. Nepal Sadbhawana Party (NSP)-

The NSP came into existence on 3 April 1990. Previously, the leadership of this group was active in the name of Nepal Sadbhawana Parishad (Nepali Goodwill Council) in the Terai region of Nepal. Mr. Badri Prasad Mandal is the Acting President of this party. In the general election of 1991 this party secured six seats, three seats during the mid-term polls of 1994, and five seats in the general election of 1999.

The main objective of this party is to promote Terai interests. The declared objective of the party is to establish a democratic-socialist society by ending exploitation and discrimination in the political, economic, social linguistic and cultural fields. It also aims at securing the status of a second national language for Hindi and constitutional to Maithali, Newari, and other languages. This party is demanding resolution of citizenship problem, reservation of backward communities and women and introduction of federal administrative system in the country. Moreover, this party is regarded as communal, regional and sectarian party of Madhesias, and also regarded as the potential long arm of India.

5. Nepal Workers and Peasants Party (NWPP)-

This party was founded on 1969, whose objective is to promote Maoist new Democracy. The President of this party is Narayan Man Bijukchhe (Rohit). In the general election of 1991 this party secured two seats, four seats during the mid-term polls of 1994, and 1 seat in the general election of 1999.

The faction within the NCP emerged when Rohit developed differences of opinion with late communist leader Pushpa Lal. Comrade Rohit organized

NWPP in his native town of Bhaktapur and expanded it to other areas, namely Chitwan, Jumla and some districts of Karnali Zone in the Far Western Development region of Nepal.

Rohit took the line of utilizing Panchayat elections to expand his party's network as well as communist ideology. Accordingly, he was successful in sending a representative of his party to the National Panchayat in 1981 and 1986 elections. Mr. Karna Hyonju, who represented this party to National Panchayat in 1981, however, turned himself into a 'bona-fide' Pancha once he was elected to panchayati legislature. Rohit's supporters lynched him to death allegedly in 1987 in Bhaktapur during the relief operations in the aftermath of massive earthquake. Rohit and his supporters were arrested for the murder, and were later released following the restoration of multi-party system in April 1990. This party participated in the United Left Front until it withdrew from the Front in early December 1990.

6. People's Front Nepal (PFN)-

PFN was formed on 10 July 2002 after two parties – United People's Front (Vaidya) and Rastriya Janamorcha Nepal (National People's Front, NPF) – merged, whose present president is Mr. Amik Sherchan.

Before merging, the UPF (Vaidya) was formed on 8 August 1994 due to a split in the UPF, whose chairman was Amik Sherchan. This party believes in parliamentary process and democratic system and is willing to contest the election of the House of Representatives. The UPF (Vaidya) got nine seats in the general election of 1991, no seats during mid-term polls of 1994, and got one seat during 1999 general election.

Likewise, the other faction, National People's Front (NPF), was established on 1995 and headed by Mr. Chitra Bahadur K.C. prior to its merging. This party is left aligned and supports multiparty democracy, and had won five seats during the general election of 1999.

Constitutional Provisions regarding Parliamentary Power

Parliamentary Power have been considered as another national "actor" because in the Preamble of the *Constitution of Kingdom of Nepal – 1990*, the political system of Nepal is considered as parliamentary multiparty democracy.¹¹⁸ Likewise, Part 17 of this constitution

¹¹⁸ *Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 2047 (1990)*, Preamble.

elaborates the position of the political organizations, and Part 8 talks about how from within the political organizations election is conducted for the Parliament.¹¹⁹

Under Part 17, Political Organizations, it is stated that persons who are committed to common political objectives and programs shall, subject to laws made under proviso (3) of clause (2) of Article 12 of this constitution, be entitled to form and operate political organizations or parties of their choice and to generate or cause to be generated publicly in order to secure support and cooperation from the general public for their objectives and programs, and to carry out any other activity for this purpose; any law, arrangement or decision which restricts any of such activities shall be inconsistent with this constitution and shall be void.^{120 121}

Similarly, the same constitution has the following provisions relating to single party – any law, arrangement or decision which allows for participation or involvement of only a single political organization or party or persons having a single political ideology in the elections or in the political system of the country shall be inconsistent with this constitution and shall be void.¹²² Likewise, it further continues stating that the Election Commission shall withhold recognition from any political organization or any party formed either with the objectives of single political organizations or on the basis of religion, community, caste, tribe or region.¹²³ To make the standing of the political organizations strong, this constitution requires at least five percent women candidates of the total number of candidates for the purpose of election to the House of Representatives.¹²⁴

¹¹⁹ Ibid., Part 8 and 17.

¹²⁰ Ibid., Part 17, Article 112(1).

¹²¹ Freedom to form unions and associations, provided that nothing in this clause shall be deemed to prevent the making of laws to impose reasonable restrictions on any act which may undermine the sovereignty, integrity or law and order situation of the Kingdom of Nepal. See, Ibid., Article 12(2), © and (3).

¹²² Ibid., Article 112(2).

¹²³ Ibid., Article 112(3).

¹²⁴ Ibid., Article 114.

On the other hand, in the same Part of the constitution, provisions required for securing recognition for the purpose of contesting elections as a political organizations or party has been stated:

Any political organizations or party wishing to secure recognition from the Election Commission for the purposes of elections, shall be required to register its name with the office of the Election Commission in accordance with the procedure as determined by the Commission. A petition so submitted for registration shall contain clear information about the name of the concerned political organization or party, the names and the addresses of the members to its executive committee or any such committee and such petition shall be accompanied by the rules and manifesto of the organization or the party...Political organizations and parties must have secured a minimum of three percent of the total votes cast in the election to the House of Representatives held pursuant to this Constitution in order to qualify for registration.¹²⁵

The elected members from various political parties make up the Legislature of Nepal, which consists of His Majesty and the two Houses – House of Representatives and National Assembly.¹²⁶ The House of Representatives consists of 205 members for the duration of five years unless dissolved earlier, where one member is elected from each election constituency.¹²⁷¹²⁸ Under the “*state of emergency*” situation, the term of the House of Representatives may be extended by an Act for a period not exceeding one year.¹²⁹ Any vacancy in a seat occurring in the House of Representatives, while a portion of its term still remains, shall be filled through by election.¹³⁰ The House of Representatives shall, elect a Speaker and a Deputy Speaker from among its members.¹³¹

¹²⁵ Ibid., Article 113(1 and 2).

¹²⁶ Ibid., Article 44.

¹²⁷ Ibid., Article 45(1 and 2).

¹²⁸ For the purpose of the election, the administrative districts shall be treated as election districts, and the ratio of the number of seats allocated to any district shall be, so far as practicable, equal to the ratio of population of that district to the national population as determined by the last census preceding the concerned election; and the number of election constituencies shall be equal to the number of seats so allocated. See Ibid., Article 45(2).

¹²⁹ Ibid., Article 45(3).

¹³⁰ Ibid., Article 45(8).

¹³¹ Ibid., Article 51.

Likewise, the National Assembly shall consist of sixty members – ten members to be nominated by His Majesty from amongst persons of high reputation who have rendered prominent service in various fields of national life; thirty-five members, including at least three women candidates, to be elected by the House of Representatives in accordance with the provisions of law, on the basis of the system of proportional representation by means of the single transferable vote; and, fifteen members, three from each of the Development Regions, to be elected in accordance with laws on the basis of the system of single transferable vote by an electoral college consisting of the Chief and the Deputy-Chief of the Village and Town level Local Authorities and the Chief, Deputy-Chief, and the members of the District level Local Authorities.¹³² This assembly is a permanent House with tenure of six years with one-third of its members' tenure expiring every two years.¹³³ The National Assembly shall elect a Chairman and Vice Chairman from among its members.¹³⁴

Looking at these provisions mentioned in the constitution, it is clearly seen that the political parties that have the elected representatives in the House of Representatives play a vital role in the political system of Nepal. These political parties cannot be left aside, because they do represent the general populace – in which lies the sovereignty. Though party politics have their own vested political interests, the present constitution does not have any provisions for any of the political parties to be left aside for political activities. Especially, those parties that do secure more than three percent of vote during the previous election is only considered for election purposes – this itself is self-explanatory for the choice of the six major political parties made for this paper.

¹³² Nepal has five development regions: Eastern, Central, Western, Mid-Western, and Far Western.

¹³³ *Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 2047 (1990)*, Article 46 [1(a), 1(b), 1(c), 2, 3].

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, Article 52.

The Events, Perceptions, Intentions, and Influence of the Parliamentary Power since 4 October 2002 regarding the Maoist demands

After His Majesty Gyanendra removed PM Deuba and assumed the executive power, according to Article 127 of the constitution on 4 October 2002, the political parties are seen to be totally against the royal move. Though the King tried to get the consensus of the parties for the formation of the new Council of Ministers, it didn't become possible because of the ongoing internal and external squabbles between and among the political parties. This resulted in appointing Mr. Lokendra Bahadur Chand as the PM of Nepal on 10 October 2002 by His Majesty.¹³⁵ After this appointment, His Majesty formed the Council of Ministers on 11 October 2002 on the recommendations of PM Chand.¹³⁶ Though Chand appealed to all the political parties to come ahead to participate in the government, they refused and said that the King had made an unconstitutional move by appointing him as the PM.¹³⁷ The paragraphs that follow will include the views and perceptions of the six main political parties; but prior to this it is appropriate to state the joint perception. It can be seen that the major political parties have jointly denied participating the newly formed Chand government. A joint meeting of six political parties was held on 25 October 2002 at the NCP (UML) Central Office, where the following decisions were taken to advance ahead the country in the positive direction for safeguarding the achievements of the popular mass movement of 1990:

It is an unquestionable fact that the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal, 1990 was promulgated to exercise the sovereignty and the state power according to the will of the Nepalese people expressed in the mass movement of 1990. It is also an established fact in the country that the sovereignty of the kingdom of Nepal, according to the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal, 1990, has been invested on the Nepalese people and the Nepalese people's opinion was expressed in the election held for the

¹³⁵ News on Radio Nepal, 11 October 2002 at 1510 hrs.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ "Early polls and peace talks with Maoists is a top priority for the present government: PM Chand."

House of Representatives in 1999. In fact, the political parties elected in the dissolved House of Representatives represent the sovereign Nepalese people until the last mandate of the people proves otherwise. In relevance of this fact, the conclusion of the last all party meeting held on 7 October 2002 is still valid. In that decision we had agreed that the situation of the country had has been further complicated and uncertain due to the constitution of the Council of Ministers undermining the suggestions of the political parties. The political parties were of the opinion that the Council of Ministers should be constituted according to the will of the Nepalese people expressed through the mass movement of 1990, the spirit of Preamble and Article 128 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal, 1990 and nominating the representatives recommended by the political parties on the basis of their suggestion and consent. Therefore, we once again emphasize on the fact that the solution of the developing complicated situation should be sought according to the democratic system within the constitution in consonance with the consultation of the political parties represented in the dissolved House of Representatives.¹³⁸

Similarly, on 10 January 2003, the leaders of the five Leftist Parties pressurized for the necessity of united agitation for the progressive solution to the problem; one of the participants said that the country has reached the stage of agitation and for this the Leftist parties should sit for the discussion and ready for united agitation.¹³⁹ Regarding the declaration of ceasefire, the parties “cautiously” welcomed the truce, still longing for a “final and joint audience” with the King.¹⁴⁰

In the all-party meeting held on 23 January 2003, NC, NCP (UML), NWPP and PFN decided to jointly appeal to the King for an audience, and if the audience is granted the party leaders planned to hand over a copy of the report prepared by the task force -- formed to draft the nature of the struggle -- and make a final appeal to the King to revoke the 4 October 2002

¹³⁸ *Press Communiqué of six political parties.*

¹³⁹ “Five Leftist parties demand for Interim government,” *Annapurna Post* (Kathmandu) daily Nepalese newspaper, 11 January 2003, Vol. 1, No. 234.

¹⁴⁰ “Four parties want ‘final joint’ meeting with king,” *Himalayan Times* (Kathmandu) daily English newspaper, 25 January 2003, Vol. 2, No. 64.

move.¹⁴¹ According to the parties, if there is no positive response, they will go for a struggle.¹⁴²¹⁴³

To continue further with the perceptions of the individual political parties, detailed information has been provided for the analytical purpose of this paper.

Nepali Congress (NC)-

A day after His Majesty Gyanendra removed PM Deuba, NC termed the King's move as "unconstitutional and undemocratic," and the views were expressed that the royal move could weaken the constitutional monarchy and multiparty democracy.¹⁴⁴ The NC also arrived at the decision that:

...the irresponsible moves of Prime Minister Deuba that he took after the dissolution of the House of Representatives and aftermath were responsible to lead the present situation of the country. In another decision, party reiterates its demand for reinstatement of the dissolved House claiming it was the only way to safeguard the achievements of 1990 popular movement...also stressed the need to start dialogue between the political parties and the monarch to end the present state of political turmoil and mistrust between them and also bring back the national politics into right track.¹⁴⁵

According to Arjun Narsingh K.C., the spokesman of the NC, Koirala is said to have told His Majesty that the Royal action was against the letter and spirit of the constitution, and then suggested the monarch to resurrect the dissolved parliament as the first preference, followed by the formation of the all-party government as a second choice.¹⁴⁶ K.C. added that the monarch had

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ *NCs term King's move 'unconstitutional, undemocratic'*, 5 October 2002 [online news]; available from http://www.kantipuronline.com/archive/kpost/2002-10-6/kp_frontpg.htm#LookForward; Internet; accessed 6 October 2002.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Damaru Lal Bhandari & Ghanashyam Ojha, *Leaders advise HM to form all-party government*, 6 October 2002 [on-line news]; available from http://www.kantipuronline.com/archive/kpost/2002-10-7/kp_frontpg.htm#LeadersAdvise; Internet; accessed 7 October 2002.

asked Koirala's opinion on the formation of the "all-sided" government, which would also have representation of the King, but the NC wanted only those steeped in parliamentary practice to be in the coming government.¹⁴⁷

Similarly, another leader of NC, Mr. Narhari Acharya remarked on 20 October 2002, that all the political parties must be ready for the constituent assembly because the royal promulgation and formation of the new government had overruled the constitution of the country.¹⁴⁸ A day later, former DPM Poudel said that the Parliamentary election is impossible unless the government initiates dialogue with the Maoists; stressing the revival of the dissolved Parliament, Poudel expressed that Maoists would initiate talks only with the parties and constitutionally elected government.¹⁴⁹ Supporting Poudel, NC party spokesman K.C. said that the time had not come to demand for the constituent assembly at the present context of the country.¹⁵⁰

In due course, the Central Working Committee of NC met under the chairmanship of Koirala on 22 October 2002, and came forward with the following decisions:¹⁵¹

- NC upholds its earlier stand that the Royal Announcement of 4 October 2002 has transgressed the Preamble of the 1990 constitution that says 'people are and shall remain the source of national sovereignty'. NC neither lends political support to the present government, which has been formed violating the constitutional provision, nor intends to participate in it. The logical and constitutional solution to the present political impasse is: i), the holding of the general elections within six month period, or in case if it is not feasible, ii), the continuation of dissolved parliament by reinstating it. Since, as it has not been possible to hold general elections, the reinstatement of dissolved Parliament alone can help to bring back

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ "Political parties must be ready for Constitutional Assembly – Mr. Narahari Acharya," *Kantipur* (Kathmandu) daily Nepalese newspaper, 21 October 2002, Vol. 10, No. 241.

¹⁴⁹ "Political parties must stress reinstating dissolved Parliament, if the government fails to conduct election by Nov/Dec 2002 – Mr. Ram Chandra Poudel," *Rajdhani* (Kathmandu) daily Nepalese newspaper, 22 October 2002, Vol. II, NO. 135.

¹⁵⁰ "Nepali Congress Central Committee meeting calls for parliament reinstatement," *Rajdhani* (Kathmandu) daily Nepalese newspaper, 23 October 2002, Vol II, No. 136; other local Nepalese media dated 23 Oct 2002.

¹⁵¹ *NC Press Statement on 22 October 2002*, 22 October 2002 [online press release]; available from http://www.nepalicongress.org.np/press-release/press_statement.html; Internet; accessed 15 November 2002.

the troubled political process to normalcy and that would help to find political as well as constitutional solution of the existing problems arising out of Maoist activities.

- In order to ensure the freedom of the people as well as of the national self-confidence and unity, all sides of the national spectrum need to adopt the practical viewpoint with the necessary seriousness of the purpose and commitment. In this context, an attempt by any side of the political spectrum to seek a solution in isolation to the problem, will become futile and only will contribute to the complexity of the existing problem. In view of this, it is the time view of NC that the solution to the existing national problem lies in the joint effort, based upon the values established by the People's Movement of 1990 and in close understanding and mutual trust between His Majesty and the political parties, represented in the dissolved parliament. In view of grave political situation of the country, Nepali congress thinks that all pro-democracy forces need to proceed ahead jointly, on the basis of mutual trust, understanding and solid unity with concrete programs.
- In view of the grave and difficult situation now existing in the country, NC makes a public appeal to the NCP (Maoist) for an immediate halt to its incessant, in-human violence upon the workers of the political parties, including NC, and also of the armless general people. The party also appeals to the Maoists to come forward in order to participate in the political mainstream of the country and be sensitive for the protection and preservation of the freedom of the country and her people.
- NC remains fully committed to go to the people in order to form public opinion for the restoration of people's sovereign rights, exercised through their duly elected representatives, that have been taken away unconstitutionally by the royal declaration of 4 October 2002. In this regard, NC has decided that the local level bodies of the party, together with its fraternal organizations, will conduct programs at their corresponding levels and that the members of the Central Working Committee will visit various regions and submits their reports within two months.

On another occasion, Krishna Sitaula, a member of NC Central Working Committee, said on 24 November 2002, that the King dismissed the Deuba Cabinet on charge that he could not hold election on scheduled date; but the king too could neither hold election nor declare date for the polls within six months of the dissolution of the parliament.¹⁵²

¹⁵² Nepal Solidarity Network, *Chand government on fire for keeping mum on poll dates*, 25 November 2002 [on-line news from *The Kathmandu Post*]; available from http://63.123.146.244/sage/nepalsolidarity/news112502_04.shtml; Internet; accessed 28 November 2002.

Regarding the Maoist proposal of forming a dialogue team, NC President Koirala said on 6 December 2002 that he could not grasp the "significance" of the Maoist proposal insisting on the formation of a dialogue committee by none other than the King himself; on the other hand, NC Central Working Committee member Narahari Acharya said that the King and political parties must not be scared of the constituent assembly, which would ultimately represent the people's opinion.¹⁵³ Whereas, the Speaker of the House of Representatives Mr. Tara Nath Ranabhatt, who is also a member of NC, warned the king and the political parties that the ongoing conflict between them could be "dangerous" to the country; hence he called them to stand united to resist the force of "republic seekers".¹⁵⁴

In the continuation of the views being floated, Koirala while addressing a huge rally of party workers in Birtamode of Jhapa district on 17 December 2002 demanded that army should be made accountable to parliament under statute.¹⁵⁵ To gain public support, the NC announced a nation-wide rally on 5 January 2003 to protest against the royal move of October 4; the objective of the rally was to impress upon the King the need to make correction in the constitutional process and to press for the redressal of the hardship faced at the local level – main among them being the restoration of law and order and security from the Maoist rebels.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵³ Nepal Solidarity Network, *Koirala doubts Maoist moves*, 7 December 2002 [on-line news from *The Kathmandu Post*]; available from http://63.123.146.244/sage/nepalsolidarity/news120702_02.shtml; Internet; accessed 10 December 2002.

¹⁵⁴ This view was expressed at the workshop on "Management of Conflicts in Nepal," organized by Center for Study on Good Governance and Democracy (CSGD). See *The Stand off between king, parties 'dangerous', warns Speaker*, 17 December 2002 [online news]; available from <http://www.nepalnews.com.np/contents/englishdaily/ktmpost/2002/dec/dec18/index.htm#3>; Internet; accessed 25 December 2002.

¹⁵⁵ Chintamani Dahal, *Make army accountable to parliament, says Koirala*, 19 December 2002 [online news of *The Kathmandu Post*]; available from <http://www.nepalnews.com.np/contents/englishdaily/ktmpost/2002/dec/dec19/index1.htm>; Internet; accessed 21 December 2002.

¹⁵⁶ *NC rally on January 5 to protest against royal move*, 20 December 2002 [online news]; available from <http://www.nepalnews.com.np/contents/englishdaily/ktmpost/2002/dec/dec21/index.htm#3>; Internet; accessed 20 December 2002.

Likewise, during a program on “Constitutional Crisis and Its resolution,” NC Spokesman K.C. said that the issue of constituent assembly is democratic and it is not against the principle of the NC or democracy, however, in present circumstances the NC does not see any relevance of it.¹⁵⁷ Emphasizing the need to restore the House of Representatives in order to bring back the present constitution into its original state, K.C. said as the Maoists have laid off their demand for republic a political resolution should be looked for to bring them into the democratic process.¹⁵⁸ On the same occasion, NC Central [Committee] member Acharya expressed that in case of consensus among the democrats, monarch, and the Maoists [all] should go for the constituent assembly for safeguarding the achievement of the 1990 popular movement, multiparty culture, the sovereignty of the people and the country.¹⁵⁹

With these perceptions coming forward, it came to be known on 22 Dec 2002 that the President of NC, Koirala, had a meeting with the Maoist politburo member and the President of Revolutionary Council, Dr. Baburam Bhattarai at Chandigarh [India]. According to the source, Dr. Bhattarai came from Jharkhand [Bihar, India] to Chandigarh to meet Koirala. The meeting lasted for nearly five hours in which both the leaders discussed about the present political situation of the country, the royal move, and other important subjects related to the country.¹⁶⁰ On the other hand, Mr. Sushil Koirala, NC General Secretary stoutly opposed the October 4 Royal move and called for an early re-instatement of the dissolved House of Representatives, and warned that any delay in resolution of the Maoists crises could prove disastrous for the nation.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁷ *Leaders express mixed reactions on current political crisis*, 21 December 2002 [online news]; available from http://www.spacetimeonline.com/Pub/Dec_22/ST_Today_Country.htm#6; Internet; accessed 22 December 2002.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ “Talks between Nepali Congress President Koirala and Maoist leader Dr. Bhattarai,” *Naya Current* (Kathmandu) weekly Nepalese newspaper, 24 December 2002.

¹⁶¹ *King blamed for split in political parties*, 25 December 2002 [online news]; available from

Likewise, on 27 December 2002, commenting on the government-Maoist talks, Koirala said, there would be no meaning of the dialogue as long as the parliament is not revived, and also accused the government of unpreparedness on the issue of talks and agenda.¹⁶² Koirala, who has launched a crusade against the dissolution of the House of Representatives, also said that the problems dogging the nation could not be resolved by use of force; instead, it is the King and the Parliament, which can be expected to unitedly [sic] resolve the issue.¹⁶³ He further said that since 4 October, the current political situation looks apparently both fragile and uncertain because the Maoist problem continues to dilute the political equation of the country; thus the political mismatch that has brought the King to the fore is democratically a contradicting force.¹⁶⁴

Regarding the ceasefire by government-Maoist, NC President Koirala said that there was enough room for suspicions as the two armed forces would come together against the democratic forces; and continued by saying that during the talk both sides should concentrate on safeguarding and consolidating the achievements of 1990 popular movement.¹⁶⁵ He further said that he did not know if talks were with the King or the Prime Minister, nor the conditional ties.¹⁶⁶ However, on 31 January 2003, Koirala hinted that his party would sit alongside the government

<http://www.nepalnews.com.np/contents/englishdaily/ktmpost/2002/dec/dec26/local.htm#2>; Internet; accessed 25 December 2002.

¹⁶² Binod Bhandari and Bhim Ghimire, *King cannot go against people's wish: Koirala*, 27 December 2002 [online news of *The Kathmandu Post*]; available from

<http://www.nepalnews.com.np/contents/englishdaily/ktmpost/2002/dec/dec28/index.htm#8>; Internet; accessed 1 January 2003.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ Puran P. Bista, *Power and politics*, 31 December 2002 [online news of *The Kathmandu Post*]; available from <http://www.nepalnews.com.np/contents/englishdaily/ktmpost/2002/dec/dec31/features.htm#4>; Internet; accessed 31 December 2002.

¹⁶⁵ *Parties "cautiously" welcome truce declaration*, 30 January 2003 [online news]; available from <http://www.kantipuronline.com>; Internet; accessed 30 January 2003.

¹⁶⁶ *Koirala, Nepal reaction*, 30 January 2003 [online news]; available from <http://www.nepalnews.com.np/archive/2003/january/arc588.htm>; Internet; accessed 31 January 2003.

for peace talks with Maoists if they were invited; and if the political parties were sidelined, the NC would counter it with new strategy.¹⁶⁷

Nepal Communist Party (United Marxist Leninist) or NCP (UML)-

During the audience with the King, after the removal of PM Deuba, General Secretary of NCP (UML) Mr. Madhav Kumar Nepal told that he had suggested formation of an all-party government as the only viable option; and the solution to bring the Maoists in the political main stream was by holding peaceful dialogues with them. He further said that UML is not in favor of the revival of the dissolved parliament, and they wanted the elections to be held as soon as possible in fair and free manner.¹⁶⁸ On 8 October 2002, the Central Committee meeting of NCP (UML) was held at its party office, which concluded that the royal promulgation made on 4 October was against the spirit of the people's movement, 1990 and has violated the *Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal, 1990*; the meeting further emphasized that future steps should be taken, as per the constitution and on the basis of trust and understanding between the political parties in the parliament and His Majesty the King, to hold free and fair elections as soon as possible.¹⁶⁹

At a Tea Party, organized by NCP (UML) on 20 October 2002 at its party headquarters, the leaders expressed that if the King would not initiate to amend his earlier decision of formation of Chand government; then the government he had formed would not be able to acquire political support of the parties. Likewise, General Secretary Nepal stressed on constituting a new government under Article 128 of the constitution, and also added that if the

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ Damaru Lal Bhandari and Ghanshyam Ojha, *UML for national government*, 6 October 2002 [online news]; available from http://www.kantipuronline.com/archive/kpost/2002-10-7/kp_frontpg.htm#; Internet; accessed 7 October 2002.

¹⁶⁹ *UML 31st meeting of the Central Committee*, 8 October 2002 [online]; available from <http://www.cpunuml.org>; Internet; accessed 15 October 2002.

necessary amendment would be made then his party would probably support the government.¹⁷⁰¹⁷¹

Eventually, the meeting of the Central Committee of NCP (UML) was held on 31 October 2002, which decided to launch a “People’s Consciousness Campaign” intending to create public opinion in safeguarding the *Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 1990*, to extend further achievements of people's movement of 1990, to protest against the encroachment of the constitution, to encourage dialogue and understanding among political parties, the King and the civil society and to create a ground for progress, deterring the country from conflict and clashes.¹⁷² Talking to journalists at the Tribhuvan International Airport (TIA) [at Kathmandu], on his return from Sri Lanka, NCP (UML) General Secretary Nepal said the facts that executive powers have been given back to the Chand ministry should come in an authoritative way from the Royal Palace; and also reiterated that a “national government” with the participation of all the political parties of the dissolved House of Representatives could be the only alternative to give way out to the present constitutional and political crises.¹⁷³ Commenting on the nation-wide barbaric Maoist attacks upon civilians and development infrastructures, Nepal said that the Maoists should understand the fact that even the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri

¹⁷⁰ *Political parties appealing His Majesty himself to amend his earlier decision*, 20 October 2002 [online news]; available from <http://www.nepalnews.com.np>; Internet; accessed 20 October 2002.

¹⁷¹ Article 128 of the *Constitution of The Kingdom of Nepal – 1990*, states the provisions regarding the Council of Ministers. Under Article 128(1), it states that the Council of Ministers existing at the commencement of this Constitution shall be deemed to have been constituted under this Constitution. Likewise, under Article 128(2) it is stated that if, for any reason the Council of Ministers referred to in Clause (1) is dissolved, His Majesty shall constitute a new Council of Ministers consisting of representatives from the main political parties; and under Article 128(3) it is stated that a Council of Ministers constituted under Clause (2) above shall consist of a Prime Minister and, on his recommendation, other Ministers, State Ministers and Assistant Ministers as may be required. See, *Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 2047 (1990)*.

¹⁷² *NCP (UML) Central Committee meeting decisions*, 31 October 2002 [online]; available from <http://www.cpnulm.org>; Internet; accessed 15 November 2002.

¹⁷³ Nepal Solidarity Network, *Nepal demands executive power for Chand government*, 17 November 2002 [online news from *The Kathmandu Post*]; available from http://63.123.146.244/sage/nepalsolidarity/news111702_04.shtml; Internet; accessed 20 December 2002.

Lanka, after the loss of several thousands of people and millions of property had to come back to the table for talks.¹⁷⁴

During December 2002, in an interaction program on “Constitutional Crisis and Its Resolution,” the NCP (UML) Central Committee member Bhim Rawal said that the Maoists have not guaranteed whether they would recognize the constitution out of the constituent assembly, whether they would lay down their arms, and said that the new constitution may lead to an adverse situation by doing away with the rights of the people.¹⁷⁵

On 2 January 2003, General Secretary Nepal, in his paper, presented at the 33rd Central Committee meeting, came down heavily on the King and Mr. K. P. Oli, an influential party leader. Nepal, in his paper charged the King with violating the agreement reached between the monarch, Left Front and NC at the time of formulating the constitution, after the 1990 “Peoples’ Movement.”¹⁷⁶ Holding the monarchy as responsible for the current political crisis, the 10th page of the paper mentions that the major political difference, following the royal move, is against the reactionary and regressive forces; it further mentions that the differences have been reflected through the movements and struggles, being largely carried out by UML and other political parties, against the autocratic rule and regressive forces.¹⁷⁷

In the report the UML, a party which favors constitutional monarchy, for the first time mentioned under the sub-title “Perspectives to view at monarchy” on page 53, that monarchy has lost its credit, while going against the judicial movement of the people and it has been a target of

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

¹⁷⁵ *Leaders express mixed reactions on current political crisis*, 21 December 2002 [online news]; available from http://www.spacetimeonline.com/Pub/Dec_22/ST_Today_Country.htm#6; Internet; accessed 25 December 2002.

¹⁷⁶ Ghanshyam Ojha, *Nepal’s angry diatribe against king, Oli*, 3 January 2003 [online news]; available from <http://www.nepalnews.com.np/contents/englishdaily/ktmpost/2003/jan/jan03/index.htm#4>; Internet; accessed 5 January 2003.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

peoples' revolution and protest.¹⁷⁸ It further mentions that during such a situation, the institution has fallen into a great crisis, plunging the entire nation into a state of instability and chaos, and holds the palace responsible for dividing political parties, seducing the party leaders and cadres by preying on their greed and creating a false illusion among the political parties.¹⁷⁹ In support to Nepals' paper dated 2 January 2003, the Central Committee of NCP (UML) endorsed the organizational and political report on 6 January 2003, which concludes with the view that the major political differences of the party was with the King.¹⁸⁰

On 14 January 2003, General Secretary Nepal blamed the King of attempting to revive the party-less *Panchayati system* by accepting the civic felicitation in Biratnagar [Nepal] on 3 January 2003, where he accused the King of trying to herald his active politics at the city, which has a glorious history of initiating struggle to uproot both *Rana regime* and *Panchayat system* in the past.¹⁸¹ He then warned of the unprecedented consequences -- launch a united movement against the King -- incase the king keeps on ignoring the suggestions of political parties.¹⁸²

On the other hand, in respect to the ceasefire between the government and the Maoists, the NCP (UML) General Secretary has welcomed it and said that it would be good if it moves forward in an easy manner, but pointed out his dissatisfaction about the national parties being kept in the dark over the issue.¹⁸³ In yet another turn of the deadlock facing the entire nation, Nepal, dropped hints that UML could go for constituent assembly, if all political parties agree

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ *NCP (UML) committee affirms political differences with the king*, 6 Jan 2003, extracted from various local Nepalese newspapers dated 7 January 2003.

¹⁸¹ *King is trying to revive the Panchayati regime*, 14 Jan 2003, extracted from various local newspapers dated 15 January 2003.

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ *NCP (UML) welcomes ceasefire*, 30 Jan 2003, extracted from local Nepalese newspaper dated 31 January 2003.

that the current constitution is non-functional.¹⁸⁴ He further said that the way the ceasefire has been announced has raised concerns.¹⁸⁵

Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP)-

King Gyanendra also granted audience to Surya Bahadur Thapa, the leader of the RPP which had already welcomed the monarch's actions to sack the government of Deuba; Thapa is said to have suggested that an all-party government should be formed which should also have the representation of the King.¹⁸⁶ Enumerating the option, which ought to be explored, RPP Vice President Dr. Prakash Chandra Lohani said that their party could at the most settle for a government constituting of parties that believe in parliamentary process, and representation of the King.¹⁸⁷

During December 2002, the newly elected Chairman of RPP, Mr. Pashupati SJB Rana, suggested the need to analyze conflicts scientifically, while reiterating his party's commitment to consensus among political parties, and then for agreement between the King and the political parties.¹⁸⁸ In an interview, Mr. Rana said:

We must admit that the parliament failed to find a way out to the problem of Maoist insurgency for nearly three years. So, there is no guarantee that the restoration of parliament would help to resolve the problem. All of us should accept that restoration of peace is the main agenda at present... We should find a common platform that is agreeable to all seven [now six after one of them merged] parties in the dissolved parliament and His Majesty. We have seen that the Maoists have been able to keep the establishment divided over the last three or four years. G P Koirala was their enemy number one till sometime back. Now, they are befriending him. So, if the establishment agrees to come together, the Maoists too

¹⁸⁴ Ghanashyam Ojha, Ujir Magar & Shyam Sundra Sashi, *Nepal tilts towards constituent assembly*, 30 January 2003 [online news]; available from <http://www.kantipuronline.com>; Internet; accessed 31 January 2003.

¹⁸⁵ *Leaders welcome ceasefire, doubt Maoist commitment*, 31 January 2003 [online news]; available from <http://www.nepalnews.com.np/archive/2003/january/arc589.htm>; accessed 1 February 2003.

¹⁸⁶ Damaru Lal Bhandari & Ghanashyam Ojha, *Leaders advise HM to form all-party government*.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ *The Stand off between King, parties 'dangerous', warns Speaker*.

would be forced to come to the negotiating table...It is obvious that the parliamentary parties and government can agree on the bottom line of constitutional monarchy and multi-party democracy...The Maoist insurgency does have a regional dimension in the sense that there are very similar movements in other parts of the subcontinent such as People's War Group (PWG) and Maoist Communist Center (MCC). The Maoist parties operating in the region have also set up their regional network. The geopolitical affects us in the sense that if the situation persists, a security vacuum would emerge here. As we are located between two nuclear powers to the north and south, a very dangerous situation could unfold. So, it is not in the interest of either India or China to let instability in Nepal prolong itself.¹⁸⁹

Regarding PM Chand's government, RPP issued a 15 days ultimatum on 21 January 2003 to the Prime Minister to quit his party post or the premiership, criticizing Chand for failing to protect the interest of the party workers.¹⁹⁰ On the other hand, about the ceasefire decision, the RPP said on 30 January 2003 that it is a positive decision unless the parties do not utilize the period for mulling further strategies against the Nepali people.¹⁹¹

Nepal Sadbhawana Party (NSP)-

On 6 October 2002, NSP extended belated critical support to the Royal action; but also thought that the "action" is "contradictory to democratic norms and constitutional provisions."¹⁹² The party further emphasized the need for a national consensus among the King, political parties and the civic society to overcome current political turmoil and safeguard constitution and constitutional monarchy.¹⁹³

¹⁸⁹ *A more influential role doesn't mean a role outside the constitution*, 24 December 2002 [interview of Mr. Pashupati SJB Rana]; available from <http://www.nepalnews.com.np/contents/englishdaily/ktmpost/2002/dec/dec24/features.htm#6>; Internet; accessed 10 January 2003.

¹⁹⁰ *RPP not happy with PM Chand*, 22 January 2003 [online news]; available from <http://www.nepalnews.com.np/archive/2003/january/arc581.htm>; Internet; accessed 25 January 2003.

¹⁹¹ Parties "cautiously" welcome truce declaration.

¹⁹² Damaru Lal Bhandari & Ghanashyam Ojha, *Leaders advise HM to form all-party government*.

¹⁹³ Himalayan News Service, *NSP for consensus to overcome current crisis*, 6 October 2002 [online news]; available from http://nepalresearch.org/ht_excerpts/2002_10/ht_2002_1007.htm#NSP; Internet; accessed 15 December 2002.

Likewise, on 7 October 2002, a press statement was released after the Central Working Committee of NSP met. In the statement it was stated the necessity for the King, political parties and the civic society to join hands to resolve various problems including the Maoists at the present adverse situation of the country; and also concluded that the concern expressed by His Majesty the King in prevailing situation in the country and the commitment towards the constitutional monarchy, multiparty democracy and the consideration of the spirit of the constitution in the royal promulgation was also commitment towards the constitution.¹⁹⁴

On the other hand, on 12 November 2002, the senior member of NSP -- Mr. Hirdesh Tripathi -- said that there is a necessity of interim government including the Maoists party to solve the present situation of the country; and like in 1990 a new constitution should also be established.¹⁹⁵ Regarding the government-Maoist ceasefire, NSP thinks that it is very positive.

Nepal Workers and Peasants Party (NWPP)-

On 6 October 2002, His Majesty Gyanendra granted audience to Mr. Narayan Man Bijukchhe, president of NWPP, where Bijukchhe suggested the King to first hold the local election and then go for the parliamentary polls in response to King's queries, and also drew the attention of His Majesty to hand over the executive power to the political parties.¹⁹⁶

Similarly, during December 2002, Bijukchhe told that that the 1990 people's movement was not enough to assure the public sovereignty, another greater revolution is required to assure

¹⁹⁴ "Nepal Sadbhawana Party," Nispakchaya (Kathmandu) weekly Nepalese newspaper, 8 October 2002, Vol. XI, No. 26.

¹⁹⁵ Nepal Television news, 11 Nov 2002.

¹⁹⁶ Damaru Lal Bhandari & Ghanashyam Ojha, *Leaders advise HM to form all-party government*.

people of their rights, and constituent assembly is the need of time.¹⁹⁷ Regarding the ceasefire, the party has made no comments until the information cut-off date, 30 January 2003.

People's Front Nepal (PFN)-

On 9 November 2002, PFN Chairman Mr. Amik Sherchan claimed that the rebel leadership has dropped hint of sitting for peace talks under active assistance from the human rights organizations; he, however, debunked claims that the government has become successful in cultivating contacts in the rebel outfit as part of efforts to bring the outfit to the dialogue table.¹⁹⁸

Likewise, on 19 November 2002, United Leftist Front Nepal of which PFN is a component, released a press statement demanding immediate solution of the present political turmoil, either by reinstating the dissolved House of Representatives or constituting interim government will all-party consensus.¹⁹⁹ Moreover, to show its protest the PFN organized protest rallies on 16 December 2002 in various parts of the country, giving strong warning to the King of serious consequences unless the monarch rectifies His “constitutional mistakes” committed on 4 October.²⁰⁰ Addressing a mass meeting in Baglung [Nepal], Amik Sherchan warned that the future of the monarchy would be in danger if the monarch did not rectify his constitutional errors.²⁰¹ Meanwhile, addressing a rally in Narayangadh [Nepal], party's Vice-Chairman and

¹⁹⁷ *Alliance for united movement against royal moves says Deuba*, 22 December 2002 [online news]; available from <http://www.nepalnews.com.np/contents/englishdaily/ktmpost/2002/dec/dec23/index.htm#8>; Internet; accessed 26 December 2002.

¹⁹⁸ Nepal Solidarity Network, *Left leaders claim rebels ready for discussions*, 10 November 2002 [online news of *The Kathmandu Post*]; available from http://63.123.146.244/sage/nepalsolidarity/news111002_06.shtml; Internet; accessed 15 December 2003.

¹⁹⁹ “Leftist Front demand an interim government,” *Space Time* (Kathmandu) daily Nepalese newspaper, 20 November 2002, Vol. III, No. 15.

²⁰⁰ *People's Front holds nation wide rallies*, 16 December 2002 [online news]; available from <http://www.nepalnews.com.np/contents/englishdaily/ktmpost/2002/dec/dec17/index.htm#10>; Internet; accessed 17 December 2002.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

former lawmaker Lilamani Pokharel said that the people would launch a decisive war against the monarchy if the king did not rectify his constitutional mistakes and hand over the executive power to the people; he further said that the election to the constituent assembly is the only solution to the present crisis.²⁰² In yet another mass meeting in Ilam [Nepal], party General Secretary Navaraj Subedi urged all the political parties, abiding by the present constitution, to forge a unity to bring the constitutional process back to the right track and hold dialogue with the warring Maoist rebels; and also rapped both the government security forces and Maoists for killing innocent people in the name of maintaining peace and security and for the "liberation" of the people.²⁰³

Regarding the ceasefire, the president of PFN said that the success of the ceasefire would depend on how the government deals with other political parties; he further said that there is no ground to be enthusiastic if, the two armed forces alone want to solve the problem by themselves.²⁰⁴

To summarize this period, we can very well say that the perceptions of the six parties were constantly changing as the time progressed, but they all state that the King had made an "unconstitutional move." At present the political parties are conducting their individual and joint party meetings to come to a general consensus on how to move forward. Since, the information cut-off date is 30 January 2003 for this paper, I will not be including other developments.

²⁰² Ibid.

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ *Parties "cautiously" welcome truce declaration.*

The Events, Perceptions, Intentions, and Influence of the Parliamentary Power from the start of Maoist insurgency until 3 October 2002 regarding the Maoist demands

The paragraphs that follow will include the views and perceptions of the six main political parties; but prior to this one should look at the joint perceptions. On 13 October 2000, the nine left parties – NWPP, NCP (Mashal), NCP (United), NCP (Marxist), NCP (Marxist-Leninist), NCP (Marxist-Maoist-Maoist), NCP (Unity Center), United People’s Front (UPF), and National People’s Movement Coordination Committee (NPMCC) -- urged the government to create the "minimum environment" required to holding talks with the Maoist leadership, warning that the government’s move to mobilize the army to combat insurgency could lead to civil war.²⁰⁵

Moving forward with the same perceptions, the nine leftist parties -- NCP (Samyukta), NCP (Marxist-Maoist-Maoist), NCP (Marxist), NCP (Mashal), NCP (Unity Center), UPF, NWPP, NCP (ML), and NCP (UML) – held a joint meeting on 18 January 2002 to analyze the situation originated from the declaration of the “state of emergency,” where they seriously discussed the killings and arrests of hundreds of opposition political party's activists and innocent people; and further condemned the Maoists for their continuing violence and urged them to come for dialogue.

After the dissolution of the House of Representatives on 22 May 2002 by His Majesty the King on the recommendation of PM Deuba, the five political parties – NC, RPP, NSP, NWPP, and PFN – jointly agreed on 23 September 2002, to initiate the reinstatement of the House of Representatives, if the government failed to hold the upcoming election scheduled for 13

²⁰⁵ *Leftists urge government for talks with Maoists*, 14 October 2002 [Online news]; available from <http://www.nepalnews.com.np/contents/englishdaily/ktmpost/2000/oct/oct14/index.htm#5>; Internet; accessed 18 October 2002.

November 2002.²⁰⁶ In support to this, the six major political parties – NC, NCP (UML), RPP, NSP, NWPP, and PFN -- submitted a joint memorandum on 26 September 2002 to PM Deuba, appealing to take immediate steps in creating suitable/secure atmosphere for the forthcoming general election.²⁰⁷ They further accused the government of being unsuccessful in maintaining law & order situation in the country.²⁰⁸

Looking at the deteriorating law and order situation in the country, an all-party meeting of – NC, NC (Democratic), NCP (UML), RPP, PFN, NSP, and NWPP -- was called on 29 September 2002 to discuss the political uncertainty and to seek an alternative to the upcoming November 13 Parliamentary election according to the constitutional provision.²⁰⁹ The meeting reached a conclusion that holding the election on November 13 was not possible due to the lack of adequate security measures; therefore, authority was given collectively to PM Deuba for postponing the scheduled election.²¹⁰

To continue further, the perceptions of the individual political parties are provided below for the analytical purpose of this paper.

Nepali Congress (NC)-

Contradicting views started floating amongst the members of the NC during 11 May 2000. Home Minister Govinda Raj Joshi of NC was expressing the confidence that with enough policemen, armed with sophisticated weapons, the rebels could be controlled; however, there were others who were saying that the issue must be settled through talks and dialogue -- Minister

²⁰⁶ All-party meet agreed to initiate reinstating Parliament if the election could not be held on schedule date.

²⁰⁷ “Six major political parties submitted memorandum to PM Deuba,” *Himalayan Times* (Kathmandu) daily English newspaper, 27 September 2002, Vol 7, No. 275.

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

²⁰⁹ “All Party meeting advised PM Deuba to postpone upcoming November 13 Parliamentary election,” *Space Times* (Kathmandu) daily Nepalese newspaper, 30 September 2002, Vol. 2, No. 33.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

for Water Resources Khum Bahadur Khadka of NC repeated his stance at a meeting in Mahendranagar [Nepal] by saying that the Maoist problems must be solved through talks.²¹¹

Amazingly, only on 20 October 2000, the ruling NC made public its views on Maoist insurgency. Prior to this, the NC Spokesman Mr. Narahari Acharya had presented the party's opinion at the 16 October meeting convened by the committee looking for ways to resolve the problem. The six-part document deals with the problem vis-à-vis constitutional issues, talks and dialogue, deployment of security forces, political, socio-economic and administrative aspects; excerpts from the document are as follows:²¹²

- Issues related to the Constitution-

The NC will not be party to or support any effort or action that would go against the basic provisions of the constitution. The NC does not have any proposal to amend the constitution. The party feels the need to make the present democratic institutions more effective by mobilizing local governance units through decentralization.

- Dialogue-

The NC is always ready to end any problem facing the country through dialogue. The party is ready for unconditional talks and has instructed the government to make efforts to find ways for peace talks to resolve the Maoist problem; and is ready to ensure the safety of the Maoists coming to talks and their safe passage back should the talks break down, and keep secret the discussions until a final decision is reached by both parties. The Maoists should give up violence while the talks are underway and the government should also not take any anti-insurgency measures during that time.

- Mobilization of security forces-

One of the major responsibilities of the government is to ensure the security of all citizens. The armed struggle aimed at toppling the political system underway is not a simple law and order issue. This is what all-political parties

²¹¹ "Division in NC policy regarding Maoists," *The People's Review* [online]; available from <http://www.yomari.com/p-review/2000/05/11052000/division.html>; Internet; accessed 5 January 2003.

²¹² "NC's view of the Maoist problem," *Nepali Times* (Kathmandu) English newspaper, 27 October 2000, translated from Saptahik Bimarsha of 20 October 2000; available from <http://www.nepalnews.com.np/ntimes/oct27-2000/pg6nepalesepress.htm#NC's%20view%20of%20the%20Maoist%20problem>; Internet; accessed 3 January 2003.

and people should be clear about. It is natural for the government to use the forces (the police and the army) at its command to disarm those that have taken up arms against the present political system.

- Political aspect-

It is necessary for all political parties in parliament and other national parties to agree on the following: have maximum policy-level agreement to denounce the Maoist violence and terror, and form joint citizen's security committees; undertake joint public meetings and other political programs; and resolve the issues related to law-making to control the Maoist insurgency.

- Socio-economic aspect (related to the much talked about package program)-

All programs relating to education, health and development that have been prepared by the government should be promptly implemented. Since most of the affected areas are cut off from the mainstream, provisions will have to be made to provide food grains, education facilities, health services, and income and employment generating programs should be given priority. The government will, with help from district-level organizations and governance units and political parties, review these programs and only implement them after making the required necessary changes.

The government should make provisions to provide loans to people to undertake income-generation projects. Programs that exploit the poor should be immediately stopped. Employment opportunities should be provided to those affected by the insurgency. The local people's representatives, the administration and the police should form small groups that move from one village to the other to listen to, understand and help resolve problems as they arise. Programs relating to backward groups, women and other exploited groups should be implemented immediately.

- Administrative aspect-

Proper rules and laws should be formulated and implemented to control the rebellion. A dialogue with the rebels must also be started, for which an understanding with all political parties is needed. Since, all administrative aspects of the districts cannot be overseen by the center, there is a need to create regional administrative centers. The government will have to make all efforts to provide peace and security to all citizens, by making the police more efficient. There is also a need to make intelligence gathering on the insurgency more effective.

Eventually, on 12 April 2001, the Central Working Committee of the NC asked the government to use all security measures to counter the Maoist insurgency and to check the deteriorating law and order situation in the country; it further recommended the approval of the National Security Council (NSC) of using the army in counter-insurgency operations and sending the decision to His Majesty for approval. In this regard two ordinances – Armed Police Force, and Regional Administration – were sent by the Cabinet for re-promulgation by His Majesty.²¹³

Regarding the scheduled general election on 13 November 2002, NC spokesman Mr. K.C., remarked on 18 August 2002 that their party was preparing for public agitation rather than home working for the upcoming election.²¹⁴ On the other hand, the Election Commission recognized PM Deuba's NC faction as Nepali Congress (Democratic) on 23 September 2002, which was initially created after PM Deuba after being removed from the general membership of NC on 26 May 2002.²¹⁵ Likewise, on 28 September 2002, NC refused the proposal of forming an all-party interim government [by] postponing the upcoming November 13 Parliamentary election in order to bring Maoists in the political mainstream.²¹⁶ This was further elaborated by NC Spokesman K.C. on 29 September and by Central Working Committee on 1 October, saying that the election cannot be held in free, fair, and peaceful manner, therefore the dissolved Parliament must be revoked in draining out the present constitutional crisis.^{217 218}

²¹³ *NC meet recommends security measures*, 13 April 2001 [online news from *The Rising Nepal*]; available from <http://www.nepalnews.com.np/contents/englishdaily/trn/2001/apr/apr13/index.htm#1>; Internet; accessed 19 November 2002.

²¹⁴ "NC Girija faction preparing for public agitation," *Rajdhani* (Kathmandu) daily Nepalese newspaper, 18 August 2002, Vol. 2, No. 76.

²¹⁵ "Deuba Congress registered as Nepali Congress (Democratic)," *Space Times* (Kathmandu) daily Nepalese newspaper, 23 September 2003, Vol. 2, No. 324.

²¹⁶ "Nepali Congress refused to go for Interim Government postponing November 13 Election," *Space Times* (Kathmandu) daily Nepalese newspaper, 28 September 2002, Vol. 2, No. 329.

²¹⁷ "All Party meeting advised PM Deuba to postpone upcoming November 13 Parliamentary election."

²¹⁸ *Nepali Congress (NC) not to be part of all party government*, 1 October 2002 [online news]; available from <http://www.nepalnews.com>; Internet; accessed 5 October 2002.

A week later, in accordance to the Article 53(4) of *Constitution of Kingdom of Nepal-1990*, PM Deuba recommended on 3 October 2002 to His Majesty for the postponement of the Parliamentary election citing the present grave situation of the country.²¹⁹ The proposal for the recommendation was however not agreed upon by most of the ministers of Deuba cabinet including Home Minister Khum Bahadur Khadka.²²⁰ However, His Majesty Gyanendra after holding consultation with leaders of major political parties, head of the constitutional bodies, intellectuals, and legal & constitutional experts dissolved the House of Representatives and called for fresh election to the Lower House of the Parliament on 13 September 2002.²²¹ NC considering it as unconstitutional condemned this action.²²²

Nepal Communist Party (United Marxist Maoist) or NCP (UML)-

Regarding the ongoing Maoist insurgency, on 7 April 2000, General Secretary Nepal said that the Maoists are following the wrong way and they will never succeed in their mission; and he further questioned -- how could they be revolutionary by killing innocent people? He further said that this is the movement aimed at discrediting the communist movement in the country by capturing the districts where communist parties had bigger influence.²²³

In one of the issues brought out in Nepalgunj [Nepal] on 26 August 2000, about UML perceiving the Maoists being “friendly forces,” General Secretary Nepal denied this report on 13

²¹⁹ “PM Deuba recommended postponing upcoming election for more than a year,” Kantipur (Kathmandu) daily Nepalese newspaper, 4 October 2002, Vol. 10, No. 228.

²²⁰ Ibid.

²²¹ Ibid.

²²² Ibid.

²²³ Madhav Kumar Nepal, “Maoist Movement is Aimed At Discrediting The Communist Movement In The Country,” 7 April 2002 [Interview by *Spotlight* (Kathmandu) magazine, April 7-13 2000, Vol. 19, No. 38]; available from <http://www.nepalnews.com.np/contents/englishweekly/spotlight/2000/apr/apr07/national4.htm>; Internet; accessed 30 December 2002.

September 2000.²²⁴ He said, “If they are friendly to us, we will answer in the same tone, and if they turn hostile, we will react accordingly.”²²⁵

On 16 November 2000, NCP (UML) in its just-concluded Central Committee meeting, adopted a political document calling for amendments to the constitution.²²⁶ As such, the main opposition party had become the first to officially seek amendments to the constitution, a document, which was the result of a compromise between the NC, the monarchy, and the NCP (UML) itself in the days immediately after the restoration of democracy in 1990.²²⁷ General Secretary Nepal urged the Maoists to grab the opportunity to hold dialogue over its recent proposals for constitutional amendments.²²⁸

As the Maoist party continued their violent activities in the Mid-Western region of Nepal, the top leader of the main opposition party NCP (UML) expressed their grave concern on 7 April 2001 over the deteriorating law and order condition of the country. General Secretary Nepal stated in a press release that there was a need to amend the constitution in order to consolidate the multi-party democratic policy.

On the other hand, on 30 April 2001, General Secretary Nepal said that the Maoists had emerged as the “Fourth Force” in the political scene of the country. At a program organized to commemorate the “People’s Democratic Movement,” General Secretary Nepal said on 19 February 2002 that the Maoist problem was the result of bad governance of the NC and its

²²⁴ *Nepal denies ‘Maoist remark’*, 13 September 2000 [online news]; available from <http://www.nepalnews.com.np/contents/englishdaily/ktmpost/2000/sep/sep13/index.htm#2>; Internet; accessed 20 November 2002.

²²⁵ Ibid.

²²⁶ Ameet Dhakal, *UML’s call for constitutional amendment*, 17 November 2000 [online news from *The Kathmandu Post*]; available from <http://www.nepalnews.com.np/contents/englishdaily/ktmpost/2000/nov/nov17/index.htm#3>; Internet; accessed 15 November 2002.

²²⁷ Ibid.

²²⁸ Ibid.

corrupted leaders.²²⁹ Speaking at the program, he stressed reforms in the present constitution and fair elections.²³⁰

An internal report forwarded to the NCP (UML) General Secretary Nepal on 5 August 2001, stated that if the Maoists joined the political mainstream, the UMLs base would be weakened.²³¹ The report was given while the Maoists and the then government, led by Sher Bahadur Deuba were holding talks, and it recommended that the Deuba government and the Maoists should not be allowed to reach an understanding, if it happens then it may affect the party's political standing.²³²

The main opposition, NCP (UML) on 7 May 2002 gave impressions that they were distancing further with the Maoists condition for talks and opposed the formation of constituent assembly; it however decided to pressure the government for amendment in the present constitution.²³³

Again reiterating their old strategy, on 26 September 2002, the Central Working Committee of NCP (UML) unanimously decided to support a referendum to either form a constituent assembly as demanded by the Maoists or make necessary changes in the constitution.²³⁴ The meeting also urged the government to postpone the November polls and

²²⁹ *UML urges Maoists to hold dialogue*, 8 December 2000 [online news]; available from <http://www.nepalnews.com.np/contents/englishdaily/ktmpost/2000/dec/dec08/index.htm#8>; Internet; accessed 15 November 2002.

²³⁰ *Ibid.*

²³¹ Tika Ram Pradhan, *UML scared of Maoists joining mainstream*, 30 December 2002 [online news]; available from http://www.nepalresearch.org/ht_excerpts/2002_12/kp_2002_1230.htm#UML%20scared%20of%20Maoists%20joining%20mainstream; Internet; accessed 5 January 2003.

²³² *Ibid.*

²³³ *Constituent assembly not necessary: UML*, 7 May 2002 [online news]; available from <http://www.nepalnews.com.np/contents/englishdaily/ktmpost/2002/may/may08/index.htm#2>; Internet; accessed 30 November 2002

²³⁴ *UML in favor of referendum*, 27 September 2002 [online news]; available from http://www.kantipuronline.com/archive/kpost/2002-9-27/kp_frontpg.htm#UML%20in%20favour%20of%20referendum; Internet; accessed 30 November 2002.

form an all-party government to seek a peaceful resolution of the present crisis in case the government cannot hold fresh polls.²³⁵

Regarding the postponement of 13 November 2002 election by the PM Deuba's cabinet, NCP (UML) welcomed the decision, stating that it was in line with the consensus reached at the all-party meeting; Mr. K. P. Sharma Oli, standing committee member, remarked that the decision to recommend delaying of elections was taken by the all-party meeting.²³⁶

Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP)-

On 21 September 2001, RPP issued a statement expressing that the party did not agree with the Maoists on displacing the constitutional monarchy and the democratic system from the country.²³⁷ It further stated that many of the demands put forward by the Maoists are logical and the party believes that they have to be considered and problems posed by the constitution be solved by amending it through a consensus but totally disagrees with the Maoist view that the whole constitution has to be annulled, and that formation of an interim government without coming to an agreement on several principle issues were not appropriate as it reflected the desperateness of political parties to come to power.²³⁸

During an interaction program held by the party in the capital on 28 January 2002, RPP Spokesman Kamal Thapa said that the party had decided to propose the government to inter alia make some changes in the constitution, mobilize the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) and other security forces in a coordinated manner to fight terrorism, work towards bringing Maoists in the

²³⁵ Ibid.

²³⁶ "His Majesty consults major political party leaders," Kantipur [Kathmandu] daily Nepalese newspaper, 4 October 2002, Vol. 10, No. 228.

²³⁷ *RPP never agreed to Maoists' proposal*, 22 September 2001 [online news]; available from <http://www.nepalnews.com.np/contents/englishdaily/ktmpost/2001/sep/sep22/index.htm#11>; Internet; accessed 20 November 2002.

²³⁸ Ibid.

main stream of national politics, and ensure free and fair polls in future.²³⁹ However, a fresh declaration by another RPP stalwart, Dr. Prakash Chandra Lohani does see the role of the monarch, and says that the monarch should be consulted in this regard.²⁴⁰

Similar to the views of Dr. Lohani, on 31 March 2002, over a dozen senior leaders of the RPP strongly called for His Majesty King's active role, even if it is unconstitutional, to give way to the present crises plaguing the country.²⁴¹ They said that except by the King, the constitution has been defied from every angle -- political parties, government, parliament, constitutional bodies, administration wings -- and they have been completely defunct, and now the King has to bear active role, irrespective of it being unconstitutional.²⁴² Even if it is unconstitutional, the King should play an active role in protecting the country by bringing the outlawed Maoists in the mainstream politics.²⁴³

On 1 Oct 2002, an emergency meeting chaired by the President of RPP, Mr. Surya Bahadur Thapa, decided to go for all-party government in order to drain out the present political crisis/instability in the country.²⁴⁴ Likewise, Mr. Pashupati SJB Rana, RPP General-Secretary, remarked that the King and all the parties should seek a way out of the current crisis together.²⁴⁵

²³⁹ Ibid.

²⁴⁰ *RPP divided over constitutional reform issue?*, 27 March 2002 [online news]; available from <http://www.nepalnews.com.np/contents/englishweekly/telegraph/2002/mar/mar27/index.htm#3>; internet; accessed 15 December 2002.

²⁴¹ *RPP call for king's active role*, 31 March 2002 [online news]; available from <http://www.nepalnews.com.np/contents/englishdaily/ktmpost/2002/apr/apr01/local.htm#3>; Internet; accessed 30 November 2003.

²⁴² Ibid.

²⁴³ Ibid.

²⁴⁴ "Rastriya Prajatantra Party wishes to go for All-party government," *Budhabar* (Kathmandu) weekly Nepalese newspaper, 2 October 2002, Vol. 7, No. 46.

²⁴⁵ "His Majesty consults major political party leaders."

Nepal Sadbhawana Party (NSP)-

On 17 April 2000, in Rajbiraj [Nepal], president of the NSP Gajendra Narayan Singh said that it is the duty of all citizens to help promote and protect the multiparty democratic system, as it is the best of the world's political systems; and further continued by saying that his party is engaged in ensuring the Terai people's right to live in dignity and added that the party opposes the violence and terror unleashed by the Maoists.²⁴⁶

A year later, on 23 March 2001, NSP decided to boycott the parliament on the days the two ordinances, Armed Police Force (APF) and Regional Administrators (RA) ordinance respectively were to be discussed until some changes were made in the wordings. The party opposed the fact that full operation power was being given to the RAs and the APF; the party further said that it feared the government could use the power against other political parties to gain supremacy.²⁴⁷ These two ordinances were being brought to curb the Maoist insurgency.

Speaking on a different occasion on 17 August 2001, president Singh said that Nepal should have a federal form of government for which there is the necessity of constitutional amendment; he further said that five provinces should be established under the Federal system where provinces will have to be divided on cultural and geographical basis, and these provinces should be given maximum autonomy, which then would help solve the problem of the people of the Terai.²⁴⁸

Regarding the 13 November 2002 general election, the Acting President of NSP Mr. Badri Prasad Mandal remarked that the country would face another major crisis if the Maoists

²⁴⁶ *NSP observes its tenth anniversary*, 18 April 2002 [online news], available from http://www.nepalresearch.org/politics/archive/parties_general/archive.htm; Internet; accessed 25 December 2002.

²⁴⁷ *NSP supports ordinances with reservations*, 24 March 2001 [online news]; available from <http://www.nepalnews.com.np/contents/englishdaily/ktmpost/2001/mar/mar24/index.htm#3>; Internet; accessed 20 November 2002.

²⁴⁸ *NSP threatens agitation*, 17 August 2001 [online news], available from

would not contest the upcoming election.²⁴⁹ Similarly, other NSP leaders also voiced concern about the impartiality and fairness of the coming elections and also blasted the government for dissolving parliament and calling fresh elections stating that if the election does not take place on time, a constitutional crisis will emerge and that will hurt the people's faith in parliamentary democracy.²⁵⁰ While addressing a meeting of his cadres at Khas bazaar, about 50-km south-west of Bhadrapur [Nepal], the district headquarters, Mandal said that the House was dissolved due to a NC intra-party squabble and the double-standards of the erstwhile main opposition party, CPN-UML [NCP (UML)]. He also urged Maoist rebels to give up the ongoing violence, and take part in mainstream politics.²⁵¹

Nepal Workers and Peasants Party (NWPP)-

On 25 August 2001, the President of the NWPP, Mr. Narayan Man Bijukchhe, addressing a mass meet in Khalanga [Jajarkot district], the popular left leader said that his party cadre would not give in to the threat of the Maoists.²⁵² He also remarked that the demand for republic at present was not in nation's favor, and that the country should be able to use the constitutional monarchy.²⁵³ He further said that the present constitution can be amended if the ruling Congress

<http://www.nepalnews.com.np/contents/englishdaily/ktpost/2001/aug/aug17/index.htm#8>; Internet; accessed 25 December 2002.

²⁴⁹ "NC Girija faction preparing for public agitation," *Rajdhani* (Katmandu) daily Nepalese newspaper, 18 August 2002, Vol. 2, No. 76.

²⁵⁰ *NSP contests polls on Madhesi grievances*, 13 June 2002 [online news]; available from http://www.kantipuronline.com/archive/kpost/2002-6-13/kp_frontpg.htm#NSP%20to%20contest%20polls%20on%20Madhise%20grievances; Internet; accessed 25 December 2002.

²⁵¹ *NSP ready to face mid-term elections*, 28 June 2002 [online news]; available from http://www.kantipuronline.com/archive/kpost/2002-6-28/kp_valnation.htm#NSP%20ready%20to%20face%20mid-term%20elections; Internet; accessed 25 December 2002.

²⁵² *NWPP not to divert from party ideology*, 26 August 2001 [online news]; available from <http://www.nepalnews.com.np/contents/englishdaily/ktpost/2001/aug/aug26/local.htm#2>; Internet; accessed 25 November 2002.

²⁵³ *Ibid.*

[NC] and the main opposition UML agree, but what is more important is to make the citizens more aware.²⁵⁴

Regarding the dissolution of the House, Bijukchhe said UMLs welcome to dissolution of the House has instead proved a nexus between Deuba and the UML leader. He said that PM Deuba was right in dissolving the Lower House but was not supposed to do so especially when the country was undergoing serious economic crisis and Maoist insurgency. On the other hand, the NWPP members, who held its central committee meeting here to discuss on several issues such as dissolution of the House, emergency and mid-term polls said that no free and fair elections would ever take place under the present situation.²⁵⁵

People's Front Nepal (PFN)-

On 6 February 2002, the Chairman of National People's Front (NPF) Chitra Bahadur K.C. said that his party would strongly oppose the extension of emergency in the forthcoming 21st session of the Parliament, and also flayed the escalation of violence from the Maoists by saying that the Maoists could "ultimately harm the communist movement" in the country.²⁵⁶ He further emphasized that the political parties should not abide by the Maoists' demand for a constituent assembly since there may be "a ploy" within the demand; he also urged the Maoists to lay down arms and come to the table for peace talks since the national and international environment was unfavorable to their "so-called revolution."²⁵⁷

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

²⁵⁵ *NWPP chief flays UML*, 19 June 2002 [online news]; available from http://www.kantipuronline.com/archive/kpost/2002-6-19/kp_valnation.htm#NWPP%20chief%20flays%20UML; Internet; accessed 25 December 2002.

²⁵⁶ National People's Front and United People's Front later merged into People's Front Nepal on 10 July 2002.

²⁵⁷ *NPF to oppose emergency extension*, 7 February 2002 [online news]; available from <http://www.nepalnews.com.np/contents/englishdaily/ktmpost/2002/feb/feb07/index.htm#6>; Internet; accessed 25 November 2002.

After the merging of NPF and the United People's Front (UPF) on 10 July 2002 to PFN, General Secretary Mr. Nawaraj Subedi stated on 5 September 2002 that the decision to dissolve the House of Representatives on 22 May 2002 was against the democratic norms and also an attack on constitution of the country.²⁵⁸

While looking at this period, 13 February 1996 until 3 October 2002, it can be said that this period included internal squabbles, allegations, frequent changes in ideas and views amongst the six major political parties. Though the constitutional provisions of the party are very strong, the behaviors and the attitudes were very weak. This period included the dissolution of the House, wherein the parties could not tackle the problem efficiently. Likewise, the official views and perceptions about the Maoist insurgency were made very late, which resulted in a vacuum of understanding. Moreover, it was found that individuals from same party had different views regarding the governance and the issue in hand.

²⁵⁸ "His Majesty consults major political party leaders."

MAOIST POWER

"Ultimately, we will have to fight with the Indian army. That is the situation. Therefore, we have to take into account the Indian army. When the Indian army comes in with thousands and thousands of soldiers, it will be a very big thing. But we are not afraid of the Indian Army."²⁵⁹

--- Prachanda, leader of the Maoists of Nepal, in an interview to a Maoist journalist of Latin America.

Definition of Maoist Power



*Photo 9: Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda),
Chairman of Nepal Communist Party (Maoist)
Source: Internet search, under respective names.*



*Photo 10: Dr. Baburam Bhattarai
Coordinator
United Revolutionary People's Council*



*Photo 11: Ram Bahadur Thapa
Military Commander
People's Liberation Army*

For the purpose of this paper, the Nepal Communist Party (Maoist) is the source of this power. At present Mr. Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda) personifies this power, including all the national and international elements which supports the "People's War."

Historical development of Maoist Power

After the genesis of the Nepal Communist Party (NCP) in September 1949 by Pushpa Lal, different groups and sub-groups of communist parties with different ideologies were formed under different leaderships. During 23 November 1990, the NCP (Unity Center) was formed due to the merger of NCP (Mashal), NCP (Fourth Congress), and Sarbaharabadi Sramik Sangathan

²⁵⁹ B. Raman, *THE MAOISTS OF NEPAL: Three perspectives*, Paper no. 277, 13 July 2001 [article online of South Asia Analysis Group]; available from <http://www.saag.org/papers3/paper277.html>; Internet; accessed 20 November 2002.

(Proletarian Worker's Organization), of which Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda) became the General Secretary. The NCP (Unity Center) contested the general election of 1991 in the name of Samyukta Jana Morcha (United People's Front or UPF) headed by Dr. Baburam Bhattarai. In 1993, the NCP (Unity Center) broke into two factions – NCP (Maoist) and NCP (Fourth Congress). Prachanda now heads NCP (Maoist), and the objective of this party is to abolish parliamentary system and follow *new People's Democracy* through "People's War."

The NCP (Maoist) took momentum when the political wing of Nepal's radical left parties, the UPF split in August 1994 into two parties – UPF (Vaidya) and UPF (Bhattarai); during May 1991 election, the UPF had been the third strongest force in the House of Representatives with nine members in the Parliament.²⁶⁰ UPF (Bhattarai) joined hands with NCP (Maoist) in the beginning of 1995 to wage "People's War". The objective of UPF (Bhattarai) is to bring a total revolution, even though violent, and to establish a *republican government*.

Eventually, before mid-term election on 1994 the UPF (Bhattarai), a political wing of NCP (Maoist), led by Dr. Baburam Bhattarai denounced parliamentary politics and boycotted the elections.²⁶¹ On March 1995, the NCP (Maoist) led by Prachanda fore-swearing elections and decided to take up arms against the government. After the downfall of the Nepalese government led by Late Man Mohan Adhikari of NCP (UML) in September 1995, and following the harsh government actions against the Maoist forces in western Nepal, the NCP (Maoist) found the time ripe for revolution.²⁶² During the October of 1995 the "Sija Movement" in Rukum and Rolpa [Nepal] was planned to recruit UPF (Bhattarai) youths for rebellion, which was later countered by November 1995 "Romeo Operations" by police to win the "hearts and minds" of the people in

²⁶⁰ *Maoist insurgency (including emergency reports)*.

²⁶¹ Anju Susan Alex, *Maoists of Nepal*, [online article]; available from <http://www.ipcs.org/nmt/milgroups/maoist-nep.html>; Internet; accessed 20 November 2002.

²⁶² *Maoist insurgency (including emergency reports)*.

Rolpa and Rukum districts, which ultimately didn't go according to the plan and resulted in widespread police abuses and public anger. With these activities going on in the mid-western region of Nepal, the NCP (Maoist) declared "People's War" from 13 February 1996.


The political and security analysts say that the reason behind the "People's War" in Nepal is because of the following existing problems in the society:²⁶³

- Due to the geographical condition, the governments' security and development programs has not reached all the places in the country.
- Maoist affected regions are far from central management.
- The citizens are poor, simple, and uneducated.
- Unemployment.
- Untrustworthy and doubtful matters.
- Oath taken by people in the rural society not to get dissected from the local communal religion.
- Domination in the society/community by elites.
- Financial inequality.

Likewise, according to security sources, the Maoist affected districts of Nepal total to 32.²⁶⁴ Out of 75 districts, 6 districts – Rolpa, Rukum, Salyan, Jajarkot, Kalikot, and Pyuthan -- have been categorized as grade "A," *highly affected*; 8 districts – Gorkha, Kavre, Ramechhap, Sindhuli, Sindhupalchowk, Surkhet, Dolakha, and Dang -- have been categorized as grade "B," *moderate affected*; and 18 districts -- Tanahu, Lamjung, Dhading, Udayapur, Bardiya, Jumla, Lalitpur, Gulmi, Ardhakhanchi, Nuwakot, Okhaldhunga, Makwanpur, Dolpa, Khotang, Dailekh, Parbat, Baglung, and Accham -- have been categorized as grade "C," *slightly affected*. The map shown below gives a clearer picture:

²⁶³ The views are collected in general from various articles and journals.

²⁶⁴ At this given point and time, I do not agree with the data of the security sources, because all 75 district of Nepal is now under Maoist influence.



Map 1: Maoist affected districts of Nepal.

The security sources continue by saying that the Maoist modus operandi including – assassinations, explosions, arsons, fatal attacks, sabotages, destruction of infrastructures, threats, kidnappings, hostage takings, attack on offices and personnel of security force, and vandalisms – have left the country torn apart.²⁶⁵ The data received from Nepal Police shows that 4620 Maoists, 863 Nepal Police personnel, 244 Royal Nepal Army personnel, 112 Armed Police Force personnel, and 760 civilians have been killed from the start of insurgency until December 2002.²⁶⁶ This indeed is a grave concern regarding national security.

The Events, Perceptions, Intentions, and Influence of the Maoist Power since 4 October 2002 regarding their Demands

After His Majesty Gyanendra removed PM Deuba on 4 October 2002, stating that he had assumed the executive power under Article 127 of the constitution, the Maoists came out with a

²⁶⁵ Due to security reasons, the names of the sources have not been quoted.

²⁶⁶ According to the Anti-terrorist Division, Nepal Police record December 2002.

press release dated 5 October 2002, which voiced against the royal move demanding the dismissal and dissolve of the Palace for establishing a *New Nepal*:

The Royal declaration has hit over the achievement of historic people's movement of 1990 and has openly started the feudal autocracy. The baton of non-existing 'Royal Power' has been used to attack the fundamental rights of the people and the feudatories have clearly shown their tyrannical fascist faces in front of everyone. The time has now come for the sovereign people to reject the unauthorized decision of the palace regarding the dismissal and dissolve; instead the sovereign people must dismiss and dissolve the feudal palace itself. Our party strongly appeals the entire public-related powers to unite and move forward with the historic work for the establishment of New Nepal without being involved in the greediness, threat, warning and verbosity of feudal elements.²⁶⁷

With the effects of this heated press release still being analyzed, on 7 October 2002 the NCP (Maoist) and the United Revolutionary People's Council of Nepal (URPC) came out with another press release, requesting all concerned to protest against the tyrannical monarchical retrogression by grandly making the 27 October 2002 "Madesh (Terai) and Tharuwan closure," and to make 11, 12 & 13 November 2002 "Nepal Closure" successful; they continued by saying that they would voluntarily support the protest program launched by other political powers and organizations.²⁶⁸ This press release showed the possibilities of joint agitation or at least provocation for agitation from the Maoist side. It is indeed a strategic move from the side of the insurgents because other political parties were also voicing against the royal move.

After about two weeks, on 24 October 2002, another Maoist press release floated around giving options to the King for either dialogue or to continue fighting. This move shows a major change in Maoists strategy, because it is directed towards accepting the King to become a part for solving the problem. This indeed is the first indication of the Monarchical Power being

²⁶⁷ Maoist press release dated 5 October 2002.

²⁶⁸ Maoist Press release dated 7 October 2002.

recognized by the insurgents. The text of the press release is so crucial, that it needs to be stated below to understand the change of Maoist strategy:

In the present situation of reverse step moved by King Gyanendra, the proposal for peace talks process has confused and complicated the matter... We think that, in today's grave situation of the country, there are two options to come out of this situation... Under the first option: the cooperation of entire political party representatives of the country including our party, intelligentsia as well as the King to find the way out of the present political stalemate. The answer to the establishment of new constitution would be important through the election of constituent assembly, and proposal to lead the country towards progressive system peacefully... Under the second option: If the King, instead of leading the nation towards national unity and people's sovereignty; tries to suppress people by deploying Royal Nepalese Army and the International Army keeping his reactionary stubbornness then there is no alternative in front of people but to go ahead with the decisive and historic struggle. If the first option is to be taken then proposal for the conducive atmosphere should be made, and if the second option is to be taken then without discussion we are ready for it, the King will be responsible to make the situation clear.²⁶⁹

While the above development was being analyzed by the Nepalese government and the general populace, on 14 November 2002 interview of the top Maoist leader -- Krishna Bahadur Mahara – by Cable News Networks (CNN) Satinder Bindra surprised everyone. The major thrust of the recorded and then telecasted interview is outlined below, which indicates the possible future moves of the Maoists in relation to the ongoing situation of stalemate.²⁷⁰

- Has predicted the protracted insurgency will soon end in an “historical and decisive war.”
- The rebels are fighting on behalf of the majority rural poor to rid the country of an outdated feudal system that favors only a small urban elite.
- We are a political force and do not support terrorism. We condemn all types of terrorism.
- We have a proper political thought to serve the people, to liberate the people, to establish a society based on equality in the country and we are fighting for this based on a proper political idea and thought.

²⁶⁹ Maoist Press release dated 24 October 2002.

²⁷⁰ Krishna Bahadur Mahara, “Maoist leader predicts 'war to the end',” interviewed by Satinder Bindra, Cable News Network (CNN) recorded telecast, 14 November 2002 Posted: 7:53 AM EST (1253 GMT); available from <http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/south/11/14/nepal.mahara/index.html>; Internet; accessed 15 November 2002.

- We want the ruling class to decentralize all their powers to the people of this nation.
- We have demanded an interim government and constituent assembly. The government is not agreeing to our proposal for a constituent assembly because they know that they'll lose. They just have the support of the army and certain pimps in position of power.
- Our slogan has always been people's democracy and new democracy.
- The reason why the government is opposing talks is that they are preparing for a fully-fledged war.
- We are ready to redefine our army and make it into a national army because the army that exists right now is just serving the king.
- The king does not want actual democracy. It is a ploy by the king so that the people are on his side. The situation around him is forcing him to talk peace.

Immediately after this interview, a flux of Maoists press releases -- on 13 November 2002, 16 November 2002, and 23 November 2003 – were forwarded to the local press stating similar views. This indicated that the Maoists either wanted to do a safe landing or was making a strategic move towards continuing their “People’s War”. The ongoing scenario of all other political powers voicing against the royal move, might have been the genesis of the “pressure politics” from the side of the Maoists.

Again a series of press releases started on the month of December 2002, showed the hurriedness of the Maoists towards fulfilling their demands. One of the press releases’ dated 3 December 2002 stated that after their Central Committee Meeting, it had been decided for joint and united approach to bring out the Nepalese society from the present crisis to a new long-lasting outlet; to create a positive environment, not to take physical action against any workers of other political parties, and to request the other political parties to issue strong directives regarding not to use their workers as informants and conduct criminal activities against the “People’s War”; not to sabotage physical infrastructure; and, to start dialogue and conversation with all the political sectors and also with the present movers of the old power – if the old power

makes the appropriate environment, a dialogue team has been formed for the dialogue.²⁷¹ Wonderfully laid out, this press release not only indicated that some kind of contacts have been made with the government, but again shows their acceptance in the existence of the Monarchical Power.

Four days after the above press release, Maoist leader Dr. Baburam Bhattarai was interviewed by email on 7 December 2002 by Chitra Tiwari, a Washington based analyst of international affairs, which was published on 14 December 2002 on The Washington Times.²⁷² It is very appropriate to put forward the synopsis of the interview, because the context of climax being reached is quoted, which has a significant thrust on the possibilities of various scenarios that can develop. Likewise, this interview indicates the Maoist proposal for a “new government of their kind.” It speaks about balance of present triangular power, foreign policy, and tries to show their commitment towards multiparty system, and can be taken as a breakthrough for the future scenario:²⁷³

- The situation is now peaking towards a climax after the fratricidal and regicidal “king,” Gyanendra, and his notorious son, Paras, have staged a retrogressive coup d’etat against the supine parliamentary democracy on 4 October 2002 and restored autocratic monarchy in the country. This has substantiated our long-held position that the limited democratic rights won after the 1990 people’s movement were not enough for a full-fledged democracy, and the real state authority and sovereignty were still vested in the monarchy due to its traditional strange-hold over the royal army, bureaucracy and the economy.
- In the current triangular balance of forces — namely [among] the monarchists, parliamentary democrats and revolutionary democrats — if the latter two democratic forces are able to mount a joint struggle against the feudal autocratic forces, there are strong chances that democracy will be consummated in the country in the near future.
- Our own preference would be to settle the problem internally without any external interference. But if the complexities of the situation, particularly Nepal’s specific geo-strategic positioning between two super states, India and China, so dictate,

²⁷¹ Maoist press release dated 3 December 2002.

²⁷² Tiwari, *Maoists seek a democratic Nepal*.

²⁷³ Ibid.

then we would not mind facilitation or mediation of some genuinely neutral international organizations.

- Our party, our party Chairman Prachanda and our various publications have time and again stressed that our immediate political agenda is to consummate a democratic republic in the country. Please note that we are not pressing for a "communist republic" but a bourgeois democratic republic. For that we have advanced the immediate slogans of a round-table conference of all the political forces, an interim government and elections to a constituent assembly, which have been increasingly endorsed by an overwhelming majority of the population.
- As the constituent assembly is the highest manifestation of bourgeois democracy in history, we fail to understand why anybody claiming to be a democrat should shy away from this.
- The Second National Conference of our Party held last year has already resolved to discard some of the negative and harmful experiences of the international communist movement — particularly those of the Stalin era — and further develop and enrich the positive experiences, especially on the question of mass democracy. Skeptics can go to our numerous base areas and see for themselves how we are practicing democracy among millions of different classes, nationalities, regions, castes and gender.
- Since ours is a genuine People's War, the people themselves are the real source of our finances. We also collect taxes from businessmen and industrialists, and occasionally seize from banks. As regards the sources of weapons, it is an open secret that our enemy is the greatest source so far. As Mao said, even the foreign powers may supply us via our enemy.
- As per the action against two Nepalese citizens working in the U.S. Embassy in Katmandu for espionage charges, the party has reviewed the cases and resolved that henceforth, if any such charges were leveled against any such employee, the concerned embassy would be advised before taking any actions. However, we would caution the enlightened American people to beware of the xenophobic propaganda of the U.S. government to hide its nefarious agenda.
- We have publicly stated our position about the future state and government systems in the 75-point Common Minimum Policy and Program of the United Revolutionary People's Council (URPC). There we have clearly stressed our commitment to a multiparty system in the future state setup.
- We have time and again made it clear that we will have diplomatic and friendly relations with all the countries of the world on the basis of five principles (Panchsheel) of peaceful coexistence — namely mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and national integrity, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality, mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence. Given the specific geo-strategic position of the country sandwiched between the two huge and hostile states of India and China, we will strive to maintain friendly and equidistant relations with the two immediate neighbors. It is just ridiculous to presume that a state of Nepal's size and strength can inflict by design any harm to giant India, a nuclear power. Rather Nepal has long been a victim of unequal relations with India since the Sugauli Treaty of 1815-16, which will have to be sorted out in a friendly manner.

- By ideological persuasion, we are avowed proletarian internationalists. Hence we have no xenophobic apprehensions to have mutually beneficial economic and other relations with any country or international organizations. In that sense, we would welcome foreign aid and loans, which are beneficial to the Nepalese people and their economic development. Of course, the basic thrust of our economic development policy would be self-reliance and abolition of dependency, which has plagued the country's economy for long. For this we intend to restructure our economic relations with foreign countries and multilateral institutions in a friendly and cooperative manner.

Sadly, on 26 January 2003 at around 0730 hours in the morning, the Inspector General of Armed Police Force Mr. Krishna Mohan Shrestha, his wife Mrs. Nudup Shrestha, and their bodyguard Sub-Inspector Surya Regmi, while in morning walk, were shot dead by the *Special Task Force* of the NCP (Maoist).²⁷⁴ While this critical and grave situation was being evaluated by the general public, to the extreme surprise, on the night of 29 January 2003, the Maoists declared ceasefire, and gave a press statement, signed by their Chairman Prachanda, which stated:

It is well understood that our party is always ready for the positive and progressive solution to the present civil war in the country. We have been publicizing our minimum conditions to make environment for the talks. In this connection, yesterday we were informed about the governments decision that to start the process of peace talks, the previous government's decision of declaring Maoists as terrorist has been revoked, the red corner notices issued against the Maoists leaders has been withdrawn, government's decision of fixing price tag on the heads of top Maoist leaders has been withdrawn, and the decision of cease-fire has been done. This decision of the ruling party is taken positively by our party and through this press release we declare cease-fire and willingly participate in the peace talks process. Like always, the party appeals the entire revolutionary warriors of the liberation army, authorities of the people's power, and the general public to work according to the declaration. The party also appeals for the continuation of the organizational and peaceful mobilization to move forward in favor of general policy of the party and minimum-working plan -- round table conference, interim government, and constituent assembly.²⁷⁵

²⁷⁴ Preliminary report of police investigation team.

²⁷⁵ Maoist press release dated 29 January 2003.

Immediately within two hours of this Maoist press release the government also gave a press statement stating that government and the Maoists have decided to agree to a cease-fire as the government has taken initiative to resolve the Maoist problem through dialogue.²⁷⁶

At this juncture I think that it is very important to state the view given about “negotiation” by Prachanda, during an interview on 28 May 2001, which was published by *Human Rights and People’s War in Nepal*, so that the real meaning of Maoist “negotiation” can be understood:

I feel the question of negotiations with the old state power is a very sensitive question in the revolutionary movement. It is clear from the experience of revolution from past history to the present day that the reactionary ruling class has been utilizing the question of negotiations as a weapon hoodwink the masses, to engineer a split in the revolutionary movement and to prepare the ground for large-scale massacre. Marxism-Leninism-Maoism has taught us that whether to negotiate or not to negotiate with the old state power depends on the concrete analysis of concrete conditions. The principal decisive factor in this is the defense of the basic interests of the people and the revolution. Our guiding principles on the question of negotiations are the experiences and summation of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty under Lenin's leadership and the Chunking negotiations under Mao's leadership. We consider the question of negotiation as a battlefield that has to be faced by the revolutionary movement under certain concrete conditions. We have launched a serious debate and study on the question of negotiations in the light of the negative experiences of the past and present, including that of Peru...We are most serious about the whole Party and the masses not having any illusion about negotiations even if the main leadership of the Party were to fall into enemy hands...It is important to grasp that if, the Party's policies and program for negotiations were to be realized, if the situation so demands, it would draw the victory of the People's War in Nepal closer...Lastly, we want to assert that there is no reason to be under any illusion or to be apprehensive about the talk of negotiation aimed at advancing the People's War and revolution to victory. We are confident that we are making a creative application of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism against right capitulationism and sectarian dogmatism, with the aim of defeating the enemy on the negotiations front also, whilst assuming full

²⁷⁶ This press release has already been stated under Monarchical Power, in Step 3 of this paper.

initiative in our own hands in a situation of continuous victory of the People's War.²⁷⁷

Indeed it is a great surprise and one can ask a critical question at this juncture: looking at Prachandas' view about "negotiation," is this cease-fire the sound of bugle to move towards "Civil War" or "Peaceful Nepal?" The answer to which lies in the near future.

This period floated with Maoist press releases, where changes in approach has been observed, and can be taken as a potential aspect for the prediction of Nepal's future. The Maoists at present are said to be conducting their polit-bureau meetings. Since, the information cut-off date is 30 January 2003 for this paper, I will not be including the other developments.

The Events, Perceptions, Intentions, and Influence of the Maoist Power from the start of their Insurgency until 3 October 2002 regarding their Demands

On 4 February 1996 the UPF (Bhattarai) submitted a list of 40-point demands, to the then government headed by PM Deuba giving him until 17 February 1996 to act upon.²⁷⁸ Five days before the deadline and because the demands were disregarded, the NCP (Maoist) declared "People's War" from 13 February 1996 under the leadership of Prachanda, and launched the first attack at various places of the four districts – four incidents at Rolpa, one incident each at Gorkha, Sindhuli, and Kavre – by using methods like arson, vandalism, looting, assault, and attacks on police posts.²⁷⁹ Here it is appropriate to state Prachanda's view, so that his initiation towards "People's War" can be better understood:

²⁷⁷ Prachanda, "However torturous the road may be, the victory of the world proletarian revolution is certain," Interviewed by Human Rights and People's War in Nepal, 28 May 2001 [posted online]; available from http://www.insof.org.politics/170202_interview_pra.htm; Internet; accessed 12 December 2002.

²⁷⁸ *Maoist demands*, [posted online]; available from <http://www.nepalnews.com.np/ntimes/feb16-2001/nation.htm#Maoist%20demands>; Internet; accessed 20 December 2002.

²⁷⁹ Nepal Police Record.

We decided that we should initiate *People's War* from different parts of the country. We should centralize in mainly three areas -- East, Middle, West-and the capital. Cities should also be another point, not for armed clashes, but for propaganda and such things. And one other area where we should concentrate work is in India, because more than seven million Nepalese live in India. Therefore India should be the other point where we should make efforts to resist the ruling classes.²⁸⁰

At this juncture, it is appropriate to state the 40-point demands made by the Maoists to get a sense of their perception and intentions, which is the core of this paper. The translated versions of the demands, which fall under three main categories are:²⁸¹

A. Demands related to nationalism-

1. All discriminatory treaties, including the 1950 Nepal-India Treaty, should be abrogated.
2. The so-called Integrated Mahakali Treaty concluded on 29 January 1996 should be repealed immediately, as it is designed to conceal the disastrous Tanakpur Treaty and allows Indian imperialist monopoly over Nepal's water resources.
3. The open border between Nepal and India should be regulated, controlled and systematized. All vehicles with Indian license plates should be banned from Nepal.
4. The Gurkha/Gorkha Recruitment Centers should be closed. Nepali citizens should be provided dignified employment in the country.
5. Nepali workers should be given priority in different sectors. A "work permit" system should be strictly implemented if foreign workers are required in the country.
6. The domination of foreign capital in Nepali industries, business and finance should be stopped.
7. An appropriate customs policy should be devised and implemented so that economic development helps the nation become self-reliant.
8. The invasion of imperialist and colonial culture should be banned. Vulgar Hindi films, videos and magazines should be immediately outlawed.
9. The invasion of colonial and imperial elements in the name of NGOs and INGOs should be stopped.

B. Demands related to people's democracy-

10. A new Constitution should be drafted by representatives elected for the establishment of a people's democratic system.

²⁸⁰ B. Raman.

²⁸¹ *Maoist demands.*

11. All special privileges of the king and the royal family should be abolished.
12. The army, the police and the bureaucracy should be completely under people's control.
13. All repressive acts, including the Security Act, should be repealed.
14. Everyone arrested extra-judicially for political reasons or revenge in Rukum, Rolpa, Jajarkot, Gorkha, Kavre, Sindhupalchowk, Sindhuli, Dhanusa, Ramechhap, and so on, should be immediately released. All false cases should be immediately withdrawn.
15. The operation of armed police, repression and State-sponsored terror should be immediately stopped.
16. The whereabouts of citizens who disappeared in police custody at different times, namely Dilip Chaudhary, Bhuwan Thapa Magar, Prabhakar Subedi and others, should be investigated and those responsible brought to justice. The families of victims should be duly compensated.
17. All those killed during the People's Movement should be declared martyrs. The families of the martyrs and those injured and deformed should be duly compensated, and the murderers brought to justice.
18. Nepal should be declared a secular nation.
19. Patriarchal exploitation and discrimination against women should be stopped. Daughters should be allowed access to paternal property.
20. All racial exploitation and suppression should be stopped. Where ethnic communities are in the majority, they should be allowed to form their own autonomous governments.
21. Discrimination against downtrodden and backward people should be stopped. The system of untouchables should be eliminated.
22. All languages and dialects should be given equal opportunities to prosper. The right to education in the mother tongue up to higher levels should be guaranteed.
23. The right to expression and freedom of press and publication should be guaranteed. The government mass media should be completely autonomous.
24. Academic and professional freedom of scholars, writers, artists and cultural workers should be guaranteed.
25. Regional discrimination between the hills and the terai should be eliminated. Backward areas should be given regional autonomy. Rural and urban areas should be treated at par.
26. Local bodies should be empowered and appropriately equipped.

C. Demands related to public livelihood-

27. Land should belong to "tenants". Land under the control of the feudal system should be confiscated and distributed to the landless and the homeless.
28. The property of middlemen and comprador capitalists should be confiscated and nationalized. Capital lying unproductive should be invested to promote industrialization.

29. Employment should be guaranteed for all. Until such time as employment can be arranged, an unemployment allowance should be provided.
30. A minimum wage for workers in industries, agriculture and so on should be fixed and strictly implemented.
31. The homeless should be rehabilitated. No one should be relocated until alternative infrastructure is guaranteed.
32. Poor farmers should be exempt from loan repayments. Loans taken by small farmers from the Agricultural Development Bank should be written off. Appropriate provisions should be made to provide loans for small farmers.
33. Fertilizer and seed should be easily available and at a cheap rate. Farmers should be provided with appropriate prices and markets for their produce.
34. People in flood- and drought-affected areas should be provided with appropriate relief materials.
35. Free and scientific health services and education should be available to all. The commercialization of education should be stopped.
36. Inflation should be checked. Wages should be increased proportionate to inflation. Essential goods should be cheaply and easily available to everyone.
37. Drinking water, roads and electricity should be provided to all villagers.
38. Domestic and cottage industries should be protected and promoted.
39. Corruption, smuggling, black marketing, bribery, and the practices of middlemen and so on should be eliminated.
40. Orphans, the disabled, the elderly and children should be duly honored and protected.

The idea of starting the people's war may have been hatched following a meeting that took place on 1 July 1995 between the Indian Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist) (People's War) and the Nepal Communist Party (Maoist).²⁸² At the meeting the two parties issued the following joint statement:

The Parliamentary system of the reactionaries is facing a crisis everywhere, but the revisionists still are shamelessly trying to take the people along that path. It has, therefore, become essential to eliminate the counter-revolutionary confusion of the parliamentary system and lead the people toward 'people's war.' The Marxist-Leninist-Maoist revolutionaries of all countries thus bear the historic responsibility of unitedly providing leadership to the imminent world revolution so as to direct it along the path shown by Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao by thwarting revisionist conspiracies.²⁸³

²⁸² *The Maoist Problem.*

²⁸³ *Ibid.*

When we read the article written by Anju Susan Alex, it is found that the core objective of “People’s War” is to establish new *People’s Republic*:

The 'people's war' according to the Maoist leader Prachanda (real name Pushpa Kamal Dahal), Secretary General of NCP (Maoist), in pure Marxist-Leninist-Maoist terms is one which is directed against feudalism and for establishing a People's Republic. They believed their principle provided the scientific tools to emancipate the suppressed working class. The 'People's War' is directed against the 200 year old coalition between feudalism and imperialism which would ultimately lead to the establishment of the Peoples Republic.'²⁸⁴

On the operational side, the Maoists used to have two kinds of fronts during their starting phase, which at present is considered totally illegal: legal and illegal fronts.²⁸⁵ The National Agitation Coordination Committee (NACC) was considered as the legal front, which included human rights activists, intellectuals, professors, and people from various walks of life, who created pressure to the government on the behalf of the NCP (Maoist). On the other hand, the NCP (Maoist) itself was an illegal front, which included its activities in expanding its organization, recruiting, training, and involving in guerilla activities to create control and terror in the society.²⁸⁶

When we talk about sympathizers and supporters, it can be said that the list is very long. Maoists have sympathizers and supporters within the country and abroad in the form of individuals, independent and international organizations, and the possibility of the support by the communist blocs. The support from within the country varies from labors to the intellectuals, which can be outlined as:²⁸⁷

- All Nepal National Independent Students Union (Revolutionary), ANNISU (Rev)
- All Nepal National Communist Youth League (Revolutionary)
- All Nepal Ethnic Community Association (Revolutionary)

²⁸⁴ Anju Susan Alex.

²⁸⁵ After the cease-fire, things seem questionable until 30 January 2003.

²⁸⁶ Compiled from police sources.

²⁸⁷ Compiled from Maoist documents and police sources.

- All Nepal Intellectual Organization (Revolutionary)
- All Nepal Trade Union Association (Revolutionary)
- All Nepal Women's Association (Revolutionary)
- All Nepal Labor Union (Revolutionary)
- All Nepal Teachers Association (Revolutionary)
- All Nepal Cultural Association (Revolutionary)
- All Nepal Carpet Laborers Association (Revolutionary)
- All Nepal Transport Labor Union (Revolutionary)
- All Nepal Hotel & Restaurant Labor Union (Revolutionary)
- All Nepal Builders Association (Revolutionary)
- All Nepal Meter Temp Labor Union (Revolutionary)
- All Nepal Press Labor Union (Revolutionary)
- All Nepal Thanka Artists Labor Union (Revolutionary)
- All Nepal Shops Labor Union (Revolutionary)
- All Nepal Newspaper Sellers Union (Revolutionary)
- Himalayan Trading Labor Union (Revolutionary)

Likewise, the external supports range from the Maoist Communist Center (MCC) and People's War Group (PWG) in India, to the communist parties in the western world. When considering the list of international supporters, we can identify them as:²⁸⁸

- All India Nepal Union
- All India Nepal Students Union
- Transportation Labour Union, India
- Nepal Youth Association, Chennai Committee, India
- United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA)
- Northern Bihar Liberation Front (NBLF)
- Bharatya Communist Party (Maoist)
- Maoist Communist Centre (MCC), India
- Peoples' War Group (PWG), Andra Pradesh, India
- East Bangal 'Sarbahara' Party, Bangladesh
- Kerala Communist Party
- Revolutionary Communist Party, USA
- Philippines Communist Party
- Turkey Communist Party
- Rastriya Swayan Sewak Party (RSS), India
- Revolutionary International Movement (RIM)

²⁸⁸ Ibid.

When we look at the article written by Anju Susan Alex, it is stated that there is an extremely good linkage of Nepalese Maoists with other Maoist entities:

The Maoist communist revolutionaries from Peru, Philippines and India (Andhra Pradesh and Bihar) are linked with the Revolutionary Internationalists Movement (RIM), which is preparing the ground for the ultimate coming together of the Communist Revolutionaries throughout the world. The NCP (Maoist) is a participating member of this movement. The RIM is the embryonic center of the world genuine communist forces and it's struggling for the formation of a Communist International, a new type based on Marxist-Leninist-Maoism. It is believed that they have more than fraternal links with the Maoist Communist Center (MCC), which operates in the Indian States of Bihar and the People's War Group (PWG) in Andhra Pradesh. It is also believed that the Maoist insurgents have linkages with the LTTE operating in Sri Lanka.²⁸⁹

The above article can be truly verified by the way Prachanda describes the influence of international proletariat on their movement:

In the whole process of this final preparation...there was consistent international involvement...RIM Committee (Revolutionary Internationalist Movement)...the experience in Turkey, the experience in Iran, and the experience in the Philippines...experience in Bangladesh and from some experience in Sri Lanka...we were also having direct and continuous debate with the Indian communists, mainly the People's War (PW) and Maoist Communist Center (MCC) groups...It helped us to understand the whole process of People's War. Therefore, what I want to say here is that one of the specific things about our People's War, the initiation of our People's War, is that there was international involvement right from the beginning...Help, debate and discussion was there.²⁹⁰

While talking about the linkages, one of the links between the Nepalese Maoists and the Indian Maoists can be better understood by their joint declaration of 8 July 2002:

The Indian rulers in their historic worldwide campaign against so-called terrorism, seeks to crush the revolutionary forces of not only India but also throughout South Asia. Acting as a regional guideline of the imperialism specifically the US imperialism, the Indian expansionists together with their puppets in Nepal are planning further intervention in the sovereign states of Nepal to crush the growing Maoist forces there.²⁹¹

²⁸⁹ Ibid.

²⁹⁰ B. Raman.

²⁹¹ Police source.

Looking at the South Asian communist movement, in the recent months, the struggle against various forms of revisionism and right opportunism within the Maoist movement has played a powerful role in promoting Marxism-Leninism-Maoism and strengthening the unity of Maoist forces, what at present has taken concrete form through the Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA) established on 1 July 2001, of which Nepalese Maoists are a active member.²⁹²

Principally, the “People’s War” takes its cue from the Maoist principle of "encircling cities with liberated village."²⁹³ Based on the *Spirit of Revolutionary Internationalism*, the Maoists think that the new *People’s Democracy* will be reached by the under-mentioned strategic phases:²⁹⁴

1. Strategic Defense-

- Preparation (From February 1995 until 12 February 1996)
- Commence (From 13 February 1996 until March 1996)
- Continuity (From March 1996 to September 1997)
- Construction of Base Areas (From September 1997 to 12 February 2000)

2. Strategic Stalemate-

- Public struggle at cities (From 11 February 2000)
- Eradicate illusions created by reactionaries (Continuing)
- Joint government Revolutionary Communist powers (Moving towards)

3. Strategic Offense-

- To follow international conventions on war

²⁹² *Declaration of CCOMPOSA*, August 2002 [online on Human Rights and People’s War in Nepal]; available from http://www.insof.org/160202_decl_ccomposa.htm; Internet; accessed 2 January 2003.

²⁹³ Anju Susan Alex.

²⁹⁴ The dates in the bracket signify the period that the Maoists in Nepal applied their outlined strategy.

The above strategic phases are being followed step by step by the NCP (Maoist) in their objective towards declaring Nepal a “People’s Republic.” At present they are at the strategic stalemate stage, trying to eradicate illusions created by the elements they call reactionaries, and moving towards *Joint Government of Revolutionary Communist Powers*. They are using various means – coercion, threat, press releases, etc – to request other communist political parties to come had in hand to create a revolutionary power.

Geographically, Maoists have divided the country into 3 Zones and 27 districts.²⁹⁵ The political party structure consists of polit-bureau, central committee, regional bureaus, sub-regional bureaus, district committees, and cell committees. The military of the Maoists are called “People’s Liberation Army (PLA)”, which have four different command levels. Under a *Central Military Commission*, they have eastern, central, western, and external military commands. Under these commands the PLA is divided into four groups, as of 13 August 2000 -- *security forces* for the villages, *public intimacy group* to look after rights and justices of people, *squads* for administration and intelligence, and *platoons* to combat security forces. At present the government security forces say that the Maoist attacks in some places have been numbered in thousands. Though the level of the PLA cannot be determined to the point of fact at this instance, the Maoists claim that their army is of brigade level.²⁹⁶ They have established the expected Maoist division of forces into part-timers responsible for local defense, and full-timers responsible for force-on-force assaults.

The Maoist mode of warfare is based on the military technique of Mao-tse Tung of inflicting defeat on a powerful army as the cardinal principle in carrying out their raids by

²⁹⁵ Anju Susan Alex.

²⁹⁶ Compiled from Maoist documents and police sources.

Guerillas who are trained on the strategies of the Chinese military strategist 'Sanju'.²⁹⁷

Manpower, of course, derives from the clandestine infrastructure, which has become quite developed in some areas, drawing sustenance from a combination of exploitation of grievances and adroit use of terror.²⁹⁸ Military analysts estimate:

The current NCP (Maoist) strength at 3,000-4,000 'hardcore militants', or regular troops, and 10,000-15,000 men organized in various local militias. In addition, there are thousands of activists and other cadres who work openly in the countryside, or through front organizations in the towns. Initially, the insurgents had only hunting guns, mostly muzzle-loaders collected from local people and a few home-made rifles and pistols, which they had obtained from illegal gun factories in the neighboring Indian state of Bihar. Their tactic of raiding police armories has allowed them to expand their arsenal to include .303 rifles, 12-bore shotguns and pistols, while attacks on army camps have yielded hauls of sten-guns and Indian-made self-loading rifles. These small arms have been supplemented by bombs made from explosives smuggled into the country, mostly by sympathetic Nepalese laborers working on road construction projects in India.²⁹⁹

The Maoists see the success of their armed struggle as having passed or have to pass through the following three stages:³⁰⁰

- The armed struggle against the Nepalese police, which they claim to have already defeated and de-moralized. They claim to be confident that the Nepalese Police is no longer in a position to counter them effectively.
- The armed struggle against the Royal Nepal Army which, according to them, they would prefer that the army comes into the rural/interior areas to attack them so that they could confront and defeat it.
- The armed struggle against the Indian army. The Maoists apprehend or even foresee that when they ultimately proclaim the establishment of a People's Republic of Nepal either in the areas presently under their control or in the whole of Nepal, if and when they capture Katmandu, India might not be a silent spectator of their success and that its Army might intervene to crush the Maoists. They proclaim themselves as confident of being able to take on the Indian Army, with the back-up support of the Maoists of India in general and of Bihar in particular.

²⁹⁷ Anju Susan Alex.

²⁹⁸ Information has been collected through Maoist publications, daily and weekly Nepalese newspapers, police reports, and interaction with security personnel, on different dates from 13 February 1996 until May 2002.

²⁹⁹ Extracted from various discussions held with Nepalese security personnel.

³⁰⁰ B. Raman.

The justice systems established by the Maoists, as of 13 August 2000, reflects their strategic move to rule the country. The six types of courts they have visualized and created are:³⁰¹

- Village Level People's Court
- Area People's Court
- District People's Court
- Bureau People's Court
- Regional People's Court
- Central People's Court

Likewise, on 22 November 2001 a thirty-seven members United Revolutionary People's Council (URPC) was formed, which has a coordinator, an assistant-coordinator, a secretary, and 34 other members, and the coordinator is Dr. Baburam Bhattarai. This council was formed by the conference of the representatives of the PLA, different *National and Regional Fronts*, different *Mass organizations*, and districts *United People's committees*; moreover, it is a transitional and temporary united body of the people which would carry out the administrative, legislative, and war time functions in the liberated areas and will direct the united people's committees -- it is the alternative of monarchial structure and would work for peoples republic of Nepal.³⁰²

In December 1998, a group in the NCP (Maoist) revolted and broke away and accused the Maoists leader Prachanda of imposing dictatorship and suppressing any criticism within the party, Mr. Bharat Dahal, conveyor of the *Patriotic Communist League* said that Prachanda had placed himself above principles and the people which had promoted extreme individualism and anarchism in the party had launched the 'People's war;' as many as 24 Maoist-supporters openly revolted and deserted the party to form the league.³⁰³

³⁰¹ Except regional and central courts, other courts do exist in the Maoist controlled areas.

³⁰² *People's Council formed*, [posted online at Human Rights and People's War in Nepal]; available from http://www.insof.org/news/251101_peoples_council.htm; Internet; accessed 30 December 2002.

³⁰³ Anju Susan Alex.

On 25 February 2001, on the occasion of the fifth year of “People’s war,” from a convention held in the Rolpa district, the Maoists adopted the "Prachanda path" as the party’s ideological stance with the same stature as that of international communist ideologies of Marxism, Leninism and Maoism.³⁰⁴ ³⁰⁵ From this day onwards, the NCP (Maoist) have been using the ideology of Marxism, Leninism, Maoism, and Prachanda path. The context of this convention can be better understood by going through the Maoist convention notes:

At the conclusion of the convention Prachanda declared that there were no real communist parties in Nepal ... the situation in the country had become chaotic and in order to resolve the present stalemate, the insurgents were ready to initiate dialogues with the representatives of the King, the government, the Nepali Congress and the NCP (UML). They also suggested the formation of an "interim government" and their willingness to participate in it should such a government be formed. The statement stresses the need to coordinate the important changes that took place on the international scene in recent years with the long-term strategies of the people's war and people's armed revolution. The statement concludes that no specific model of the proletariat revolution could presently be developed in the context of the changes taking place in the world today.³⁰⁶

In an interview given to a local media on 2 August 2002, Prachanda reiterates the party’s present political view, by saying that the party has moved forward the demand of interim government, election to constituent assembly, and republican state for the solution to present confused and trouble situation; for this if the royalists are ready to solve the problems through talks and conversation then we are ready for referendum for the question of republic or monarchy.³⁰⁷

³⁰⁴ The literary meaning of “Prachanda path” is “Prachanda way.”

³⁰⁵ According to Prachanda, “Prachanda Path” is the set of ideas developed from the second conference. This name is kept, because it represents the centralized expression of the collective leadership and Comrade Prachanda’s “correct and continuous leadership”. See Prachanda.

³⁰⁶ *The Maoist Problem*.

³⁰⁷ Interview of Prachanda published in a local media dated 2 August 2002.

During 31 August 2002, Maoists called for unity of all political parties for the positive political solution through public agitation, stating that the feudalist palace puppet PM Deuba faction has given an amusing reply saying that talks could not be held unless Maoists lay down arms and has pleaded the Imperialists lords for the continuation of Royal Army terror.³⁰⁸ With this press release, a verge of attacks were conducted destructing the basic infrastructures like hydro-power plants, bombing residences and offices, attacking police stations and killing policemen, and organizing *Nepal Closures*.

On the other hand, in an article written by Dr. Baburam Bhattarai he states that the present war between monarchists and democrats is a virtual war:

...unless a new constitution is made by an elected constituent assembly and the country's armed forces are kept under the unqualified control of the people's representatives, no form of democracy can flourish and sustain in the country. It is often reported that we have since then dropped our cardinal demands of the republic and the constituent assembly, and are left with that of a mere interim government...this is not only utterly false but just ridiculous. How can we leave out such core issues, and that too after so much sacrifice? Then why should we wage the war at all? Yes, during the course of negotiations last year we had agreed not to discuss the question of republic for the convenience of the other party, but had reserved our right to take the issue to the people during the elections to the constituent assembly. Our goal of the republic was retained, but only the means to achieve it was agreed to defer to the constituent assembly in place of the negotiating table...As regards the constituent assembly, the issue was just raked up when it was not spotted in one of the public statements of our Party Chairman recently. Is it necessary and logical to chant all the demands publicly all the time? By no means. Therefore, let it be clear to all that the three demands are interrelated and constitute a single whole of the immediate political agenda of the democratic revolution, and remain valid to this day. If somebody wants to believe otherwise and live in a fool's paradise, it is his/her choice.³⁰⁹

³⁰⁸ Maoist press release dated 31 August 2002.

³⁰⁹ Dr. Baburam Bhattarai, *Rejoinder on some current issues*, 4 Sept 2002 [online article]; available from http://www.insof.org/050902_bb_arti.htm; Internet; accessed 15 November 2002.

On 3 October, the Maoists brought out another press release, which has to be critically read and understood because it came a day before PM Deuba was sacked by His Majesty King Gyanendra prior to taking the executive power:

After the protest from the general public, the unsuccessful attempt to conduct the election after dissolving the house of representative has become a failure. Therefore, instead of reinstating the house of representatives, which is better even for the parliamentarians to solve the present political crisis in a positive way by talks and dialogue, the wickedness of the feudal elements and their followers to postponed the election and form an interim government is nothing else but the repetition of history from 2007 through 2017 (1950 to 1960 AD). There is no doubt that this is another conspiracy against our party's proposal for the progressive positive political solution and the round table conference and negotiation to solve the present situation of civil war in the country. Therefore, we appeal to the entire leftist parties, progressive, patriots and democratic powers to unite against the conspiracy of the feudal elements and seek for the progressive political solution. If any body has been dreaming to get one-self secured by aggravating the civil war through postponing the said election and forming the all-party government, it will never become true.³¹⁰

Therefore, the conclusion of this period -- the events, perceptions, and intentions of the Maoist Power from the start of insurgency until 3 October 2002 regarding their demands -- can be seen as the initiation of Maoist insurgency due to unfulfilled of their demands by the then government resulting in the escalation of "People's War" backed by Maoist international links in which they operated both under legal and illegal fronts. With lots of sympathizers and well-wishers both in-country and abroad, Maoists have been able to launch massive attacks on the security forces, and are functioning with their own system of governance at their controlled areas to move towards forming a new *People's Democratic Republic* in Nepal – by using the philosophy of "Prachanda path" integrated to the already existing philosophy of *Marxism, Leninism, and Maoism*.

³¹⁰ Maoist press release dated 3 October 2003.

Synopsis of the in-depth study

The perception of the three powers have been found to differ significantly between the two given time-frames: from the start of Maoist insurgency until 3 October 2002, and 4 October 2002 until the information cut-off date 30 January 2003. It is seen that the role of the Monarchial power went from passive to active; the Parliamentary power from conducting military actions while in government to chanting slogans to conduct “joint agitation” if the political parties are sidelined (after PM Deuba was shacked by His Majesty); and, the Maoist power from the demand of *republican state* to the formation of new constitution through constituent assembly and moving towards a progressive political solution for establishing a new *People’s Democratic Republic*. It is seen that with the changes in the government there has been changes in the perceptions of all the three powers. This has been especially true after 4 October 2002, where His Majesty shacked PM Deuba and formed a new government after taking over the executive power.

Likewise, the change in the individual perceptions of the “three powers” has highly influenced their behaviors with each other. It is seen that the political parties, once voicing for the monarch has now started voicing against Him; similarly, the Maoists were previously seen to be doing the same. On the other hand the Maoists, once trying to negotiate with the Parliamentary power, has now sidelined them and has initiated dialogue with the Monarchial power. In a similar way, the Monarchial power once very near and dear to the Parliamentary power has now been avoiding them. Therefore, one can say that at present there is a stalemate between the Monarchial and Parliamentary powers, whereas an alignment between the Monarchial and the Maoist powers on their way towards a peaceful dialogue.

Lastly, it is seen that the “three powers” are using the Maoist demands as “bargaining chips” to ensure their politics flourish and get strengthened in the eyes of the general populace. Some within the Parliamentary power is voicing to reinstate the dissolved House of Representatives, whereas, others are voicing for an “all-party government” stating that if their demands are not fulfilled they will go for “joint agitation”. On the other hand, the Monarchial power is requesting all the political parties to join the present government to solve the Maoist problem through dialogue or else in silent words they seem to say “we will deal with it alone”; whereas, the Maoist power is using the strategy of negotiation as their present weapon. In totality one can say that a bargain is going on about whom to give what, how much, and to whom – the philosophy being holding on to the “power politics”.

Step 4: Specify all possible courses of action for each actor.

The possible courses of action open to each actor are:

A. Monarchial Power-

a. Negotiates (N)–

This course of action represents the situation, where the Monarchial power initiates, responds, or participates to peace-talks with the Maoists requesting support from the Parliamentary power; or, supports the initiation, responding, and participation to peace-talks of the “all-party government;” or agrees to remain as a constitutional monarch. This peace strategy aims at a negotiated peace agreement between the three powers on the basis of agreeing with the *continuity of multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy by either amending the present Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 1990 or through a new Constitution formed through round table conference, interim government, and constituent assembly.*

These situations might arise if the Parliamentary power is unable to conduct peace talks with the Maoists and provide a sense of security to the general populace; or, the present government formed by the King cannot conduct peace-talks, or the King makes a strategic move to have the Parliamentary power on His side, or King fulfills the demands of the Parliamentary power,

or the King agrees to withdraw from “active monarchy” (after take over of power) and return to normalcy.

b. Power takeover (P)–

This course of action represents the situations, where His Majesty ignores the present constitution and takes over the executive power and forms a non-political government (not within the parameters of the present constitution) by removing the elected government and still stating His commitment towards multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy; or, His Majesty suspends the present *Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal – 1990*, and/or puts “ban” on the political parties and its activities, and/or implements “Martial Law” in the country by mobilizing the Royal Nepal Army to combat insurgency, political unrest, and maintain law and order. This might lead towards the end of multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy, replaced by *Active Monarchy in Nepal*.

These situations might arise if the elected government fails to maintain law and order in the country due to inter-party squabbles, or if the “peace-talks” between the present government and the Maoists fail and there is an increase in offensive actions from the Maoists side, and/or if the Parliamentary power instead of supporting the Monarchical power starts “joint-agitation,” due to which the law and order situation deteriorates in the country.

c. Withdraws (W)–

This course of action represents the situation of failed Monarchical power, wherein the monarch is executed, imprisoned, or forced to flee the country either by the Maoist and/or the Parliamentary power; or, the Maoists displaces His Majesty’s Government of Nepal; or His Majesty is forced to quit or quits by himself the Royal title but stays in the country. Due to this a grave situation of law and order might arise in the country, which might lead towards *anarchy and then to civil war*, or an environment ripe enough for the creation of new *People’s Democratic Republic in Nepal* based on a communist society.

These situations might arise if the “peace-talks” fail and the Maoist power launches massive offensive actions against the Monarchical power and displaces the present government. On the other hand, this situation might escalate to the extreme if the Parliamentary power instead of supporting the Monarchical power starts launching a “joint-agitation” against His Majesty – being dissatisfied with His approach.

B. Parliamentary Power-

a. Negotiates (N)-

This course of action represents the situations, where the Parliamentary power supports the present government formed by the King in initiating, responding, or participating to peace-talks with the Maoists; or, initiates, responds, or participates to peace-talks after an “all-party government” is formed by the King. This peace strategy aims at a negotiated peace agreement between the three powers on the basis of agreeing with the *continuity of multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy by either amending the present Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 1990 or through a new Constitution formed through round table conference, interim government, and constituent assembly.*

These situations might arise if the Monarchial power requests support from Parliamentary power to help the present government in conducting negotiation process with the Maoists; or the present government formed by the King fails in the negotiation process, or the King takes the move or is pressurized to fulfill the demand – all party government - of the Parliamentary power, or the King withdraws from “active monarchy” (after taking over power) and hands over the executive power to the “all-party government,” or the King makes a strategic move to make the Parliamentary power in His side to continue with the negotiation process.

b. Conducts joint agitation (A)-

This course of action represents the situations, where the Parliamentary power initiates, responds, or participates the “joint agitation” against both or either of the powers -- Monarchial and the Maoist power – with or without the support of either one. This might lead to forcing the monarch to accept the *constitutional monarchy, or overthrowing of monarchy leading to creation of anarchy and then moving towards civil war in Nepal.*

These situation might arise if the Monarchial power does not fulfill the demands – reinstate the House or Representatives and/or form an “all-party government -- of the Parliamentary power, and/or the six political parties are sidelined while conducting peace talks with the Maoists. Likewise, this situation might also arise if the Maoist power sidelines the six political parties during the “peace-talks,” or initiates physical actions against their members.

c. Run the government (R)-

This course of action represents the situations, where the Parliamentary power runs the government and conducts counterinsurgency operations after His Majesty forms an “all-party government” (only from the six main political

parties). This might lead to the *continuation in safeguarding the present Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 1990, which emphasizes on multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy.*

These situations might arise, if the King agrees to the demands of the Parliamentary power, and/or sees that the government He has formed is not functioning as desired in conducting the peace-talks, or the King after “taking over power” withdraws “active monarchy” and makes a strategic move to have the Parliamentary power in His side, and/or because of the regional and international pressure.

C. Maoist Power-

a. Negotiates (N)-

This course of action represents the situations, where the Maoist power initiates negotiation or responds to such an initiation by the government by seeking consensus of the other two powers for a long-term solution. This peace strategy aims at a negotiated peace agreement between all the three powers on the basis of agreeing with the *continuity of multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy by either amending the present Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 1990 or through a new Constitution formed through round table conference, interim government, and constituent assembly.*

These situations might arise if the Maoists see the necessity for safe landing and development of political infrastructure in the open society, the realization that further offensive actions against the government are futile because of the international and regional pressure, and/or their military capabilities are deteriorating due to various factors, and/or they are losing public support and hold.

b. Continues offensive actions (C)-

This course of action represents the situations, where the Maoist power rejects or withdraws from peace-talks process, and starts with sporadic and intensive offensive actions to destabilize the government to move forward to create a new *People’s Democratic Republic in Nepal.*

These situations might arise if the Maoist power thinks that they can militarily defeat the government forces, either knowing that there is a “rift” between the Monarchial and the Parliamentary power, or because of weaker combat abilities. In the long run, the “rift” might be taken as an “opportunity” by the Maoists in aligning themselves with one power to nullify the other, and vice versa. On the other hand, the Maoist may continue with their offensive actions if their demands are not met, and/or they continue getting supports from their sympathizers and co-organizations, and/or can mobilize the general mass.

c. Demobilizes (D)–

This course of action represents the situation of failed Maoist power, wherein the government security forces defeat the Maoists, and/or they surrender by themselves. This might result in *lay down of their arms and the majority of them either entering the society -- if an amnesty is given – or else imprisonment might be the faith*. Similarly, if *some of them go in hiding with their weapons, it might escalate the criminal activities* in the society. On the other hand, this situation might lead towards the *continuation of the present constitution, and the multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy*.

These situations might arise if the government forces launch successful strategic attacks on Maoist military establishments and neutralize their political infrastructure. This would only be possible if there is political stability in the country, and a strong commitment for a coordinated effort from the political powers. On the other hand, the pressure from the regional and international bodies can corner the Maoists and give them no choice but to surrender.

Step 5: Determine the major scenarios within which you will compare the alternate futures.

Before talking about major future scenarios, within which the alternate futures will be compared, one has to look at the broader aspect prior to narrowing it down to specifics. The two main future scenarios that can happen in Nepal are: *stay as independent country*, or *not*. Within the present context, Nepal *not staying as an independent country* seems not possible due to various international reasons. Therefore, the thrust has been given towards predicting the alternate futures resulting from the Maoist demands, taking Nepal as an *independent country*.

The eight future scenarios that might occur in *independent Nepal* is based on three interacting factors: *continuation of the present government formed by the King versus formation of interim government*; *continuation or amendment of the present Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 1990 versus the formation of new Constitution through the constituent assembly*; and *the continuation of the present political system of multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy versus moving towards progressive political system to form a new People's*

Democratic Republic. I haven't included the *round table conference* – one of the Maoist demands – because this is only an initiating process to reach their goal, but not an objective. Therefore, one can say that the interaction between the above-mentioned three factors would create the following eight future scenarios in *independent Nepal*, which is outlined below.

Scenario I: Continuation of the present government formed by the King, continuation or amendment of the present Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 1990, and the continuation of the present political system of multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy.

This is the “best case” future scenario from the standpoint of the country, as His Majesty has already committed towards the continuity of multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy. For this scenario to happen the Maoist power has to come along within the present political mainstream, and the Parliamentary power has to acknowledge the Kings move. This does not seem possible at this given date and time. On the other hand there would always be a threat that the King would play an active role.

Though the King has formed the present government, if peace prevails, it would lead to general election from which a new House of Representatives might be formed. From this House, a new government might then be formed to run the country by staying within the parameters of the present *Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 1990* and respecting the norms and values of the multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy. Later, the House of Representatives might amend the constitution as necessary without compromising the spirit of the *Preamble*. This is possible because the present constitution has provisions for the amendment of the constitution.³¹¹

³¹¹ *Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 2047 (1990)*, Article 116.

Scenario II: Continuation of the present government formed by the King, continuation or amendment of the present Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 1990, and moving towards progressive political system to form a new People's Democratic Republic.

This future scenario is not possible within the parameters of the present constitution whether it is amended or not. This is because the spirit of the constitution doesn't support the progressive political system. Therefore, one can reject this scenario.

Scenario III: Continuation of the present government formed by the King, the formation of new Constitution through the constituent assembly, and the continuation of the present political system of multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy.

This future scenario is also not possible because the present government formed by the King cannot form a new constitution nor can it conduct an election for a constituent assembly, according to the democratic norms. Therefore, one can reject this scenario.

Scenario IV: Continuation of the present government formed by the King, the formation of new Constitution through the constituent assembly, and moving towards progressive political system to form a new People's Democratic Republic.

This future scenario too is not possible because the present government formed by the King cannot form a new constitution nor can it conduct an election for a constituent assembly, according to the democratic norms. Only through a new constitution there might be a possibility of moving towards a new *People's Democratic Republic*, which must be jointly accepted by the three powers. Therefore, one can reject this scenario.

Scenario V: Formation of interim government, continuation or amendment of the present Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 1990, and the continuation of the present political system of multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy.

This future scenario is the “second best case” scenario of the eight, and is at least more likely if the Maoist power agrees upon -- the amendment of the present constitution and accepts the multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy -- during the peace-talks process. This scenario presupposes that the round-table conference of the three powers agrees to form an interim government, where the Maoist power also accepts the amendment of the present constitution by accepting the multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy instead of forming a new constitution through constituent assembly. In these circumstances, the likely makeup of Nepals’ political system would reflect the attributes of democratic and progressive systems.

The question then is how likely is this scenario to happen in the present context! Depending on the perceptions of the Maoist power in moving towards a new *People’s Democratic Republic in Nepal*, this scenario does not seem their ultimate objective. Though adequate international and regional pressures can make them accept the amendment of constitution instead of constituent assembly, it has to be understood that the present Monarchial and Parliamentary powers must play a vital role in this regard.

Scenario VI: Formation of interim government, continuation or amendment of the present Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 1990, and moving towards progressive political system to form a new People’s Democratic Republic.

This future scenario is not possible because of the non-existence of the new constitution, which is the only way to move towards progressive political system to form a new *People’s*

Democratic Republic. The present constitution does not acknowledge the formation of progressive political system. Therefore, one can reject this scenario.

Scenario VII: Formation of interim government, the formation of new Constitution through the constituent assembly, and the continuation of the present political system of multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy.

This is the “next-to-worst case” future scenario, which assumes that after the formation of the interim government, the Maoist would accept the political system of multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy under the new constitution to be formed through the constituent assembly. Formation of the new constitution can change the existing Nepalese foreign policy and reflect progressive characters, which in the long run can be deterrent for the overall development of the nation. While, this type of political system does not mean a *communist regime*, still the supremacy of the Maoist power would be reflected in the overall governance of the country, which in turn will eventually help push the Nepalese society towards *socialism* or *communism*. This scenario might ultimately lead to Scenario VIII, where a new *People’s Democratic Republic* might be established in Nepal, which in turn might hamper the geo-political interests of certain countries. Not only this, the establishment of this scenario is a prime indicator for the capitalist countries that *a new form of communist movement* has begun, the hub being Nepal. This creation in addition to the already established CCOMPOSA, can be taken as a primary operating area for the expansion of the communist movement throughout the world. On the other hand the Parliamentary power might start uprising, which might lead to armed conflicts, to regain what they have lost -- democratic status -- from the communists. Though this might not happen immediately, it is sure to happen as soon as the Maoist power aligned with other communist powers presses for a *republican state*, what they call as a new *People’s Democratic Republic*.

Scenario VIII: Formation of interim government, the formation of new Constitution through the constituent assembly, and moving towards progressive political system to form a new People's Democratic Republic.

This is the “worst case” future scenario of the eight projected outcomes for Nepal. This scenario presupposes that the present government, all other powers, and the regional and international communities fail to convince the Maoist power to accept the present constitution and the political system. It also assumes that the present Parliamentary and Monarchical power is unable to safeguard the present constitution and thus the country slowly starts moving towards progressive political system -- as progressive attributes are reflected within the new constitution. It also assumes that the Maoist power is gaining its strength over the governance in Nepal. As a result of the involvement of the Maoist power in the interim government, the frontal organizations of the Maoist power starts gaining control over various classes in the society like students, intellectuals, peasants, labors, etc.

Under these conditions, the full form of democracy is unlikely to survive. The gaining of power by the Maoists will foster the rise of conflict with the democratic political parties as well as the monarch. The inter alignment of the monarch with the democratic forces, might lead to another armed conflict in Nepal to gain back what they have lost – *democracy*. Not only this, these democratic forces would strive to maintain their identity or expand their influence among one another, and all seeking to get the maximum support from within and outside Nepal to tackle the new problem. In this respect the neighboring countries like India and China may use this “need” as a bargaining chip. This in long run would accelerate the conflict and may lead towards anarchism and civil war.

The implications for the world community might be very dangerous, especially the capitalist countries, as Nepal start becoming the hub of communist movement and the armed

conflict escalates. Ultimately, the problem in Nepal might become the problem of the world community, especially India. Therefore, to curb this problem, which might be the headache of India, the Indian government might mobilize their military within Nepal. Eventually, this might lead Nepal lose its independency and a global tension might arise. One can ask a question about what would US do, if these are the future circumstances in Nepal!

Taking these aspects into consideration, I have used the LAMP technique to predict the alternate futures of Nepal resulting from the Maoist demands. The events among the three powers – Monarchial, Parliamentary, and Maoist -- continue to support those within Scenario VIII -- *Formation of interim government, the formation of new Constitution through the constituent assembly, and moving towards progressive political system to form a new People's Democratic Republic* -- though at this date and time the expectations are there that it would still remain within Scenario VII -- *Formation of interim government, the formation of new Constitution through the constituent assembly, and the continuation of the present political system of multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy.*

For each of the *three powers*, we have already seen in *Step 4* that there are three courses of actions they can follow with respect to the Maoist demands. In addition to the three courses of actions, there are three future “sub-scenarios” which can occur within the context of “Scenario VIII”. They are as follows:

Sub-scenario I: Towards Peaceful Settlement.

This future “sub-scenario” assumes that the removal of the elected government by His Majesty on 4 October 2002 might initiate towards “peaceful settlement” within “Scenario VIII.” A major breakthrough has already happened as the government and the Maoists declared cease-

fire on 29 January 2003. Though the cease-fire is in effect, the settlement might only be accomplished if the “three powers” agree with each other on the following factors. First of all, the existing government with the support of the Parliamentary power needs to agree in fulfilling the Maoist demands -- roundtable conference, interim government, and constituent assembly; and the monarch has to accept the continuity of the multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy. Secondly, the Maoists have to agree on accepting the multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy, either by amending the constitution or through new constitution. Lastly, the Parliamentary power has to agree in supporting the present government (formed by the King) to negotiate with the Maoists, or needs to agree in fulfilling the Maoist demands after His Majesty forms an “all-party government.”

The continuity of “peace” depends on how the “peaceful settlement” is conducted. The two depending factors are: negotiated peace settlement by the present government (formed by the King) with the support of the Parliamentary power, or the negotiated peace settlement only by the present government (formed by the King) without the support of the Parliamentary power.

Sub-scenario II: The Status Quo.

This future “sub-scenario,” is the transient scenario, which eventually transforms into either “Sub-scenario I” or “Sub-scenario III”. This scenario assumes that if the objective of moving towards negotiated peaceful settlement via “peace-talks” fails either between the present government (formed by the King) and the Maoists or the “all-party government” (formed by the King) and the Maoists, there might be a mixed approach of continuing attacks and making demands from all the sides. The Maoists might start with their offensive actions, come out with press releases making demands for “peace-talks,” start using their frontal organizations to divert

government attention, use propaganda campaigning, and try aligning with national and international entities to create pressure on the government. On the other hand, the government might start military actions, term the Maoists as terrorists, bring forth harder statutes, equip the security forces with modern weapons and give them more authority, and call for international support to tackle the problem. In addition, this situation might be favorable enough for the “take over of power” by His Majesty.

If the Parliamentary power supports the Monarchial power, the offensive actions against the Maoists might escalate, which in-turn might be able to bring the Maoists to the negotiation table thus this “sub-scenario” might again move towards “Sub-scenario I”; whereas, if the Parliamentary power doesn’t support the Monarchial power and starts “joint agitation,” all the “three powers” might either be competing against each other or try to get aligned with one another for victory over the other, which will eventually lead towards “Sub-scenario III.” In totality, one can say that the result of this scenario might depend on whether the other two powers are supporting each other or not.

Sub-scenario III: Extreme Armed Conflict resulting in Anarchy and Civil War.

This future “sub-scenario” assumes that if the present government formed by the King or an “all-party government” formed by the King, or an “active monarchy” fails to fulfill the Maoist demands – roundtable conference, interim government, and constituent assembly – then the situation of “Sub-scenario II” will take place, which if continues for an extensive period of time, might lead to extreme armed conflict resulting in anarchy and then to civil war in the country. Likewise, a “joint agitation” by the Parliamentary power, on either of the two powers, can worsen this “sub-scenario.”

For this situation to take place, the Nepalese government forces has to be in such a condition that they can no longer conduct counterinsurgency operations due to unfavorable political situations and/or combat inabilities. This might lead to the Maoists continuing with their extensive offensive actions, wherein the Monarchial and the Parliamentary powers are unable to safeguard Nepal from loosing her *democracy*. This might create a disbalance in the South Asian region, and might be taken as an “encroaching tiger” by the Indians and the Chinese – thus resulting in the involvement of military forces of South Asia, *especially India*. The outcome of this scenario is either a reduction of Nepal into anarchy, abolition of monarchy, displacement of His Majesty’s Government of Nepal by communist government, or loosing her independency.

Step 6: Calculate the total number of permutations of possible “alternate futures” for each scenario.

The general formula for computing the number of alternate futures is $X^y=Z$. Where X equals the number of courses of action open to each actor, and y equals the number of national actors involved; thus, Z will equal the total number of alternate futures to be compared.³¹²

It is evident that now there could be a significantly greater number of possible alternate futures, depending on how each actor decides to pursue its destiny.³¹³ In this LAMP paper, there are three actors and three courses of action opened for each actor. Therefore,

$$Z = X^y$$

Since, in this paper X is equal to 3 and y is equal to 3,

$$Z = 3^3 \quad \text{or,} \quad Z = 27$$

³¹² Lockwood and Lockwood, *LAMP*, Book of Readings, 38.

³¹³ *Ibid.*, 4.

Therefore, the total number of alternate futures is 27 for each “sub-scenarios.” In this LAMP paper it is found that there are five “alternate futures” out of twenty-seven that are “bizarre” because their combinations are not logically possible; still this paper have used all the twenty-seven “alternate futures” including the five “bizarre” “alternate futures,” and performed “pair wise comparisons,” so that integrity of the LAMP technique continues. The five “bizarre” alternate futures are:

- *PRN: The Monarchial power takes over power, the Parliamentary power runs the government, and the Maoist power negotiates.*

This alternate future is not possible because there is no possibility for the Parliamentary power to run the government, if His Majesty takes over the executive power.

- *PRC: The Monarchial power takes over power, the Parliamentary power runs the government, and the Maoist power continues offensive actions.*

This alternate future is not possible because there is no possibility for the Parliamentary power to run the government, if His Majesty takes over the executive power.

- *PRD: The Monarchial power takes over power, the Parliamentary power runs the government, and the Maoist power demobilizes.*

This alternate future is not possible because there is no possibility for the Parliamentary power to run the government, if His Majesty takes over the executive power.

- *WND: The Monarchial power withdraws, the Parliamentary power negotiates, and the Maoist power demobilizes.*

This alternate future is not possible because there is no reason for the Monarchial power to fail and thus withdraw, while the parliamentary power is negotiating and the Maoists are demobilizing.

- *WAD: The Monarchial power withdraws, the Parliamentary power conducts joint agitation, and the Maoist power demobilizes.*

This alternate future is not possible because there is no reason for the Monarchial power to fail and thus withdraw, when there is a possibility to bring the agitating Parliamentary power to negotiation, since Maoist power is demobilizing.

Step 7: Perform a pair wise comparison of all “alternate futures” within the scenario to determine their relative probability.

Here the alternate futures are analyzed two at a time, always assuming that the two futures being compared at the moment are the only ones that exist.³¹⁴ All the futures for each “sub-scenarios” are numbered 1 through 27. Future number 1 has been compared to 2 based on all the information that I am aware of until 30 January 2003, and the future deemed “most likely to occur” has been given one vote. Future number 1 has been then compared to future number 3, 4, and so on in the same way until all the futures are compared within that “sub-scenario”. Then after, the future number 2 has been compared with future number 3, 4 and so on in the same way. This pair wise comparison of futures was then repeated for the other “sub-scenarios”.³¹⁵ The formula used for the number of pair wise comparisons is expressed below:

$$X = (n-1) + (n-2) \dots + (n-n)$$

Here n equals the total number of alternate futures to be analyzed, and X equals the total number of pair wise comparisons that must be performed.³¹⁶ In this LAMP paper,

$$X = (27-1) + (27-2) \dots + (27-27) \quad \text{or} \quad X = 26 + 25 \dots + 0 \quad \text{or} \quad X = 351$$

Therefore, the total votes necessary is 351 for each respective “sub-scenarios”. This step has been clearly shown under *Step 8, Tables 1, 2, and 3* respectively, where all the twenty-seven “alternate futures,” including the five “bizarre” “alternate futures” have also been compared among each other to avoid the temptation for ruling out certain futures. I have taken this approach so that the strength of the LAMP technique continues and the entire range of possibilities is considered.

³¹⁴ Ibid., 40.

³¹⁵ Ibid.

³¹⁶ Ibid.

Step 8: Rank the “alternate futures” for each scenario from the highest relative probability to the lowest based on the number of “votes” received.

The *Steps 7 and 8* have been combined in *Tables 1, 2 and 3* respectively, where the “alternate futures” have been rank ordered from “most likely” to “least likely” based upon the number of votes received. Since, the information cut-off date for this paper is 30 January 2003, the ranking of the “alternate futures” has been done according to the information available until that date. Because of the dynamic, constantly changing nature of the universe of “alternate futures,” the periodical "revote" of the alternate futures must be done to account for the new information received.³¹⁷

³¹⁷ Dr. Jonathan S. Lockwood & Kathleen O’Brien Lockwood, *The Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP)* (Washington DC: American Military University, December 1993), 44.

Table 1

Sub-scenario 1: Towards Peaceful Settlement				
Possible Future Number	Monarchial Power	Parliamentary Power	Maoist Power	Number of Votes
13	P	A	N	25
4	N	A	N	24
1	N	N	N	22
10	P	N	N	21
14	P	A	C	20
8	N	R	C	19
7	N	R	N	18
9	N	R	D	18
2	N	N	C	18
3	N	N	D	18
11	P	N	C	18
12	P	N	D	17
15	P	A	D	17
6	N	A	D	15
5	N	A	C	15
22	W	A	N	11
20	W	N	C	10
23	W	A	C	9
19	W	N	N	6
25	W	R	N	6
27	W	R	D	6
26	W	R	C	6
16*	P	R	N	4
17*	P	R	C	4
18*	P	R	D	3
24*	W	A	D	1
21*	W	N	D	0

N = Negotiates
P = Power takeover
W = Withdraws
R = Runs the government
A = Conducts joint agitation
C = Continues offensive actions
D = Demobilizes
Note: The alternate futures marked with “*” are not logically possible.

Table 2

Sub-scenario 2: The Status Quo				
Possible Future Number	Monarchical Power	Parliamentary Power	Maoist Power	Number of Votes
8	N	R	C	26
7	N	R	N	25
1	N	N	N	24
3	N	N	D	23
2	N	N	C	22
9	N	R	D	21
11	P	N	C	20
10	P	N	N	19
12	P	N	D	18
13	P	A	N	17
4	N	A	N	16
6	N	A	D	15
5	N	A	C	14
14	P	A	C	13
15	P	A	D	12
22	W	A	N	11
20	W	N	C	10
23	W	A	C	9
19	W	N	N	8
25	W	R	N	7
26	W	R	C	6
27	W	R	D	5
17*	P	R	C	4
16*	P	R	N	3
18*	P	R	D	2
24*	W	A	D	1
21*	W	N	D	0

N = Negotiates
P = Power takeover
W = Withdraws
R = Runs the government
A = Conducts joint agitation
C = Continues offensive actions
D = Demobilizes
Note: The alternate futures marked with “*” are not logically possible.

Table 3

Sub-scenario 3: Extreme Armed Conflict resulting in Anarchy and Civil War.				
Possible Future Number	Monarchial Power	Parliamentary Power	Maoist Power	Number of Votes
23	W	A	C	26
22	W	A	N	25
20	W	N	C	24
19	W	N	N	23
26	W	R	C	22
25	W	R	N	21
27	W	R	D	21
8	N	R	C	19
7	N	R	N	19
1	N	N	N	17
3	N	N	D	16
2	N	N	C	15
9	N	R	D	13
11	P	N	C	13
10	P	N	N	12
12	P	N	D	10
13	P	A	N	10
4	N	A	N	9
6	N	A	D	8
5	N	A	C	7
14	P	A	C	6
15	P	A	D	5
17*	P	R	C	4
16*	P	R	N	3
18*	P	R	D	2
24*	W	A	D	1
21*	W	N	D	0

N = Negotiates
P = Power takeover
W = Withdraws
R = Runs the government
A = Conducts joint agitation
C = Continues offensive actions
D = Demobilizes
Note: The alternate futures marked with “*” are not logically possible.

Step 9: Assuming that each future occurs, analyze each “alternate future” in terms of its consequences for the issue in question.

Here most likely alternate futures would be analyzed, assuming that each future actually happens.³¹⁸ At present there is a cease-fire between the government and the Maoists, and an “action-plan” is said to be made for “peace-talks” process, it can be said that the “Sub-scenario I: Peaceful Settlement” is the most probable future scenario, though in reality the state of affairs in Nepal continues as it has been during the past seven years of Maoist insurgency: *The Status Quo minus the offensive actions*. Moreover, His Majesty Gyanendra has already removed the elected government, taken over the executive power and then has formed a new government of “non-political” personnel, especially *former bureaucrats and technocrats*. On the other hand, some within the Parliamentary power are demanding for the restoration of the House of Representatives, whereas, others for an “all-party government.” Similarly, the Maoists are trying to negotiate their demands with the Monarchical power, though they are saying that they want the political parties to be involved in the “peace-talks” process.

In these circumstances, the five alternate futures (See Step 8, Table 1) deemed “most likely” and ranked-ordered according to the votes received within “Sub-scenario I” have been summarized below for better understanding, which basically answers the question -- *what are the consequences of these particular alternate futures to the parliamentary multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy, and the likelihood to lead towards peaceful settlement, or the status quo, or the extreme armed conflict resulting in anarchy and civil war* – given the information available as of the 30 January 2003:

³¹⁸ *The LAMP Method.*

1. *Alternate Future number 13: Monarchial Power takes over power, Parliamentary Power conducts joint agitation, and Maoist Power negotiates.* This alternate future is the most likely one with line of least resistance, the future that shows the closest resemblance to the present state in Nepal. The consequences of this particular future to multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy is serious because of the advancement towards *active monarchy* by ignoring the present constitution and totally sidelining the political parties; and the likelihood of this alternate future in getting a permanent peace solution is very low, as long as there is a “rift” between the Monarchial and Parliamentary powers. The effect of this development on the Nepalese present political system would be adverse, as the former extreme rightist and royalist forces from the *Panchayat* period would provoke the monarch in moving towards the extreme, and take this opportunity to weaken the multiparty democracy for personal benefits. Moreover, there is no probability of His Majesty forming an “all-party government” as requested by the Parliamentary power in the very near future; the only possibility is the assurance that might be given by His Majesty committing to safeguard multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy, wherein the Maoists might try to negotiate or align itself with the Monarchial power for the sake of safe-landing or better standing.

Likewise, so long as the present government formed by His Majesty continues, the Parliamentary power will continue threatening or actually moving towards a “joint agitation” against the monarch. Due to this build-up of pressure, His Majesty might move towards negotiating with the Parliamentary power with the help of Chand government, requesting support for the “peace-talks” with the Maoists. Though this request might be made, it doesn’t seem probable at this time that the Parliamentary power would whole-heartedly negotiate with the monarch, which would then still leave the presence of “joint agitation” as a possible threat.

Similarly, so long as the Parliamentary power thinks that the Maoist and the Monarchial power would sideline them during the “peace-talks” process, the threat of “joint agitation” would still continue as in the present.

On the other hand, if the “peace-talks” approach taken by the Maoists is nothing else but a strategy to move towards their third phase, *strategic offence*, then the possibility of “peaceful settlement” does not exist. This can be very well verified by the approaches they have been taking for the last six months and their publicized demands through various press releases. At present, it seems that the Maoists will continue with the cease-fire and the negotiation for peace talks so that their political infrastructure develops in the open society. This would continue until the present government breaks the cease-fire by mobilizing the military, or the Maoist think that they would gain a better position by aligning with either one of the other two powers due to the existing “rift” -- especially if the situation of “joint agitation” continues.

Similarly, the consequences in other areas can be unequal social justice, division in the society among the aristocrats and the general populace, economic setbacks, and increase in civil unrest situations. These consequences, might be the indication that Nepal is moving towards loosing multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy, and is being slowly turned into active monarchy -- with full of civil unrest scenarios -- because of political instability, inter-party squabbles, ego between the three powers, and the “watch and grasp” nature of the Maoists

2. *Alternate Future number 4: Monarchial Power negotiates, Parliamentary Power conducts joint agitation, and Maoist Power negotiates.* This alternate future is the second most likely, where the Monarchial power would try to convince the political parties to help deal with the ongoing problem. The consequences of this particular future to multiparty democracy and

constitutional monarchy can be still seen as advancement towards *active monarchy* by attempting to negotiate with the political parties through assurances. The likelihood of this alternate future in getting a permanent peace solution would still be very low, until His Majesty is able to convince the Parliamentary power that He is totally committed towards multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy. The effect of this development on the Nepalese present political system can be of two fold: one, where the King is totally committed to what he has said and moves towards fulfilling it, therefore creating a better understanding between the Parliamentary and the Monarchial power, which would eventually help safeguard democracy; and the other, where the former extreme rightist and royalist forces from the *Panchayat* period starts provoking the monarch in moving towards weakening the multiparty democracy for personal benefits. In the very near future, it seems that there is no probability for His Majesty forming an “all-party government” and/or “reinstating the House of Representatives” as requested by the Parliamentary power; the only possibility would be the assurances given by His Majesty in His commitment towards safeguarding multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy by acknowledging the present constitution and supporting the value of an “all-party government,” and/or handing over the executive power to the present government through royal address. This assurance itself would be questionable, because of the present rightist encroachment in the Nepalese politics, which would try provoking the King to again move towards the extreme. At this juncture, the possibility of the Maoists trying to negotiate or align itself with the Monarchial power for the sake of establishing strong political infrastructures could happen.

On the other hand, if the Parliamentary power feels assured on His Majesty’s commitment, they would withhold threatening or actually moving towards a “joint agitation” against the monarch. Though this situation is there, it doesn’t seem probable at this time that the

Parliamentary power would whole-heartedly negotiate with the monarch, unless and until the assurances are fulfilled, which would again leave the presence of “joint agitation” as a possible threat. Similarly, so long as the Parliamentary power thinks that the Maoist and the Monarchial power are sidelining them during the “peace-talks” process, the threat of “joint agitation” would continue as in the present.

On the other hand, if the “peace-talks” approach taken by the Maoists is nothing else but a strategy to move towards their third phase, *strategic offence*, then the possibility of “peaceful settlement” does not exist. At present, the Maoists would continue with the cease-fire and the negotiation for peace talks so that they can strengthen their political infrastructures. This would continue until the present government breaks the cease-fire by mobilizing the military; or the Maoist think that they can gain a better position by aligning with either one of the other two powers; or if the Maoists analyze that the creation of better understanding between the Monarchial and Parliamentary powers can hamper their objective.

Similarly, the consequences in other areas can be questionable personalities, creation of mistrust, usage of propaganda and disinformation campaigning, economic setbacks, and increase in civil unrest situations. Though these consequences do exist, if the King fulfills what he has assured to the Parliamentary power or for the time being the Parliamentary power thinks positively, then the continuity of the negotiation process for peaceful settlement would continue with the objective for safeguarding the multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy; if the King does not fulfill His assurances then the “joint agitations” would once again start, which would again force the King to continue with the *active monarchy*, wherein the role of the Maoists would establish the extremeness of the Kings activeness.

3. *Alternate Future number 1: Monarchial Power negotiates, Parliamentary Power negotiates, and Maoist Power negotiates.* This alternate future would only be possible if the three powers concurs on the a negotiated peace agreement on the basis of agreeing with the continuity of multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy by either amending the present Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 1990 or through a new Constitution formed through round table conference, interim government, and constituent assembly. The critical aspect of this future is the acknowledgement of all the parties in accepting the strength of each other and then to move towards a negotiated peaceful settlement. Monarchial power has to be convinced that the future of nationalism, national unity and sovereignty is not compromised, and there would be a continuity of multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy. Such a decision on the part of the Monarchial power would be helped immensely if the Maoists acknowledge this aspect; though at present this does not currently appear to exist. Similarly, the Parliamentary power has to be assured that their future is intact – this seems very rare at present. There are no adverse consequences of this future if the “peace-talks” process succeeds; in fact it would stabilize the countries political scenario, which will have a positive impact on the overall development of the nation; in fact the effect of this development on the Nepalese present political system would be seen as moving towards better understanding between all the three powers, which would eventually make the continuation of multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy possible.

On the other hand, if the “peace talk” approach taken by the Maoists is nothing else but a strategic approach to move towards their third phase, *strategic offence*, then the possibility of “peaceful settlement” does not exist. At present, the Maoists would continue with the cease-fire and the negotiation for peace talks so that they can strengthen their political infrastructures. This would continue until the present government breaks the cease-fire by mobilizing the military; or

the Maoist think that they can gain a better position by aligning with either one of the other two powers; or if the Maoists analyze that the creation of better understanding between the Monarchial and Parliamentary powers can hamper their objective.

The other consequence of this future is the creation of an “interim government” including the Monarchial, Parliamentary, and the Maoist powers. This then would make the political position of the Maoists stronger, which would help them flourish their goal of creating a new *People’s Democratic Republic* in Nepal.

4. *Alternate Future number 10: Monarchial Power takes over power, Parliamentary Power negotiates, and Maoist Power negotiates.* This alternate future is like Alternate Future number 13, the only difference being the Parliamentary power is in the stage of negotiation with the other two powers. In this future, if the Monarchial power once again sees that the nationalism, national unity and sovereignty of the country is in danger due to the non-acceptance of multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy, His Majesty would take over the executive power. The possibility of armed conflict rises sharply in this scenario, since the Maoists might start their offensive actions, and the Parliamentary power might also put pressure on the Monarchial power by threatening to conduct “joint agitation.” The consequences of this particular future to multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy would be damaging than those mentioned above, because the likelihood of this alternate future moving towards armed conflict is very high. The effect of this development on the Nepalese present political system would be very grave, as the former extreme rightist and royalist forces from the *Panchayat* period would provoke the monarch in moving towards the extreme, and take this opportunity to weaken the multiparty democracy for personal benefits. Similarly, there is no probability of His Majesty forming an

“all-party government” because of the possibility of deteriorating situation in the country, and need for centralization and a full fledged army mobilization.

On the other hand, the Parliamentary power would pursue to convince the monarch not to move towards active monarchy; which if, not taken positively by the monarch would be used as a weapon against Him. Due to this build-up of pressure, His Majesty might move towards negotiating with the Parliamentary power to form an “all-party government,” which doesn’t seem possible at present.

Likewise, if the “peace-talks” approach taken by the Maoists is nothing else but a strategy to move towards their third phase, *strategic offence*, then the possibility of “peaceful settlement” does not exist, and they would use this situation to move towards their ultimate goal of forming a new *People’s Democratic Republic* in Nepal, by trying to align with either of the other two powers.

Similarly, the consequences in other areas can be seen as rise in security expenses, human rights violence, and increase in civil unrest situations. These consequences might be the indication that Nepal is moving towards loosing multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy, and is being slowly turned into active monarchy, wherein the clash of powers can occur which would eventually help communism thrive in the long run.

5. *Alternate Future number 14: Monarchial Power takes over power, Parliamentary Power conducts joint agitation, and Maoist Power continues offensive actions.* This alternate future under “Sub-scenario I” has the greatest possibility of armed conflict thus resulting in anarchy and civil war. In fact, this “sub-scenario” could itself lead towards the “withdrawal” of the Monarchial power, resulting in unstable set of alternate futures. The key factor in this future is

the “joint agitation” of the Parliamentary power, which might be directed towards either one or both of the other two powers with or without the support of either one. This future assumes that His Majesty would be weakened by the unavailability of the support of the Parliamentary power, deteriorating law and order situation, and the financial crisis rising out of militarization. The consequence of this particular future is the total abolition of monarchy, and the possibility of moving towards *republican state with communist hold*; wherein, the likelihood of this alternate future in getting a peace solution is negligible. The effect of this development on the Nepalese present political system would be very grave, as there would be chaos and uprisings in the country, which might benefit the neighboring countries for military intervention in Nepal – leading to lose independency. On the other hand, if the offensive actions by the Maoists escalate to the degree, there would be chances of a total take-over of the country, wherein a new communist society would get established, thus the potentiality of forming a new *People’s Democratic Republic*.

Step 10: Determine the “focal events” that must occur in our present in order to bring about a given “alternate future”.

A “focal event” is an occurrence of sufficient magnitude that it changes the relative probability of the universe of alternate futures; the most likely future would have no or fewest focal events leading into it, whereas, the least likely futures would have more focal events leading to it.³¹⁹ Therefore, the “focal events” that must occur at present in order to bring about the five most likely “alternate future” in the “Sub-scenario I” are as follows:

³¹⁹ Lockwood & Kathleen O’Brien Lockwood, *The Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP)*, 55.

1. *Alternate Future number 13: Monarchial Power takes over power, Parliamentary Power conducts joint agitation, and Maoist Power negotiates.*

The focal events are:

- His Majesty moves towards preserving nationalism, national unity and sovereignty, as well as, to maintain peace and order in the country, and also to ensure that the state of the nation does not deteriorate due to the incompetence of the elected government.
 - Deteriorating relation between the Monarchial and Parliamentary power.
 - Maoist power takes the opportunity of the “rift” created between the Monarchial and Parliamentary power to respond to negotiate a cease-fire, and, eventually, a peace-settlement.
 - Internal and external factors.
2. *Alternate Future number 4: Monarchial Power negotiates, Parliamentary Power conducts joint agitation, and Maoist Power negotiates.*

The focal events are:

- Monarchial power continues negotiating towards a peaceful settlement -- after the cease-fire -- between the three powers.
 - Deteriorating relation between the Monarchial and Parliamentary power continues.
 - Maoist power continues with negotiating their demands and moves towards peaceful settlement, while cease-fire is continuing.
 - Internal and external factors.
3. *Alternate Future number 1: Monarchial Power negotiates, Parliamentary Power negotiates, and Maoist Power negotiates.*

The focal events are:

- Monarchial power continues moving towards negotiated peace agreement between the three powers on the basis of agreeing with the continuity of multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy by either amending the present constitution or through a new constitution formed through round table conference, interim government, and constituent assembly.

- Parliamentary power moves towards negotiated peace agreement between the three powers on the basis of agreeing with the continuity of multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy by either amending the present constitution or through a new constitution formed through round table conference, interim government, and constituent assembly.
- Maoist power continues with negotiating their demands and moves towards peaceful settlement, while cease-fire is continuing.
- Internal and external factors.

4. *Alternate Future number 10: Monarchial Power takes over power, Parliamentary Power negotiates, and Maoist Power negotiates.*

The focal events are:

- If the Maoists do not agree upon multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy as the base line during the peace-talks process, and the Parliamentary power is not able to convince the Maoists in this regard, then His Majesty would move towards active monarchy to safeguard the nation, national unity, control the possible influx of communism, and to safeguard the interest of the Shah dynasty.
- Parliamentary power continues towards negotiated peace agreement between the three powers on the basis of agreeing with the continuity of multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy by either amending the present constitution or through a new constitution, interim government, and constituent assembly.
- Maoist power continues with negotiating their demands to move towards peaceful settlement, while cease-fire is continuing.

5. *Alternate Future number 14: Monarchial Power takes over power, Parliamentary Power conducts joint agitation, and Maoist Power continues offensive actions.*

The focal events are:

- His Majesty continues with active monarchy to preserve nationalism, national unity and sovereignty, as well as, to maintain peace and order in the country, and also to ensure that the state of the nation does not deteriorate due to the possibility of communist encroachment.

- Relation between the Monarchial and Parliamentary power deteriorates because of the power take-over by His Majesty. Moreover, the Parliamentary power might start “joint agitation” against the Maoists if they start harming their party cadres.
- Maoist power starts continuing offensive actions thinking they can militarily defeat the government forces and thus establish new *People’s Democratic Republic* in Nepal.

Step 11: Develop indicators for the “focal events”.

For each focal event associated with an alternate future, it is possible to develop a list of indicators that such an event either has occurred or is about to occur, which the analyst must be periodically “revote.”³²⁰ Therefore, the “indicators” for each “focal events” for the five most likely “alternate futures” in “Sub-scenario I” are as follows:

1. *Alternate Future number 13: Monarchial Power takes over power, Parliamentary Power conducts joint agitation, and Maoist Power negotiates.*

The focal events and its indicators of this alternate future, can be outlined as follows:

- His Majesty moves towards preserving nationalism, national unity and sovereignty, as well as, to maintain peace and order in the country, and also to ensure that the state of the nation does not deteriorate due to the incompetence of the elected government, wherein the indicators would be-
 - Increase in Maoist offensive actions
 - Squabbles within the ruling party
 - Frequent changes in the government
 - Frequent changes in views on how to deal with the Maoist problem
 - Dissolution of the House of Representatives
 - Unsuccessful informal and formal talks with the Maoists
 - Government programs directed towards solving Maoist problem fails
 - The unsuccessful use of nations last resort – state of emergency and Royal Nepal Army -- to curb Maoist insurgency

³²⁰ Ibid., 56.

- Increased anti-monarchist views
 - Increase in new trends of state offences
 - Maoists establishing parallel local governments
 - Elected government recommends to His Majesty the postponement of the general election due to deteriorating law and order situation
 - His Majesty removes the elected government and takes over executive power
 - Parliamentary power fails to recommend names for the new government to His Majesty
 - His Majesty moves towards active monarchy by forming a new government without the consensus of the Parliamentary power, but still showing his commitment towards multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy
- Deteriorating relation between the Monarchial and Parliamentary power, wherein the indicators would be-
- Parliamentary power terms His Majesty's move of 4 October 2002 as "undemocratic and unconstitutional"
 - Parliamentary power threatens to go for "joint agitation" or initiates, responds, or participates to "joint agitation" against the monarch if the royal move is not corrected
 - His Majesty does not fulfill the demand to reinstate the House of Representatives and/or form an "all-party government as demanded by the Parliamentary power
 - Joint party meetings conducted to find ways for "joint agitation"
 - No "joint audience" given by His Majesty to the Parliamentary power
 - Demand for making the Royal Nepal Army accountable to the Parliament rather than the King
 - Parliamentary power is sidelined during cease-fire process
 - Suspicion about the cease fire by the Parliamentary power
 - Parliamentary power blames His Majesty for trying to revive party-less *Panchayati System*
- Maoist power takes the opportunity of the "rift" created between the Monarchial and Parliamentary power to respond to negotiate a cease-fire, and, eventually, a peace-settlement, wherein the indicators would be-
- Maoist press releases demanding the Monarchial power for dialogue or continue fighting, wherein their demands are again reiterated
 - Declaring a dialogue team through local media even before cease-fire is announced
 - Informal talks with the Monarchial power

- Cessation of all military and terrorist activities
 - The present government revokes decision of declaring the Maoists as terrorists, withdraws “red corner notices” [from INTERPOL] issued against the Maoists, and withdraws “price tags” on the heads of Maoist leaders, which were previously decided by the elected government
- Internal and external factors, wherein the indicators would be-
- Deteriorating Maoist military capabilities
 - Maoists losing public support and hold
 - Maoists realize that further offensive actions against the government are futile because of the international and regional support through military/development aid to curb Maoist insurgency
 - Internal conflict within the Maoists
 - Maoists strategy to use “negotiation” as a weapon to move towards strategic offense by forming a joint government of revolutionary communist powers
 - Maoists see the necessity for safe landing and development of political infrastructure in the open society

2. *Alternate Future number 4: Monarchial Power negotiates, Parliamentary Power conducts joint agitation, and Maoist Power negotiates.*

The focal events and its indicators of this alternate future, can be outlined as follows:

- Monarchial power continues negotiating towards a peaceful settlement -- after the cease fire -- between the three powers, wherein the indicators would be-
- Initiates, responds, continues, or participates to peace-talks with the Maoists through the present government requesting support of the Parliamentary power
 - His Majesty assures the Parliamentary power that the executive power would be handed over to the present government
 - His Majesty assures the Parliamentary power that an “all-party government” would be formed
 - His Majesty assures to reinstate the House of Representatives
 - His Majesty shows His commitment towards multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy through royal address, or while meeting with party leaders
 - His Majesty and the government starts meeting political party leaders either individually or jointly

- Monarchical power continues conducting informal talks with the Maoists to prepare a general outline for the code of conduct between the negotiating parties
 - General amnesty given to the Maoists
 - Monarchical power calls for “all-party meeting” or “round-table conference”
 - His Majesty tries informally to negotiate with the Maoists in making them accept the multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy as a base for furthering the formal dialogue
 - Cessation of military actions
 - Talk team members formed with or without the support of Parliamentary power
- Deteriorating relation between the Monarchical and Parliamentary power continues, wherein the indicators would be-
- Parliamentary power terms His Majesty’s move of 4 October 2002 as “undemocratic and unconstitutional”
 - Parliamentary power threatens to go for “joint agitation” or initiates, responds, or participates to “joint agitation” against the monarch if the royal move is not corrected
 - His Majesty does not fulfill the demand to reinstate the House of Representatives and/or form an “all-party government as demanded by the Parliamentary power
 - Joint party meetings conducted to find ways for “joint agitation”
 - No “joint audience” given by His Majesty to the Parliamentary power
 - Demand for making the Royal Nepal Army accountable to the Parliament rather than the King
 - Parliamentary power is sidelined during cease fire process
 - Suspicion about the cease fire by the Parliamentary power
 - Parliamentary power blames His Majesty for trying to revive party-less *Panchayati System*
- Maoist power continues with negotiating their demands and move towards peaceful settlement, while cease-fire is continuing, wherein the indicators would be-
- More press releases demanding for urgency in peace-talks
 - Informal talks with the Monarchical power
 - Cessation of all military and terrorist activities
 - Talk team members formed by the Maoists
 - Pressure groups formed by the Maoists
 - Round-table conference called by the Maoists
 - Code of conduct for negotiation outlined and discussed

- Request made by Maoists to the political parties to help during the peace talks process
 - Reiteration of Maoist demands
 - Starts gaining control over various class in the society
- Internal and external factors, wherein the indicators would be-
 - Deteriorating Maoist military capabilities
 - Maoists losing public support and hold
 - Maoists realize that further offensive actions against the government are futile because of the international and regional support through military/development aid to curb Maoist insurgency
 - Internal conflict within the Maoists
 - Maoists strategy to use “negotiation” as a weapon to move towards strategic offense by forming a joint government of revolutionary communist powers
 - Maoists see the necessity for safe landing and development of political infrastructure in the open society

3. *Alternate Future number 1: Monarchial Power negotiates, Parliamentary Power negotiates, and Maoist Power negotiates.*

The focal events and its indicators of this alternate future, can be outlined as follows:

- Monarchial power continues moving towards negotiated peace agreement between the three powers on the basis of agreeing with the continuity of multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy by either amending the present constitution or through a new constitution formed through round table conference, interim government, and constituent assembly, wherein the indicators would be-
 - Continues, or participates to peace-talks with the Maoists through the present government requesting support from the Parliamentary power
 - If the present government is unable to conduct peace-talks
 - His Majesty assures the Parliamentary power that the executive power would be handed over to the present government
 - His Majesty hands over the executive power to the present government
 - His Majesty assures the Parliamentary power to form or forms an “all-party government”
 - His Majesty assures to reinstate or reinstates the House of Representatives

- His Majesty continues reiterating His commitment towards multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy
 - Monarchial power continues meeting political party leaders either individually or jointly
 - Monarchial power continues conducting informal talks with the Maoists and Parliamentary power to prepare a general environment for sitting in the peace-talks process
 - Monarchial power calls for “round-table conference” with the support of Parliamentary power
 - His Majesty continues trying informally to negotiate with the Maoists in making them accept multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy
 - Cessation of military actions
 - Talk team members formed with the support of Parliamentary power
 - The round-table conference between three powers for a negotiated peaceful settlement
 - Monarchial powers includes Parliamentary power during the Peace-talks process
 - His Majesty forms an “interim government,” including the Maoists
- Parliamentary power moves towards negotiated peace agreement between the three powers on the basis of agreeing with the continuity of multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy by either amending the present constitution or through a new constitution formed through round table conference, interim government, and constituent assembly, wherein the indicators would be-
- Parliamentary power is assured by His Majesty’s assurances, and comes in front to support the Monarchial power
 - Cessation, withdrawal, or suspension of “joint agitation”
 - Parliamentary power supports the Monarchial power as His Majesty has reinstated the House of Representatives and/or formed an “all-party government
 - Joint party meetings conducted to find ways for “peaceful settlement”
 - Parliamentary power starts formal and informal talks with the other two powers
 - Parliamentary power speaks positive about the King
 - Speaks about solving the present crisis through dialogue between three powers
 - Parliamentary power reemphasizes in the continuity of multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy
 - Parliamentary power accepts the formation of an “interim government,” including the Maoists

- Maoist power continues with negotiating their demands and moves towards peaceful settlement, while cease-fire is continuing, wherein the indicators would be-
 - More press releases demanding for urgency in peaceful settlement
 - Informal talks with the Monarchical power
 - Informally talks with Parliamentary power
 - Cessation of all military and terrorist activities
 - Talk team members hold formal talks with the government talk team
 - Pressure groups formed by the Maoists
 - Request made by Maoists to the political parties to help during the peace talks process
 - Reiteration of Maoist demands
 - Starts gaining control over various class in the society
 - Accepts the formation of an “interim government,” including the Maoists

- Internal and external factors, wherein the indicators would be-
 - Deteriorating Maoist military capabilities
 - Maoists losing public support and hold
 - Maoists realize that further offensive actions against the government are futile because of the international and regional support through military/development aid to curb Maoist insurgency
 - Internal conflict within the Maoists
 - Maoists strategy to use “negotiation” as a weapon to move towards strategic offense by forming a joint government of revolutionary communist powers
 - Maoists see the necessity for safe landing and development of political infrastructure in the open society

4. *Alternate Future number 10: Monarchical Power takes over power, Parliamentary Power negotiates, and Maoist Power negotiates.*

The focal events and its indicators of this alternate future, can be outlined as follows:

- If the Maoists do not agree upon multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy as the base line during the peace-talks process, and the Parliamentary power is not able to convince the Maoists in this regard, then His Majesty would move towards active monarchy to safeguard the

nation, national unity, control the possible influx of communism, and to safeguard the interest of the Shah dynasty, wherein the indicators would be-

- Removal of “all-party government” if it was formed during negotiation process
 - Formation of new government without the consensus of the political parties
 - Maoists demanding for republican state and calling His Majesty to step down and fight for presidential candidacy
 - Parliamentary power not able to convince the Maoists to accept the multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy
 - Removes the “all-party government” or the “interim government” from power, if that was formed during the negotiating process
 - His Majesty suspends the present constitution
 - His Majesty puts “ban” on political parties and its activities
 - His Majesty implements “martial law” in the country
 - His Majesty mobilizes the Royal Nepal Army to combat Maoist insurgency, political unrest, and maintain law and order
 - Intelligence reports indicate Maoist build-up for offensive actions
 - Most of or all of the Left parties aligning with the Maoists
 - Maoists planning towards establishing joint government of revolutionary communist powers
 - Increased activity of CCOMPOSA in the region
 - Talk process gets unsuccessful
 - The following is implemented: declaration of the Maoists as terrorists, re-issuance of “red corner notices” [from INTERPOL] against the Maoists, and re-issuance of “price tags” on the heads of Maoist leaders
- Parliamentary power continues towards negotiated peace agreement between the three powers on the basis of agreeing with the continuity of multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy by either amending the present constitution or through a new constitution, interim government, and constituent assembly, wherein the indicators would be-
- Parliamentary power supports the Monarchial power as His Majesty has reinstated the House of Representatives and/or formed an “all-party government”
 - Joint party meetings conducted to find ways for “peaceful settlement”
 - Parliamentary power continues formal and informal talks with the other two powers
 - Parliamentary power speaks positive about the King

- Speaks about solving the present crisis through dialogue between three powers
 - Parliamentary power frantically continues to negotiate the continuity of multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy with the Maoists
 - Parliamentary power tries to convince the Monarchial power not to move towards active monarchy; instead demands for the continuity of the “all-party government” or formation of an “all-party government”
- Maoist power continues with negotiating their demands to move towards peaceful settlement, while cease-fire is continuing, wherein the indicators would be-
 - More press releases stating that offensive actions would be continued if demands are not met
 - Cessation of all military and terrorist activities
 - Talk team members try to hold formal talks with the government and Parliamentary power members
 - Pressure groups formed by the Maoists
 - Request by Maoists to the political parties to help them fight against the Monarchial power
 - Reiteration of Maoist demands, especially about establishing a republican state
 - Maoists continue to negotiate with other Left parties for a joint alignment
 - Maoists tries to show the national and international community on how the Monarchial and Parliamentary powers backed away from the peace-talks

5. *Alternate Future number 14: Monarchial Power takes over power, Parliamentary Power conducts joint agitation, and Maoist Power continues offensive actions.*

The focal events and its indicators of this alternate future, can be outlined as follows:

- His Majesty continues with active monarchy to preserve nationalism, national unity and sovereignty, as well as, to maintain peace and order in the country, and also to ensure that the state of the nation does not deteriorate due to the possibility of communist encroachment, wherein the indicators would be-
 - Increase in Maoist offensive actions
 - Squabbles within the ruling party
 - Unsuccessful informal and formal talks with the Maoists

- Increased anti-monarchist views
 - Maoists establishing parallel local governments
 - Present government recommends to His Majesty of the possibility of deteriorating law and order situation in the country
 - Maoists demanding for republican state and calling His Majesty to step down and fight for presidential candidacy
 - Parliamentary power failed to convince the Maoists to accept the multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy
 - Continuation of the suspension of the present constitution
 - Continuation of “ban” on political parties and its activities
 - Continuation of “martial law” in the country
 - Continuation of the mobilization of the Royal Nepal Army to combat Maoist insurgency, political unrest, and maintain law and order
 - Left parties align with the Maoists
 - Maoists objective generated towards establishing joint government of revolutionary communist powers
 - The following continues: declaration of the Maoists as terrorists, “red corner notices” [from INTERPOL] against the Maoists, and “price tags” on the heads of Maoist leaders
- Relation between the Monarchial and Parliamentary power deteriorates because of the power take-over by His Majesty. Moreover, the Parliamentary power might start “joint agitation” against the Maoists if they start harming their party cadres, wherein the indicators would be-
- Parliamentary power aligns itself to fight either one or both the powers to regain democracy
 - Parliamentary power terms His Majesty’s move “undemocratic and unconstitutional”
 - Parliamentary power threatens to go for “joint agitation” or initiates, responds, or participates to “joint agitation” against the monarch if the royal move is not corrected
 - His Majesty does not fulfill the demand to form an “all-party government, or removes the “all-party government” from power
 - Joint party meetings conducted to find ways for “joint agitation”
 - Maoists harm party cadres or attack the offices of political parties
- Maoist power starts continuing offensive actions thinking they can militarily defeat the government forces and thus establish new *People’s Democratic Republic* in Nepal, wherein the indicators would be-
- Rejects or withdraws from peace-talks
 - Maoist press releases demanding for the acceptance of their demands or face offensive actions

- Starts offensive actions
- Takes advantage of the possible “rift” between Monarchial and the Parliamentary power
- States openly about creating republican state
- Continue getting support from sympathizers and co-organizations like, CCOMPOSA, etc.
- Increase in casualty rates
- Nepalese and Indian Maoists align
- Maoist voices against the royal move

Step 12: State the potential of a given alternate future to “transpose” into another alternate future.

Transposition is a highly abstract concept; and when alternate futures share common focal events and indicators there is a potential for transposition.³²¹ Therefore, the five most likely “alternate futures” that can transpose into another “alternate future(s)” in “Sub-scenario I” are as follows:

Alternate Future number 13: Monarchial Power takes over power, Parliamentary Power conducts joint agitation, and Maoist Power negotiates.

This alternate future will lead to *active monarchy*, however, if the Monarchial power starts negotiating and assuring the Parliamentary power of forming an “all-party government” and starts requesting for their active help, the situation would cool down and the Parliamentary power would not immediately go towards “joint agitation.” Similarly, if the government does not launch military actions against the Maoists and the Maoists does not see other better options, they would continue with the cease-fire and “peace-talks” process. In these circumstances this alternate future has the potential for transposing into Alternate Future number 4.

³²¹ *The LAMP Method.*

Alternate Future number 4: Monarchial Power negotiates, Parliamentary Power conducts joint agitation, and Maoist Power negotiates.

If the Parliamentary power continues with the “joint agitation” without heeding the monarchs’ assurances and commitments, then this situation would again return to *active monarchy*, wherein this alternate future would transpose into Alternate Future number 13, wherein the total attributes of “power take over” would be seen. On the other hand, if the Monarchial powers’ assurances are taken positively by the Parliamentary power, this alternate future has the potential for transposing into Alternate Future number 1.

Alternate Future number 1: Monarchial Power negotiates, Parliamentary Power negotiates, and Maoist Power negotiates.

If the Maoists do not agree upon multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy as the base line during the peace-talks process, and the parliamentary power is not able to convince the Maoists in this regard, this alternate future has the high potential to transpose into Alternate Future number 10, wherein His Majesty would move again towards *active monarchy*.

Alternate Future number 10: Monarchial power takes over power, Parliamentary power negotiates, and Maoist power negotiates

This alternate future has potential to transpose into Alternate Future number 14, if the Monarchial power does not heed the words of the Parliamentary power -- not to move towards *active monarchy*. If the Monarchial power heeds the word of the Parliamentary power, then this future would transpose into Alternate Future number 8, which can be said to be future “Sub-scenario II;” wherein His Majesty would form an “all-party government” to work jointly with the Parliamentary power to deal with the Maoist problem.

Alternate Future number 14: Monarchial Power takes over power, Parliamentary Power conducts joint agitation, and Maoist Power continues offensive actions.

This alternate future can either transpose into Alternate Future number 8 or 23. If it transposes into Alternate Future number 8, one could say that the future “Sub-scenario I” has changed to “Sub-scenario II;” or if it transposes into Alternate Future number 23, one could say that the future “Sub-scenario I” has changed into “Sub-scenario III.” Therefore, the situations would be either: His Majesty forming an “all-party government” to deal with the Maoist problem, or the characteristics of “withdrawal or failed” Monarchial power would be seen.

CONCLUSION

This paper has focused on addressing the alternate futures of Nepal resulting from the Maoist demands, where the three political powers – Monarchial, Parliamentary, and Maoist plays a critical role. After an in-depth study of these three powers was conducted, the LAMP method was used to analyze the events, perceptions, intentions, and influence of these powers from the start of Maoist insurgency on 13 February 1996 until the information cut-off date of 30 January 2003, to reach to the conclusions. The results of this paper have fully addressed the hypothesis, which was stated during the in-depth study of the issue – *the perceptions of the three main political powers of Nepal, regarding the demands made by the Maoist insurgents, differ significantly enough to adversely affect parliamentary multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy, and will eventually lead to extreme armed conflict resulting in anarchy and civil war.*

Though I have tried my level best to stay away from biases the number of actors have been kept to the minimum, knowing that there are other actors in this issue who are playing an indirect role. This has been the limitation on my part because of the excess of “actors” would have increased the number of permutations and combinations in this paper, which would not

have been possible to do it manually. Still, I have used the most probable “actors” that are playing a direct role in this issue. Similar, studies in this field including different “actors” would be helpful to justify my conclusions, or help move towards predicting this issue from a different angle.

On the other hand, the purpose of the study has been met because future scenarios and sub-scenarios were identified, wherein the alternate futures were critically analyzed. Out of the eight future scenarios, the worst-case scenario -- *formation of interim government, the formation of new constitution through the constituent assembly, and moving towards progressive political system to form a new People’s Democratic Republic* -- was taken to further the study. Within this worst-case future scenario the most probable “sub-scenario” – *peaceful settlement* -- was identified out of three. This most probable “sub-scenario” was then acted upon by the three courses of actions each “powers” could take. Using this technique, twenty-seven alternate futures were then rank-ordered according to the votes received, within this “sub-scenario,” which depended upon the information available until 30 January 2003.

It is thus found that there is no possibility of negotiated peaceful settlement in the near future in Nepal, since all of the three powers are not in concurrence with each other. Unless and until an “all-party government” is formed, the Parliamentary power would not support the Monarchical power. Likewise, the Maoists approach of “negotiation,” if it is being used as a strategic tool to move towards *strategic offence* then the possibility of peace does not exist. Similarly, the increase in sidelining the political parties by the other two powers is actually increasing the political strength of the Maoists, which ultimately would help them create political infrastructures in the open society. With the *People’s Liberation Army* already formed and functional with major successes, the Maoists can integrate their power politics by moving

towards urban environment, which in turn would slowly erode the democracy in the country. This would then create conflict with other democratic forces, which in turn would try to regain back what they might lose – democracy – giving future rise to anarchy leading towards civil war. This overall scenario in Nepal can then lead towards foreign military intervention to destabilize the South Asian region. Not to mention what the US would do, by looking at the emerging facts and figures that Nepal is becoming the hub of communism in South Asia. These factors would then create a higher level of misunderstanding between the regional and the global powers. After all, the revival of communism is the end of democracy.

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