

**AMERICAN MILITARY UNIVERSITY**

**WILL BOSNIA INTEGRATE WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION?  
A LAMP PREDICTIVE STUDY**

By

Lora Aggour

INTL504 Analytics I

Dr. Jonathan S. Lockwood

June 11, 2009

## **Introduction**

Bosnia today has not moved far beyond the hostile and ethnic violence that occurred between the Bosnian Muslims, Serbs and Croats that began in 1992 after Bosnia seceded from Yugoslavia. War raged in Bosnia from 1992 to 1995 until the Dayton Peace Accords were signed, ending hostilities. Today, the Peace Implementation Council that oversees the Dayton Accords alleges that the radicalization of political rhetoric, the unraveling of reform processes, attempts to roll back previously agreed upon reforms, and challenges to Bosnia's constitution and to the Dayton Accords are all on the rise. All three ethnic groups are trying to alter the Dayton Accords to fit their own interests. The Bosnian Muslims want to end the independence of the Republika of Srpska (RS), the Croats have not given up on creating a third territorial entity, and the Serbs still aspire to independence.

The war left Bosnia's economy in tatters and many agree its integration into the European Union (EU) will increase living standards and serve to inspire hope and reform as well as assure Bosnia's continued democratization. The EU has made it clear they want Bosnia to join the union, however, in order to do so the three ethnic factions in Bosnia must unite. The EU wants Bosnia to implement specific reforms and once Bosnia is represented by a single, unified voice, it will be able to fully engage in the process of EU accession. The responsibility for moving the country forward resides with Bosnia's political leaders and officials, which means it is up to all three entities within Bosnia to come together for the common good of the country. This research paper is a predictive study using the Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP) to predict Bosnia's prospects for European integration. The question asked is "Will Bosnia with its three nationalistic identities, become sufficiently integrated to be allowed to join the EU?"

The issue of determining if the three ethnic groups will cooperate and unite to join the EU

is of great importance. If the hostility continues they could end up returning to civil war, which will produce both a humanitarian disaster and a security nightmare. A disintegrating country at war within Europe might attract Jihadists and could then become a possible sanctuary for terrorists. Both the United States (US) and Europe can not afford for this to happen and will lead them to intervene in a war as well, in order to achieve a permanent settlement solution to Bosnia.

### **Literature Review**

A Bosnian could be a Serb, a Croat, or a Muslim who resides in the region known as Bosnia. Herzegovina is a small region at the southern tip of the country. There is no ethnic distinction between a Bosnian and a Herzegovian, just a regional distinction. Both regions have the same distinctive culture. Bosnian Muslims were Slavic speaking Europeans who converted to Islam in the 14<sup>th</sup> century as part of the Ottoman Empire. The country is referred to as Bosnia and Herzegovina or BiH, or just Bosnia. The term Bosniak is now used to refer to the Muslim citizens of Bosnia (Wheeling Jesuit University, CET, 2002).

From the end of World War II to 1980, Josip Broz (Tito) ruled the former Yugoslavia as a one-party socialist state. The country consisted of six republics and two autonomous regimes. The republics were Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Serbia, and Montenegro. After Tito's death in 1980 the country fell into economic and political decline, which encouraged opportunities for power seeking individuals. Serb and Croat extremists carried the banner of ethnic nationalism. A war of independence began in Croatia in 1991. Slovenia became independent in 1991 and Macedonia in 1992.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is made up of 48% Bosniaks (Muslims), 34% Bosnian Serbs (Eastern Orthodox), and 15% Bosnian Croats (Roman Catholic) (Bureau of European & Eurasian Affairs, 2009). With many Bosnian Serbs supporting the creation of greater Serbia,

Bosnia's Muslims and Croats called for a referendum for Bosnia's independence in March 1992 (Center for Balkan Development, 1996). Since all three ethnic groups had lived side by side, no specific territory was inhabited by any of them. In 1992, a war started throughout Bosnia and the Bosnian Serb policy was to try and establish a pure Serb area by driving out both Bosniaks and Croats. The Croat nationalists also tried to do the same by carving out a portion of land from Bosnia. Their respective goals were to create a greater Serbia and a greater Croatia.

After over three years of brutal war, shown on TV with countless massacres, ethnic cleansings and refugees, the world had had enough. A general framework agreement for peace in BiH was negotiated. The Dayton Peace Agreement documents were initialized in Dayton, Ohio on November 21, 1995, and signed in Paris, France, on December 14, 1995. The agreement is known as the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA). The DPA carved Bosnia into two autonomous and ethnically based entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, an uneasy alliance of Bosnian Muslims and Croats (the Federation), and the Republika of Srpska (RS) for the Serbs. There were 11 Annexes to the agreement that dealt with the protection of refugees, human rights, boundary lines, elections, constitutions, and arbitration (Office of the Spokesman, 1995). Each entity has its own government, military and police. A central government overlooking these entities with a rotating presidency handles banking and foreign policy. Overall, these entities are states within a state.

Currently RS has autonomy in the northern and eastern areas of the country, which were taken over by the Serbs during the war. The central, western and southern parts of the country contain mostly the federated Muslims and Croats (see map in Appendix A). There exists the district of Brcko, a neutral area, a self-governing administration unit placed under joint Serb, Croat, and Bosniak authority (BBC, 2009). Thus the Dayton Peace agreement reinforced, rather

than healed, ethnic divisions and allowed the three groups to continue implementing their ethnic agenda and their endeavors to exploit the aforementioned power sharing arrangement. At the national level, each of the three national groups is represented equally. There are three sets of representation and officials in most government organizations. The result is a bloated public sector, presided over by 160 government ministers. Government bureaucracy absorbs a staggering 50 percent of the gross domestic product (Bilfesky, 2009).

Implementation of the DPA is supervised by the High Representative (HR) for BiH, selected by the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), an international body made up of 55 nations that oversees Dayton. The High Representative has many powers (The Bonn Power given in 1997) including the dismissal of elected and non-elected officials, as well as the right to impose laws. This international supervision by the Office of High Representative (OHR) is supposed to end when the country is judged to be stable, however, conditions for its ending are still not fulfilled. Moreover, the EU has also delegated the HR with the additional role of the EU Special Representative (EUSR).

The chair of the Presidency of BiH rotates every eight months among three members (Bosniak, Serb, Croat), each elected for a 4-year term. They are directly elected from within the Federation voting for the Bosniaks and the Croats, and the Republika Srpska for the Serbs.

With its eagerness to bolster its credibility as a security actor, in 2004 the EU replaced the International Implementation Force (IFOR), a NATO-led 60,000 stabilization force (SFOR) in Bosnia whose mission was to separate the combatants, by an EU-led peacekeeping force (EUFOR). Current security challenges include weapons smuggling, apprehension of war criminals, border security, and religious extremist groups. (ICG, 2004).

In March 2009, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1869 designated Austrian,

Valentin Inzko, as High Representative for BiH. Mr. Inzko also has the title of EU Special Representative (HR/EUSR). When the OHR closes, Mr. Inzko is meant to remain only in his capacity as EU Special Representative. However, fulfillment of the five objectives that support the Dayton Accords is required for a transition from the office of HR to the stand-alone office of the EUSR. BiH must deliver on the following objectives:

- (1) Resolution of the issue of apportionment of property between state and other levels of government and establishing an inventory of state property.
- (2) Resolution of defense property and adopt transfer agreements for immovable defense property.
- (3) Full implementation of the constitutional amendment on the Brcko district.
- (4) Establish proper functioning of the indirect taxation authority.
- (5) Entrenchment of the rule of law: implementation of the National Strategy for dealing with war crimes (OHR, 2009).

In a meeting in March 2009, a PIC communiqué expressed serious concerns over the worsening political, economic and social situation in the country, as well as the often blocked and reversal of reforms, increased nationalist rhetoric, and challenges to Bosnia's constitution and the OHR's mandate. In addition, at the meeting of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly held in Sarajevo on March 19-21, 2009, experts indicated the difficult political situation in BiH is unraveling the reform process in the country. Several worrying trends are evident: the radicalization of political rhetoric, the tendency of locals to question the viability of the Bosnian state, the use of fear mongering as a tool of political mobilization, and ethnic communities remaining largely divided. As a result, the meeting called for sustained international attention (NATO, PA, 2009).

To understand the ethnic divide is to look at the period when Bosnia was unified as part

of Yugoslavia. Under communist rule, it was a serious crime to openly express ethnic aspirations of any kind (Center for Balkan Development, 1996). Thus the Catholic Croats, Muslim Bosnians and Orthodox Serbs spoke the same language and lived together peacefully. Tito, in power from 1945-1980, strove to create an administrative system in Yugoslavia that would not allow any one national group to dominate. The war in Bosnia changed all of that.

Human rights observers agree that all three armies attacked civilians and committed atrocities during the war, however, they assign the Bosnian Serbs the biggest share of the human rights violations. Of concern now: is it possible for these ethnic wounds to heal? Cehajic et al, asked a sample of Bosnians Muslims about their readiness to forgive the misdeeds committed by Bosnian Serbs during the war and they found that “frequent and good quality contact with members from the perpetrator group predicted forgiveness (positively) and desire for social distance (negatively)” (2008, p. 351).

Another argument used against Bosnian integration is the existence of ancient hatreds as a way of life in the Balkans. The belief was that once Tito was no longer in power, the people would return to the traditions of ethnic or religious hatred and fighting. As indicated by Conces (2005) that argument continues to be propagated by the people who would like to continue the conflict. Bosnia has had long periods of peace and tolerance among different faiths and different peoples living together, similar to many other regions in Europe. It has been recommended that instead of ethnically based parties, broad-based, multiethnic political parties are needed in diverse societies in order to create democracy (Reilly, 2006). It has been shown that improvements in economic factors alone do not improve ethnic harmony, they can however, either strengthen or erode ethnic ties (Baker & Ausink, 1996). Currently in Bosnia, a possible breath of fresh air to the political landscape is a new party called “Our Party”. It is made up of a

multi-ethnic group of prominent young Bosnians led by Bojan Bojic, a Bosnian Serb and comprises civic activists, young professionals and prominent artists with the goal of removing ethnic mistrust (Sito-Sucic, 2008).

In Bosnia today, the Dayton Accords have created a weak central government that deals with foreign and inter-entity relationships and left the real power in the hands of the Federation and the RS. The Federation between the Muslims and Croats has been a war time marriage of convenience formed against the Serbs. Thus Bosnia today has not moved beyond the situation of three hostile, self governing ethnic enclaves that prevailed at the end of the war. The ethnic disputes that currently exist threaten any prospect for Bosnia to join the EU. As stated by Marko Prelec, Crisis Group's senior analyst in Sarajevo, "Tensions are high and national leaders are challenging the Dayton settlement more openly than ever before", (ICG, 2009). Each is hoping to change Dayton to fit their interests, the Bosniaks want to end the independence of RS, the Croats have not given up on creating a third territorial entity for them to dominate, and the Serbs still aspire to independence. "Bosnia's gridlock has got so bad, and the political atmosphere is so poisonous, that for the first time since 1995 the unthinkable of renewed fighting is thinkable once again. Conflict is now a distinct possibility" (The Economist, 2009, p. 1). To join the EU, all three have to give up their separatist ideas and start the reforms required by the EU.

The war left Bosnia's infrastructure and economy in tatters. With its extremely weak economy, integration within the EU could increase living standards and serve to inspire hope and reform. However, to join the EU, a country must meet the Copenhagen Criteria, rules that define whether a country is eligible to join the European Union. The criteria require that a state have institutions in place that are able to preserve democratic governance, protect human rights, have a functioning market economy and accept the obligations and intent established by the EU. This



membership criteria was laid down in the June 1993 European Council in Copenhagen, Denmark.

In the meantime, integration of BiH into Europe would assure its democratization. Furthermore, the integration of a community with a large Muslim population will help foster community cohesion with countries across the EU. It will send significant political signals about the nature of the West and its integration of different communities (Gow, 2007). However, the EU asserts that it is only possible to enter into a relationship with a sovereign state that can present itself as a negotiating partner with a single voice. The continuing struggle between the forces of integration and separation within BiH has made it difficult for the country to present itself as a nation capable of entering into negotiation for EU membership. Nevertheless, the government announced on April 10, 2003, that its major policy goal is to join the EU in 2009 (ICG, 2003). Joining the EU will allow Bosnians to gain greater prosperity and freedom to travel and work abroad, however, the government has failed to acknowledge what price there will be to pay for joining. Massari (2005, p. 265) stated that “according to opinion polls, EU membership is not a priority among any of the three ethnic communities that make up the country. In RS, in particular, many people strongly oppose sacrificing the entity’s independence in the interests of European integration.”

The Swedish Foreign minister, Carl Bildt, asked by journalists whether the Swedish EU presidency would accept Bosnia’s applications for EU membership, said he didn’t think “Bosnia is there yet”, adding there is a long list of reforms to be undertaken (Latal, 2009). On the other hand, “Many Bosnians doubt that the EU wants them to join or can persuade local politicians to reform”, says Sabine Freizer, Crisis Group’s Europe Program Director (ICG, 2009).

Meanwhile, hardliners on all sides recognize that advancing toward Europe means giving

up their ideal solution. Despite concerns, the EU signed a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with Bosnia in 2008 (European Union, 2008), a major step in the long journey toward possible EU membership.

In summary, BiH's cumbersome institutional structures formed by the implementation of the DPA make it difficult to develop a coherent policy for a unified country. The ethnic divide is not historically created and wounds from the civil war can be healed if all parties involved are willing to work towards unification. The question is will they do it? The following is the application of the 12 steps of the LAMP (Lockwood & Lockwood 1993) technique to predict the future action of the three ethnic groups toward fulfilling the EU requirements for reform.

### **Step 1: Definition of the issue for which the most likely future is to be predicted**

The issue for which the most likely future is to be predicted is the joining of Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) to the European Union (EU). I.e., the question is "will Bosnia with its three nationalistic identities, become sufficiently integrated to be allowed to join the EU?"

### **Step 2: Specify the national actors involved**

The number of national "actors" who can directly affect this issue are three: the Bosniaks, the Croats and the Serbs. The action of these three identities will define the course of action each will take toward satisfying the requirements of the EU.

### **Step 3: Perform an in-depth study of how each actor perceives the issue in question**

To explore the possibility of Bosnia joining the EU, an in depth look at each actor involved, the Bosniaks, the Croats and the Serbs and their perception, intentions and possible

course of action toward EU integration follows.

### The Bosniaks

The wartime nationalist party, the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), was founded in 1990 by Alija Izetbegovic, a politician who built support from many Croats, Serbs and internationally, with his opposition to the division of Bosnia between Belgrade and Zagreb. Essentially, the party was mainly interested in maintaining the territorial and political integrity of Bosnia. According to Babuna, “The Bosnian Muslims, who possessed, in contrast to the Bosnian Serbs and Croats, no homeland other than Bosnia-Herzegovina and who were scattered through Bosnia-Herzegovina together with the other national communities, were aware of the fact that they were able to protect their national interests only in a unified Bosnia-Herzegovina” (2005, p. 445). Nevertheless, some members of the SDA did not hide their aspirations to have a Muslim-dominated state (Tzifakis, 2007). Such an action of Bosniak nationalism undermined the support of moderate Bosnian Croats and Serbs for a united Bosnia. The SDA lost its access to power in 2000 due to scandals and corruption and relinquished its pre-eminence to the Social Democratic Party (SDP), which called for a limited change in the country’s political system.

In the 2006 election, Haris Silajdzic, leader of the Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), was elected into the collective presidency in a landslide with the promise of entity abolition, i.e., no more RS (Tzifakis, 2007). Silajdzic, a Bosniak, and one of the country’s three presidents, wanted the RS to be abolished saying it was created through genocide (Economist, 2009). The call for such a radical change in the Dayton Accords to accomplish this goal of the Bosniaks for Bosnian unity strengthens the hands of the national Croats and Serbs who resist such a change. Also, the Bosniaks have allowed the Islamic fighters who came to help them in the war to stay, which has been a source of fear and uncertainty for both the Croats and Serbs. In

October 2008 local elections were held and the results showed that the SDA party that currently has a moderate approach had gained strength once again (The Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd, 2009), this will balance the BiH party.

In summary, the Bosniaks leadership currently want integration through a radical change in the Dayton Accords by abolishing the RS. However, they support a peaceful integration. They favor an ethnically mixed state, which is in their best interest. Thus, they support the implementation of reforms as called for by the EU.

### The Croats

The wartime nationalist party, the Croatian Democratic Union of BiH (HDZ), was also formed in 1990. It started as a sister party of the HDZ in Croatia. The party was supported by a majority of Bosnian Croats. Its' platform is to create "Greater Croatia" through the secession of the Bosnian Croats and integrating them into Croatia. "HDZ-1990", a dissident party from the HDZ, was formed by a group of moderates following the continuous resistance of the HDZ to the Federation, for not supporting the Federation structure and not allowing the Federation to take control of public companies in the Croat-dominated areas.

Croats, in an effort to retain power and to defy integration, have transferred assets from public to private hands not for the purpose of providing economic recovery and growth but in a way of attaining ethnic power. An example is the transfer of ownership of Aluminij Mostar, Bosnia's most profitable firm, from the Bosnian State to a Croatian company, which has reduced the prospects of ethnic reintegration (Donais, 2002). Another example is the city of Mostar, within the Federation, which has a majority of Croats. It took several attempts to unite the divided city and develop a power-sharing formula to include guaranteed representation for each of the constituent peoples on the City Council. Recently, the City Council failed to appoint a

new Mayor, six months after the election (OHR, 2009). Even though some Croats feel that they have been shortchanged in the division of power, other Croats press for the abolishment of entities (as have the Bosniaks) and the strengthening of central institutions.

In the 2006 presidential election, Zeljko Komsic won the Bosnian Croat presidency from the Social Democratic Party (SDP), however, the local election in October 2008 showed that the HDZ in BiH had once again showed a return to strength (The Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd, 2009).

In summary, the Croats still aspire for their own territorial entity, however, Croat separatist sentiments are not as strong as the Serb separatists. Being the smallest of the three ethnic groups, they still yearn to have their own independent Croat mini state. The Croats are implementing some of the reforms called for by the EU and resisting the implementation of some that lead to full integration.

### The Serbs

The wartime nationalist party, the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) formed in 1990 supported the effort to unite all Serbs into “Greater Serbia”, with the secession of Bosnian Serbs and integrating them into Serbia. The Bosnian Serbs have implemented the portion of the Dayton Accords regarding all aspects of partition, however, they have resisted any item that deals with reintegration, such as refugees, repatriation, and a common legislature. The war left Bosnia with three police forces: Bosniak, Croat and Serb. As a result, the police have acted as a tool to prevent implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords, in particular refugee return, and have been known to be involved in organized crime and other illegal activities. The integration process of the police force called for by the EU was openly resisted by the RS party whereas Bosnia’s other parties made significant concessions to the RS (ICG, 2005). The Bosnia High

Representative in June 2004, dismissed 61 top Serb officials from office for their obstructions (Tzifakis, 2007). Many Serb nationalists demanded their secession using Montenegro's independence as an example. Furthermore, it is in the RS constitution that it's the duty and the right of all citizens to defend the sovereignty and independence of the entity.

As reported in *Russia Today* (2009) "Srpska Prime Minister Milorad Dodik says, "What is fundamental for us is the permanency of the Republic of Srpska. It is beyond challenge and it is the Republic of Srpska that must function with all the competencies with which it was endowed by the Dayton agreement. It must have its own institutions, its own government, its own president and parliament, its own way of life and of course, its own place within Bosnia-Herzegovina." According to the PI communiqué of March 2009 (OHR, 2009), RS authorities have continued to fail to reply to a notable number of instructions and requests by the HR to secure access to documents. Mr. Dodik's party, Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) is the dominant party of the RS. He has previously hinted at the possibility of the RS seceding from BiH (The Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd, 2009). Some Serbs, however, argue that secession is not realistic and simply want to defend the autonomy they won in the Dayton Accords.

In summary, the Serbs want to keep their autonomy gained in the Dayton Accords but still desire for a greater Serbia. Such a desire for unity with greater Serbia could overcome the pressure applied by the EU. In RS, the nationalist separatist elements are strong and that could ultimately lead to destabilizing the country by resuming the violent struggle aimed at attaining their goal of secession. In terms of reforms required by the EU, they only implement the ones that do not interfere with their goals.

**Step 4: Specify all possible courses of action for each actor**

There are three general courses of action that the three actors could follow:

1. Work toward joining the EU, i.e., through working together in a positive manner to fulfill the requirements of the EU, i.e., abandon their ethnic identities toward a goal of integration (JOEU).
2. The actors continue the same current policy of mistrust and ethnic tension and the progress toward joining the EU will stall, that is, tending towards the status quo (STALL).
3. The relationship between the actors becomes more negative and deteriorates further than it is now and ultimately secession and partition will occur (PART).

**Step 5: Determine the major scenarios within which the alternate futures will be compared**

One scenario is envisioned, which is the assumption that if BiH fulfills the requirement of the EU for reforms it will be welcomed by the EU to become a member.

A scenario where the EU is not interested in having BiH join was not assumed as this seems to be unlikely as most statements from the EU show positive interest and encouragement for BiH to join, but BiH must satisfy EU requirements.

**Step 6: Calculate the total number of permutations of possible “alternate futures” for each scenario**

The general formula for computing the number of alternate futures is:

$$X^Y = Z$$

Where X equals the number of courses of action open to each actor, which is 3.

Y equals the number of actors involved, which is 3 (it is assumed each actor has the same number of courses of action open to it).

Z equals the total number of alternate futures to be compared, i.e.,

$$3^3 = 27 \text{ possible alternate futures}$$

**Step 7: Perform a “pairwise comparison” of all alternate futures to determine their relative probability**

A “pairwise comparison” is comparing the likelihood of each alternate future two at a time. This is accomplished by comparing alternate future number 1 to alternate future number 2, and determining which is more likely to occur. The one that is more likely to occur (the winner) is given one vote. Then one compares alternate future number 1 to alternate future number 3, again to determine which is most likely to occur. This continues until all possible futures have been compared to each other. The total number of votes is a function of the number of alternate futures to be analyzed. The number of pairwise comparisons, V, is obtained from the formula:

$$V = n(n-1)/2,$$

where n equals the total number of alternate futures, i.e.,

$$V = 27(27-1)/2 = 351 \text{ votes.}$$

Table 1 shows all 27 alternate futures and the number of votes each alternate future received from the pairwise comparisons. The number of votes indicates the alternate future most likely to occur.



**Table 1:** Alternate futures and the corresponding votes they received.

<b>Alternate Future</b>	<b>Bosniaks</b>	<b>Croats</b>	<b>Serbs</b>	<b>Votes</b>
1	JOEU	JOEU	JOEU	15
2	STALL	STALL	STALL	16
3	PART	PART	PART	10
4	JOEU	JOEU	STALL	16
5	JOEU	STALL	JOEU	12
6	STALL	JOEU	JOEU	8
7	JOEU	JOEU	PART	20
8	JOEU	PART	JOEU	13
9	PART	JOEU	JOEU	0
10	STALL	STALL	JOEU	12
11	STALL	JOEU	STALL	18
12	JOEU	STALL	STALL	22
13	STALL	STALL	PART	24
14	STALL	PART	STALL	16
15	PART	STALL	STALL	5
16	PART	PART	JOEU	2
17	PART	JOEU	PART	6
18	JOEU	PART	PART	23
19	PART	PART	STALL	5
20	PART	STALL	PART	7
21	STALL	PART	PART	25
22	JOEU	STALL	PART	26
23	JOEU	PART	STALL	18
24	STALL	JOEU	PART	21
25	STALL	PART	JOEU	7
26	PART	JOEU	STALL	3
27	PART	STALL	JOEU	1

Votes 351

JOEU = Join European Union – fulfilling EU reform requirements

STALL = At a Standstill – tending toward the status quo of stalemate

PART = Partition Country – deterioration of the status quo and ultimately partition

**Step 8: Rank the alternate futures from highest relative probability to the lowest based on the number of “votes” received**

The next step in the analysis is to rank the alternate futures from the highest relative probability to the lowest, based on the number of votes received. Table 2 shows the alternate futures arranged in terms of the votes they received from “most likely” to “least likely”.

**Table 2:** Alternate futures ranked by the number of votes each received.

<b>Alternate Futures</b>	<b>Bosniaks</b>	<b>Croats</b>	<b>Serbs</b>	<b>Votes</b>
22	JOEU	STALL	PART	26
21	STALL	PART	PART	25
13	STALL	STALL	PART	24
18	JOEU	PART	PART	23
12	JOEU	STALL	STALL	22
24	STALL	JOEU	PART	21
7	JOEU	JOEU	PART	20
11	STALL	JOEU	STALL	18
23	JOEU	PART	STALL	18
2	STALL	STALL	STALL	16
4	JOEU	JOEU	STALL	16
14	STALL	PART	STALL	16
1	JOEU	JOEU	JOEU	15
8	JOEU	PART	JOEU	13
5	JOEU	STALL	JOEU	12
10	STALL	STALL	JOEU	12
3	PART	PART	PART	10
6	STALL	JOEU	JOEU	8
20	PART	STALL	PART	7
25	STALL	PART	JOEU	7
17	PART	JOEU	PART	6
15	PART	STALL	STALL	5
19	PART	PART	STALL	5
26	PART	JOEU	STALL	3
16	PART	PART	JOEU	2
27	PART	STALL	JOEU	1

9	PART	JOEU	JOEU	0
---	------	------	------	---

JOEU = Join European Union - fulfilling EU reform requirements

STALL = At a Standstill - tending toward the status quo of stalemate

PART = Partition Country - deterioration of the status quo and ultimately partition

**Step 9: Assuming each future occurs, analyze each alternate future in terms of its consequences**

As indicated in the LAMP method, most decision makers will be interested only in three to five most likely futures. Assuming that each alternate future actually happens and each actor takes the course of action of that particular future, the five most likely futures considered are numbers 22, 21, 13, 18 and 12. These top five futures will be analyzed in depth to provide a greater understanding of the consequences involved in each.

FIRST ALTERNATE FUTURE #22 (26 votes) The Bosniaks are working toward fulfilling the EU's required reforms, the Croats are stalling and the Serbs are edging towards partition.

This is a kind of situation that is similar to the status quo. The Bosniaks have no homeland other than Bosnia and it is in their national interests to have a unified Bosnia. The Serbs have won autonomy through the DPA and are not willing to give that up for the sake of EU membership. The Croats are not as strong a supporter for integration as the Bosniaks and are not as strong a supporter for independence as the Serbs, thus they are stalling the process of reform implementation. It does not help either to see Kosovo declaring its independence, thus giving the Serbs another example of secession as with Montenegro's independence. The Serb statement of March 2009 stressed that the RS will not relinquish its government, parliament or its own way of life. In addition, many people in RS oppose sacrificing the entity's independence in

the interest of European integration. Such radicalization of political rhetoric has been on the rise lately.

This alternative future will lead to a disastrous outcome in Bosnia. Currently, the economic situation in Bosnia is bad and is getting worse. As indicated by the Economist (2009, p. 1), "that for the first time since 1995 the unthinkable of renewed fighting is thinkable once again, conflict is now a distinct possibility". The High Representative and EU are pressing all sides to cooperate, but especially the Serbs. The High Representative has dismissed several Serb officials from office for their obstruction to reforms and he will continue to do so. However, the continuing deterioration of the situation might lead to actual violence and civil war. If the Serbs start a war the Croats will follow, which will force Europe and NATO to interfere. Such a war would be another humanitarian disaster and an embarrassment to Europe and its credibility as a security power.

SECOND ALTERNATE FUTURE #21 (25 votes) The Bosniaks are stalling and both the Croats and Serbs are edging toward partition.

This time the Bosniaks are not giving up on their goal of ending the independence of the RS and are not willing to accept the slow progress produced by the DPA as well as a call for radical change in the DPA so that full integration of the country can be accomplished. The Bosniaks rhetoric will then strengthen the hands of the nationalist Croats and the nationalist Serbs. The Serbs will then be forced to side more strongly for partition and if they do the Croats will have the courage to demand the same.

The consequences for this future is that it will lead to a stronger possibility of armed conflict as the Bosniaks will see the country disintegrating though it is in their interest to have a unified Bosnia. Should the Serbs and Croats separate, the Bosniaks would move to prevent it. In

addition to the loss of life, the economy would be in tatters, and the EU and NATO would be embroiled in the resulting conflict.

THIRD ALTERNATE FUTURE #13 (24 votes) Both the Bosniaks and Croats stall the reforms required by the EU, the Serbs are again edging toward partition.

Bosniaks and Croats in the Federation are willing to cooperate but they are not seriously negotiating with the Serbs in a way that does not undermine the Serbs autonomy. The Serbs are acting in a way that could lead to partition by using political rhetoric and challenging the Dayton Accords. In this situation it is quite possible that the Serbs separate and declare independence similar to Kosovo's declaration, and the Federation remains as an entity. Economically this will be a problem for both entities and would be a problem for the EU as well. It would be difficult for the EU to force integration of the two entities if the separation occurs peacefully. It will ultimately be a long time before either entity could join the EU.

FOURTH ALTERNATE FUTURE #18 (23 votes) The Bosniaks are pushing for fulfilling the EU requirements but both the Croats and Serbs are edging toward separating.

The Bosniaks are willing to accept the Dayton Accords and work on its modification in steps, without pushing for the end of RS independence immediately. However, both the Croats and Serbs are looking to create Greater Croatia and Greater Serbia. The consequence for this situation is that the Bosniaks will have to prevent it and the unthinkable renewal of fighting will occur. Again the EU will be embroiled in the war, as well as NATO.

FIFTH ALTERNATE FUTURE #12 (22 votes) The Bosniaks are for integration and fulfilling EU requirements, and the Croats and Serbs are stalling.

This is an improved alternate to the current situation. The Bosniaks want integration, but not through forcing the process but giving time to progress toward that goal. For example, not

forcing changes in the DPA to occur quickly to eliminate the independence of RS. In the meantime the Serbs are not threatening to separate but are stalling towards implementing the needed reforms. The Croats recognize that they are limited as to what they can do and begin to slowly cooperate with the Bosniaks, and coupled with the bad economy, the Serbs will follow as well. The consequence of these actions is that the country's economy might improve and all three will see a glimmer of hope for the future. The Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs will continue peaceful participation in a multi-ethnic Bosnian state. The EU will be encouraged and hence push for further cooperation between the three ethnic groups, which might help speed the process for Bosnia to join the EU.

**Step 10: “Focal events” that must occur in order to bring about a given alternate future**

The LAMP technique defines a “focal event” as a major occurrence that changes the relative probability of alternate futures. The problem for Bosnia is that there is a strong desire to join the EU for the perceived benefits it would provide. However, Bosnia's political leaders would have to give up their own ethnic solutions for Bosnia and move beyond the ethnic divide. A major event will be the October 2010 election. The leaders they elected and the EU's ability to persuade the politicians to reform will determine which of the most likely futures will occur. Another important focal event is the new party “Our Party”, made up of a multi-ethnic group of young Bosnians whose success will also determine the direction Bosnia will take.

For the five alternate futures discussed, certain events must occur in the present to create the alternate future.

FOCAL EVENT FOR FIRST ALTERNATE FUTURE #22 The Bosniaks are working toward fulfilling the EU's required reforms, the Croats are stalling and the Serbs are edging toward

partition.

- Bosniak moderates prevail and end their call for the RS entity to be eliminated.
- Croatian moderates prevail even though they are not likely to cooperate with the Bosniaks but at least they are not unraveling the reform process.
- Serbian nationalists prevail and their aim for independence (like Kosovo) or creating a Greater Serbia and their political rhetoric continues to be more radical.

FOCAL EVENT FOR SECOND ALTERNATE FUTURE #21 The Bosniaks are stalling and both the Croats and Serbs are edging toward partition.

- Bosniaks call for the end of the independence of the RS as it is an entity created through genocide.
- Croatian nationalists prevail and the reform process unravels.
- Serbian nationalists prevail and their aim for independence (like Kosovo) or creating a Greater Serbia and their political rhetoric continues to be more radical.

FOCAL EVENT FOR THIRD ALTERNATE FUTURE #13 Both the Bosniaks and Croats stall the reforms required by the EU, the Serbs are again edging toward partition.

- Bosniaks call for the end of the independence of the RS as it is an entity created through genocide.
- Croatian moderates prevail even though they are not likely to cooperate with the Bosniaks but at least they are not unraveling the reform process.
- Serbian nationalists prevail and their aim for independence (like Kosovo) or creating a Greater Serbia and their political rhetoric continues to be more radical.

FOCAL EVENT FOR FOURTH ALTERNATE FUTURE #18 The Bosniaks are pushing for fulfilling the EU requirements but both the Croats and Serbs are edging toward separating.

- Bosniak moderates prevail and end their call for the RS to be eliminated.
- Croatian nationalists prevail and the reform process unravels.
- Serbian nationalists prevail and their aim for independence (like Kosovo) or creating a Greater Serbia and their political rhetoric continues to be more radical.

FOCAL EVENT FOR FIFTH ALTERNATE FUTURE #12 The Bosniaks are for integration and fulfilling EU requirements, and the Croats and Serbs are stalling.

- Bosniak moderates prevail and end their call for the RS to be eliminated.
- Croatian moderates prevail even though they are not likely to cooperate with the Bosniaks but at least they are not unraveling the reform process.
- Serbian moderates prevail and Serbian nationalists moderate their political rhetoric.

**Step 11: Develop indicators for the focal events.**

For each focal event associated with an alternate future a list of indicators for each event is developed. Indicators are a subset of focal events that may signal the emergence of a particular focal event.

FOCAL EVENT: Bosniak moderates prevail and end their call for the RS entity to be eliminated.

**KEY INDICATORS:**

- Bosnia's High Representative and EU through coercive or diplomatic efforts convince the Bosniaks to back off the call for abolishing the RS.
- Economic situation worsens and all Bosnians become motivated to follow the path of reform as dictated by the EU.
- The new party "Our Party", made up of a multi-ethnic group of young Bosnians, gains



strength and support and leads to a swing in public opinion.

- In the 2010 election Haris Silajdzic, a Bosniak, one of the country's three presidents and a hard liner who stated that RS was created through genocide, loses the election to a moderate politician.

FOCAL EVENT: Croatian moderates prevail even though they are not likely to cooperate with the Bosniaks but at least they are not unraveling the reform process.

KEY INDICATORS:

- Bosnia's High Representative and EU through coercive or diplomatic effort convince the Croats to cooperate and implement the Dayton Accords reform.
- Resolve the city of Mostar Mayor's appointment.
- Resolve the issue of the transfer of ownership of Bosnian State companies to Croatian companies (example: Alumnis Mostar).
- Economic situation worsens and all Bosnians become motivated to follow the path of reform as dictated by the EU.
- The new party "Our Party", made up of a multi-ethnic group of young Bosnians, gains strength and support and leads to a swing in public opinion.

FOCAL EVENT: Serbian nationalists prevail and their aim for independence (like Kosovo) or creating a Greater Serbia and their political rhetoric continues to be more radical.

KEY INDICATORS:

- The Serb rhetoric continues unabated and their desire for independence or for unity with Greater Serbia overcome the pressure applied by the High Representative and EU.
- A more hard line person in the Serbian leadership that calls for achieving partisan goals prevails over a more moderate leadership and resumes actions aimed at unifying Bosnian

Serbs with Greater Serbia.

- The reappointment of Milorad Dodic, a hardliner, the Prime Minister of RS.
- Belgrade provides more help to Serb nationalists in RS.

FOCAL EVENT: Bosniaks call for the end of the independence of the RS as it is an entity created through genocide.

KEY INDICATORS:

- Bosniak hardliners will prevail over the moderates and are resisting the pressure applied by the High Representative and EU.
- Re-electing in 2010 Mr. Silajdzic or another hardliner.
- The Bosniak hardliners will argue that the Serbs continue to resist the call for reforms and thus become less accommodating as well.
- The Bosniaks attempt to work with the Croats in the reform process is not succeeding.

FOCAL EVENT: Croatian nationalists prevail and the reform process unravels.

KEY INDICATORS:

- The Croat nationalists desire for Greater “Croatia” overcome the moderates and continue to resist the efforts by the High Representative and EU to cooperate.
- Croats are not willing to resolve the issue of the city of Mostar.
- Croats continue to resist establishing an inventory of state property.
- Croats leadership increases the level of rhetoric and calls for more ethnic separation and the pursuit of an independent Croat state.

FOCAL EVENT: Serbian moderates prevail and Serbian nationalist moderate their political rhetoric.

KEY INDICATORS:

- Bosnia's High Representative and EU, through coercive or diplomatic efforts convince the Serbs to back off of their rhetoric and their call for secession.
- Economic situation worsens and all Bosnians become motivated to follow the path of reform as dictated by the EU.
- The new party "Our Party", made up of a multi-ethnic group of young Bosnians, gains strength and support.
- Electing a more moderate Serbian President, as well as Mr. Dodic, head of the party, SNSD and a Prime Minister of RS, and a hardliner is replaced.
- Economic assistance from Belgrade dries up.

**Step 12: Assess the potential of a given alternate future to "transpose" into another alternate future**

The transposition of one alternate future to another is an abstract concept. It will happen if an actor's action changes, hence the perception of the other actors will change as well. Thus, these changes will "transpose" one alternate future to another, hence changing the relative probability of all possible futures.

Alternate future #22, where the Bosniaks are working toward fulfilling the EU required reforms, the Croats are stalling and the Serbs are edging toward partition, has the potential to transpose to alternate future #12, where again the Bosniaks are for integration and both the Croats and Serbs are stalling. If more pressure from the EU comes to bear on the Serbs, their calls of separation might be toned down and they will start to cooperate. Stalling will be progress as it will open up the chances of actual progress toward more reforms.

Another possibility that might happen, though its probability is low, is in the October

2010 election. A “unique” focal event might occur if all three ethnic groups elect moderate presidents, in such a case, this single event will transfer alternate #1, which received only 15 votes from a less likely alternate future into the most likely one. In such an alternate all three ethnic groups will work together to fulfill the EU reform requirements and Bosnia moves toward integration with the EU. Again, this possibility has only a slim chance.

## **Conclusion**

Bosnia today is at a crossroad. Its three ethnic groups, the Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs fought a bloody war with too many autocracies being inflicted on each other. The Dayton Peace Accords ended the fighting but did not end the antipathies between the parties. Today each ethnic group still looks out for its own interests. The Bosniaks want to end the independence of RS; the Croats have not given up on creating a third territorial entity and the Serbs still aspire to independence. The three groups have lived in harmony before, and there is no reason that they cannot go back to live in harmony again.

The Bosnian economy is in tatters and thus joining the EU will improve its economy, inspire hope and reform, as well as assure its democratization. However, to join the EU, Bosnia has to meet the EU Copenhagen Criteria which are rules that define whether a country is eligible to join. One of the main criteria is that the country must be able to speak with one voice.

The Peace Implementation Council (PIC) is prodding all three ethnic groups to work together through its Office of the High Representative (OHR). However, the situation has currently deteriorated such that some argue conflict is now a distinct possibility. This is obvious by the fact that reforms are unraveling and political rhetoric has become radicalized.

The EU is pushing for Bosnia to join. Even with the current problems in Bosnia the EU

signed a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with Bosnia in 2008, which is a major step in the long journey towards possible EU membership.

The question is, will Bosnia's ethnic groups continue their feud or cooperate and implement the reforms the EU requires of them for membership. The LAMP method for prediction was used to determine future possibilities for Bosnia to join the EU. Several alternate futures were presented with the majority of them not being optimistic. Based on the findings of this LAMP analysis, the possibility for Bosnia to disintegrate is quite high. The likelihood of Serb secession based upon current perception is very real. Since Bosnia's leaders carry most of the responsibility for the country's problems, it is hoped that the coming election in October 2010 will result in more moderate leaders being elected, so that a more optimistic future for Bosnia will materialize. It will be interesting to see what the 2010 elections bring.

## References

- Babuna, A., 2005. "National Identity, Islam and Politics in Post-Communist Bosnia-Herzegovina 1. *East European Quarterly*, Vol. 39:4, December 1, pp 405-447. <http://www.proquest.com/>, downloaded 3/15/09.
- Baker, P.H. and J.A. Ausink, 1996. "State Collapse and Ethnic Violence: Toward a Predictive Model", *Parameters*, Spring, pp. 19-31. <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/Parameters/96Spring/baker.htm>, downloaded 4/19/09.
- BBC, 2009. "Bosnia-Herzegovina is Recovering from a Devastating Three-year War Which Accompanied the Break-up of Yugoslavia in the 1990s.", *BBC News*, January 7, 3 pp. [http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country\\_profile:Bosnia-Herzegovina](http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profile:Bosnia-Herzegovina), downloaded 3/12/09
- Bilefsky, D., 2009. "War's Lingering Scars Slow Bosnia's Economic Growth", *International Herald Tribune*, Sunday, February 8, 3 pp. <http://www.ihf.com/bin/printfriendly.php&id=20008087>, downloaded 3/12/09.
- Bosnia Herzegovina Political Map, 2009. <http://www.mapsofworld.com/bosnia-political-map.html>.

- Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, 2009. "Bosnia and Herzegovina, U.S. Department of State, January, 6 pp. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2868.htm>, downloaded 3/12/09.
- Cehajic, S., R. Brown and E. Castano, 2008. "Forgive and Forget? Antecedents and Consequences of Intergroup Forgiveness in Bosnia and Herzegovina, *Political Psychology*, Vol. 29:3, pp. 351-367.
- Center for Balkan Development, 1996. "History of the War in Bosnia, May, 6 pp. [http://www.friendsofbosnia.org/edu\\_bos.html](http://www.friendsofbosnia.org/edu_bos.html), downloaded 3/12/09.
- Conces, R., 2005. "A Sisyphean Tale: The Pathology of Ethnic Nationalism and the Pedagogy of Forging Humane Democracies in the Balkans", *Studies in East European Thought*, Vol. 57:2, pp 139-184. <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx&direct=true&db=aph&AN=16658059&site=ehost-live>, downloaded 3/15/09.
- Donais, T., 2002. "The Politics of Privatization in Post-Dayton Bosnia", *Southeast European Politics*, Vol. III:1, June, pp. 3-19.
- The Economist, 2009. "Bosnia's Future: A Tearing Sound", *Economist*, World Europe, April 2, 2 pp. [http://www.economist.com/world/europe/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story\\_id=13414173](http://www.economist.com/world/europe/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story_id=13414173), downloaded 4/19/09.
- The Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd, 2009. "Bosnia and Hercegovina Politics: Outlook – Political Tensions Remain", EIU ViewsWire, February 24, 3 pp. <http://www.proquest.com/>, downloaded 3/15/09.
- European Union, 2008. "EC: Council Decision of 18 February 2008 on the Principles, Priorities and Conditions Contained in the European Partnership with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Repealing Decision 2006/55/EC, *Official Journal L*, 080 19/03, pp. 0018-0031. <http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do&uri=OJ:L:2008:080:0018:01:EN:HTML>, downloaded 3/30/09.
- Gow, J., 2007. "Europe and the Muslim World: European Union Enlargement and the Western Balkans", *Journal of Southeast European & Black Sea Studies*, Vol. 7:3, pp. 467-482. <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=26473011&site=ehost-live>, downloaded 3/15/09.
- International Crisis Group, (ICG), 2003. "Thessaloniki and After II: The EU and Bosnia", *Europe Briefing*, No. 28, 20 June, 2 pp. <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1816&l=1>, downloaded 4/1/09.
- Ibid., 2004. "EUFOR: Changing Bosnia's Security Arrangements", *Europe Briefing*, No. 31, 29 June, 1p. <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=2833&l=1>, downloaded 4/1/09.
- Ibid., 2005. "Bosnia's Stalled Police Reform, No Progress, No EU", *Europe Report*, No. 164, 6

- September, 2pp. <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3645&1=1>, downloaded, 4/1/09.
- Ibid., 2009. “Bosnia’s Incomplete Transition: Between Dayton and Europe”, *Europe Report*, No. 198, 9 March, 32 pp. <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5978&1=1>, downloaded 3/12/09.
- Latal, S., 2009. “Bosnia’s First and Latest Envoys Discuss Future”, *Balkan Insight*, 7 April, 2 pp. [http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/17990/?tpl=299&ST1=Text&ST\\_t1=Article](http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/17990/?tpl=299&ST1=Text&ST_t1=Article) ..., downloaded 4/19/09.
- Lockwood, J.S. and K.O’B. Lockwood, 1993. “The Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP)”, location: *Joint Military Intelligence College*, December, 99 pp.
- Massari, M, 2005. “Do All Roads Lead to Brussels? Analysis of the Different Trajectories of Croatia, Serbia-Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina”, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 18:2 pp. 259-273. <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=17575622&site=ehost-live>, downloaded 3/15/09.
- NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 2009. “International Officials and Experts Speaking at NATO PA Seminar Warn of Unravelling of Reform Process in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Call for Sustained International Attention”, *NATO PA*, 23 March, 3 pp. <http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp&CAT2=1705&CAT1=23&CAT0=2&COM=1794&MO>, downloaded 4/4/09.
- Office of the High Representative (OHR), 2009. “Communique of the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council”, *Peace Implementation Council*, PIC SB Political Director, 26/3, 5 pp. [http://www.ohr.int/print/&content\\_id=43264](http://www.ohr.int/print/&content_id=43264), downloaded 4/4/09.
- Office of the Spokesman, 1995. “General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, Dayton Peace Accords, University of Minnesota, Human Rights Library, December 1, 4 pp. <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/icty/dayton/daytonframework.html>, downloaded 3/14/09.
- Reilly, B., 2006. “Political Engineering and Party Politics in Conflict-Prone Societies”, *Democratization*, Vol. 13:5, pp. 811-827. <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=23368996&site=ehost-live>, downloaded 3/15/09.
- Russia Today, 2009. “Strain Still Shows in Bosnia-Herzegovina”, 18 March, 2pp. [http://www.russiatoday.com/Top\\_New/2009-03-18/Strain\\_still\\_shows\\_in\\_Bosnia-Herzegovina](http://www.russiatoday.com/Top_New/2009-03-18/Strain_still_shows_in_Bosnia-Herzegovina), downloaded, 4/19/09.
- Sito-Sucic, D., 2008. “New Multiethnic Party Aims to Stir Bosnia Politics”, Reuters, September 17, 2pp. <http://www.reuters.com/articlePrint?articleId=USLG71840820080917>, downloaded 3/12/09.

Tzifakis, N., 2007. "The Bosnian Peace Process: The Power-Sharing Approach Revisited", *Perspectives: Central European Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 28, pp. 85-101. <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=27623801&site=ehost-live>, downloaded, 3/5/9.

Wheeling Jesuit University/Center for Educational Technologies, 2002 . "The Balkans: Bosnia, *Global Perspectives: A Remote Sensing & World Issues Site*, 14 pp. <http://www.cotf.edu/earthinfo/balkans/bosnia/BNtopics8.html>, downloaded 4/26/09.

## Appendix A



Bosnia Herzegovina Political Map, 2009